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INTRODUCTION 
I THE ORIGINS OF MODERN BRITISH POLITICS 
our understanding of the modern British political system requires a 
fuller appreciation than we presently have of the political changes 
of the decade from 1918 to 1929. It was in this decade that mass 
politics 'were first, established in Britain, that the electoral 
competition of Liberals and Conservativbs alone (with Labour only a 
marginal force) was transformed into a Labour-Conservative-Liberal 
contest in which Labour and Conservative Parties triumphed, and 
that the dominant political ideologies underwent a transformation. 
While social and economic questions played a significant part in 
elections prior to 1914, from 1918 onwards they were the central 
issues and 'socialism' and 'anti-socialism' were presented as the 
central ideological themes. 
The 'cauldron' in which the terms of modern politics were set was 
the period from 1918 to 1924, with the years of 1919 and 1920 of 
critical significance. It was in these years that Labour 
established itself as the alternative party. of government, although 
socialism failed to establish itself as a dominant ideology. Few 
historians have been in any doubt as to the importance of these 
years. For Butler and Stokes the years which follow 1918 mark 'the 
making of the new alignment in British politics', 'a 
transition.. accompanied by a fundamental change in the basis of 
party allegiance especially the rise of the class alignment which 
has dominated electoral politics since the inter-war period'. 
") 
Miliband has suggested that "there are 'few years in the history of 
the Labour Movement more important than the immediate post-war 
years'. 
(2) From a different perspective - the politics of the 
elite - Cowling has-contended that the years which follow 1919 
D Butler and D Stokes, Political Change in Britain, (London, 
1969) p. 172-181. 
2R Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism :A study in the politics 
of Labour (London, 1964) p. 65. 
1 
witness 'the beginning of modern British politicsl. 
(3) 
The author 
of Lancashire and the new Liberalism, PF Clarke, whose thesis it 
is that progressive Liberalism had absorbed the growth of class 
consciousness prior to the First World War, is adamant that 'after 
1918 we are in a different world', 
(4) 
and Kendall writes that the 
period saw 'elements of real danger to the social order', 
demonstrating to him that in the immediate ' post-war years' the 
crisis which British society faced ... was probably the most serious 
(5) 
since the-time of the Chartists' . 
According to Ramsden, the historian of the Conservative Party, 'the 
Conservative victory of 1924 marked a watershed in British 
politics, the end of a period of transition' 
(6) 
, and Co ok who 
argues that a distinction must be drawn between the downfall of the 
previously dominant Liberal Party and the decline of it, suggests 
that . 
The outcome of the crucial 1924 election was the virtual 
annihilation of the party. After this debacle with the 
Liberals reduced to parliamentary rump, the party was 
never again to be considered as a party of government. 
This factor underlay Lloyd George's failure in 1929. (7) 
However the period from 1924 to 1929 was important also, even if 
less obviously so than the immediate post-war years. If the 
3M Cowling, The Impact of Labour: 1920-1924 (Cambridge, 1971). 
4PF Clarke, 'A Sociology of British Elections', History (1972) 
p. 54. 
5W Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain: 1900-1921 
(London, 1969) p. 1§7. 
6J Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-40, (London, 
1978), p. 265. 
7C Cook, The Age of Alignment, (London, 1975), p. 341. 
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revolutionary threat of the left and the Liberal threat to 
anti-socialist unity had faltered, it was not certain how modern 
politics would be shaped. From 1924 to 1929 we see the failure of 
Labour's Parliamentary left to capture political power within the 
party and the growth of a social reforming tradition within the 
forces of the right. By 1929 the differences between Labour and 
Conservative Parties may have appeared to the elector to be less 
matters of fundamental dispute than quantitative differences over 
how far economic and social reform should go. 
In examining how the making of modern politics took place, the task 
of this introductory chapter is, first, to place the period 
1918-1929 in its proper economic and social context; and, second, 
to examine the received explanations we have for the changes that 
took place and so place our examination of the period in proper 
historiographical context. Our focus is the electoral politics of 
Scotland. Nowhere had the Liberals before 1914 enjoyed such 
predominance, both in industrial and rural areas. Yet by 1929 the 
Conservative and Labour Parties dominated Scottish politics. In 
1922, Scotland moved faster to Labour than other parts of the 
country. And in 1924, the Conservatives achieved a bigger victory 
in Scotland than at any time in the nineteenth or early twentieth 
centuries. In 1929, the Liberals failed to recover most of the 
ground they had lost in the preceding election. 
3 
II THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
The period from the 1900's to 1930's sees a change-over hastened by 
the First World War from one type of political economy to another, 
from what Joan Smith has called an era of 'Liberal hegemony' to an 
era of 'modern conservation'"). with socialism failing to 
establish itself as a dominant ideology in its period of greatest 
possibilities, the years during and after the First World War. 
This was obviously somehow related to far-reaching economic change. 
Before World War One, Scotland was, first of all, one of the high 
growth and high employment regions of the United Kingdom. For 
example between 1880 and 1914, Scotland's relative position within 
the United Kingdom was improving, with its share of coal output 
rising from 12.4% to 14.8%, steel from 14.8% (taking the 1880-1884 
average) to 20.8% (in 1910-1913) and shipbuilding retaining a third 
share of UK output. In 1913 Scotland's unemployment rate was only 
1.8% (of the insured , labour force) contrasted with 8.7% (in (2) London) Secondly, Scotland had a more open economy - with 
indigenous control linked to the greater predominance of family 
firms, as opposed to joint stock companies, with limited 
opportunities for mergers, amalgamations and monopolies. 
J Smith, Commonsense Thought and Working Class Consciousness: 
Someaspects of the Glasgow and Liverpool Labour Movements in 
the early years of the twentieth cenýýr . (Edinburgh University, PhD Thesis, 1981. ) 
2 For a fuller discussion of the Scottish' economy in this, 
period, see R Campbell, The Rise and Fall of 'Scottish Indusqy_ 
(Edinburgh, 1980), and A Slaven, ' 
The Development of the West 
of Scotland 1750-1960 (London, 1978T. -. 
4 
As Scott and Hughes write of the early years of the twentieth 
century, 
The Scottish business system still bore the signs of its 
origins in small family enterprises. Although the period 
from the 1890's to the First World War involved numerous 
company amalgamations, the new combines differed only a 
little from their predecessors... Amalgamation involved 
the fusion of independent family concerns into a holding 
structure in which there was little reorganisation at the 
technical or financial levels ... Marry dominant firms were 
either family firms, which had adopted the joint stock 
form concerns which had grown up on the basis of old 
family firms, or groups of family firms held together 
through a holding company. Only in the case of the 
railways and some newer firms in oil and electricity was 
the family principle not to be found. (3) 
Third , Scotland , LPIýared to be progressing before 1914. If wages 
did not match United Kingdom averages, they were rising faster than 
in the rest of Britain. And while Scotland's social problems were 
immense for example, one half of Scots lived in one or two roomed 
houses there were signs of social improvement, such *as in the 
fall in infant mortality rates between 1871 and 1911. The Scottish 
Infant Mortality rate was actually below -that of England and 
(4) 
Wales If there were symptoms of a deeper malaise affecting the 
industrial economy, as the severity of - the 1906-1908 recession 
indicated, and if Scotland was both overdependent on a small group 
of stable industries and suffering because' of a high level of 
capital exported abroad (in preference to reinvestment in. the home 
economy), it was still possible for politicians to argue that 
Scotland's economic difficulties were temporary and that the 
dominant trend was one of improvement. 
3M Scott and J Hughes, 
_Anatomy 
of Scottfsh (London, 
1979) pp. 53-54. 
4 For a fuller discussion of poverty and social policy, see I 
Levitt, 'The Scottish Poor Law and Unemployment, 1890-1929', 
in T Smout (ed), The Search for Wealth and Stability (London, 
1979) pp 262-282. 
5 
These economic and social characteristics helped to determine 
political attitudes. While we shall see that middle class sup-port 
veered towards Conservatism ýafter 1886 and working class voters 
became dependent on Liberalism, the Liberals were after all a party 
of all Scotland - rural and industrial, east and west, Highland-and 
Lowland - in a sense that no other party has since managed to be. 
. 
Their support owed little to their political organisation or the 
representativeness of their candidates (in 1910, of fifty-nine 
Liberal MP's, twenty-five were lawyers, none were working men and 
(5) 
many were Englishmen) . Rather the resilience of Liberalism owed 
more to the relevance of 'the Liberal philosophy, as demonstrated by 
the appeal of the social and economic views posited by Gladstone in 
his Midlothian speeches, as early as 1879. As Joan Smith has 
argued from her study of Victorian Glasgow, that Liberal ideology 
consisted on a view of society which was participatory, localised 
and an interdependent but distinct "beehive" of societies and 
organisations. Liberals favoured municipal initiative in 
preference to state action, and opposed monopolies. They believed 
in progress and a society in which large numbers of people from all 
classes participated in society through their voluntary 
associations. 
(6) 
By the late nineteen twenties, Scotland was a very different kind 
of economy and society. First, Scotland's economic base was 
contracting. While there is a historical debate on the extent and 
causes of the crisis, it is impossible to resist Alford's summation 
5C Larner, The Scottish MP since 1910 : His background and 
Lijjjp_ýrformance, Xeroxed paper (Glasgow, 1969), p. 4. 
6J Smith, op cit, p. 168. 
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that 'the striking feature of the inter-war years in contrast with 
the late nineteenth century was the persistently wide margin of 
(7) 
unemployed resources' Scotland's share of British output fell 
from 11.8% in 1907 to 10.5% in 1924 and only 8.8% in 1935 
(8) 
, and 
with around 10% of the British labour force, Scotland had nearly 
15% of British unemployment throughout the inter-war years, with an 
estimýted three fifths of the workforce experiencing at least one 
(9) 
period of unemployment during the 1920's The most striking 
p*roblems were in the staple industries - agriculture, mining, 
steel, engineering and textiles - which had formed the basis of 
Scotland's industrial progress before 1914. While in 1907, they 
represented more than half (53%) of all output, by 1924 they 
accounted for only 48% and by 1935 only 39% of output 
(10). 
7B Alford, REEr and Reco British Economic Growth, 
1918-1939, (London, 1972), p. 82 
8C Harvie, No'Gods and Precious Few Heroes, (London, 1981), 
p. 36. 
9E Kebblewhite, The Im ac of Unemploy nt on the DevejUEerjý 
of Trade unionism in Scotland, Aberdeen University, PhD. 1979 
pp. 70-71. 
10 C Harvie, op. cit., p. 38. 
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TABLE 0.1 
The Performance of Scotland's Basic Industries, 1911-1929 
West Scotland Scotland Scotland Scotland 
Coal Pig Iron Steel Shipbuilding 
m. tons m. tons m. tons Clyde launching 
m. tons 
1911-13 22.7 1.32 1.3 676.0 
1918-20 17.1* 0.97 1.8 617.2 
1927-29 16.8 0.61 1.3- 544.3 
1919 only 
Source : GlasLoýi Herald, Annual Trade Reviews, cited in A Slaven, 
op cit., p. 164. 
Table 0.1 illustrates the difficulties faced by coal, iron and 
steel and shipbuilding after the war. As early as 1921, officials 
in the Scottish Office realised that Scotland's economic problems 
were permanent, rather than temporary. Diagnosing a picture of 
'unrelieved blackness' a confidential report remarked: 
The main belt of severe unemployment and accompanying 
distress runs through the mining, steel and shipbuilding 
areas of Fife, Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow, Lanark, 
Dumbarton, Renfrew and Ayr ... It is difficult to pick out 
any industrial occupation as being principally affected 
by unemployment, almost all are in bad condition. 
The report suggested that 'those engaged in export trade and the 
means of export 'are worse than those engaged in home trade' while 
only 'certain luxury services' were 'remarkably vigorous'. it 
added that an estimated 25,000 miners were in excess of capacity of 
the mines to absorb them for years to come. 
(11) 
0 
'Reports and Memorandum by the Board of Health into Industrial 
Unemployment and Distress, 1921', Scottish Rý-cord O. ffice HR 
31/36. 
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In fact in spite of a net 'emigration of one third of a million 
Scots between 1921 and 1931, unemployment was never less than . 10% 
throughout the inter-war years. The numbers in metal industries 
and mining fell dramatically between the 1921 and 1931 censuses, by 
(12) 
23% and 18% respectively Shipbuilding whose Clyde output had 
fallen-four fold between 1920 and 1923 employed 100,000 workers in 
(13) 1920 but only 50,000 in 1925 and only 10,000 in 1932 
Second, Scotland's economy was becoming increasingly corporate in 
its organisation. As Scott and Hughes suggests three trends stand 
out in the inter-war years, "economic concentration anglicisation 
of control and the growth of government regulation" 
(14). 
By 1923, mergers had brought three of Scotland's seven banks into 
the hands of English banks. With steel, coal and shipbuilding 
amalgamations, Colville's became a centre for the integration of 
steel, shipbuilding and shipping interests in the West of Scotland. 
This development was closely associated with the rise of Lithgow in 
shipbuilding and together these firms were to become the pivot of 
Scottish heavy industry. In whisky distillers, in brewing Scottish 
Brewers, and in textiles Jute industries, (with Coats and Linen 
Thread) became dominant, and the rail companies became part of 
London dominated cartels. As Scott and Hughes suggest: 
Expansion of these companies tended to occur through the 
direct acquisition of other companies rather than through 
the older holder company form. Monopolisation in each of 
the major industrial sectors was producing the large 
corporations of the modern period. This does not seem to 
have resulted in any straightforward separation of 
ownership from control. Companies still seem to have 
been controlled through ownership of a substantial 
shareholding and family control remained a reality (15). 
12 E Kebblewhite, op cit., p. 30. 
13 Ibid, oP cit., p. 21. 
14 J Scott and M Hughes, op cit., p. 67. 
15 Ibid, p. 88. There was even what Harvie called 'vertical 
cartellization' with shipping, shipbuilding and steel closely 
linked. 
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As industry became more corporate, trade unionism became more 
concentrated. The war had seen a doubling of trade union 
membership and at its peak, Scotland's trade unionists numbered 
half a million, a third of the working population. When in 1924-25 
the STUC conducted its only major survey of trade union membership 
in Scotland it found that the concentration of membership was such 
that despite there being 227 individual unions, fou. r-fifths of 
trade unionists were in the largest thirty-six unions. In 
addition, three-fifths of Scotland's trade unionists by 1924 were 
affiliated to British rather than specifically Scottish trade 
(16) 
unions Although religions retained a loyalty that was far 
stronger than in England, with 26% of the adult population adhering 
to the reunited Church of Scotland in 1930 and 11% members of the 
Roman Catholic Church (whereas in England the Church of England had 
only 11% of the adult population), it was increasingly clear that 
(17) 
class-based loyalties were most prominent one sign of this 
was that the Scottish Cooperative organisation which had been an 
independent association detýached from political activity joined the 
Labour cause. In 1917, the Scottish Co-operatives made much of the 
running for affiliation of the British organisation to the Labour 
(18) Party 
However, the economic problems Scotland faced hit different groups 
unevenly, and their social importance must be measured not only 
against the experience of the changing occupational and industrial 
characteristics of the Scottish labour force but also against the 
expectations fostered by the war. As one writer put it: 
16 Scottish Trades Union Congress, Report to 1925 Congress. 
17 C Harvie, op cit., p. 78. 
18 A full study of the Scottish Co-opetative Wholesale Society 
has been made by JA Kinlock, The Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale_Society 1868-1918, Strathciyde University PhD, 1976. 
See also S Pollard,.. 'The Foundation of the Co-operative Party' 
in A Briggs and J Saville, Essays in Labour Histo 
_1886-1923, (London, 1971) p. 185-210. 
10 
The combined effects of wartime inflation, occupational 
mobility, the virtual disappearance , 
of the unemployed 
residuum and the narrowing of wage differentials had 
significantly raised the aspirations and expectations of 
wage earners as a whole ... Labour's sense of relative 
deprivation had somehow to be reduced if the stability of 
British society in the post war society was to be 
ensured( 19) 
Generally, the twenties saw little redistribution of income between 
rich and poor, despite the growth of taxation on both low and high 
incomes. What redistribution in wealth which did take place in the 
period was within the top fifth of the population and not from rich 
to poor 
(20). 
There was however to be a considerable degree of 
upward mobility, with large numbers added to white-collar 
occupations between 1921 and 1931 
(21) 
. Probably it was outward 
mobility through emigration more so than upward mobility through 
education that did most to lessen the potential tensions in 
Scottish society. 
19 K Burgess' The Chýllenge of Labour, (London, 1980) p-205. I ------------------- 
20 A Harrison, The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Scotland 
(Strathclyde University, 1975) shows wealth inequalities 
remained stable. It seems also that direct and indirect 
taxation as a 'percentage of total income did not alter the 
class structure of the twenties, apart from perhaps affecting 
those with incomes above E10,000. The share of national income 
for wages between 1920 and 1929 remained stable. In his 
The Social Framework Hicks gauges the redistributive effect of 
social service expenditure to be small not least because of 
the operation of the insurance principle. For a fuller 
comment on the questions, see AC Saunders and D 
Jones, A Survey of the Social Structure of England and Wales 
(Oxford, 1958) and Sir J Hicks, The Social Framework, Jrd. ed., 
ýOxford, 1960). 
21 In No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, C Harvie concludes: 
.. I AltGoRTjh economic change seems to have* increased class 
polarisation the institutions of Scottish society actually 
inhibited the development of a positive class consciousness in 
Scotland. They provided means of spiralling out of the 
working class ... and they also created ... a range of middle 
class organisations and leadership roles'. (p. 87). 
11 
More than 400,000 Scots left the country during the nineteen 
twenties. It was a group that contained a disproportionate number 
(22) 
of lower middle class and skilled manual workers 
Unemployment was a sharp dividing line. To some extent it was 
softened by changes in national insurance and the poor law but the 
(23) 
general prospects for the unemployed person were poor As 
Levitt has shown, poor law relief benefits for the unemployed were 
between' 37-50% of average wages in the nine teen-twent ie s. A 
special Clydeside survey in 1923-24, which followed the Sýottish 
Office study of 1921, confirmed how necessary public relief was to 
combat the worst effects of the depression, and, in particular, the 
problems facing mothers with young children. Although a follow-up 
survey of 1930 suggested the majority of families were 'adjusting' 
to poverty, it was clear to officials, as Levitt suggests, that the 
social fabric of Scotland was dependent on the Poor Law and its 
ability to respond to the pressures of unemployment 
(24) 
. The 
officials knew that in spheres like medical care Scottish provision 
now lagged behind England. In the post war period Scottish infant 
mortality was higher than in England and Wales though national 
comparisons disguised very large regional variations in each 
country. But the position of many wage earners in the 'first part 
of the twenties was deteriorating also, as'the wage increases won 
22 M Flinn et al, Scottish Population HiýtoDL (Cambridge, 1977). 
They estimate that net emigration ran at 28,000 per annum 
between 1901 and 1910 but 35,000 per annum between 1921 and 
1930. Between 1901 and 1930,446,212 Scots left but only 
98,464 came to Scotland, in all a net loss of 347,748 
virtually wiping out the natural increase in population. 
0 
23 B Gilbert; British Social Policy 19_18-1938 (London, 1970). He 
argues in particular that the result of the first two years of 
post-war - government social policy was 'a vast system of 
working class relief'. (p. 32). 
24 1 Levitt, Poverty in Scotland: The Historical Background, 
Appendix One. G Brown and R Cook Fe-d. 'Y-*. Scotland: Y'KiT -ReZ1 
. 
Eiyiýe. (Edinburgh 1982, forthcoming). See also I Levitt, in T 
Smout (ed. ) op. cit., pp262-282. 
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from 1914 to 1920 were eroded, as Table 0.2 confirms, and money 
wages did not recover before 1927. Waites has suggested that real 
wages were actually lower in 1923,1924, and 1925 than they had 
(25) 
been in July 1914 
Social tensions were potentially greater in Scotland not least 
because Scotland bad bad a higher preponderance of skilled 
workers - especially in West Scotland where it was estimated that 
70% of Scots workers were 'skilled'. No less important was the 
position of thý miners, who numbered more than a tenth of the 
labour force in 1921, and who regarded themselves on a par with the 
'labour aristocracy' of skilled workers. For Hobsbawm, 'the period 
from 1914 was to see the collapse of the labour aristocracy 
comparable to the collapse of the old handicrafts in the decades 
after the Napoleonic wars, though perhaps more serious, I and trade 
unionists at the time did not disagree that 'the gulf which at one 
(26) 
time divided the skilled from the unskilled is disappearing' 
Kebblethwite has suggested that the dilution of engineering work 
was so great that whereas in 1914,60% of workers were skilled, by 
1926 and 1933 respectively, only 40% and 32Y. were, 
(27) 
and the new 
compression of the occupational structure was reflected in both 
wage levels and security of employment. In building, engineering, 
mining and craft work, the gulf between skilled and semi-skilled or 
unskilled wages narrowed considerably between 1914 and 1930, as the 
failure of industrial action amongst 
25 B Waites. 'The Effect of the First World War oil Class and 
Status in England, ' Scottish Labour History Society Journal, 
12,1978. P. 3-10. 
26 STUC Conference, 1925, Chairman's Introductory Speech. 
27 E Kebblethwite, op cit., p. 313. According to her study of 
firms in the Engineering Employers Federation, the proportion 
of semi-skilled workers rose from 20% in 1914 to 30% in 1921 
and again to 45% and 57% in 1926 and 1933. Skilled 
proportions for these years were 60% (1914); 50% (1921); 40% 
(1926); and 32% (1933). 
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the engineers and miners confirmed this trend. While labourers 
still experienced a higher likelihood of unemployment, what. is 
startling about the nine teen-twent ie s in contrast to pre-war years 
is the severity of unemployment amongst iron, steel, shipbuilding, 
and mining workers. A: measure of the erosion of their position can 
be gauged in Table 0.3 from the declining union memberships in 
engineering and mining in particular between 1919 and 1929, 




28 In his Condition of the-British People 1911-1945, Mondon, 
1945) p. 82). Abrams suggests thaý___; ýýerZe_a`sbefore 1914 
unskilled wages were 60% of skilled rates, by 1919 they had 
increased to 75%. The main exponent of this thesis that the 
position of skilled workers was eroded is E Hobsbawm, 
Labouring Men, (London, 1964) pp. 272-363. Whereas unskilled 
workers in bailding received in 1914,64% of craftsmen's 
wages, the proportion in 1922 was 75%; in printing, the gap 
which was pre-war 33% between craftsmen and labourers had 
narrowed by 1922 to 20%. Studies carried out into wage trends 
in the interwar years showed that the lowest rises in real 
wages occurred in iron and steel, shipbuilding, mining, 
construction, and textiles (whereas the biggest rises occurred 
in agriculture, fishing, printing, transport, communications, 
distributive trades and local government services) . There 
were of course as Hobbebawm suggests 'survivals and 
adaptation' not least the expansion of a full time trade union 
bureaucracy. it would appear that the engineers, 
boilermakers, iron founders and miners were the worst hit, as 
they were squeezed by the narrowing of differentials, the rise 
of the semi-skilled, and the growth of a white collar sector. 
14 1 
Prices and Wages - 1914-25 
1914 = 100 
Money Wages Cost of Living Real Wages 
1914 100 100 100 
1920 256 249 103 
1921 240 226 106 
1922 185 183 107 
1923 169 174 97 
1924 171 175 98 
19 25 175 176 99 
Source: B Waites, op-cit. pp 3-10; also 
Forward, February 16,1925 and September 29,1925. 
TABLE 0.3 
Union Memberships in Scotland 1919 and 1929 
000's 
1919 1929 
Engineers 44.7 18.6 
Woodworkers 16.5(1922)* 16.2 
Electricians 3.0 1.5 
Miners 75.0 25.0(1926)* 
Railwaymen 43.5 30.5 
Printers 8.2 6.0 
Commercial 16.0 9.3 
Horse/Motormens Transport 5.2 5.0 
General 29'. 5 21.2 
Shop Assistants 11.5 10.7 
Distributive 14.0(1920)* 13.1 
Source: Table compiled from E Kebblethwite, op. cit., Appendix One. 
Asterisk denotes year nearest to 1919 and 1929 for which 
figures available. 
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III EXPLAINING POLITICAL CHANGE 1918-29 
While social and economic changes affected the position of employed 
and unemployed in Scotland, it is not useful for the historian to 
pose a determinist relationship when viewing the connection between 
social forces and political attitudes or political change. 
Political life often exercises an independence that forbids any 
automatic equation between the existence of class divisions and 
either class consciousness, class conflict or a socialist 
consciousness. These are not interchangeable terms. As Michael 
Mann writes: 
Firstly we can separate class identity the definition 
of oneself as playing a distinctive role in common with 
other workers in the productive process. Secondly comes 
class consciousness - the perception that the capitalist 
and his agents constitute an enduring opponent to 
oneself ... Thirdly is class totality - the acceptance of 
the previous elements as the defining characteristic of 
one's total social situation and the whole society in 
which one lives. Finally comes the conception of an 
alternative society, a goal toward which one moves 
through the struggle with the opponent(l). 
In other words, it cannot be presupposed that the existence of 
class divisions will produce a socialist consciousness on the part 
of the working class. Indeed it might be argued that Mann's 
argument might have been taken further. Political change requires 
in addition a sense on the part of social groups that change can be 
achieved, and, in cases, a loss of confidence by political elites. 
Our task is to understand how the changes of the period 1918 to 
1929 took place, for even if the fact of political change could 
have been predicted, its form and content could not. In the decade 
from 1918 onwards, *we must understand the reshaping * of party 
politics not only in terms of political organisations but also in a 
context where modern politics was being created-in the interplay 
between industrial militancy and economic depression, the gap 
between promises and performance in the social and economic 
M Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western Workin& 
. 
Slass, (London, 1973), p. 13. 
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policies pursued by Coalition, Labour and Conservative Governments, 
and the ideological differences between and within the major 
political parties. 
The view that political changes occurred, independently of the 
social and economic forces which were at work in Scottish society 
is held by many writers. They tend to take as their exclusive 
concern the activities of a small group of central politicians and 
to view the Labour achievement as neither inevitable nor 
historically necessary. Thus in his Downfall of the Liberal Party 
and in subsequent work, Trevor Wilson concludes that the political 
events of the war, personal antagonism between Lloyd George and 
Asquith, and the consequent collapse of Liberal morale and 
organisation made possible Labour's rise to prominence and the 
(2) Conservative successes of the twenties In his History of 
the Liberal Parýy, Roy Douglas, who consciously sets out to be an 
apologist for the Liberal Party, documents a series of 'accidents' 
and 'miscalculations' between the Gladstone Macdonald pact of 1903, 
and the preparedness of Liberals to allow Labour into office in 
1924, to demonstrate his general thesis that 'what failed not 
Liberalism but Liberals' 
(3). 
In his study, The Impact of Labour - 
exclusively the study of politics at the top - it is the thesis of 
Cowling that although events outside Parliament 'created an 
atmosphere which no politician could ignore, the response of the 
political elite towards Labour - knowledge for example that Labour 
leaders were only 'paper tigers', Conservative antipathy towards 
elements of the Liberal Party, and the desire of Bonar Law and 
Baldwin for independence from Lloyd George - is central to 
accounting for the short term progress of the Labour Party and the 
long term triumph of the Conservative Party as the major governing 
party. Within a tradition of British political study ý7hich assumes 
politics to be an activity conducted within the traditional 
2T Wilson, The Downfall of the liberal Party,, 1914-1935, 
(London, 1966). - 
3R Douglas, A History of theLiberal Party, 
-1895-1970, 
(London, 
1971), p. 3. 
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political system and where voters and party activists are more 
passive tools than active agents of poliiical change, Cowling 
argues that: 
In these years the Labour leaders committed themselves to 
the politics they found established and in all important 
respects the politics of 1920-1924 were continuous with 
the politics of the previous ninety years the 
polarisation of rhetoric did not produce a polarisation 
of action : social inequality was preserved by collusive 
collaboration to make rhetoric not actioh the centre of 
dispute. That was why conflict was synthetic. (4) 
A second approach which is more satisfactory is to concentrate on 
the political impact of the changing economic and social 
characteristics of British society. Thus Pelling argues that the 
rise of Labour, and the decline of the Liberals, was neither due to 
intrigues between Lloyd George and Coalition leaders nor simply to 
the impact of the war on Liberal values or Liberal unity. He 
argues that 'it was the result of long term social and economic 
changes which were simultaneously uniting Britain geoiraphically 
(5) 
and dividing her inhabitants in terms of class' For Cook the 
Liberal malaise sprang from 'fundamental an d long term 
characteristics in the structure, social composition, and outlook 
of the (Liberal) Party in the major industrial. and mining areas', 
although he adds: 
Though part of the explanation, social and economic 
forces were not wholly responsible for the Liberal 
downfall. Rather it was a succession of political blows 
coming on top of the changing social structure that 
reduced the Liberal Party from supremacy to impotence. (6) 
Few historians of the Labour Party deny the importance of both 
class divisions and a growing sense of their importance as 
explanations for the party's advance (of the Party). But fe; 
I 





and Society in the late Victorian 
. 
En&land, (London, 19685 5.01-120. 
6C Cook, The Age of Alignment, OP-cit., p. 342-3. 
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. I- 
are agreed on what that growing sense of class consciousness meant 
in real terms. Conventional historians of the Labour Party 
emphasise the organisational achievement of Labour, the extension 
into the political arena of the power of trade unionism, and the 
development of a strong party bureaucracy. For example McKibbin 
argues that Labour's increased support was grounded 'upon a highly 
developed class consciousness and intense class loyalties'(7). 
But, for McKibbin, the extension of the franchise was the important 
factor in determining the post-war Labour advance. While admitting 
it impossible to demonstiate, for example, whether the 1922 
election, if fought on 1910 boundaries but under the new franchise, 
would have yielded a similar Labour breakthrough, he and others 
argue against those who suggest that there were important social 
and ideological changes in these years, especially as a result of 
(8) 
the war . Thus for Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, the 
iight. to vote 
on top of growing trade unionisation made Labour's advance 
(9) 
possible It is an argument in line with. the conventional 
picture drawn by Samuel Beer in Modern British Politics that 
Labour's advance had little to do with the progress of socialism, 
and that the adoption of socialism, explicit in the 1918 
constitution, merely signalled the party's arrival as a major 
political force and was functional 'to the working class thrust for 
power'. It was 'the consequence of the more basic decision to play 
for supremacy taken by the organised working class'. 
7R MpKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924, 
(London, 1974), Introduction. 
8J Matthew, R McKibbin, J Kay, 'The Franchise Factor in the 
Rise of the Labour Party', English Historical Review, 92 
(1976) P. 796. They suggest - 'under a genuinely democratic 
pre-war franchise Labour would have been a more effective 
rival of the other parties than it actually was-the 
disproportion between their ýtrengths (Liberal and Labour) 
would have been significantly less and diminishing'. 
9 Ibid., p. 796. They argue against those who 'assumed that in 
the event of manhood franchise coming before 1914, the newly 
enfranchised... would have voted in the same proportion as the 
existing electorate, even though the mass of the new voters 
came from different social classes or subclasses. 
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The growth of trade unionism at last provided the party 
with the means for a strategy of fully fledged 
independence. Moreover the increase in organisational 
power of the unions did more than merely provide an 
opportunity for this strategy. It also forced the Labour 
Party to adopt it and break politically with the 
Liberals. The adoption of socialism as an ideology was 
functional to the choice of political independence(IO). 
But for others the franchise changes were a necesýýiý_y but not a 
sufficient explanation of Labour's advance, 
( 11) 
and some pose a 
more sociological explanation of bow Labour's advance was achieved, 
suggesting that the growth of collective organisation (in 
accompaniment with the franchise) may be insufficient to explain 
the nature of the Labour Party and the extent and limits of the 
party's advance. In a series of articles, Parkin has attempted to 
relate political behaviour - and especially working class political 
preferences - to value systems. He argues that whereas the 
institutions of society are important in defining people's values, 
Labour voting is 'a symbolic act of defiance', made possible and 
sustained through the collectivist values of working class 
communities, created by industrial workers through their collective 
experience at work. Parkin distinguishes between the dominant 
value system (whose social source is the major institutional order) 
which provides an ideological framework for endorsing existing 
inequalities, leading to deferential or aspirational definitions of 
the reward structure (i. e. conservatism); the subordinate value 
10 S Beer, Modern British Politics, (London, 1965), p-151-2. 
The Matthew McKibbin and Kay view is disputed, as Chapter One 
suggests, by PF Clarke, 'The Electoral impact of the Liberal 
and Labour Parties, 1910-1914, ' English Historical Review, 91, 
1975, and in his subsequent article, 'Liberals, Labour and the 
franchise., ' Ibid, 93,107 pp. 182-190. - 
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system (the social source of which is the local working class 
community); and the radical value system, the source of which is a 
mass party, which provides an oppositional interpretation of class 
inequalities (i. e. socialism). Parkin suggests that in the light 
of the failure of the Labour Party to relate people's experience to 
the wider political order, the standard working class response is 
one of accommodation, what he terms 'a negotiated form of dominant 
values'. In a sophisticated argument, which accepts a modified 
version of Parkin's theories as relevant to the new political 
situation after World War One, Chamberlain argues that Labour's 
rise was due neither to changes within the political elites nor- 
primarily to, people's adoption of socialist ideology but more to 
the existence of sub-cultures in British society which provided 
'the necessary structural supports for Labour voting', first, 
working class community life in which col lectivist values. developed 
and, second, the value system created by industrial workers in 
response to the organisation of production and their collective 
experiences at the work place. Thus, while many voters embraced 
Labour because Labour ideology made sense of their social position 
as trade unionisation rose and class consciousness became 
pronounced, there were very good reasons why other manual workers 
did not. 
Manual workers do not vote Conservative because they are 
deferential or because they conceive of themselves as 
middle class: rather they have a conservative outlook 
when they are isolated from structural positions which 
provide an alternative normative system from that of the 
dominant institutional orders of society(12). 
In examining these various approaches to the development of modern 
politics the concentrbation of our attention is on the years 1918 to 
1929. This is not to argue that the political achievement of the 
12 F Parkin, 'Working Class Conservatives :A Theory of Political 
Deviance ,1 British Journal of Sociology 18, No. T, ( 1967) . The argument is extended in F Parkin, Class Inequalký3r 
Political Order (London, 1971). Chamberlain's article is 




Labour Party can be encapsulated into an eleven year period which 
begins twenty five years after the founding of the Independent 
Labour Party and nearly twenty years after the forging of the 
Labour Party between socialists and trade unionists. As EP 
Thompson argues in his essay, 'Homage to Tom Maguire' , there could 
have been no Labour Party without the decision of socialists in the 
eighteen eighties to break with the traditional two party*system of 
the day, 
(13) 
and our examination of the post-war period does not 
diminish -the importance to later years of the resurgence of 
socialism in the eighteen eighties and the socialist agitation of 
the I. L. P. in particular from the eighteen nineties onwards. Nor 
does our examination of the post-war period deny the importance of 
the changes - brought about by the First World War's impact on 
society. Winter has argued: 
The war-time compression of the class pyramid is 
reflected both in the merger of the Conservative and 
Liberal Parties and also in the reorganisation of the 
Labour Party as the voice of more than the manual working 
class, or, as Webb liked to call them, the workers by 
hand and by brain(14). 
Winter suggests that not only the advance of the Labour Party but 
the nature of its socialism is determined by the experience of war: 
Clause Four is incomprehensive outside the context of a 
war in which (1) Class collaboration and not ouvrierism 
determined the political and industrial response of the 
party leadership and the vast majority of its working 
class supporters; (2) In which there was an improvement 
in the standards of the working class which change both 
heightened expectations of the working class of social 
reform and kept those hopes channeled within the 
traditional party structure; (3) In which the Russian 
Revolution made the formation of a left alternative to 
Bolshevism both necessary and inevitable; and (4) in 
which political alliances between middle . class 
intellectual and trade unionists in defence of working 
class interests were established as permanent fixtures in 
the labour movement. 
13 E Thompson, 'Homage to Tom Maguire, I in A Briggs, J Saville 
(eds. ) Essays in Labour Hi2Lýry, (London, 1967), pp. 276-316. 
14 J Winter, 'A Note on the Reconstruction of the Labour Party in 




Most commentators have suggested, in spite of their diverse 
approaches, and theoretical stances, that either the growth. of 
class consciousness or the effect of war had in 1918 made Labour's 
political advance inevitable. But even if that were so, it would, 
in 1918, have been impossible to predict the nature of the Labour 
Party or the political system over the next ten years, in 
particular how the cross currents between socialist rhetoric, 
industrial militancy, economic depression and social reform would 
conspire to produce a new order, stability and equilibrium in 
Britain. 
What the historian gains in breadth he also loses in depth. 
Although this study extends its range to a period of eleven years, 
it is primarily a study of the politics of electoral competition in 
Scotland. While some attempt is made to relate the events in 
Scotland to the ideological and political changes that characterise 
the period in the whole of Britian, and also to place these changes 
in their local context, much moi: e study is undoubtedly required of 
particular events and issues such as the impact of the Irish 
'(15) 
question on Scottish politics and of the experience of 
individual communities and constituencies. There are however, now 
excellent studies both of some of the events of the period, such as 
the General Strike in Scotland, 
(16) 
and of industrial and political 
15 D Rollo, qompýrative Aspects of Irish Politics in Glasgow, 
Boston and New York, Edinburgh University B. Litt., 1971; M 
Sol and Devel2pmýnt Tobin, The Irish Question and the KEeEgen. 
of the Lab in Britain 1910-1924, Strathclyde 
Tniversity M. Litt. ' 1980, are two important contributions to 
the study of the importance of the Irish in Scottish and 
British politics. 
16 There are now a -considerable number of studies of the iTq act .p and events of the General Strike of 1926, in particular i 
Skelley, The General Strike of 1926, (London, 1976) which 
contains two excellent local studies of East and West 
Scotland. In addition, the atmosphere in Fife is revealed 
most clearly in I Macdoiigall (ed) Militant Miners (Edinburgh, 
1981). 
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areas, in particular Aberdeen 
(17) 
9 
Glasgow (20) , and communities in ýif e (23) 
and Kincardineshire -. Despite the 
mushrooming of local history, we need fuller-studies of other areas 
of Scotland, in particular the development of politics in rural 
areas, despite James Hunter's seminal work, 
(24) 
The Making of the Crofting dommunity 
The study which follows is thus p)! imarily a study of electoral 
politics in the five 'elections from 1918 to 1929, with all 
limitations that such an examination entails. As John Vincent has 
observed, electoral data show 'only the outward and visible signs 
of an invisible political situation which has to be intuitively 
appreciated in the light of many variablest. He writes of election 
results: 
17 C Phipps, The Aberdeen Town Council and Politics, 1900-1935. 
The Developaýnt of 
-a- 
Local Labouý_Taýty in Aberdeen, 
University of Aberdeen, M. Litt., 1980. 
18 W Walker, Juteopolis, (Edinburgh, 1979). 
19 A Trevis, The Development of the Labour Movement in Ayrshire, - 
1914-1926, Strathclyde University, M. Litt., 198U 
_IitiS. _ 
20 1 McLean, The Labour Movement in CLydeside_E2 s, 
1914-1924, Oxford University, D. Phil., Also, P Liddell, 
The Glasgow Trades Council, Strathclyde University, M. Litt., 
1977, and J Smith, op. cit. 
21 1 Macdougall, (ed)., Militant Miners, (Edinburgh, 1981). 
22 S McIntyre, Little Moscows, (oxford, 1980). 
. 23 M Dyeý, The* Politics of kincardineshire, Aberdeen University, 
PhD, 1967. 




They speak of the relation of the many to the few for. 
that is by definition what they are. They show how the 
many react to the few, how the few are constrained to 
respond to the many, while at the same time making them 
enter a situation which the many alone bad not 
created(25). 
25 J Vincent and M Stenton, Macalmonts ParliameEýý Pollbooks, 
(London, 1973) p. lx. 
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CHAPTER 1- THE 1918 ELECTION 
I NEW POLITICS AND OLD POLITICS 
The 1918 election stands midway between an old world of politics 
and a new one. The crucial change in the electoral system that was 
to make the new politics possible had occurred by the time of the 
1918 election - through the extension of the franchise to all men 
over twenty . one and all women over thirty. In 1867, only 7% of the 
adult population had been able to vote. After the Second Reform 
Act, the electorate rose to 16% of adults. In 1885 after the Third 
Act, it was 2'8%('). Thus before 1918, all women and nearly 40% of 
(2) 
all men were disenfranchised In Scotland it was estimated that 
in 1911 only 57.3% of men in the burghs and 62.5% of men in the 
(3) 
counties had the vote . With plural voting 
(estimated to account 
for 7% of the pre-1918 electorate), the disqualification of 
electors receiving poor relief other than medical relief and the 
difficulties associated with registration, Pelling has calculated 
that only 89 British constituencies were predominantly working 
class 
(4) 
and Macaffrey has shown how only one half of eligible 
(5) Irish working me. n had the vote in 19 10 These are probably as 
useful indications as any of the electoral arithmetic which 
militated against the success of a party appealing entirely to the 
working class. 
I C Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 474. 
2N Blewitt, The Peers, the Parties and týL People, (London, 
1972), p. 359. 
3 Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, 'The franchise factor in the rise of 
the Labour Party, ' English Historical Review, 92, (1976), 
p. 727. There were of course wide variations wit. hin Scotland, 
as the authors suggest. Enfranchisement ran at 79.7% of adult 
males in Inverness Burghs but only 40.6% of adult males in 
Glasgow Bridgeton. 
4HM Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections, (London, 
1967), pp. 410-4ý-O. 
5J Macaffrey, 'The Irish Vote in Glasgow in the late Nineteenth 
Century, ' Inn*es Historical Review, 24,1970, pp. 30-37. 
Macaffrey's estimate is made from a comparison of potential 
voters with a sýudy, of rate booýg. 
With both the extension of voting rights and the redistribution of 
constituency boundaries, the electoral geography of Scotland in 
1918 was for the f irst time dominated by working class 
constituencies. This was to remain the case throughout the 
twenties and was further increased by the extension of the vote to 
working class women in time for the 1929 election. By 1929,90% of 
(6) 
adults over twenty-one were on the voting register If we were 
to define seats with more than 20% of voters in middle class 
occupations, then only three of more than one hundred middle class 
(7) 
constituencies of Britain were in Scotland There were, of 
course, also constituencies which were dominated by a large 
agricultural vote. While there were only twelve constituencies 
which, according to a study of the 1921 census, had more than half 
the employed men engaged in agriculture (of which only one 
Aberdeenshire Central was in Scotland), Scotland did have twenty of 
the 141 seats in Britain with more than one quarter of men employed 
in agriculture. Sixteen of these had more than thirty per cent in 
(8) 
agriculture and eight had more than forty per cent If we were 
to take the middle class and agricultural seats together (allowing 
for an overlap in East Perthshire), then there remained twenty-two 
seats which were not dominated by the industrial working class 
vote. Of the forty-nine constituencies, twelve had more than 20% 
of employed men in mining (and in fact ten had more than 30%, and 
(9) four more than 40%) It will be seen that these were the seats 
that moved fastest to the Labour Party in the nineteen twenties. 
6 According to Matthew et al, there was still a small proportion 
of British adults excluded. They estimated adult, male 
enfranchisement to be 94.1% of adult males in 1921. Only 79.27. 
of females aged thirty and over had the vote. These were 
British estimates. Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, op. cit., p. 732. 
7D Butler and A Soman, British Political Facts, (London, 1968) 
p. 200. 
M Kinnear, The British Voter An atlds. and survey since 
_1885, (New York, 1960) p. 122-3. 
8 Ibid., p. 119-20. 
9 Ibid., p. 116-7. 
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Scottish Liberalism dominated the electoral geography of Scotland 
throughout the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth 
century. The Liberals won every Scottish election from 1832 to 
1914 with one exception. The only time they failed to win a 
majority of seats was in the general election of 1900 but in. the 
three elections which followed, in 1906, and in January and 
December, 1910, the Liberals appeared to recover the# position, 
winning 57.6%, 55.8% and 53.3% of the total votes. As Henry 
Pelling demonstrates, Scotland from 1885 to 1910 exhibited a marked 
aversion to Conservatism, with the Conservatives (with or without 
Liberal Unionists) receiving on average only 40.3% of the votes 
the lowest regional share in Britain - in the six elections within 
(10) 
this period The swing from Liberals to Conservatives which 
took place in Britain between 1906 and 1910 almost passed Scotland 
by, with the Conservatives failing to make significant headway in 
January 1910 and only marginally improving their position in 
December. 
But if Scottish politics before 1914 seemed stable, things were not 
static. From 1885 to 1914 the Liberals transformed themselves into 
a party of primarily working-class voters, while the Conservatives 
concentrated on attracting the middle-class vote. Urwin has 
written of Scottish politics in the late nineteenth century, that: 
'Conservative activity occurred' in a political and social milieu 
which was organisationally and fundamentally opposed to the ideas 
and philosophy of Toryism, and Blewitt states any new 
electoral 
10 H Pelling, Social_Geography of British Elections, op. cit. 
pp372-413 * See also N Blewitt, The Peers, The Parties and 
the People : The General Elections of 1910, (London, 1972). 
Between 1906 an4 January 1910 the swing against Liberalism and 
to Conservatism was only 1.8% in Scotland contrasted with 4.37. 
in Britain; between January and December 1919, it was 1.8% 
contrasted with 0.8% in Britain. 
11 D Urwin, Scottish Historical Review, 44, (1965), p. 90. 
28 
alignment had 'scarcely begun in Scotland by the end of 1885', the 
Conservatives being an 'impotent minority' holding one third of. the 
(12) 
votes, and one seventh of the seats . But in the 1886 election 
there was a swing of more than 7% from the Liberals as they lost 19 
seats, mainly to the newly formed Liberal Unionists. One in every 
five of Liberal Unionist members in 1886 came from Scotland and 
with few exceptions Scottish industrial capital moved towards 
Conservatism. Macaffrey who has studied the Liberal split in the 
West of Scotland has written: % 
Af ter 1886 political behaviour in the West of Scotland 
became more clearly differentiated along class lines with 
the Gladstonians enjoying the support of the labouring 
masses as the Liberal Unionists drew closer in spirit and 
practice to the Conservatives. (13) 
Nevertheless, changing class alignments did not mean that Scotland 
had absorbed a switch to modern politics. Much depended on the 
nature of the political issues that were prominent. The 1910 
elections testify more to the prominence of the old issues - 
anti-landlordism in particular - than to the growth of welfare 
politics. As Austen_Chamberlain was to remark: 
Our only chance of winning Scotland is to change the 
issues on which Scotsmen vote. As long as it is the land 
and the rest of the radical programme we shall be beaten. 
We must try to make them think of something else and that 
something else can only be tariff reform. (14) 
In fact Scottish demonstrations which had taken place in support of 
Lloyd George's budget in 1909, were more of an anti-landlord 
(15) 
character 
12 Blewitt, op. cit., P. 7-. 
13 J-Macaffreý, Scottish Historic: al Review, 50 (1971) p. 149.. 
14 A Chamberlain, Politics from Inside, (London, 1936), p. '198. 
15 Gýýjsg(ýH Herald, September 20,1909. 
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At the time of the first election of 1910, Balfour remarked of 
Scotland, that: 'I have no doubt whatever that there is a genuine 
and strong f eeling against what they call the hereditary 
principles. It is the sort of doctrinaire point which appeals to 
(16) 
the less educated among my countrymen' . The. Glýsgow. Eeralý put 
it clearly: 
The elections in Scotland have up to the present time been 
influenced -by the House of Lords question out of all 
proportion to its importance. The widespread hostility to 
the upper house may be partly traced to popular annoyance 
at the judgement of the law lords against the United Free 
Church. (17) 
Blackwood's ýLagazine took the same view, arguing that 'the 
elections being fought on the old issues,, resurrected much of the 
old Liberalism of the eighties; Scottish Liberalism is one of the 
most stubborn and feudal forms of Conservatism that we know. It is 
loyalty partly to a tradition and partly to a man, for the spirit 
of Mr Gladstone still 'walks on Scottish soil and the echoes of 
Midlothian have not died away'(18). Chamberlain did not believe it 
possible to sell the idea of a 
Scotland, 
(19) 
and* the Scotsman's 
after the election found that: 
non-elected House of Lords to 
survey of Unionist candidates 
They all say that the principal cause of our defeat was 
animosity to the Lords as hereditary legislators, some 
adding that the feeling was embittered by dislike of them 
as landlords and they all say there is no chance of 
changing the verdict as long as the issue remains the 
same . (20) 
16 Balfour to Salisbury, February 4,1910. Cited in Blewitt, 
op. cit., p. 411. 
17 Ibid 
18 Blackwood's Magazine, March 1910. 
19 A Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 220. 
20 Ibid., p. 206. 
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As Balfour concluded: 
Lords and landlords used as practically synonymous terms 
had been their great difficulty. Reform of the House of 
Lords and a definite programme of land reform both in 
rural and urban districts were their chief desiderata. 
(21) 
By 1912, the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists had merged to 
form the Scottish Unionist Association. In Scotland there was a 
separate agreement after Austen Chamberlain had recognised 'we 
could not bind the Scottish organisations in any way ... the case 
of Scotland must be separately treated and the Scotsmen must settle 
(22) 
it for themselves' Nevertheless the Liberal Unionists had 
displayed a zeal in 1910 for candidatures that was only rivalled by 
their lack of success.. In January 1910 there had been nineteen 
interventions and in December . fifteen. But only 
in two 
constituencies in January and in three in December had the Liberal 
Unionists recorded victories. Yet despite the poor support for 
Liberal Unionist candidates, modern Conservatism was being 
established in Scotland. Thus Urwin can write of the years before 
the first world war: 
The years witness... the transformation of the Scottish 
Conservatives from an impotent minority group into a 
political party with a great mass following and with a new 
interest in politics manifest amongst its adherents. (23) 
There was in fact little sign also in Scotland that the Liberals 
were pursuing the new progressive policies that PF Clarke has 
(24) identified for Lancashire Rather there seemed to be a sense 
21 Ibid., p. 240. 
22 Ibid., p. 418. 
23 D Urwin, Scottish Historical Review, 44,1965, p. 94. 
24 PF Clarke Lancashire and the New Liberalism, (Cambridge, 
1971). 
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that with improved organisation, membership and finance the 
Liberals could maintain their wide ranging support. In 1912 for 
example the retiring Scottish Liberal Associations Chairman claimed 
that: 'the organisation was never better than it is today. 
Whatever happens in the immediate future I have no doubt the 
Scottish Liberal Association will be fully equal to the demands 
made upon itt(25) . But the Liberals did find themselves under 
pressure organisationally in the two years before the war. They 
were concerned about constituency organisation in the by-elections 
they faced, agreeing that some local associations needed to be 
overhauled 
(26) 
and in some cases restarted 
(27). 
Finance also 
continued to be a major problem(28) 
Yet the policy matters that concerned Liberals most- in Scotland 
were the traditional concerns of classical Liberalism. For 
example, the party's general council of 1912 concentrated its 
attention on debating home rule, land reform, votes for women (as 
(29) 
well as proportional representation) and free trade An 
examination of Executive Minutes in the two years before the 
outbreak of war reveals that the only major discussions on social 
reform concerned the local workings of education and poor law acts 
25 Scottish Liberal Association General Council, November 29-30, 
1912. 
26 Scottish Liberal Association, Organisation Committee, November 
20,1913, March 19,1914. 
27 Scottish Liberal Association, Eastern Finance Committee, 
December 18,1913. The Eastern Committee found in 1913 that 
'one of the greatest difficulties they had to contend against 
of present was the scarcity of names of gentlemen who might be 
asked to contribute'. In February 1914, as a general election 
was felt- to be imminent, the Eastern Finance Committee asked 
for an extra grant from party funds 'to enable the 
Association's-Finances to be put on a sound basis'. 
28 Ibid., February 26,1914. 
29 Scottish Liberal Association General Council, November 29-30, 
1912. 
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and the opposition of fishermen to the new national insurance 
(30) 
legislation, which Liberals felt might lose the party votes . 
But even on the traditional issues the party in Scotland was not 
prepared to go as far as the radical pressure groups wanted them 
to. On the women's issue, the party regretted the tactics of the 
suffragettes 
(31) 
and refused to send any representative on a 
deputation to the Prime Minister organised by the Glasgow and West 
* (32) 
of Scotland Association for Women's Suffrage -. While the party 
supported land reform, it refused to endorse the taxation proposals 
of the 'land values' group of Liberal MP's 
(33) 
and their main 
concern was the creating of smallholdings, endorsing minor 
(34) 
amendments to the 1911 Scottish legislation When the Land 
Nationalisation Society approached the party for support and 
assistanpe, * this was ruled out of order because 'the society's 
objects were not in - accordance with, the views of the 
(35) 
Association' 
In the 1910 General* Election, the threat of Labour in Scotland 
could be easily swept aside. In South Ayrshire, for example, where 
the party had stood in 1906 also, the Labour vote fell from 20.8% 
to 
30 Ibid., June 10,1913. 
31 Ibid., November 29,30,1912. Later, in 1914 when the Glasgow 
Branch of the National Union of Women Suffrage Societies 
organised a processing in Glasgow, the Executive resolved only 
to leave attendance 'to individual members of the Executive?, 
Scottish Liberal Association, Executive, June 3,1914. 
32 Scottish Liberal Association, Organising Committee, January 21, 
1914. 
33 Scottish Libe*ral Association, General Council, November 29,30, 
1912. 
34 SLottish Liberal Assopiation., Organising Committee, kay 21., 
1914. For example, the party's land committee was concerned 
that 'many farm servants did not know how to obtain a holding'. 
35 Scottish Liberal Association, Executive, May 13,1913. 
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12.9% of votes, and in Camlachie, where Labour stood in the 
election of 1906 and the two elections of 1910, the Labour vote 
slumped from 30% in 1906 to 28.9% in January and only 18.1% in 
December. Labour's January performance was so dismal in fact that 
it did not stand in December in four seats contested in January. 
Nevertheless in the by-elections of the period from 1910 the 
Liberals appeared to be in some difficulty, as Labour intervened in 
almost every by-election after 1912. In three of five by-elections 
contested on a three party basis, the Unionists pushed Liberals 
into second place. Two of these seats, Midlothian and Leith, had 
been Liberal strongholds, without a break from 1885. The Liberals 
(36) 
themselves put their defeat down to poor organisation In 
other three by-election contests where Labour did not intervene, 
the swing against Liberalism was just under 5%. Kinnear has 
calculated that if the swing from the Liberals had been repeated in 
a general election, the Unionists stood to gain between fifteen and 
(37) 
twenty Scottish seats at a future general election 
The Liberals were themselves sufficiently worried in 1913 to plan a 
conference for organisers under the theme 'How best to meet the 
(38) 
propaganda of the Unionist and Labour Parties' But 
by-elections and elections were different affairs and although 
Liberals were doing badly nothing could be certain. Clarke 
suggests partly on the basis of the North East Lanarkshire 
by-election in 1911 where Labour fell back on its performance in 
the previous by-elections of 1901 and 1904 (although it improved on 
its showing in January 1910), that in two party contests where 
there was an arrangement between Liberals and Labour, Liberalism 
(39) 
could hold its own But in Scotland the chance of pacts was 
becoming increasingly unlikely. 
36 Scottish Liberal Association Organising Committee, April 9, 
1914. 
37 M Kinnear, The British Voter, p. 34. 
38 Scottish Liberal Association, Executive, September 18,1913. 
39 PF Clarke, 'The Electoral Impact of the Liberal and Labour 
Parties, 1910-1913, ' English Historical Review, 91, (1975), 
p. 832. 
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II THE WEAKNESS OF LABOUR 
Prior to 1914, Scottish Labour formed one of the weakest sections 
'of the British Labour Party, despite its zeal for promoting 
candidates at Parliamentary elections. As the 1910 report of the 
National Executive Committee of the Labour Party remarked, 'the 
, political organisation of Scotland is not as good as it might 
be .... the steady and persistent work of the local Labour Parties is 
not as marked as 'in England'('). While a Scottish Workers 
Parliamentary Election Committee had been initiated in 1899, before 
the creation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900, and 
while the miners of Scotland supported Labour representation from 
the 1880s onwards, (well before the British miners' decision to 
affiliate to the Labour Party in 1909), Scottish Labour did 
surprisingly badly at elections 
(2) 
. It was the Scottish 
Independent Labour Party that was the most powerful political force 
in Scotland. It. claimed fifty branches in 1906 and far more by 
(3) 1910 The Scottish Advisory Council of the Labour Party was 
only formed in 1913 - the result of national dissatisfaction with 
Labour's Scottish organisation' - and it appointed a full time 
(4) 
organiser Ben Shaw But by 1914 Labour's electoral achievement 
was confined to three Parliamentary victories, all under special 
circumstances, and despite Labour's policy of independence from 
Liberalism in Scotland, the successes were more of a tribute to 
Labour National Executive memorandum on 'Scotland", April 13, 
1910. Cited in R McKibbin, op. cit., p. 91. 
2A brief study of the Scottish Workers Parliamentary Election 
Committee is included in F Bealey, Labour and Politics 
1900-1906, (London, 1958). For an examination of the Scottish 
Miners, see R Gregory, The Miners and British Politics, 
(Oxford, 1968). 
3 For a fuller study of ILP organisation see R Dowse, Left in- 
the Centre, (London, 1966), pp12-19. 
'4 For the basic history of the Scottish Advisory Council 
-normally called the Scottish Council - See R McKibbin op. cit., 
pp39-43. 
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radicalism than to socialism. George-Barnes won Blackfriars, later 
renamed Gorbals, . in a three party contest 
in 1906, with Irish 
support, and held it in 1910, but only after the Liberal Party 
(5) 
dropped out He was of course to be the only victorious 
Coalition Labour candidate in 1918. Alexander Wilkie was supported 
by the Jute Workers Union in Dundee but he benefited from Dundee's 
two member constituency and the transferable vote system that 
oper4ted there. As the historian of the Labour movement in Dundee 
has suggested, 'his election was a confirmation of Dundee's 
Liberalism rather than a challenge to it'. Wilkie did not outpace 
(6) 
Churchill: indeed in 1910 he recommended the second vote to him 
The only Labour victory against Liberalism in 1910 was in fact 
William Adamson's win in December 1910 in West Fife. But in this 
case, no Conservative stood and the result suggested that Labour 
was victorious because of a switch of substantial votes from 
(7) 
Conservative to Labour between January and December 1910 
But if Labour's parliamentary aspirations were frustrated by the 
existing political parties, Labour was by 1914 making considerable 
progress in local elections. While there was a long history of 
working class representation in local bodies in Scotland, it was 
from 1906-7 onwards that Labour candidates stood on a specific 
Labour platform, as nominees of a party, mainly under the auspices 
of the Independent Labour Party. By 1914 Labour had two hundred 
local representatives in Scotland on parish councils, town and 
(8) 
county councils, and school boards In some areas, such as 
Leith, Bothwell and Wemyss, the party controlled a third of parish 
council seats before the war. In Carmichael in 1913, the party 
5A fuller study of the Blackfriars election is contained in D 
ýrative_Aspects of Irish Politics in Boston, Rollo, Gomp! 
New York and Glasgow, Edinburgh University, B. Litt. 1971. 
6W Walker, 'Dundee's Disenchantment with Churchill', Scottish 
Historical Review, 49,1970, p. 91. 
7 Viscount Elibank the Liberal Whip believed that Labour votes 
were gained from the Conservative and Liberal Unionist 
Parties, rather than Liberals. Elibank Papers, 1910. 
8 Forward, -November 13,1921.36 
took control and in Cambuslang, with eight of seventeen seats, it 
was near to power(9). But while Labour was also making gains , -in 
the cities - winning five additional council seats in Glasgow in 
1913 for example to make a representation of eighteen - the party C3 
was firmly established only as an additional force in local 
politics, not as a governing party. It was not surprising 
therefore that in his Socialism in. Scotland Haddow described the 
years, 1906-1912, as 'a struggle with adversity' 
(10) 
and that a 
future Labour Secretary of State of Scotland, Tom Johnston, wrote 
after an unsuccessful by-election campaign in 1911: 
Labour and socialists have a sharp reminder that the 
cause for which they fight will not be achieved without 
an amount of propaganda and organisation work... there is 
a huge jungle of prejudice and inertia and ignorance to 
be cleared away. (11) 
A study of Lanarkshire provides the best illustrations of the 
problems Labour faced before 1914. Nowhere had Labour attempted 
with more vigour to break the strength of Liberalism as in 
Laiiarkshire, from as early in 1888 when Keir Hardie stood in the 
Mid-Lanark by-election. Indeed nowhere did Labour place so many 
candidatures before 1914. Labour stood in four by-elections after 
1900 - North East Lanark in 1901,1904 and 1911 and South Lanark in 
1913 and in general elections Labour fielded three candidates in 
Lanarkshire out of its seven in Scotland in 1906, three out of nine 
in 1910 (January) and one out of five in 1910 (December), as well 
as placing candidatures in local elections. What made Lanarkshire 
apparently fertile ground for socialists was the financial support 
from the Lanarkshire miners union, which had joined the Scottish 
Workers Parliamentary Election Committee, and which grew from less 
than three thousand members in 1896 to thirty thousand in 1900 and 
9 Forward, May 2,1914; May 23,1914. 
10 W Haddow, Socialism in Scotland (Glasgow n; d. ). 
11 Forward, March 18,19 11. 
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forty thousand by 1914. With leaders such as William Small and 
Robert Smillie, the miners union's key officials from the eighýeen 
eighties onwards were socialists. Yet William Stewart, one of the 
Independent Labour Party's organisers, was to write in 1905, '1 
don't know what to say about Lanarkshire. There are only five ILP 
branches in all in Lanarkshire and there ought to be fifty-five. I 
very much believe that there are more socialists in Lanarkshire 
than the whole of the rest of Scotland but somehow they have never 
managed to get themselves thoroughly organised'. He added however 
that once organised 'they will make a clean sweep of the Liberal 
(12) 
and Tory representatives from the end to end of the shire' 
Although there were only five branches in 1905, there were fifteen 
ILP branches by the end of 1906 after the appointment of the only 
full-time ILP organiser in Scotland and the formation of the 
(13) 
Lanarkshire Socialist Federation during 1905 In 1906 Stewart 
was to write that 'the change seems nothing short of a 
(14) 
miracle' With the onset of unemployment in 1907 and 1908, 
Labour optimism grew even stronger. 
By 1909 Labour were confident enough to risk fighting three 
parliamentary seats, yet 1910 brought four defeats - three in 
January and one in December. In fact in North-East and North-West 
(15) 
Lanark the vote almost halved between 1906 and'1910 
12 Labour Leader, January 6,1905. For a fuller discussion of 
Lanarkshire Labour Politics, see G Brown, The Development of 
the Labour Party in North Lanarkshire, 1885-1914, Edinburgh 
University Undergraduate Dissertation, Economic History 
Department, 1972. 
13 Labour Leader, June 30,1905. 
14 Ibid., *July 6, *1906. 
15 Forward, January 1,1910. 
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TABLE 1.1 
VOTES CAST FOR LABOUR IN LANARKSHIRE 1901-1911 
NE NW MID 
1901 2900 
1904 2984 
1906 4658 3291 758 
1910 2160 1718 3864 
1910 3847 
1911 2876 
(1) Independent Labour - not endorsed by Miners or ILP. 
Source: F Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 
1885-1918 Zdl-asgow, - 19695. 
An indication of the difficulties confronting local Labour 
activists during Parliamentary contests at this time can be guaged 
from the records of the one local ILP branch that survives - 
Shettleston and Tollcross (part of Lanarkshire before 1918). When 
the neighbouring Camlachie Labour Representation Committee 
approached the branch for help in the contest in December 1910, the 
branch was more interested in their county council contest where 
their candidate was John Wheatley. The minutes record that 
Shettleston and Tollcross ILP 'agreed to write stating that owing 
to local elections our hands were full at present but immediately 




not cope with electoral demands given that, in terms of membership, 
the pre-war period was merely one of quiet undramatic progress. 
Shettleston ILP was formed in 1905, charging 6d subscription every 
16 . Shettleston and Tollcross ILP, November 24,1910. 
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(17) 
month and organising fortnightly meetings During the first 
year the branch had enrolled f if ty-eight members although it had 
only retained thirty by the end of the year. In its second year it 
(18) 
enrolled one more, f if ty-nine, and retained thirty-nine A 
Socialist Sunday School was formed, and in 1910 they bought their 
own hall. They were, the minutes recorded proudly, 'the only 
political party in the district who had a hall they could call 
(19) 
their own' By the outbreak of war, they had added another 25 
members af ter reducing their subscription to one shilling a year 




The official explanation of the slow progress of Labour before 1914 
tended to be that the Irish issue distracted attention and 
prevented any quicker advance. When the party's assistant 
secretary JS Middleton addressed the Scottish Labour conference in 
1931, he propounded this view: 'Until Home rule was granted they 
could not attract to the Labour Party the large Irish vote 
throughout the country' 
(21). 
Lanarkshire is a good test case of 
the 'Irish' effect - proportionately Lanarkshire had the biggest 
concentration of Irish voters in Scotland, although by the turn of 
the century Macaffrey is probably right to suggest that, with only 
half the Irish community born outside Scotland, it was now a 
settled community in Scotland. Estimates of the importance of the 
Irish vote differ. 
17 Shettleston and Tollcross ILP Branch, August 21,1905. 
18 Ibid., August 29,1906. 
19 Ibid., March 31,1910. 
20 Ibid., October 29,1910-. 
21 Labour Party, Scottish Conference, 
-Rep 
rt, 1931, p. 34. 
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According to Macaffrey's research, based on one area of Glasgow, 
only half of those Irishmen who were qualified to vote as 
householders were able to vote because of the large turnover in 
(22). 
tenancies, the rating levels and the receipt of poor relief 
Estimates of other observers of the Lanarkshire and Scottish 
political scene in the period suggest that the Irish vote was not 
all that large or well organised. In Lanarkshire's three most 
working-class constituencies, it was less than one fifth of all 
electorate, not less than two thirds of which were working-class. 
TABLE 1.2 
ESTIMATES OF IRISH VOTE IN LANARKSHIRE 
Electorate Irish Vote Irish % Working Class % 
Mid-Lanark 1810 17,803 c3,000 15 72 
North East 
Lanark 1901 16,894 c3,000 17 71 
1910 22,554 c3,000 14 73 
North West 
Lanark 1906 16,814 c3,000 17 67 
1910 20,274 c3,000 15 69 
Source: Labour Leader, September 7,1901; Labour Leader, July 6, 
1906; joLward, January 22,1910; Glasgow Herald, December b, 1910. 
Also Census Information. 
In Scottish politics, moreover, the tactics of the United Irish 
League were not consistent and it did not always support 
Liberalism. In certain cases the League urged support for Labour 
against what it considered to be unsympathetic Liberal candidates. 
22 Macaffrey, The Irish vote .... loc. cit., pp. 30-37. 
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This happened in the 1901 North East Lanarkshire by-election 
(23) 
and in the North East and North West constituencies in 1906 
(. 24) 
. 
In 1901 the United Irish League gave what was to be their defence 
throughout that they 'do not ask at elections as to whether a 
candidate is a Liberal or a Tory or a Labour man. They ask which 
man is sounder on the Irish question and that man they recommend to 
(25) 
the electors' What happened in Lanarkshire raises questions 
about the general impact of the Irish vote. While the United Irish 
League were to support Barnes when he won in Gorbals in 1906, they 
did not support Wilkie who was to win in Dundee, and*their support 
was insufficient to win North West Lanarkshire, Camlachie and 
Paisley for Labour. In 1918, United Irish League support for most 
Labour candidates in the West of Scotland was in itself 
(26) 
insufficient to bring the party victory Generally it seems 
that their influence helped Liberals in marginal fights with the 
Conservatives (in 1906 the Scotsman argued -that there were f if teen 
seats where the Catholic votes held the balance between the two 
traditional parties) 
(27) 
, but it is doubtful if they were as 
crucial to holding back independent Labour as has beed suggested. 
While Wheatley's Catholic Socialist Society was denounced, Wheatley 
argued that 'it is the custom if not a rule for the priest to take 
no part in politics', 
(28) 
and Paton wrote of Lanarkshire at this 
time 
(29) 
23 Labour Leader, September 14,1901. 
24 D Rollo, op. cit., p. 192. 
25 Labour Leader, September 14,1901. 
26 D Rollo, op. cit., p.. 193. 
27 M Tobin, The Irish Question and týe Emergence and Development 
of the Labouý_Party, St 
* 
rathclyde' University MS 980), 
p. 192. For a full discussion of the 1918 result see below, 
pp98-100. 
28 Socialist Review, February 1909. 
29 J Paton,. Proletarian PilLrimage, (London, 1936), p. 186-7. 
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On one occasion when I was talking to one of our members 
a simple unlettered Irish labourer in Lanarkshire I asked 
him about the attitude of the local priest. He assured 
me he gave no trouble ... They just let him understand he 
said, that we bowed to him in the church in all things 
spiritual and in matters temporal we are permitted to 
think for ourselves. 
The real problem was the failure of Labour to capture the working 
class vote as a whole. There can be no doubt that the Labour Party 
suffered from the apparent radicalism of local Liberal candidates 
and the fact that the traditional issues of 'classical Liberalism' 
remained at the centre of the political stage. For example, in the 
first decade of the century Lanarkshire boasted Liberal MPs such as 
Findlay, Whitehouse and Douglas - as well as Cunningham-Grahame - 
(30) 
who supported radical measures of social reform But, as we 
have suggested, perhaps it was more important to their success that 
the key issues remained those of constitutional reform, free trade 
and land. After the January e; ection of 1910, the agent for William 
Small, Labour candidate in North West Lanarkshire, concluded, 
'possibly Labour could not have completed the contest under' less 
favourable conditions.. . *Scottish electors are against the House of (31) 
Lords and protection... (and) are determined to win' 
30 Findlay, Liberal candidate and later MP in North East Lanark, 
from 1904 was a temperance radical who had, he said, risen 
'from the bottom of the ladder with iron burning in his soul 
at the ill-division of wealth... there was not a man or boy... 
but had as good an opportunity for rising to the highest 
position ... What was required was character, energy and 
ability'. He supported old age pensions, land settlement, a 
graduated income tax, the municipilisation of water and gas 
(Glasgow Herald, January 22,1906). In North West Lanark, 
Douglas and in North East Lanark, Whitehouse, were described 
as 'vigorous social reformefs' . (Glasgow Herald, December 6, 8 and 8,1910). 1 
31 Forward, January 29,1910. 
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The Liberals were not so certain of their hold on a county like 
Lanarkshire as to renounce attempts at an agreement with Labour. 
While Liberals and Labour made no agreements in Scotland to fight 
jointly (as Scotland was specifically excluded from any 
arrangements made), there were attempts locally at co-operation. 
In 1901, for example, at the time of the North East Lanarkshire 
by-election, Viscount Elibank -a Liberal Whip - favoured Liberal 
support for Smillie in preference to a Liberal Imperialist, 
Harmsworth. Indeed it seems that two radical Liberal candidates 
were prepared to leave the field clear for Smillie. But no 
(32) 
arrangement became possible In 1904 the Scottish Liberal 
Association set up a conciliation committee to examine where 
(33) disputes with Labour might be avoided, but with little success 
In 1906 the three Lanarkshire Liberal MPs were opposed by Labour 
candidates. It seems, however, that before the 1910 elections a 
more sustained effort to make an electoral pact was contemplated. 
It was suggested that the Liberals might stand down in one 
constituency (North West Lanarkshire) in return for a free run in 
another (North East Lanarkshire). An alternative suggestion was 
that Smillie move his candidature from Mid-Lanark to North East 
Lanarkshire where he would be given a clear run. As Small's agent 
recalled: 'The Liberals were almost on their knees to get us to 
withdraw Small'. But Smillie and the rest of the Labour Party were 
(34) 
unprepared to compromise We can make no negotiations with 
you', they said, 'If you really want to avoid splitting votes shift 
(35) 
your Mid-Lanark Liberal into North East Lanark' 
32 Labourieader, August 31, September 7,. 1901. 
33 Scottish Liberal Association, Executive Minutes, March 30, 
1904 and June 29,1905. Cited in Gregory op. cit., p. 91. The 
Committee had not met by June 1905. 
34 Forward, January 22,1910, January 1,1910. 
35 Forward, November 25,1909. 
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In Scotland Labour pursued a deliberate strategy of full 
independence from the Liberals and while, before 1914 it hindered 
any Labour attempts to gain parliamentary representation, it 
clearly distinguished Labour for the longer run as a distinctive 
political force. Some writers have suggested that if thd franchise 
had been available to those who were technically entitled to vote, 
and if the franchise had been extended before 1914, Labour would 
(36) 
have been in a strong position prior to the outbreak of war 
It is unlikely that such changes would have made a substantial 
difference, given Labour's failure to win substantial support 
amonst those working class voters who were able to vote. But there 
is equally little doubt that the Labour Party was establishing 
itself as a third force in Scottish politics, particularly in the 
years 1912 and 1913. For a generation, many areas had been 
influenced by socialist propaganda and when Labour performed well 
in the 1913 South Lanark by-election in a seat that was a mixed 
community of rural workers and minerý, Robert Smillie wrote that it 
showed the effect of more than twenty years of socialist activity 
during which he had personally stood in seven election or 
by-election campaigns: 
Ten years ago it would have been an impossibility. At 
that time the miners in the division would not have 
listened to their officials speaking Labour politics. 
They believed that trade unions had no right to interfere 
in politics and generally they supported the Liberal 
Party. Since then, the trade union decision, the minimum 
wage bill, the interference of the military and civilian 
oppression have opened up their eyes to the fact that the 
Liberal Party is as much the party of capitalism as the 
Tory Party. Therefore it is not surprising that hundreds 
of miners whom I have found to be Liberals a few years 
ago have now thrown up Liberalism for good and have 
openly aligned themselves with the Labour Party. 
36 See for example McKibbin, op. cit., pp72-87 and Matthýw, 
McKibbin and Kay, op. cit., p. 796. 
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The latter (Liberalism) was a tradition with them but in 
Labour they have hope ... with these men are the youths. 
These are surely with us and their allegiance is an 
indication of our inevitable success. (37) 
The period between the election of 1910 and the outbreak of war in 
1914 did strengthen the forces of Labour. First there was a growth 
in trade union membership that was unrivalled ift comparison with 
previous periods. In 1892 after the first wave of 'new unionism' 
in Scotland there had been only 147,000 trade unionists in 
Scotland, two thirds of whom were in Glasgow. Less than one in 
five of manual workers were in trade unions and two thirds of 
Scottish trade unionists were in engineering and shipbuilding, 
mining and construction. While trade union membership declined 
drastically in the last years of the nineteenth century, it grew 
quickly again after 1906, and especially after 1910. By 1911 the 
STUC's membership was twice that of 1898, wi th 140,000 affiliated 
members, and by 1914 the miners had fifty tho'usand members, the 
dock labourers 7,000 and the ironmoulders and steel workers more 
than eight thousand. Glasgow Trades Council itself in 1914 had 
more than 70,000 affiliated members and Edinburgh Trades Council 
15,000. In addition a shop assistants union, a farm servants union 
and a workers union (whose Scottish membership rose from 250 in 
(38) 1911 to-9,000 in 1914) had been formed The period saw major 
strikes amongst dockers, transport workers and miners (with the 
Scottish miners independently pursuing strike action for a 'four 
day week' as war was declared). Although a strike at Singers in 
Clydebank raised questions of industrial control over the 
workplace, Scotland did not experience the same level of 
37 Forward, March 29,. 1913. 
38 Hymah, The Workers Union, (London, 1971), p. 88. For a further 
discussion of trade unionism, see WM Marwick, A short HýsýýqrZ 
of Labour in Scotland. (London, 1967). 
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syndicalism or militancy that existed elsewhere. The Glasgow 
Trades Council was to state in its report for the years 1912-1914 
that 'the number of disputes locally have not been so many or quite 
so long, 1 a reminder that Scotland's skilled unions remained the 
most prominent and least likely in this period to engage in 
(39) 
precipitate strike action But the experience of growing trade 
union organisation in Scotland provoked, as McKibbin stressed in 
his discussion of Britain as a whole, 'issues which tended to draw 
all working class organisations together... and fostered a sense of 
(40) 
class consciousness' 
Trade union support for Labour was stimulated by the Trade Union 
Act, finally passed in 1913, which allowed for the creation of 
political funds. And from a low level of political organisation in 
1910 at the general elections, Scotland was experiencing also an 
improvement in its Labour Party machinery. After 1913, a Scottish 
Advisory Council of the Labour Party with Ben Shaw as secretary 
co-ordinated local activities, and was the successor of both the 
disbanded Scottish Workers' Parliamentary Election League and the 
alliances that had brought forward candidates in the 1910 
elections, but it did not convene a full conference until 1916. 
There were few Fabian Societies in Scotland before 1914. As WH 
Marwick ' states they 'existed sporadically', and while both the 
Social Democratic Federation and the Socialist Labour Party were 
active, especially in Glasgow 
(41) 
1 it was the Independent 
Labour 
Party that was to prosper in strength, due not least to the 
powerful propaganda of the Forward newspaper, formed by ILP members 
in 1906 and profitable after 1911 
(42) 
with sales approaching I 
39 Glasgow Trades Council, Rep rt, 1912,14p. Cited in J Smith, 
op. cit., p. 409. 
40 McKibbin, op. cit., p. 33. 
41 For a fuller discussion see J Smitý, op. cit., p. 405-420. 
42 Forward, August 31,1956. 
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20,000 (43). It had a motto, 'We - shun sectarianism as we shun (44) 
smallpox? , and allowed members of varying factions, space in its 
columns. But its writers were primarily supporters of the ILP, and 
despite -the ILP's divisions over Labour Party affiliation it 
advocated Parliamentary and Municipal electioneering. 
But while organisation was being improved, and there is, evidence we 
have , cited for improvement in membership, the war is a dividing 
line in Scottish politics, First, the social impact of the loss of 
lives at the front must not be underestimated, particularly since 
it has been estimated that 100,000 Scots, 20% of British losses, 
(45) 
died f ighting Second, the war increased unionisation to a 
level that, had not been previously seen in Scotland. It had 
reached half a million by 1918. Third, the war brought social 
advances that stimulated Labour to argue for more social reform. 
As Winter has argued, semi-skilled and unskilled workers improved 
their positions; welfare and sanitation provisions were extended; 
allowatices were given to soldiers' wives; rationing helped a 
proper distribution of goods; and health care improved. Of 
course, as he also suggests: 'It is only because urban poverty was 
so widespread before 1914 that we can claim that the war occasioned 
in general a relative and for many an absolute advance over pre-war 
(46) 
standards' 
43 Sales figures estimated from Forward reports. Cited in W 
Campbell, The OqgLný and E Development of Forward 
An Assessment of its Impact on Labour Politics 
in Glasgow, 
__1906-1914, 
Edinburgh ýffn-Ue -rs i ty Undergraduate 
Disseration, 1972, p. 21. 
44 Forward, No. 1, October 13,1906. For example, in 1910, Tor; Wr-cf carried a long debate on attitudes to the Labour Party 
between John McLean and John Wheatley. 
45 C Harvie, op. cit., p. 24. 
46 J Winter, 'A Note on the Reconstruction of the Labour Party, 
loc. cit., p. 66. 
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Finally, in Scotland the war occasioned a new level of militancy 
amongst sections of organised labour. While Scots were amongst the 
most enthusiastic of war recruits in the early months (one in five 
miners had joined by February 1915 and one in four after a year of 
(47) 
war), with voluntary recruitment proportionally higher in 
Scotland than in England, the war also brought the socialists of 
the ILP, and oth6r parties, into prominence. During the war Labour 
was to be helped by the adverse response to forms of industrial and 
military tonscription, by the growing support for a negotiated 
peace rather than 'a fight to the finish', and by the impact of the 
Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution put socialism on the 
agenda in a practical way that no other event did. It allowed 
pacifists of the left to link with those who now supported 'peace 
by negotiation' in a practical alliance that became identified with 
the Labour Party and while in the long run it created divisions 
within the socialist camp, it made in 1917 the organisation of a 
socialist party almost inevitable. 
ýhe wartime events on Clydeside, which was to house one quarter of 
a million war workers, contributed to the development of the 
left-wing of the Labour movement. In the engineers' unrest of 
1915, which led to the suppression of For, ý7ard, the howling down of 
Lloyd George, and the deportation of strike leaders, the issue was 
not so much anti-war feeling as the problem of 'diluting' skilled 
work. Hinton has written of the 'narrow craft outlook of engineers 
in 1915-161 and shown that the unrest was limited in its scope, 
extending little beyond the engineering workshops, only a dozen of 
which were controlled by the militant Clyde Workers Committee, and 
missing almost entirely the shipbuilding yards and marine 
engineering workshops. It was, he points out, the Socialist Labour 
Party Leaders Muir, McManus, Messer and Bell - and not the 
pacifist John Maclean or the Glasgow ILP leaders who directed 
(48) 
events . Maclean's anti-war stance placed him outside the ambit 
47 RP Arnot, A History of the Scottisb Miners., (London, 1955), 
p. 142.1 
48 J Hinton, The First Sho Stewards, (London, 1973), p. 140-161. 
49 
of the Clyde Workers Committee. With the failure of strike action 
we see, according to Hinton, 'the progressive isolation of the 
militant vanguard in the munitions factories ... the principal 
explanation of the failure of the shop steward movement to develop 
a political offensive against the war lies not in the consciousness 
(49) 
of its leaders but in the consciousness of its rank and file' 
The war strikes of 1915 and 1916 undoubtedly aroused resentment 
especially after imprisonment of the. strike leaders, and other 
agitators like Maclean and Maxton. *But the Independent Labour 
Party always remained at a distance from the industrial unrest. It 
drew its members from the craftsmen, the small traders, the 
schoolteachers and white collar workers (rather than from the 
engineers and more characteristic industrial workers), who played a 
prominent part in the wartime rent strikes, and it was really these 
that brought together the industrial and political wings of the 
Labour Movement. The rent strikes of the war were Scottish wide 
and not simply confined to Glasgow. They did not involve slum 
dwellers so much as the more substantial elements in the working 
class, skilled workers in the shipyards, and engineers together 
with their eminently respectable wives 
(50). Their success which 
forced the Government to appoint a departmental enquiry and 
eventually led to the Rent Restriction Act, was to boost the 
strength of the Indpendent Labour Party. Between 1915 and 1917 ILP 
(51) 
membership in Glasgow for example doubled 
49 Ibid . While Hinton's final conclusions are disputed by, for 
example, I Maclean, his discussion of the strike leadership in 
1915 is not. 
50 J Melling, Scottish Labour History__Society Journal 13. (1979), 
pp. 39-45. See also McHugh's contribution in Journal, 12, 
(1978), pp. 36-40 and Melling again in Journal No. 15 (1981) 
p. 4-15. 
51 Forward, April 12,1917. 
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The rent strike linked industrial and political action, where the 
'dilution' strikes had failed. But if the revolutionary leaderý of 
war-time militancy on the Clyde were progressively isolated, what 
they , did achieve was to develop a new form of industrial and 
political organisation which opposed the equation of socialism with 
state control and was to be important as a theoretical basis for 
the Communist Party. The growth of the shop stewards movement 
itself led Gallagher and others to advocate a form of syndicalism 
in a series of pamphlets, not least the publication 'Direct Action' 
(52) 
in 1919 
When the Commissioners on Industrial Unrest took evidence in 
Scotland in 1917 and 1918 they found that 'unrest was not as great 
as earlier in the war, ' although there remained a 'revolutionary 
element'. The main grievances they found centred on housing, where 
they detected 'a striking revelation of the acute need in 
industrial centres', and on profiteering which people felt 
(53) 
contributed to the rising costs of living However with 
compulsory conscription and with the growth of a 'peace by 
negotiation' movement, which linked itself to the small pacifist 
group that already exists in Scotland, there was a growing support 
for the left. In January 1918, when the Government threatened the 
conscription of skilled munitions workers, a strike on the Clyde to 
(54) 
force an end to the war was only narrowly averted 
52 Hinton, op. cit. , where the story of the industrial militancy 
on the Clyde is traced in detail. 
53 Commission of Enquir into Industrial Unrest, Scotland, 1917, 
Parliamentary Papers Vol. XV,, 1917-18, p. 3. 
54 Hinton, op. cit., p. 255-264. As Hinton writes the Government's 
new manpower bill threatened the conscription of skilled 
munitions ýnd I united industrial unrest with the antiý-war 
movement'. 
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The anti-war movement was not confined to Glasgow, as a commentator 
in Scottish Review confirmed: 
The strength of the hostility to militarism in Scotland 
may be -gathered from the fact that the War Party is a 
discredited minority in nearly all the Trades and Labour 
Councils north of the Tweed. Only in Aberdeen and 
Edinburgh has it been possible to secure a bare majority 
in favour of the Labour Party in the Westminster 
Parliament... in all the other Trades Councils so far. as 
I have been able- to find out the feeling is strongly 
antimilitarist and even pacifist. (55) 
That there was still considerable support for the war in areas such 
as Aberdeen was revealed by the discussions which preceeded the 
Aberdeen South by-election of April 1917. When Francis Johnson, 
the ILP National Secretar_v, asked Joseph Duncan, Secretary of the 
Scottish Farm Servants Union, to consider standing as a candidate, 
Duncan wrote in reply: 
A peace by Negotiations f ight would be an absolute leap 
in the dark. There is no UDC nor does the Council for 
Civil Liberties mean anything else than the ILP. The 
Trades Council is evenly divided and if a candidate were 
put up the Council could not be got to support him. It 
might support the Goveinment candidate, the President and 
quite a number of delegates certainly would. Except for 
the ILP there is no body in the city which would support 
such a candidate. None of the churches would give any 
aid and I could not place my hand on any electors who 
would sign nomination papers except those in the ILP or 
in close touch with it. It would be practically 
impossible to get an election committee of any size 
together as again we should have to depend on the ILP. 
(56) 
55 Scottish Review, Spring 1917. The miners for examýle were for 
peace. James Macdougall wrote that: 'at the huge gathering 
held at Hamilton, and elsewhere, solemn declarationý of 
opposition to the continuance of the war were carried with 
absplute unanimity'. The Miners ballot in Lanarkshire on 
peace negotiations recorded a vote of 18,767 for immediate 
peace negotiations and 8,249 for the continuance of the war. 
(James Macdougall, 'The Scottish Coalminer,? The Nineteenth 
CentLry and After, December 1927, p. 769). 
56 Joseph Duncan to Francis Johnson, February 28,1917. Francis 
Johnson Correspondence 1917/44/1. 
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The reason was, he said, that there was little or no munitions work 
and even shipyards had been denuded of workers who had gone to war. 
Aberdeen had, he concluded, been 'cleaned out of workers' as 
industries had 'shrunk' (57) Thus, while the ILP were still keen 
to place a peace candidate in the field, a visit by the Scottish 
organiser William Stewart led him to conclude it would 'not be wise 
to put forward an ILP candidate, the chief reason being that most 
of the Labour voters are away from Aberdeen, and that any votes 
secured would. give an inadequate expression of the real feeling of 
(58) 
the constituency on the questions at issue' Stewart's 
conclusion was right. When the Union of Democratic Control 
insisted on placing Pethick-Lawrence as a 'Peace by Negotiation' 
candidate, he received only 333 votes - 6ý. 5% of the poll. 
The Russian Revolution was the final catalyst for the socialist 
movement. While in the long run its impact was to divide the left 
in Britain into deeply entrenched factions, the first revolution 
was inspirational to socialists, leaving, for example, James Maxton 
'dumbfounded... it was what all socialists told us should take 
place... but it had come sooner than we had, expected'. Forward 
almost at once detected an upturn in support for the left due to 
(59) 
events in Russia 
The general shift to the left between 1915 and 1918 was reflected 
in the mood of the newly constituted Scottish Advisory Council of 
the Labour Party when it first met formally in 1916. The 19 16 
Conference opposed compulsory conscription, with only six of the 
three hundred delegates present appearing to have any reservations. 
57 Joseph Duncan to Francis Johnson, March 5,1917, Francis 
Johnson Correspondence. 
58 William Stewart to Francis Johnson, March 8,1917,, Francis 
Johnson Correspondence. 
59 Forward, July 14,1917. A full discussion of the impact of 
the Russian Revolution is contained in A Nassibian, 
Attitudes on Clydeside towards the Russian Revolution 
T9-f7-':: f9-24. Strathclyde University, M. Litt. 1977. 
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The Conference then went on to vote for the opening of peace 
negotiations. On the domestic front, the Conference supported a 
right to work bill 'which shall have for its object the legalising 
of a working day with a maximum of eight hours', which should be 
implemented 'in view of the disorganised state in which the Labour 
market will be af ter the war 1(60) . The Party also went on to 
express oppo. sition to government policies on housing - the issu ,e 
which as the report stated 'has largely engaged our attention' - 
but the Labour Party was precluded by its new constitution from 
affiliating to the new Scottish National Association on 
(61) 
Housing The Executive wanted a distinctive Scottish programme 
which concentrated on thr. ee issues - communal ownership of land, 
housebuilding for the working classes, and free education 
although the national party precluded them from publishing any 
(62) 
statement during the war 
Nor was the socialist radicalism of the Labour Party in Scotland 
confined to social - or indeed domestic - issues. At an Industridl 
Conference in March 1917 which was called under the au I spices of the 
joint Labour Party Trade Union Committee, 'Conference 
representing 35,000 Scottish workers congratulates the Soviet 
people on having overthrown the Czarism and sincerely hopes they 
will be able to establish the freedom of the people'. And at the 
same conference a mild motion from the platform concerning military 
service was beaten down by the ILP amendment moved by Maxton which 
stated: 'This Conference is of the opinion that no form of 
compulsory industrial service will be acceptable to workers of the 
country'. In 1917, the Party's own conference was to oppose both 
conscription and the war, and to demand the separation of the 
(63) 
-Parliamentary Labour Party from the coalition 
60 Labour Party Scottish Council, Report of Confeience, 1916, 
p. 43. 
61 Labour Party Scottish Council, Report of Executive, 1916, 
p. 7-8. 
62 Ibid. 1 p. 8-9. 
63 Scottish Council, Report of Annual Conference, 1917, p. 43. 
See also Report of IndustriaI4 Conference, March 21,1917. 
It was no surprise that the Labour Party nationally was worried by 
the turn of events in Scotland. In April 1917, Shaw, the Scottish 
Secretary, reported to Middleton at national office: 
No leaflet issued north df the Tweed would f ind 
acceptance among the more activist Labour politicians 
which did not say something in violation of either the 
truce or the coalition or both ... Unless it contained an 
attack upon the policy of the party at headquarters not 
to mention its personalities it would be looked upon with 
suspicion. 
He also expressed his worries about the proliferation of left wing 
splinter groups in Scotland: 
It is a little aggravating to f ind so many organisations 
cropping up and appealing to our clientele and more or 
less overlapping ours. It cannot be helped meantime ... 
when challenged those persons point to the fact that the 
Labour Party has no programme. (64) 
The Glasgow ILP made their own attempts at drawing up such a 
programme. In November, 1917 a 'Special Emergency Parliamentary 
Committee' drew up proposals for a manifesto for which they hoped 
to gain workshop support. Rejecting 'patchwork reforms' the ILP's 
minimum programme contained five demands: full nationalisation of 
industry, workers control, restoration of the land to the people, 
rehousing with interest-free rents, and free education for all. 
The ILP debated the programme at a meeting in November 
(65) 
. 
Emmanuel Shinwell and William Stewart moved against the original 
draft for control of work shops by the workers with an amendment 
favouring 'ownership and control by the state or community', and 
eventually another amendment was accepted favouring 'control of the 
workshop by the workers subject to the will of the community as 
expressed in their national coun cil. sl(66). 
64 Shaw to Middleton, April 3,017, NEC correspondence/Labour 
Party. 
65 ILP Glasgow Federation Minutes, November 30,1917. 
66 Ibid. 
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Organisationally however the Labour Party remained extremely weak 
during the war years and was unable to benefit fully from the 
increased unionisation of workers. The setting up of a Scottish 
Advisory Council had been demanded since the disappearance of the 
Scottish Worker's Election Parliamentary Committee and the Scottish 
Labour Party when trades councils and constituency parties 
affiliated directly to the National Labour Conference. But from 
1912, when Arthur Henderson had held conferences in the major 
cities to discuss organisation, no agreement could be reached on 
the composition of the conference and its executive. In 1913 the 
miners' in particular had objected to insufficient trade union 
representation on the proposed Council and in 1914 Glasgow Labour 
(67) 
Party had called for increases in its delegation It was not 
until 1915 that an inaugural conference could meet and set up an 
executive. But while it was constituted to improve organisation it 
had few affiliated members. At the first full conference of the 
Scottish Council in 1916, the Labour Party's national chairman, 
George Wardle said: 
The fact that they were having a separate conference, he 
hoped, meant that they ifitended to remedy what was really 
the disparity between the number of seats in Scotland and 
the number of seats held by Labour in the neighbouring 
part of the island. - He hoped that the conference would 
organise the political Labour movement in Scotland to 
lead in the matter of seats as well as in the matter of 
men. (68) 
In fact by 1917 there were only twelve trades and Labour councils 
or local representation committees affiliated to the conference; 
outside Glasgow, only from the Aberdeen, Ayrshire South and 
Ayrshire North constituencies. Labour strength rested mainly on 
the affiliation of one quarter of a million unionists. But unions 
such as the engineers, were not affiliAted, . and the miijers' with 
I 
67 The detailed problems are set out in McKibbin, dp. cit., p-91 
onwards. 
68 Labour Party, Scottish Council Conference Report, 1916, p. 26. 
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90,000 affiliated members monopolised one third of the votes at the 
conference. The next biggest affiliated unions were'the General 
Workers (19,000), the Workers Union (18,000). the Boilermakers 
(17,000) and the National Amalgamated Union of Labour (12,000). 
only half of Scottish trade unionists were affiliated. 
The miners' numerical strength was complemented by their. initiative 
in persuading trade unions to involve themselves in politics. A 
conference of principal officials of trade unions in the west of 
Scotland was held under the auspices of the miners' executive and 
the Scottish Executive of the Labour Party in 1917 to' 
(69) 
secure 
the creation of Labour representation committees or local trades 
and labour councils. The resolutions which were carried include a 
call that 'trade unions should take concerted action and should 
join all LRCs and Trades Councils and assist in forming others when 
required'. Trade unions were urged to finance branches to enable 
them to join local constituency associations after it was agreed 
that 'a much more general sustained and determined effort is 
required on the part of these unions who are politically in 
earnest... only negligence is responsible kor the lack of proper 
(70) 
allocation of the political funds of a trade union' 
There was no sign however, that Labour was preparing for any major 
breakthrough in Scotland at the post-war election. The 
correspondence of this period between Shaw, the Scottish Secretary, 
and JS Middleton at Transport House reveals that constituencies 
were hardly in a healthy state of organisation as the war ended. 
This was true in both the counties and the cities. When a 
constituency party was to be formed in East Lothian where 'those in 
the movement seem to be wanting a Parliamentary' candidate rather 
keenly' (as Shaw told Middleton in March 1917) 
(71) 
69 Ibid., Conference Report, 1917, p. 10-11. 
70 Ibid. 




I am afraid some of our people in some of the Scottish 
counties do not realise the tremendous difficulty that a 
Labour candidate in a country constituency presents and 
my own feeling is that new candidates in very new areas; 
as far as we are concerned, should not be encouraged at 
the moment ... certainly until there is adequate 
organisation and some sort of show in the way of Labour 
representation locally there should be no thought of 
propaganda parliamentary contests. In these districts I 
think there is all to be said for consolidating our 
position and having our plans laid with a view to 
bringing into the movement as many men coming home from 
the front as we can possibly secure. (72) 
Glasgow - the radical area for anti-war activity - is a touchstone 
of the organisational problems facing Labour. Before 1914, there 
had been a variety of attempts to form Labour Representation 
Committees, culminating in a meeting of 1911 which agreed to 
replace the Municipal Workers Committee (which ran candidates at 
local elections) by a Central Labour Party' to unify and control 
all election work in the districtl(73) . By 1912, when Ben Shaw was 
appointed as first organising secretary, the Party was already in 
trouble, since the Social Democratic Federation had withdrawn, and 
(74) 
the Trades Council had refused to pay affiliation fees After 
three years of war, there were only two Labour representation 
committees in existence (in the Govan and College divisions), and 
Arthur Henderson complained that Glasgow's Labour Party had 
'totally failed to meet the requirements of so large an area. ' In 
reviewing the constituency organisation in 1917, Shaw wrote that 
College LRC was 'moribund' and even Govan LRC which had selected a 
candidate in 1916, was 'unable to pay more than the ordinary 
72 Middleton Shaw correspondence, March 21,1917, NEC 
Correspondence, tabour Party Reports. 
73 Minutes of Conference to form Central Labour Party, May 18, 
1911. 
74 Glasgow Labour Party Minutes, March 21,1912. 
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expenses of the LRC 1( 
75) When delegates met to form the new 
Glasgow Trades and Labour Council at meetings in April and june 
1918, there were ninety-three trade union branches and eleven ILP 
branches represented but still only two constituency Labour 
(76) 
representation committees 
In Glasgow the political ineffectiveness of lo. cal representation 
committees allowed the Independent Labour Party to be in the 
driving seat. When the National Executive and the Scottish 
Executive discussed Glasgow in 1916, they had suggested that at a 
future election only Rollox, Govan and Bridgeton divisions should 
(77) 
be fought in addition to the Labour seat of Gorbals However 
at a meeting in November 1917 of socialist groupings in Glasgow, 
co-ordinated by the. ILP, it was reported that 'The ILP had already 
78) 
decided to fight every possible constituency'( An election 
committee and fighting fund had been set up after. Shettleston ILP 
had proposed in October 1917 that the ILP 'be called upon to take 
immediate and energetic action to provide funds to fight six 
Glasgow seats with ILP candidates (Bridgeton, Govan, Springburn, 
Camlachie or Shettleston, Gorbals or Tradeson, and St Rollox or 
Maryhill) 
(79). Their special committee had recognised that E3,000 
was required for election finance and had recommended that ten 
constituences in Glasgow be contested. But when its report was 
discussed, two additional recommendations - to fight only five or 
all fifteen seats - were also proposed. Af ter a vote the party 
(80) decided it would contest fifteen 
75 Shaw to Middleton, March 16,1917. op. cit. 
76 Glasgow Trades and Labour Council, Minutes, June 19,1918. 
77 1.4bour Party Scottish Council, Report- of Executive, 1916, 
P. 10. 
78 Glasgow ILP Executive, Minutes, February 22,1918. 
79 Ibid., October 26,1917. 
80 Glasgow ILP Federation, Minutes, November 30,1917. 
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By March 1918 candidates had been endorsed for Bridgeton, 
Shettleston and Govan (where the previously adopted candidate had 
(81) 
dropped out) But no nominations came from Central, Gorbals, 
Tradeston, Cathcart and Pollok and, as financial difficulties 
embarrassed the ILP, a limit of six seats was set. . Their election 
committee recommended that because fund raising had not been 
successful 'no Parliamentary nominations be endorsed in addition to 
the six candidates already decided upon until a sum of E1,200 is in 
the central parliamentary fund' 
(82) 
Their financial scheme of 
1(83) 1917 was 'non-existent Some finance, came from the ILP 
nationally, 
(84) but the ILP recognised that even to fight six 
constituencies involved a minimum sum of E2,000 
(85) 
, and it was 
only agreed to allow Hillhead ILP to adopt a candidate as long as 
(86) 
the Federation in Glasgow had no financial responsibility 
Despite the enthusiasm of the Glasgow ILP, there was insufficient 
financial backing to make their dreams of fighting every seat a 
reality. 
Within the trade union movement, the principal driving force was 
the miners' union - itself a federation of six main divisions in 
Scotland, which had their own constitutions, rules, finances, and 
procedures. In 1906 five of Labour's Scottish candidates were 
miners. By the end of the 1918 election campaign, the miners' had 
over thirty years spent E23,000 in fighting twenty five 
(87) 
parliamentary contests . The Scottish miners were the principal 
81 Ibid., March 29,1918. 
82 Glasgow ILP Executive Minutes, May 31,1918. 
83 Ibid., May 24,1918. 
84 Ibid., July 26,1918. 
85 Ibid., October 16,1918. 
86 Ibid. 
87 The Miners and their Political Campaigns, Forward, November 
15,1919. 
60 
trade union force in the Labour Party's Scottish Advisory Council 
and they developed a system of financing their own organisers. in 
Scottish seats. , In 1918 they placed candidates in eight 
constituencies, even in areas where there was no divisional Labour 
Party or any other Labour organisation. , One example was the 
Peebles and South Midlothian constitutency where they formed a 
divisional Labour Party in 1919 only after they had sponsored a 
candidate at the 1918 General Election 
(88) 
We have already seen how in Lanarkshire the miners' unions made 
much of the running for independent Labour representation. In 
Ayrshire the miners were the driving force also. By 1918 almost 
all the county's 19,000 miners were unionised. But it was in 
combination with the local Independent Labour Party and under the 
umbrella of the Ayrshire Trades Council that Labour representation 
was fostered. Trevis has shown how, under the influence of Maxton 
and Maclean, the Ayrshire ILP became more left wing as the First 
World War . progressed, 
(89) ' 
and after a joint meeting of the 
Independent Labour Party's Ayrshire Federation and the Ayrshire 
Trades Council it was agreed in December 1917 to fight four 
(90) 
Ayrshire constituencies Nevertheless in Ayrshire the miners 
and ILP caused resentment as they divided the four seats between 
them. In the two predominantly mining seats of South and North 
Ayrshire, two miners - the President of the Scottish miners, James 
Brown, and, the President of the Ayrshire miners, Robert Smith - 
were selected, both with the support of, and the latter on the 
nomination of, the ILP. In the other two seats, ILP nominees were 
chosen in preference to an Engineer, Robert Climie, later 
Kilmarnockys Labour MP., 'and a former local councillor-. In both 
(91) 
, cases the miners joined with the ILP to press the ILP's case 
88 See below. 
89 A Trevis, The Deve lqRment of the Labour Movement in Ayrsý ýre, 
1914-1926, p. 147-9. Strathclyde University, M. Litt., 1980. 
90 Ibid., p. 152. 
91 Ibid., p. 155-158. 
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By 1918 in fact the miners were employing four full time agents as 
(92) 
political organisers Lanarkshire, Ayrshire and the Lothians 
were the principal areas -of political activity by the miners 
organisations. In West Fife, the political organisation was also 
run by the miners, but in the rest of the county where miners were 
not so politically active there was scarcely any coherent 
organisations at all. 
Over the rest -of the country, where there were no miners or ILP 
branches, local organisation if it existed at all, usually rested 
with trades councils or more likely individual trade unions. In 
Dundee, for example, the motive force-behind Labour representation 
was the Jute Workers Union, which claimed 20,000 union members in a 
city which had a population of only 170,000. As the local jute 
worker's organiser, John Sime, was to claim in 1919, his union 'has 
been the backbone of the LRC in fees for some years' 
(93). 
92 -Forward, November 15,1919, in article Iscottish Miners and 
their Political Campaigns'. 
93 W Walker, Juteopolis, OP-cit., p. 394. 
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III LABOUR'S CAMPAIGN IN 1918 
Clearly the Labour Party were not fully prepared for anýelection as 
early as December 1918. First, the party had been divided on the 
issue of war. Second, socialists in Scotland had concentrated much 
of their energies in industrial activities with Forward having 
continually to remind its readers of the importance of political 
work. Third, the party's new constitution was. not yet fully 
established, with many divisional Labour- Parties only properly 
constituted after the election. Membership of the Labour Party and 
constituency organisations was increasing rapidly, however, during 
1918. While figures for the Labour Party's individual membership 
were not collected until 1928, one useful measure of increasing 
activity was the growth in the Independent Labour Party during 
1918. In February 1917, Forward estimated' the 'ILP had only '112 
branches in Scotland with an estimated 3,000 members. By Maf ch 
1918 there were 167 branches with an estimated 10,000 members"). 
Perhaps that was an overestimate because the ILP's own f igures 
suggest that the number of branches rose to 184 in June 1918 and to 
192 by September, with fully paid up membership rising from 4,336 
to 7,232, and membership lists rising from 5,656 to 8,904. 
However, whatever figures are taken, by September 1918 in fact the 
Scottish ILP had the largest membership of any ILP region in 
Britain. In Glasgow it was estimated that there were twenty-seven 
branches with 2,000 members (Bridgeton being the largest with 250) 
and in Lanarkshire there were fifty branches with around 1,000 
members in all. Between them Glasgow and Lanarkshire had nearly 
(2) 
one half of fully paid up members In the East, organisation 
was still patchy, but Edinburgh Central was one of the biggest 
(3) branches with two hundred members 
Forward, March 9, i918. 
2 This information comes from A Marwick: Thesis on the 
Independent Labour Paýýty. (oxford University, B. Litt., 1964). 
3 Edinburgh Central ILP, Minutes, February 28,1919. There were 
up to 60 regular attenders. 
63 
I 
There were few Labour candidates adopted by ihe time the election 
was declared. Even ten days before nominations closed, there vere 
no Labour candidates decided in eleven constituencies in which 
(4) Labour eventually stood In three other constituencies, 
Galloway, Perth and Moray and Nairn, when Labour challenges were 
expected they failed to materialise. In two constituencies, Leith 
and Glasgow Central, the chosen candidates dropped out, with only 
Leith managing to adopt a last minute replacement. In Clackmannan 
and East Stirling, the expected Labour intervention was replaced by 
a Co-operative candidature. 
In some case there were major disputes over who candidates should 
be, which had not all been resolved by the time of the election. 
John Maclean's Labour candidature for the Gorbals was only the most 
publicised of local feuds. As a British Socialist Party nominee 
who was at the time of the election in prison, Maclean's selection 
was initially refused endorsement by the Labour Party's National 
Executive Committee, although he had support within the Scottish 
Executive of the Party. In Aberdeen North, Frank Rose, the 
eventual winner of the seat, was not officially recognised as a 
Labour Party candidate although there was no other Labour 
challenger. In Dunfermline Burghs there was a disagreement over 
who in fact the official Labour candidate was. Ponsonby, the 
sitting MP claimed that he was the Labour nominee, but so too did 
William Watson, a miners' nominee who had been entered by the 
miners after the coalition government challenged William Adamson in 
West Fife. It was left to the National Executive to resolve that 
there was no official Labour candidate in Dunfermline although 
Scotsman, November 25,1918. The constituencies were Ayr, 
DunOee, Dunfermline, Camlachie, Kelvingrove, St Rollox, 
Montrose, Kilmarnock, S; uth Midlothian and East Renfrew and 
South Aberdeen. 
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Ponsonby joined the Labour Party. In Greenock the official Labour 
candidate, Shaw, was opposed by, as Forward put it, 'a freak Labour 
(5) 
candidate', who was an Irish Nationalist 
In týe two-member constituency of Dundee when the National 
Executive Committee called for a ballot of constituency members on 
whether to fight one or two seats, they found varying views which 
included support for the Prohibitionist Scrymgeour (who had: a 
Dundee Workers' Committee In support of his candidature). But 
eventually recognition was given to the sitting member Wilkie, who 
was supported by the Jute and Flax Workers, and James Brown, a 
(6) 
Trades Council member In Aberdeen where the ILP opposed 
contesting the Aberdeen North seat, the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers had taken matters into their own hands and adopted Frank 
Rose, a Journalist, whose nomination was too late for Labour Party 
(7) 
National Executive endorsement 
Roxburgh and Selkirk constituency was typical of the difficulties 
Labour faced in finding candidates and an organisational machine. 
A Labour Party branch was formed in Hawick only in November 
1918, 
(8) 
two weeks before a candidate was selected for the Roxburgh 
(9) 
and Selkirk Constituency The Divisional Labour Party 
5 While there are references to the disputes in both Forward, 
the Glasgow Herald and Scotsman reports of the campaign, the 
differences are summarised in Labour ParLy scattish Council, 
Executive 2ejLort, 1919. 
6W Walker, Juteopolis. op. cit., pp. 448-450. 
7C Phipps, The Aberdeen Town Council and Politics 1900-1939: 
The Development of a Local Labour Party in Aberde_en, 
University of Aberdeen, M. Litt., 1980, p. 136. Rose eve tua y 
agreed to accept Labour Party policy and became a member of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
8 Hawick LýLbour Party, November 7,1918. 
9 November 23,1918. 
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was only brought into being after meetings in January and February 
(10) 
1919 In the event electoral organisation consisted simply of 
purchasing some national pamphlets, hiring a hall for meetings and 
( 11) 
urging the candidate to visit the maximum number of electors 
In spite of this in 1918 it was possible to secure a unity of 
Labour forces that did not recur afterwards. Not only were 
socialists like Maclean and Macdougall accepted as candidates but 
the Labour Party's campaign 'also managed- to involve the Highland 
Land Leage and the Scottish Co-operative Committee. The Highland 
Land League had been formed in 1909, and despite the warnings of 
Scottish Farm Servants' Union, the Scottish Advisory Council of the 
Labour Party had accepted that they were representative of Scottish 
rural opinion. The League claimed'that in a poll of 5220 to nil, 
it had voted for electoral arrangements with the Labour Party and 
that it shared with Labour a joint programme for land 
(12) 
nationaiisation This agreement was to break down almost 
immediately after the election. A second was to survive, although 
it was the source of many difficulties in the twenties. The 
decision of the Scottish Co-operative Committee to form a Central 
Co-operative Parliamentary Committee was made 'in 1917, prior to 
similar decisions by the Co-operative movement for' the rest of 
Britain, Indeed the Scottish Co-operators sought great autonomy 
from the British Organisation and Labour's Scottish Secretary, Ben 
Shaw, predicted that 'the Co-operative Movement in Scotland will 
rapidly drift into politics'. While the demands for Scottish 
autonomy were frustrated by the British Conference of April 1918 
there were to be three Co-operative candidates at the General 
(13) 
Election in Scotland 
10 Ibid., Jan. uary 28,1919 and Febr. uary 18,1919. 
11 Ibid., November 23,1918. The party wrote to Labour Party 
Sddretary Arthur Henderson 'to secure a top rate speaker'. 
12 Labour Party Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1919. See 
also Scottish Review, Autumn 1918, p. 321. 
13 Shaw to Middleton, Labour Party Archieves, Transport House 
LP/SC/14/285 as cited in M Keating and D Bleiman, Labour and 
Scottish Nationalism, (London, 1979) p. 76-77. 
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But while alliances within the left were possible, financial 
problems prevented a fuller slate of candidates. On December 2, 
the Scottish Executive were advised by headquarters of 'the 
impracticability of endorsing further candidatures', after it was 
realised that 40 had been fully adopted in addition to four 
Highland League and three Co-operative candidates, and that three 
(14) 
other candidates were being suggested 
In the end there were fifty-two Labour candidates, but only forty- 
one were officially adopted Labour nominees. Four were Highland 
Land League candidates who stood with the support of Labour, other 
three were unofficial Labour. candidates, and in four other 
constituencies - Glasgow Central, Kelvingrove, Tradeston and 
Dunfermline - candidates, as was later stated, 'ran with the 
benison of the local Labour Party organisations only - their 
15) 
candidatures being of the eleventh hour'( Of the officially 
adopted candidates three were Co-operative candidates, two were 
British Socialist Party ones (Maclean and Macdougall) , and most of 
the rest were ILP members-. In Glasgow seven of the twelve 
candidates came from the ILP (in addition to the two from BSP). 
The Glýýsgpw Herald commented that this situation with nine 
socialists out of twelve candidates was 'an injustice to trade 
(16) 
unionists' 
Problems only began with the selection of candidates. Finance was 
really the key obstacle. In reporting that red flags were being 
sold to raise election funds, Forward stated that: 'the campaign is 
being handicapped for lack of funds. ' Later there was an even more 
desperate editorial claim that several constituencies would go by 
14 Labour Party Minutes of Scottish Executive Committee, December 
2,1918. 
15 Labour Party Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1919, p. 1. 
16 Glasgow Herald, November 29,1918. 
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default simply for lack of money 
( 17) 
. The Scottish Divisional 
Council of the ILP also complained about their inadequate funding. 
They received only E1,000 from the national headquarters for all of 
Scotland for the election, of which E850 only could be distributed 
in time. In Glasgow the ILP Executive complained that only E350 
could be made available in all, from various sources for each 
candidate, and they drew the National Administrative Councills- 




The Labour Party in Scotland fought under a national programme 
which emphasised the importance of peace abroad and reconstruction 
at home. But it also issued a separate Scottish manifeso in 
association with the Highland Land League, which argued that the 
principal issues affecting Scotland were land nationalisation and 
the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. The manifesto also 
stood by large scale plans for nationalisation and for the 
(19) 
introduction of a capital levy The Independent Labour Party 
in Scotland went further in its advocacy of left-wing policies. 
Their Scottish literature pushed to the fore the issues of 
nationalisation, the setting up of a national food department, the- 
initiation of a housebuilding programme with continued rent 
control, and argued that these were 'the means to. wrest political 
power from the present ruling class' 
(20) 
The rents issue was 
especially 
17 Forward, November 16,23,1918. 
18 Glasgow ILP Executive, November 15,1918. 
19 Labour Party Scottish Advisory Council, Appeal to the Scottish 
People, (Glasgow, 1918). 
20 Independent Labour Party, Election Manifestoes, contained in 
papers of Scottish Conservative and. Unionist*Party. 
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emphasised, with the ILP claiming that 'a -rent war would soon be 
raging in the country', after the expiry of the Rent Restriction 
Act 
(21) 
There were however, ideological disagreements among Labour 
candidates, and 1918 was the only election of, the inter-war years 
where Labour candidates could include people like Maclean, who 
refused to take up his seat in Parliament, and others who were 
merely advanced Liberals. In Clackmannan and East Stirling the 
Co-operative candidate announced he was in support of Lloyd 
George's reforms, and in Inverness, the Labour candidate claimed 
'he was the true representative of the principles of the Liberal 
Party. ' In Roxburgh and Selkirk the decision to place a Labour 
candidate in the field had only been because of the view that the 
Liberal voice was not fully represented locally in the election. 
In West Fife Liberals such as Guilland, the Liberal Whip, believed 
(22) 
Adamson was moderate enough to be supported by the Coalition 
In North Aberdeen, Frank Rose infuriated local ILP members by 
arguing that Germany should be punished severely; that starving 
Germans be denied food; and that conscientious objectors should be 
(23) denied the right to vote for five years As a contrast, in 
addition to John Maclean, Macdougall - the other British Socialist 
Party candidate under Labour's banner - argued that voters should 
'not be misled by attempts to reform capitalism', and in 
Motherwell, Newbold stated: Imy slogan is complete and 
unconditional surrender of capital and all power to the working 
(24) 
class' 
21 Election Manifestoes. In St Rollox for example, leaflets said 
'Your rent is to be doubled ... vote for rent restriction at 
the ballot box' . There was they said, a Imobilisation of th ,e factors battalion (which) threatened attack on the home 
front. ' 
22 Glasgow Herald, November 21,1918. 
23 C Phipps, op. cit., p. 138. 
24 Election Manifestoes, 1918. 
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Nevertheless the Labour Party managed to retain a semblance of 
unity. Collection cards for the Labour Party were issued by the 
(25) left-wing Clyde Workers' Committee Indeed, while the Clyde 
Workers' Committee had originally planned to run their own 
candidates, it had been persuaded to leave the fight to the offical 
(26) 
parties In 1918 the Labour Party label covered a multitude of 
policy positions. 
25 , Forward, November 9,1918. 
26 Forward, February 8,1918. 
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IV THE COURSE OF THE ELECTION 
The detailed course and tactics of the 1918 General Election 
Campaign await a comprehensive study. What is clear f rom our 
examination of Scotland is that the readiness to support the 
Coalition arose from the threat of Labour success amongst a newly 
enfranchised electorate. The Coalition Government's early thinking 
favoured going to the country during war-time. By September 1918 
it was in favour of an early election and a coalition for peace- 
time, after Lloyd George had 'prophesised great unýopularity for 
the government during the period of demobilisation and said if we 
had an election in the spring we might get a Bolshevik 
Government'. 
('). 
The Labour threat in Scotland was a principal 
reason for the enthusiasm for 'coupon' arrangements in 1918 and the 
'socialist menace' was an explicit theme of Coalition, and also 
Liberal, candidates throughout Scotland. Reconstruction issues 
were admittedly also to the forefront at the start of the campaign, 
and it was difficult for the Liberals of the Asquith wing to argue 
against the Coalition programme. But in Scotland at least the 
later stages of the campaign became dominated not only by the 
jingoism of the 'Hang the Kaiser' school -a war of words 
originating from Scotland - but more important also, by warnings of 
the insidious effects of socialism. Amongst the more sophisticated 
newspapers, there was an attempt to distinguish between moderate 
and extreme wings of the Labour Party but others labelled even the 
most moderate elements of the Labour Party as 'Bolshevists'. 
Forward newspaper identified this changing mood in the campaign as 
early as the third week of November, arguing that: 'The lines of 
the campaign are already apparent. Eeverybody who does not agree 
with the capitalists is already a Bolshevik' 
(2) 
. At the end of the 
first week of December, the paper commented: 
B Hall, 'Lloyd George's Timing of the *1918 Election, ' 
Journal of British Studies, 14 (1974-75), p. 121. 
2 Forward, November 16,1918. 
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The sole Coalition stunt has been Bolshevism which has 
been met in most cases by an effective counterblast, that 
Carson and Bonar Law are prime Bolshies. Nobody is 
worrying about Lloyd George and reconstruction. Everyone 
knows the election is a Tory ramp .- Labour versus Tory. 
That is the issue. (3) 
It was the Coalition Government which'made all the early running in 
the election. The announcement of the election was in Lloyd 
George's hands. The reconstruction programme was the first to be 
issued, and every candidate was faced with responding to that. The 
adoption of candidates had necessarily to be swiftly engineered and 
the Liberal associations were faced with the choice of supporting 
the Coalition candidate or readopting or adopting their own 
candidates. In fact only twelve Liberals, who were not already 
members of Parliament, were adopted by the Liberals. Most of these 
choices, it will be seen, were last minute responses to Coalition 
tactics, rather than representing any fundamental political or 
ideological differences, and some of the candidates came forward in 
seats where a Liberal member was retiring. 
The desire to defeat Labour led to an early spate of Conservative 
endorsements for Coalition candidates. It has been said of Britain 
that it was 'only the fear of Labour and strong pressure from 
Central Office including the withdrawal of financial aid that kept 
(4) 
the local parties in line' In f act in Scotland at a national 
and constituency level Coalition was enthusiastically embraced by 
the Conservative and Unionist Party. While Bonar Law urged 
Scottish Conservatives to give support I to the candidate who in 
your honest opinion is likely to support the Government' in a 
speech in St Andrews Hall in Glasgow on 25 November, 
(5) 
the 
Ibid., Detember 7, ' 1918. 





1978), p. 141. 
5 Llas-MH Herýld, November 27,1918. 
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Western Divisional Council of the Conservatives had already gone 
further, unanimously declaring that, 'this council welcomes the 
continuance of the Coalition during the period of reconstruction 
following the war, cordially approves of the policy ýutlined by Mr 
Lloyd George and Mr Bonar Law and urges upon Unionist electors in 
each constituency the importance of giving loyal and wholehearted 
assistance to those candidates who are recognised as supporters of 
(6) 
the Coalition Government' 
At a local level Coalition was no less enthusiastically embraced. 
In Gorbals it went as far as supporting the Coalition Labour 
candidate George Barnes and forcing the withdrawal of the Unionist 
(7) 
candidate, Lovat Fraser As the Glasgow Unionist Association 
report declared, _ 
Unionists were: 'called upon to combat the 
pernicious doctrines of bolshevism as represented by Mr John 
McLean. After careful consideration and consultation with Mr 
Andrew Bonar Law and other leaders of our party it was decided we 
(8) 
should support the candidature of Mr George Barnes In 
Berwickshire and Haddington, the Unionist Council supported the 
Coalition Liberal, Hope, as 'the one most representative of what 
was best for the. common weal'(9). In Dundee, the Unionist 
Executive supported both the Liberal, Churchill, and the Labour MP, 
(10) 
Wilkie Roxburgh and Selkirk Unionists agreed to give support 
to Munro, the Liberal Secretary for Scotland 
( 11) 
. and Ross and 
Cromarty Unionist Association unanimously supported the Liberal 
6 Scottish Unionist Association, Western Divisional Council, 
. November 
9,1918. 
7 Scotsman, November 23,1918. 
8 Glasgow Unionist Association, 6th Annual Report,. January 27, 
1919. 
Scotsman, November 21,1918. 
10 Ibid., November 25,1918. 
11 Ibid., November 21,1918. 
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candidate, MacPherson, after he had been nominated by the Ross and 
Cromarty Liberal Association, despite the fact he had no 
(12) 
coupon In Dumbarton the Unionist candidate dropped out after 
the Unionist Association gave support to the Coalitionist Taylor, 
who had been supported and named by the National Democratic 
Association also, and considered himself a Coalition Liberal with 
NDP support. In Partick the Unionists supported the Coalition 
(13) (14) Liberal 9 as they did in Dunfermline In Dumfries, the 
Unionist Association first agreed to support the Independent 
Liberal, Dudgeon, and it was the Party Whips who asked it to put 
forward a Conservative candidate ' against Guilland 
(15). 
In 
Bridgeton, although McCallum Scott, the Liberal, was seen as 
radical 
(16) 
. the Unionist, Hutchison, stood down in order to 
(17) 
support him as a Coalition Liberal . In these instances, it can 
be seen that far from being drawn into a Coalition ticket, Scottish 
Conservatives embraced Coalitionism enthusiastically and in some 
cases Gorbals, Dumbarton, Ross and Cromarty, Dumfries and 
Dundee were prepared to go beyond the lines laid down by the 
party managers. Indeed the Coalition Unionists on the ground went 
further to consider supporting Liberals outside the Coalition. In 
East Fife early on in the campaign a decision was taken by the 
Unionist Executive not to oppose Asquith. The GlasSpýý Herald 
reported on 22 November that the Unionists had 'resolved by a large 
majority not to provoke a contest in view of Asquith's support for 
the Coalition principle'( 
18). (It wa s only after his Huddersfield 
12 Ibid., November 22,1918. 
13 Glasgow Herald, November 28,1918. 
14 Ibid., November 20,1918. 
15 Ibid., November 18,1918. 
16 Ibid., December 13,1918. 
17 Glasgow Unionist Association, 6th Annual Report, January 27, 
1919. 
18 Llýý&ow ! Lerýjld, November 22,1918. 
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speech at the beginning of December that this mod changed). And 
in South Midlothian and Peebles, the Glasgow Herald reported on. 25 
November that the Unionist Association had agreed not to oppose Sir 
Donald MacLean 
(19). 
Correspondence between MacLean and Sir-Henry 
Dundas, of the Unionist Association, led to Dundas asking MacLean. 
if: 'He was prepared to give whole hearted support to the proposed 
Coalition Minister and equally to Lloyd George' . Even when the 
reply stated that while full support would be given over peace and 
reconstruction, MacLean would never give an 'unqualified pledge' to 
any party because he did not consider himself a delegate to 
(20) 
Parliament, Unionist support was still forthcoming 
There were areas of disagreement between Liberals and Unionists but 
many of these were quickly resolved. Originally the Perthý 
Unionists had invited Skelton to be their candidate, but later by a 
majority the Unionist Association went back on this decision and 
agreed not to oppose the Liberal, Young, despite his programme for 
( ZI) 
state housing, social welfare and state control of land The 
Galloway Unionists who had been expected to adopt their own 
candidate, in the shape of Colonel Baillie of Broughton and Cally, 
supported insteead the Liberal MP for Kirkcudbrightshire. Here the 
circumstances were reversed since Galloway was a new seat uniting 
the previously separate Wigtownshire and Kirkcudbrightshire 
(22) 
constituencies In Argyll, the Unionist Association 
reluctantly agreed to the withdrawal of the MacLachlan of 
MacLachlan as Unionist candidate in favour of the sitting Liberal 
MP. The MacLachlan said he had accepted that Lloyd George, Bonar 
Law and George Barnes desired that 'the supporters of the coalition 
should not oppose each other' 
(23). 
19 Ibid., November 25, * 1918. 
20 S 
. 
ýcotsman, Novembdr 23,1918. 
21 Scotsman, November 25,1918. 
22 Ibid., November 18. 
23 Ibid., November 20. 
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In Lanarkshire, the Rutherglen Unionist Association 'recorded a 
strong protest' against the Liberals selecting a candidate without 
(24) 
consultation with the Unionist Association But they 
eventually agreed to the decision. In East Aberdeenshire the 
Unionists intended at first to put forward their own candidate 
against the incumbent Liberal MP, Cowan, but in the end agreed to 
(25) 
support the Coalition banner under his name In North 
Aberdeen, - the Liberal MP, Pirie, waý eventually supported but only 
following questions by the Unionists about his support for the 
(26) 
Coalition After much rancour, Captain Radcliffe, the 
Coalition Unionist candidate withdrew in Central Edinburgh to allow 
a Coalition Liberal to fight Labour. In Inverness, there was 
repeated contact between the Unionists and the Liberal 
Coalitionist, Morrison (later Lord Morrison) , since the 
Unionists 
were dissatisfied with his views. But the problems were, overcome, 
not least because of the intervention of Bruce of the Highland 
League Party, who claimed that he was representative of 
(27) 
Liberalism 
In all these areas the problems had not been insuperable. In very 
many instances Unionists had actively backed Liberal choices either 
unanimously or by a majority, despite in some cases the radical 
programmes being advocated by their choices. In others this 
positive enthusiasm had been absent but Unionists -had fallen into 
line in face of the need for unity. The extreme instance, which 
tested Unionist acquiesence to the limit was Cathcart where Sir 
Alexander Shaw had been chosen as Unionist candidate. He had 
issued his manifesto before he received a telegram on 20 November 
that: tthe Prime Minister's Whips have claimed the right to run the 
24 Scotsman, November 21,1918. 
25 Ibid., December 9,1918. 
26 Ibid., November 20,1918. 
27 Ibid., November 30,. 1918. 
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recognised Coalition candidate in the Cathcart division' . On 22 
November, the Cathcart Unionists protested against this decision 
which had been made without consulting the candidate or the 
Association within the constituency. They decided to adopt Shaw as 
representative of the Coalition and announced that they 'would 
rather lose the seat' than be represented by the Liberal Coalition 
candidate, Pratt. It was only pressure from Bonar Law that made 
Shaw withdraw. In a public letter on 4 December he stated that he 
withdrew 'in order to preserve the seat for the Coalition 
(28) 
candidate' 
In a number of other seats the Unionists undoubtedly were keen to 
reach agreement with the Liberals, even though agreement escaped 
them. There was no real desire to have their own candidates and 
only peculiar local circumstances frustrated the desire for unity. 
This can be seen by looking at three particular constituencies - 
Forfarshirej Greenock and South Ayrshire (in which constituency a 
Labour victory eventualli ensued). In Forfarshire, the Unionist 
Association asked the sitting member, Falconer, to sup. port the 
Coalition and to repudiate his vote against the Government in the 
Maurice Debate. The Unionists' support for an arrangement came 
because as the Unionist President stated, 'there were rumours in 
the county of a Socialist and Labour candidate taking the field ... 
a threatened three cornered contest would almost certainly result 
(29) 
in the return of the Socialist candidate' But Falconer's 
reply was that he would support the Coalition's reconstruction 
programme while 'reserving the right of independent action with 
regard to particular measures when they were submitted to 
Parliament', and he argued that the responsibility rested on the 
Unionists 'if by putting forward a Unionist candidate your 
committee secure the transfet of a Liberal seat to the Socialist 
(30) 
Party' In thL event the Unionist Executive in the 
constituency recommended Falconer's adoption but while Conservative 
28 Glýýpw Herald, December 4,1918. 
29 Scotsman, November 22,1918. 
30 Ibid 
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Central Officer were prepared to add Falconer to their list of 
Liberal coupon candidates, the General Committee of Forfar 
Unionists were not sufficiently satisfied with his answers, and 
overturned their Executive's advice. Thus Captain Shaw was adopted 
(31) 
as an official Coalition candidate 
The position in Greenock proved even more difficult, as two Labour 
candidates claimed Labour endorsment and two right wing candidates 
claimed Coalition support. While Sir Godfrey Collins, the sitting 
Greenock Liberal member, claimed to support. the Coalition, the 
Greenock Unionists initially found him unacceptable. When the 
Unionists adopted an alternative, Chapman, Collins argued that 'the 
London Tory Caucus had marked down the active Liberal members. 
But it transpired that Collins' predicament was more the result of 
(32) 
accident rather than design .. In fact Sir George Younger was to 
write apologetically to Collins stating that he found Collins' 
rejection 'a painful political experience'. Younger explained that 
a certain portion of seats had been allocated to Coalition Liberals 
in Scotland, after they had prepared a list of those they desired 
to fight. He and Pratt on behalf of the Scottish Liberals had been 
negotiating on the basis of that list and 'Greenock was never asked 
then at all'. It was only, said Younger, 'at the final meeting', 
that demand for Greenock had been made, too late for Younger to do 
(33) 
anything but secure neutrality in the contest Thus Chapman, 
the Unionist candidate, declared himself to be 'the resolute 
Coalition candidate' and 'an out and out supporter of the Prime 
Minister', while Collins took the Coalition line also and on his 
return to Parliament supported the Coalition. 
31 Glasgow Herald, November 23,1918. 'Forfarshire was one of the 
six additional seats Younger recommended for Coalition Liberal 
endorsements. 
32 Scotsman, November 25,191.8. 
33 Glasjýow Herald, November 26,1918. 
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In South Ayrshire, the Liberal candidate was Robertson but he found 
himself faced by a Unionist, Brigadier Pollock McCall, and an 
Independent Conservative, Wallace. The quarrel was as much between 
these last two as between Liberal and Unionist; the choise of 
Pollock McCall, a local landowner, had been made in-preference to 
(34) 
Wallace who was a leading member of the Orange Order . Wallace 
who stood as an Independent deplored the failure of the Unionists 
to support the Liberal, Robertson, to prevent a Labour victory but 
when McCall offered to stand down if Wallace did so, there was no 
response. All these candidates supported the Coalition and it was 
in the end Wallace's determination to stand that was the main 
(35) 
stumbling-block to unity 
on the Liberal side, however, there was just as much desire for 
agreement as there was on the Unionist side, despite the Liberals' 
resentment about the calling of an election and the use of the 
coupon. The Liberals felt an election was unnecessary, and they 
were particularly opposed to the coupon, but most of them werd not 
against the Coalition. Under Liberal rules, it was strictly a 
matter for local constituencies who their candidates were to be, 
and many local Liberals were perfectly willing to support 
Conservatives to defeat Labour. The real problem was that there 
had been so many Liberal seats in Scotland before 1918 that no 
matter what the Unionists conceded, these concessions seemed 
insufficient. The granting of thirty coupons to Scottish Coalition 
Liberals had been a condition of Lloyd George's agreement for 150 
Liberal Coalition candidates in Britain. Thirty coupons out of 
seventy four seats (including the University constituencies) seemed 
to Lloyd George a generous settlement, although the Coalition 
(36) Liberal Whip, Guest, felt it inadequate 
34 A Trevis, op. cit., p. 161. 
35 GlasEow Herald, December 11,1918. 
36 X Morgan, Consensus and DislLility, (London, 1979), p. 33. 
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From the Unionist side Younger accepted Guest's view and suggested 
to him that he might have additional endorsements in six more 
seats. As he wrote to Bonar Law, 'I felt all along that in most of 
the constituencies ... it would be far better to put up a Coalition 
(37) 
Liberal than a Coalition Unionist' 
In any case the Liberals were partly upable to take advantage of 
these Conservative offers because of the Weakness of their 
organisation, both nationally and locally. The Scottish Liberal 
Association was in a state of flux in 1918, on its way to being 
reorganised as the Scottish Liberal Federation. In October. 1918, 
the retiring Office Bearers of the Scottish Liberal Association 
agreed that 'no objection would be taken to waiving their right of 
winding up ' the organisation in its present form as the 
organisations that had appointed them had practically ceased to 
exist' 
(38) 
The General Council had been unable to meet the 
previous month 'owing to the fact that none of the organisations 
had been properly reformed and delegates had not been appointed to 
the Executive of the General Councilt. The National Secretary had 
called an executive meeting nevertheless, although the process of 
reorganisation was only half completed simply because of the 
(39) 
probability of a general election 
The Liberals neither wanted nor were ready for election. The 
Executive Committee in September claimed that it was 'not demanded 
(40) 
by public opinion and would imperil the unity of the country' 
37 Younger to Bonar Law, ABL, papers 95/4 cited in A Cuthbert, 
'Lloyd George and Conservative Central Office'q in A Taylor 
(ed. ). Lloyd George : Twelv! j E2j; j1Xs. (London, 1971), p. 176. 
38 SLA Meetings. of Office Bearers, October 2,1918, 'to consider 
arrangements for membership of the General Council'. 






In fact the general view among Liberals was that all Liberal 
candidates should be supported whether Coalitionist or otherwise. 
Thus the Glasgow Executive agreed that they would 'support all 
Liberal candidates in the Field'. This was in line with Asquith's 
earlier statement that he would not countenance the setting up of 
any Liberal candidate against any Liberal who has been adopted: 
'Liberal against Liberal is to my mind suicide'. The Scotsman 
noted as the campaign began: 
That the Liberals who look to Mr Asquith as their 
leader seemed to a large extent to be avoiding contests 
with Liberals who are also avowed supporters of the 
Coalition Government. 
Only in Hamilton did it appear that Coalition and Asquithian 
Liberals would be opposed. 
As the campaign developed, a surprising number of local Liberal 
Associations proved to support the Coalition outright, leading the 
Glasgow Herald to ask the Asquithian Whip Guilland to explain why 
'about half the Scottish Liberal candidates ... refused to 
fight 
the election under his management' 
(44) 
. This unkind jibe was very 
near the truth, since so many local associations looked to the 
Coalition rather than to him for leadership. The following local 
associations in fact declared without reservation for the Coalition 
: Inverness, Ross-shire, Coatbridge, Central Aberdeenshire, Bute 
and North Ayr, Kilmarnock, Clackmannan and East Stirling, 
Clackmannan and West Stirling, Dunfermline, Central Glasgow, West 
Renfrewshire, Galloway, Paisley, Shettleston, Lanark, Clydebank, 
Bothwell, Linlithgow, Partick, Perth and Kinross, Greenock and 
(45) Kelvingrove In Paisley for example the Liberal. MP, McCallum, 
who had not been awarded a coupon was put-under local pressure to 
44 
_Glasgow 
Herald, Deýcember 1,1918.. 
45 List compiled from examination of Glasýgqw Herald and Scotsman 
reports of November and December 1918. 
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stand as a Coalitionist. He decided to announce he was 'a 
whole-hearted supported of the Coalition' after his Liberal 
Association had shown 'a strongly expressed desire that he would 
support the Coalition without the qualification of Liberal' 
(46). 
In fact on the ground it seems Liberal Associations were prepared 
to support not only Liberal Coalitionists but in cases Coalition 
candidates who were Conservatives. In at least ten constituencies 
the local Liberal Ass9ciations offered to support the Unionist 
candidate usually on the grounds that the anti-socialist vote 
should not be spilt. The ten were : Clackmannan and East Stirling, 
Bothwell, Hamilton, Aberdeenshire Central, Linlithgow, Bute and 
North Ayr, Shettleston, Glasgow Central, North Midlothian and 
(47) 
Peebles and Coatbridge In most of these constituencies there 
was no Liberal candidate in the field but in some seats the Liberal 
candidate withdrew. In North Midlothian it took the casting vote 
of the Chairman to decide that no steps should be taken to look for 
a -candidate. In Bothwell, Linlithgow and Shettleston the Liberal 
(48) 
withdrew In West Stirlingshire, while the Liberals originally 
foýced Cunningham Graham to withdraw in favour of the Unionists, 
they reinstated him after the Unionists refused to place thier 
(49) 
candidate before a joint selection conference 
In fact just prior to the election the situation changed as the 
Liberals decided on last minute interventions. On 28 November, the 
Gla2gow Herald claimed that 'within the last few days Liberal 
candidates have been rushed into every constituency where it is 
46 Scotsman, November 21,22,1918. 
47 List compiled from Scotsman and Glasgow Herald, November, 
December, 1918. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Scotsman, November 20, December 6,1918. 
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thought that their interventions would bring the defeat of 
Coalition candidates Scotland provides numerous instances' 
Indeed the paper claimed to detect 'a new movement initiated by 
Asquithian Liberals for an alliance with Labour' 
(50). In fact what 
was occurring was a hardening of Liberal opinions against the 
Coalition, expressed more clearly in Asquith's speech at 
Huddersfield at the end of November, when he described the 
government as 'a junta' which was proscribing Liberal members and 
which Vas in danger of backsliding on its pledges of reforms. The 
result was to disturb severely but not destroy Unionist and Liberal 
co-operation against Labour. In Glasgow in early November for 
example, it had been predicted that the two parties should share 
out the constituencies amicably, and the Conservative candidate for 
Kelvingrove expressed the widespread Unionist frustration when 
these 'unofficial though strenuous efforts to prevent any contests 
between Unionists and Liberals' broke down. He had no hesitation 
in saying that: 'an arrangement could have been come to by which 
all parties would have been satisfied and which in particular would 
have recognised the claims of sitting mps to be returned to 
(51) 
Parliament' On top of Asquith's remarks, the Unionist 
Association's reluctance to stand down in Cathcart, made relations 
between the two parties difficult. Thus early in December some new 
Liberal candidates were adopted by some constituencies although at 
the same time some Liberals who considered fighting other seats 
thought better of it. The local arrangements for pacts suffered a 
set-back but were not destroyed. Eventually the alliance between 
Unionists and Liberals was limited but still operated widely. It 
was the Liberals who suffered from the limitations which mainly 
they had imposed. In Glasgow five sitting Liberal MPs lost their 
seats in the election. 
50 
_Glýýsgow 
Herald, November 28,1918. 
51 Ibid. 
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At the end of November Asquith claimed that too many Coalition 
candidates were Unionists and that the coupon had been unfair to 
the Liberals. It was Sir, George Younger in particular who was 
charged with what later was called 'the Scottish grab' on the part 
of Unionists, but his reply was that 'only thirty-four candidates 
put forward by the Unionist organisations have achieved official 
recognition. There are three or four cases in which that official 
recognition has not been recorded. It does not seem to be much of 
an extreme number ... In Scotland alone fifteen candidates were 
asked either by me or by the local associations to stand down in 
(52) 
the interests of the Liberal supporting the Coalition' The 
Liberals had been unable to find candidates because of their own 
weakness and in the event there were not thirty but only 
twenty-eight couponed Liberals. Liberals could often only threaten 
ineffectively to put forward a candidate and the partial breakdown 
in the later stages of the campaign of the desire for agreement 
between the two parties created a vacuum which Conservatives came 
forward to f ill. Events in Glasgow show this. The initial plan 
had. been to put forward in the fifteen seats six Liberals and six 
Unionists with three Labour or NDP candidates, although a barrier 
in the way of its realisation was the personal unpopularity of some 
of the individual Liberal MPs. In the election only three Liberals 
had Coalition support and there were eleven Unionist candidates, 
with George Barnes a Coalition Labour candidate in the Gorbals. In 
addition, in East Fife the unofficial Conservative, who was 
determined to oppose Asquith, eventually received official backing. 
The granting of thirty coupons to Scottish Coalition Liberals had 
been a condition of Lloyd George's agreement for 150 Liberal 
Coalition candidates. Thirty coupons in 74 seats seemed to Lloyd 
(53) 
George a generous agreement, although Guest felt it inadequate 
52 Glasgow Herald, December 7,1918. 
53 K Morgan, op. cit., p. 33. 
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Younger then suggested to the Coalition Liberal Whip that he might 
have additional endorsements if he chose to put up candidates in an 
extra set of Scottish seats East Fife, East Edinburgh, 
Forfarshire, Paisley, South Midlothian and Peebles, all seats where 
it seemed to him far better to put up a Coalition Liberal than a 
Coalition Unionist' 
(54) 
In fact, after all this it was hard to distinguish the Independent 
Liberals from Coalition support. An examination of their election 
manifestoes suggests that there were amongst the Independents those 
who would support the Coalition unreservedly, those who would 
support the Coalition until the peace settlement was reached, those 
who would support the Coalition as long as it kept to its manifesto 
and legislated for 'reconstruction'. Many uncouponed Liberals 
called themselves Coalition candidates and the only objection many 
had to the Coalition was the tactic of issuing coupons. For 
example the Govan candidate, Holmes, claimed to be 'the true 
Coalition candidate' . The Kelvingrove candidate MacPherson found 
it his 'first duty to assist the Coalition government'. Erskine 
Hill in North Lanark was 'strongly in favour of a national and 
Coalition solution' . Sir William Robertson in South' Ayr stated 
that 'adhesion to the Coalition Government did not involve any 
sacrifices whatever of the Liberal cause and principles'. 
54 Younger vigorously denied what was called 'the Scottish Grab'; 
the general Unionist feeling was that in 'error', six extra 
seats were handed to the Liberals. R Blake, 
The Life and Times of Andr&w Bonar Law, 1858-1923, (London, 
1955), p. 393. 
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In Kinross and West Perthshire, Gardiner called himself a 'Liberal 
Coalitionist' who 'whole-heartedly supported the programme outlined 
by the Premier'. In the Western Isles although he stood as 'an 
advanced Liberal' retaining his liberty of action and opposed a 
Liberal candidate, Coutts, who had been given the coupon, Murray 
promised whole-hearted support to the Government in solving the 
great international problems. Some, like Campbell, the Bute and 
North Ayr candidate, seized on Bonar Law's statement that support 
should be given to candidates who supported the Coalition to argue 
that 'pledged candidates claim no preference over Liberals but the 
reverse 1(55) . 
Many Liberal candidates managed to support the Coalition while at 
the same time arguing for more radical measures of social reform. 
only a few were agressively anti-coalition. In West Edinburgh for 
example, Hogge would not side with Asquith or Lloyd George but 
insisted he was 'absolutely independent ... his political 
faith was 
Liberal* faith'. While supporting nationalisation, Cunningham 
Graham declared himself in East Stirlingshire a Liberal supporter 
of the coalition 'to try its hand with the solution of the great 
problems of reconstruction' . Even the Asquithian Liberal Chief 
Whip, Guilland, who was 'determined not to go back to the Commons 
with his hands tied', said 'he would support the Coalition 
Government in all Liberal measures conceived in the right 
(56) 
spirit' 
With candidates in only half of the Scottish constituencies, the 
Liberal organisation on the ground was still poor. There was to be 
55 Quotation extracted from Election Manifestoes, 1918. 
56 Scotsman, November 22,1918. 
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little help available from the Scottish Liberal headquarters. As 
early as 11 November, a circular from the Secretary of the 
Liberal's Eastern Executive had stress the 'necessity for agents 
getting their own literature, canvas cards and speakers secured 
(57) locally' 
In all, apart from those with the coupon, there were thirty-f ive 
Liberal candidates, three of whom stood as Coalition Liberals 
without Conservative opposition and after their successful election 
supported the Coalition in Parliament. There was one independent 
Liberal in Hamilton who stood without the support of any 
organisation. Of the other thirty-one, twenty were in fact sitting 
Members of Parliament, and thus there were only eleven new 
candidatures from Liberals not MPs. In four constituencies Liberal 
fought Liberal - in Aberdeenshire and Kincardine East, Berwick and 
Haddington, Caithness and Sutherland, and the Western Isles. 
At the poll, there were thirty-four Coalition Conservatives with 
coupons, twenty-eight Coalition Liberals, two from the National 
Democratic Party and one Coalition Labour candidate, Barnes. Their 
views were in fact not substantially different from those Liberals 
without the coupon. Morgan has suggested that 'the coupon election 
was not a story of jingo emotion at all : on the whole it was 
relatively quiet' 
(58) 
. But in Scotland the story was somewhat 
different. Gideon Murray, who won the St Rollox seat as a 
Coalition candidate, was to put it rather differently : 
57 SLA, Eastern Executive, November 11,1918. 
58 K Morgan, op. cit., p. 41. 
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Any candidate who was not prepared to bring the Kaiser to 
justice ... and in f avour of exacting the largest sums 
possible from the Germans ... had little chance of being 
returned to Parliament. (59) 
And a tendency gradually become clear to equate anti-German feeling 
with anti-socialist emotion in a way that isolated Labour. 
A sign of, how the campaign disintegrated can be gleaned from the 
two election manifestoes issued by Taylor, the Coalition candidate 
in Dumbarton Burghs. His first manifesto of November stressed 
social reform. By December he issued a second manifesto to 
'develop my policy in full owing to the fact that I have been 
deprived of the right of free speech at my public meetings'. - In 
this he reiterated his support for progressive reform, including 
rent restriction until new housing was built, state control of 
land, and pensions of E1.00 weekly at 65. But the weight of his 
attack in December was upon 'the extreme Bolshevist views of those 
at present controlling the Labour Party', attacking: 'the ILP 
attitude towards unspeakable horrors, their silent accepthnce 
without protest of such atrocities as the sinking of the Lusitania 
and hospital ships ... these people are Bolsheviks and Bolshevism (60) is class war. Class ascendance of any kind is autocracy' 
59 G Murray, A'Man's Life, (London, 1936), p. 237. Murray claimed 
that when his Labour opponent claimed: 'we would never get 
anything out of the Germans by way of compensation, that cost 
him a great many votes and it was useful to me'. (p. 237). 
60 Quotations extracted from Election Manifestoes, 1918. 
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The anti-pacif ist, anti-German, anti-Kaiser propaganda was doubly 
effective. The attack on pacifism put the Labour Party, divided as 
it was on the issue of war, in a weak position. The Jingoism of 
the Lloyd George Coalition created a superficial and albeit 
temporary sense of national unity against a foreign power. But 
there was little doubt as to whom this emotion was actually 
directed against. Barnes used the techniques effectively; He was 
one of the first to demand that the Kaiser be hanged. But his 
propaganda in the Gorbals was effectively against Bolshevism. He. 
described himself early on as the anti-Bolshevist candidate. He 
had left the Labour Party, he told a local audience on 29 November, 
because MacLean had come into the constituency as a Bolshevist 
candidate. It would be cowardly, he stated, on his part to have 
run away and to have left the field to the Bolshevists. If anyone 
was disposed to label him or call upon him to label himself, he 
(61) 
wanted nothing better than to be called 'anti-Bolshevist' 
As early as 18 November, Lloyd George had warned of 'the menace of 
revolution'. In the next week, Horne in Hillhead elaborated it, 
arguing there were: 'a number of men who had no other interest 
except to tear up society by the roots and they had got to guard 
against such men who were more vociferous than their numbers 
warranted' 
(62) 
. The hawkish Mitchell Thompson was not slow in 
attacking the section of the Labour Party 'which was Republican or 
Bolshevist'. And Winston Churchill adopted in Dundee a stance 
which he was to maintain later in his long career. 'If this 
country', he said, 'had been full of John Macleans we would have 
been captured by the Huns'. Shaw in Kilmarnock was no less 
vigorous. 'If the Labour Party had been in power at that date 
(63) (1914) we would not have been safe for a real democracy' 
61 Glýýj gov? Herald,. November 30,1918.. 
62 Election Manifesto, 1918. 
63 Glasgow Herald, December '14,1918. 
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The proposal to nationalise land, McKinder stated in Camlachie, was 
(64) 
straight Bolshevism' on the last day of the campaign Lloyd 
George fulminated that Labour was being run 'by the extreme 
pacifist Bolshevist group'. 
Perhaps McKinder, the Conservative Coalitionist, put the issue more 
succinctly, on 10 December in deriding his mild Labour opponent as 
'Bolshevist' . He: 'earnestly hoped that Glasgow will give such a 
vote on Saturday as 4ill tell the rest of the Country that this 
great city, where Bolshevism is thought to be rife, is in fact very 
far indeed from generally endorsing such ideas ... in face of such 
a position it seems to say the least of it a pity that Asquithian 
Librals should be challenging Coalitionists on comparatively minor 
(65) 
issues' 
To sustain their campaign, the Scottish Unionist Association 
produced separate Scottish propaganda material in the form of 
twelve pamphlets. Five of them emphasised the Coalition's positive 
programme including promises for better housing, industrial health 
and safety, a better deal for the agricultural labourer, a lasting 
peace, imperial preference and generally for a better Britain. Two 
attacked the Liberals, one arguing that Asquith 'failed to back our 
boys at the Front', and the other going even further : 'Mr Asquith, 
who was as Prime Minister responsible for these appalling errors 
and their appalling results, is now asking for your confidence and 
your vote. You have seen how his leadership brought the empite to 
(66) 
the edge of disaster' 
But the main weight of Unionist propaganda was against both 
Bolshevism and Kaiserism. One of 'the certain definite aims of the 
coalition' was 'to punish the authors of these brutal systems ... 
to make it impossible for the criminals ever again to obtain power 
64 Glaýsgow Herald, December 4,1918. 
65 Ibid., December 11,1918. 
66 Scottish Unionist Association, General Election Literature for 
Scotland, 1918. 
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and influence in Europe or elsewhere'. 
of 'every crime against God and man'. 
said one pamphlet, were 'the trustees 
vote must be used not for: 'merely se 
class purpose. There is a duty to the 
The Germans had been guilty 
Women voters in particular, 
of the silent'. The women's 
lfish purposes nor ever for a 
, (67) dead 
The Socialists were labelled as supporters of Germany; one 
pamphlet entitled 'Pacifists are Black-legs' emphasised: 
Amongst the leaders of a section of the Labour Party ... 
are black-legs to the nation. They would willingly go 
behind the backs of the nation and particularly the backs 
of our fighting men. Throughout the war they tried to 
open negotiations with the Germans while the nation was 
fighting with Germans for its life ... they would 
have 
robbed the nation and their fighting men of their 
victory. 
Even now, a follow-up pamphlet claimed, the socialists were trying 
to open up communications with the Germans 
(68) In fact, the first 
pamphlet set the theme for the rest: 'What Bolshevist Revolution 
has done for Russia it would like to do for you' - 'every voter, 
man and woman, should read and re-read every word in this circular. 
If you want to make certain they shall not bring these terrible 
timep to you and yours, vote for the Coalition candidate'. The 
sixth pamphlet promised the abolition of cards and coupons 'to 
recover our freedom'. There would be less officialdom: 'The 
theoretical socialists of the ILP and LP whose policy is the 
nationalisation of all industry means all the controlled business 
67 Ibid . 
68 Ibid. 
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multiplied ten fold ... the millenium is "tickets for everything 
and officials to look after evervthinQ. all the time". ' . The 
pamphlet then stated there would be a 'coat controller to choose 
(69) 
coats for you' 
The anti-German issue was a facade around which to build a national 
unity against the Labour Party and when the results were declared 
most of the victorious MPs made it clear that the Socialist issue 
was more important than the German one. At the close of voting, 
the Glasgow Herald editorial writer asked: 'Is it surprising that 
the Country is unsympathetic to the Labour Party when it tolerates 
in its ranks those orders and disciplines of the new 
(70). 
71 Bolshevism There was, the paper had written two days 
earlier: 'nothing compromising in the attitude of Labour ... 
Nationalisation was the "blessed word" at meetings. The principles 
of Bolshevism alienated many electors who have been inclined to 
sympathise with the Labour propaganda' 
(71). The Scotsman summed up 
the results as proving the sanity of the electorate and 'their 
determination to have nothing to do with revolutionary and 
(72) 
Bolshevist methods' The Coalitionist victor in Bothwell said 
(73) 
'he made this fight one against Bolshevism and Socialism' 
Hope in Haddington had explicity described his Labour opponent as 
(74) 'an out and out Bolshevist and Socialist' The' electorate 




70 Glasgow Herald, December 14,1918. 
71 Ibid., December 16,1918. 
72 December 30,1918. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Glasgow Herald, December 30,1918. 
75 Ibid. 
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Barnes stated that the greatest threat facing 
Bolshevism, (76) and Barnes said: 'I believe the 
lost a great chance. If the Labour leaders 
Bolshevists of the country they would have had 
seats to their credit'. Pratt. the Liberal 
the country was 
Labour Party has 
had fought the 
a large number of 
Coalitionist in 
Cathcart, stated that: 'a line was being drawn between those who 
wish to model the state according to consýitutional usage, and 
ýhose who wish to adopt violent means which involved the tremendous 
risks they had seen illustrated in Russia'. Churchill concluded 
that the result was 'a condemnation of tyranny whether it be 
(77) 
Bolshevism or Kaiserism' 
What then was the success of the anti-sbcialist strategy? As Table 
1.3 shows the 1918-election results testify to the beginning of the 
new alignment in modern politics.. Labour which managed only 24,633 
votes in 1910 increased its vote ten fold to 285,585, just over one 
quarter of a million votes, or 22.9% of the votes cast. In 
contrast the Liberals managed only 163,960 votes, almost half its 
1910 total. 
TABLE 1.3 
Election Results in 1918 
% Vote 
Scotland U. K. 
Labour 22.9 20.8 
Liberal 15.0 13.0 
Conservative 32.8 38.6 
Coalition Liberal 19.1 12.6 
Even if the Coalition Liberal vote were added, the party's vote was 
little more than its 1910 total, although twice as many people 
7_6 Scotsman, December 30,1918. 
77 Scotsman, December 30,1918*. 
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voted in 1918. But perhaps the best illustration of the changing 
base of Liberal and Labour support is to examine the average votes 
achieved for each candidate who stood. 
TABLE 1.4 










Source: FW Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 
1918-1945. (Glasgow, 1968). 
Clearly, Labour was doing better than Independent Liberals but when 
the vote of Coalition Liberals was added, and allowance is made for 
the four seats in which Liberal fought Coalition Liberal, the 
Liberal average is still slightly smaller than that of Labour even 
allowing for the fact that in some seats there was no Conservative 
opponent to the Liberal. 
The position for the Liberals looks even worse if the 
twenty-three-party contests in which Liberal, Conservative and 
Labour Parties were in contention are examined. In all but three 
cases, Edinburgh West, Motherwell and Ayr, the Liberals were pushed 
into third place, and in none of the twenty contests did they win. 
And despite the Liberal desire for independence manifest during the 
later stages of the electoral contest, there were twenty-four 
contests where no Liberal candidate was in the field. 
In terms of parliamentary representation the -Liberals were 
decimated. Of twenty-one Liberal MPs who stood in Scotland without 
the coupons, only four survived, two of whom had not been opposed 
by the Coalition and of the other two, Hogge in East Edinburgh had 
declined to call himself an Asquithian, and in Paisley, McCallum 
had agreed in the end to fight under the Coalition banner. 
95 
No Liberal who stood without Coalition support survived in Glasgow 
or Lanarkshire. In Glasgow the Liberal position was desparate. 
Three Coalition Liberals survived as MPs but all the other Liberal 
candidates, as well as being defeated, had with only one exception 
also lost their deposits. Overall, the Liberals without the 
coupons had received only 5% of the vote in Glasgow. 
With the defeat also of Asquith in East Fife Independent Liberals 
were thin on the ground; of those who had been elected, many were 
not pro-Asquith. However, the operation of the pact had secured 
seats for Coalition Liberals in almost all of Scotland's rural 
constituencies and they had also as a result held on to the urban 
seats. Coalition Liberals won twenty-five of the twenty-eight 
contests which they entered. Seven had been returned unopposed and 
in almost all the other cases they had been faced only by a Labour 
opponent. The Coaltion Liberals won three Glasgow seats, the two 
Renfrew seats, Dumbarton, Dunfermline, Rutherglen, Kilmarnock and 
Dundee. - But their main strength was in the rural areas - they had 
won all the Highland seats (except Western Isles) and most of the 
North Eýst and Border seats. 
The Conservatives did better in 1918 than in previous elections. 
Between them, couponed and non-couponed, Conservatives secured 
thirty seats, gaining one third of the vote. Their vote was only 
fifty per cent higher than in 1910, but this simply reflected the 
fact that they did not stand in about half the constituencies; 
their average vote in contested seats ran at nearly 10,000, 
substantially higher than that of the other parties. Of the 
Party's, seats, the most striking characteristics was Xhe extent to 
which they had secured a middle-class base. Eight seats which they 
won in 1918 were to be retained throughout the twenties - they were 
the most middle-class seats of Glasgow, Ayrshire, Aberdeen and 
Edinburgh. Most of 'their seats were concentrated in mining and 
industrial areas, outside urban middle-class areas six in 
Glasgow, five in Lanarkshire, the two Stirlingshire seats, 
Midlothian North, and Linlithgow, almost all of which went Labour 
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in 1922 or 1923. The party was virtually absent from the rural 
areas, winning only Aberdeenshire Central, Forfar (where -its 
candidate was not coupon6d), East Fife (where no candidate had the 
coupon). Thus in 1918, the Conservatism in Scotland relied for its 
strength primarily on a middle-class base of support; it had yet 
to secure any major presence in the rural areas of Scotland. That 
had to await the elections of the nineteen-twenties. 
As early as '4 December, the ElýLsgow Herald had remarked that: 'the 
struggle is in fact gradually resolving itself into a trial of 
strength between the Labour Party and the Coalition, with the 
Asquithian Liberals in the position occupied by Labour at the last 
election' . On 16 December, the Herald, which believed Labour 
prospects 'were dimmed in the last few days of the campaign', still 
believed that the Labour Party would win twelve seats in Scotland, 
and named Springburn, Shettleston, Bridgeton, Linlithgow as well as 
Hamilton, Central Edinburgh, West Fife, Govan and Dundee as some of 
their predictions for Labour gains. The Conservative weekly, the 
Baiilie predicted f ive Labour gains in Glasgow alone. In f act 
Labour won only seven Scottish seats, two of which - Dundee (the 
two member seat 'where Churchill was only one right wing opponent) 
and West Fife - it already held. The party's five gains included 
Hamilton and South Ayrshire, where there were three pro-Coalition 
candidates in opposition to the Labour challenger, and in both of 
which the Labour candidate recieved a minority of the votes. But 
the wins in Govan, Edinburgh Central and North Aberdeen (where Rose 
had not been fully endorsed by Labour) were impressive. What was 
as impressive was Labour's performance in other seats where it was 
only narrowly defeated. In nine seats - some of which had a strong 
mining vote - Labour was a close second : Dumbarton, Bridgeton, 
Shettleston, Springburn, West Renfrew and South Midlothian, 
Stirlingshire West, Bothwell and Linlithgow. 
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Labour gained over a third of the vote in : Bridgeton, St Rollox, 
Springburn, Camlachie, Coatbridge, Bothwell, North . Lanark, 
Rutherglen, Linlithgow, Dumbarton District, South Midlothian, West 
Renfrew, West and East Stirling. 
How important was the Irish vote that favoured Home Rule in 1918? 
By 1922, there were just over 600,000 Roman Catholics in Scotland, 
90% of which were of Irish extraction 
(78) 
* Throughout the twenties 
anti-Catholic groups were to fulminate against the growing 
influence of the Irish, the Glasgow Herald in 1929 arguing against 
'the threat to Scottish nationality of the growth of the racially 
Irish element in the Community'. But the Catholic community was 
concentrated in the West of Scotland - over 20% of the population 
of Glasgow, Motherwell and Paisley while only 2% of the population 
(79) 
of a city such as Aberdeen From his study of the new 
electorate in 1918, Kinnear suggests that outside Glasgow there 
were eighteen Scottish constituencies where the Irish vote exceeded 
(80) 
15% of the electorate, ten where the Irish vote exceeded 30% 
With thQ removal of the barriers to a full registration of the 
working class vote, the Irish vote became more important 
statistically than it was before 1914. But could it decide the 
course of elections? All major parties made a commitment on the 
Irish issue that took them far beyond the positions they had 
supported in 1910. The Coalition manifesto which recognised that 
while it was not possible forcibly to submit Ulster to a Home Rule 
78 Glasgow Herald, March 23,1929. 
79 J Macaffrey, in D MacRoberts (ed. ). Scottish Catholicism, 
(Edinburgh, 1980), p. 230. 
80 M Kinnear, The British Voter, p. 130. 
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Parliament, promised to 
settlement 'on the basis 
promised self-government 
'freedom for Ireland ... 
suggests a measure of de*y 
'explore all practical paths' towards a 
of self-government'. Asquithian LibeFals 
as a 'statutory right'. Labour promised 
as democratic rights', in effect as Tobin 
(81) 
olution within the Empire 
Throughout the rest of Britain, the United Irish Leage supported 
individually proven allies, ensuring that many Irish mandates went 
to Asquithians rather than Labour. In Scotland, however, the 
United Irish League, while claiming to support old Liberal allies 
also, unanimously resolved that Labour was 'the most worthy of our 
confidence ... the best agency' for the pursuit of Irish 
(82) 
freedom 
The Irish list for Scotland contained twenty-six Labour candidates 
and fifteen Liberals. In Glasgow this implied support for six 
Labour candidates and five Liberals and in Lanarkshire for four 
Labour candidates and five Liberals. Prominent Liberals including 
Asquith, MacCallum, Sir Donald Maclean and McKinnon Wood received 
(83) 
Irish support But the Irish list was ineffective not least 
because there was dissatisfaction locally at the award of the Irish 
coupon. In Dunbartonshire, local Irish members rebelled against 
(84) 
the Liberal Allen and supported the Labour candidate, Martin 
In Hamilton, where the Irish Party reaffirmed its support for the 
81 For a study of manifestoes on the Irish question, see M Tobin, 
op. cit., p. 88-90. 
82 Ibid., p. 91. - 
83 Glasgoý Herald, December 7,1918. A full list of Irish League 
backed candidates is contained in this edition. 
84 Ibid., Decembdr 9, IM. 
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Liberal MP, Whitehouse, there was a strong movement of Irish 
support in favour of 
'the Labour candidate Duncan Graham 
(85) 
However, only one Coalition candidate - Keith in Hamilton 
(86) 
attributed his defeat to the Irish vote In the West of 
Scotland in particular the Irish vote may have helped to increase 
the Labour vore in areas such as Dunbartonshire, Lanarkshire and 
Glasgow and so diminished the anti-Bolshevist propaganda that 
characterised the election. 
In 1918 the Irish vote did not sway seats to Labour and the 
Liberals. Most of the Liberals it supported did extremely badly, 
(87) 
some losing their deposits 
Arguing the poll was unnecessarily low because of deficiencies in 
(88) 
the register and the inability of ex-servicement to vote, 
Labour could take comfort from the fact that a mere 6% swing to 
them would produce another ten seats. As James Maxton concluded, 
the result was: 'very satisfactory considering the wave of jingoism 
in the land. In the meantime the Labour movement had much to do in 
the industrial field and in the field of pol, t, csl(89) 
85 M Tobin, op. cit., p. 92. He argues that 'analysis of the 
election figures by the pro-Labour Irish Catholic Press did 
indicate a lack of consistency in following UIL instructions 
to support Asquithians in preference to Labour'. 
86 Scotsman, December 30,1918. 
87 E. 1,1! jILow ILerald, December 7,19 18. 




89 Glasg2w Herald, December 30,1918. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ADVANCE OF LABOUR - 1919-1921 
I THE THIRD WAY 
The years between the General Election of 1918 and 1922 mark the 
arrival of the Labour Party in both local and national politics in 
Scotland. They witness the biggest advance that the party has seen 
in its sixty yearlong history - with a quadrupling of Labour 
representation in local government between 1914 and 1920 and 
spectacular Parliamentary by-election successes in both 1919 and 
1921. In 1911, the last elections locally before the war, Labour 
had increased its local representation to 200 representatives on 
local and parish councils and school boards. By the end of 1920 
Labour had nine hundred councillors or representatives - 340 local 
councillors, 473 parish councillors and 85 education authority 
members From 1919 onwards few doubted that Labour would win 
dramatic gains in parliamentary elections. 
But Labour's advance was uneven and occurred in an economic and 
social context that was changing from the high expectations 
generated by the return of peace to the dwindling hopes of security 
ushered in by rising unemployment. At an ideological level, the 
political debate within the Labour Movement oscillated from support 
for direct action - even syndicalism - to support for traditional 
parliamentary methods. In Scotland, as we shall see, a compromise 
position which protected the parliamentary wing of the Labour 
Movement was the most strongly and successfully advocated and 
became dominant by 1920. Rising unemployment had made a 
syndicalist position even less attractive. What had been an 
aggressive movement for power became a defensive and protective 
response to depression and the threat to living stindards. The 
disaster*of the miners' "Black Friday" followed by the failure of 
the 1922 Engineers' strike confirmed the weakness of the industrial 
left. 
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Despite defeat in the General Election of 1918, much ground had 
been gained and with a larger vote, more education and more 
propaganda, the Labour view was that the country could be expected 
to turn further to Labour in the near future. With the growing 
threat of unemployment, the chronic bad housing and a new political 
awareness amongst sections of the industrial workforce and those 
being demobilisQd, an immediate programme for action seemed to be 
needed. It was this need that raised the question of direct action 
and syndicalism and of the role the extra-parl i amen tary left would 
play in the development of Scottish politics. 
The Independent Labour Party 
. 
had made the running in traditional 
Labour politics in Scotland throughout the general election. In 
1918, their most prominent Scottish theoretician, John Wheatley had 
considered in detail what attitude the Labour Movement should take 
to syndicalism, revolution and direct action generally. Writing in 
Forward in what he called 'an examination of some current criticism 
of ILP policy' he had argued that: 'the people of this country may 
have socialism when they consider it worth'their vote ... the workers 
if they desire may during the present year elect a socialist 
government'. He went on to reject both syndicalism and revolution: 
I fail to see bow whether morally justified or not a 
popular revolt in present circumstances could be 
successful in Britain while political power is held by 
the capitalists ... a bloody 'revolution is far too slow 
whether viewed from the standpoint of democracy or 
expediency. I prefer the ILP policy of relying more upon 
brains than bullets. (2) 
In reply to criticisms from the left, Wheatley was to emphasise his 
position that political action was most important to securing 
working-class power. He had been ! anxious not to minimise the 
2 Forward, January 25,1918. 
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value of industrial action' , he claimed. But his main concern was 
'to impress upon the workers of this country the tremenýous 
(3) 
importance of political power' 
However the defeat of Labour in a general election which gave the 
Coalition Government such a massive majority in Parliament,. created 
a new situation. Forward had remarked in June 1918 that 'the 
General Election will decide whether we are to establish our 
liberty by constitutional or unconstitutional means', and it began 
to offer implicit support for direct action in the wake of defeat 
(4) 
at the polls As the paper remarked, as early as 18 January 
1919, industrial action was: Ithq longest way round and the 
roughest. They have the right to make their fight in the way that 
seems best ... having missed the parliamentary opportunity there is 
nothing else for it meantime than to fight industrially'(5). 
The problem for the ILP was to hold the centre of the stage, and in 
the absence of elections, that required a new appreciation of the 
relationship between political and industrial action at a time when 
the left was split into numerous factions. Within the Labour Party 
there were three prominent schools. Af irst led by Clynes and 
Thomas - and supported in Scotland by such MPs as William Graham 
and William Adamson - argued against any direct action and wanted 
to confine industrial strike activity to purely industrial ends. 
While Adamson was the most senior advocate of that school of 
thought, in Scotland the running for it was made by men like 
William Graham recently elected as Member of Parliament for Central 
Edinburgh. In 1919 William Graham's position led to bitter 
(6) divisions within his own constituency . At a meeting in 
3 Forward, April 4,1918. 
Forward, June 20,1918. 
5 Ibid., January 18,1919. 
Edinburgh Central ILP Minutes, June 16,1919. 
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which the Chairman was unseated (and later resigned), a motion that 
William Graham 'did not deserve the support of the working class' 
was put. Graham only survived by thirty-six votes to twenty 
(7) five (The Edinburgh Central ILP branch voted to join unity 
talks with BSP, SLP and Communist Workers' League 
representatives 
(8) 
and to send a delegate to the BSP Provisional 
Committee Conference in June 1919. ) 
However the problem was that parliamentary action was too obviously 
ineffective, as even Ramsay Macdonald was not slow to argue in a 
regular column he wrote for Forward, and at the Labour Party's 1919 
Conference, there were strong complaints that 'the PLP was not 
doing its real work as a political weapon' and that 'politics is 
too serious to be played with by trade union officials', such as 
the existing Labour MPs. Even strong parliamentarians like Herbert 
Morrison argued that the PLP 'has failed in voicing the aspirations 
on great national questions of principle' and others claimed there 
was little difference between Labour and Liberals. The 
Parliamentary Leader, Adamson, had as his only defence that 'their 
first duty, their chief work... was to put the view of Labour as 
faithfully and intelligently as they possibly could'(9). 
The Parliamentary Party was in fact a major embarrassment for those 
who supported Parliamentary Socialism. In June 1920 the Scottish 
Executive complained the party in Parliament had mustered only 19 
7 Ibid., June 9,1919. There had been some resignations from 
those who claimed that the ILP was iperely 'a reform party. 
Graham's principal. antagonist was R6ber. t Foulis, who had-stood 
as a Labour candidate in 1918. 
8 Edinburgh Central ILP Minutes, June 16, -1919. 
9 Labour Party, Report of Annual Conference, 1919, p. 164. 
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votes against the rent bill. Later the Executive went further, 
complaining about the 'extreme dissatisfaction at the attendance 
record of the present parliamentary Labour members in the House of 
Commons': 
The Executive, ... calls upon the National Labour Party to 
take immediate opinion on these matters as the state of 
affairs is seriously prejudicing Labour's prestige in the 
country. ( 10) 
A second school, within the syndicalist tradition, supported direct 
action as the only course for achieving a fundamental 
transformation of existing society. This separation of industrial 
and parliamentary or municipal politics ran counter to the 
traditions of the ILP and the Labour Party in Scotland, although 
its advocates ranged across the various political parties, the 
British Socialist Party (BSP), the Socialist Labour Party (SLP) and 
the shop stewards' movement. Hinton writes that a substantial 
proportion of the Communist Party's new recruits 
, 
of 1920-21 were 
more in favour of syndicalism than of the Bolshevik idea of a 
vanguard party, which they had not fully grasped. Thus he 
concludes that 'the characteristic and distinguishing feature of 
communism in Britain during 1919-21 was not the idea of the 
revolutionary --party but the idea 'of soviet power'. While Hinton 
argues that during the war years the shop stewards' movement had 
pursued neither a strategy for alternative union organisations nor 
for amalgamation of existing unions into 'industrial unions' and 
had thus failed to create any alternative organisation to existing 
unions, by 1920 the revolutionaries in Scotland had embraced a 
theory of 'soviets' as alternatives to the existing political and 
industrial structures and as vehicles for the capture of political 
power. But they were not united, some working tbrough existing 
t 
10 Labour Party, Scottish Executive Minutes, June 14,1920. 
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unions, some arguing for an extended 'Triple Alliance' and others 
for alternative workers' organisation. Indeed Direct Action which 
argued not simply for workers' committees in'industry but also for 
'social committees' in communities was one of the upshots of the 
discussions of-the period. But as Hinton concludes: 
In their efforts to promote unity by placing the struggle 
for soviet power at the centre of the political agenda 
the shop stewards could not avoid revealing their own 
isolation from the mass of the workers. (11) 
The novelty was the emergence of a third way. It was a courýe 
embraced by Macdonald, Forw; ýrd, the ILP in Scotland, and some 
trade union advocates. Smillie was probably the most prominent 
supporter. He was a member in 1918 of the ILP and of the Scottish 
Committee of the Labour Party, as well -as being the recognised 
leader of the Scottish miners. The basis of the third way was to 
continue to stress the importance of parliamentary activity, to 
urge the Labour Party in Parliament to become more effective, and 
to emphasise, the importance of propaganda and organisation as a 
means of developing socialist consciousness. But the hinge of the 
strategy - and its novelty - was its support for direct action as a 
means of bringing the existing Parliament and Government into line 
with its constitutional responsibilities to the majority in the 
country. Direct Action was not an alternative to Parliament, but a 
complement to it. As 1919 and 1920 progressed, support for 
industrial action inherent in the third way could give ground to a 
renewed emphasis on political organisation. But the flexibility of 
its approach allowed Labour and the ILP to hold the political 
centre in Scotland, as militancy first increased and then declined 
after the events of January 1919 showed it to be ineffective. 
In February 1919 in an article entitled, 'ILP Stocktaking', Forward 
set out its zitguments in favour of 'a coming together ... an agreed 
programme of action'. It believed that capitalism had strengthened 
itself as a result of the war and election, and while Labour was 
11 J Hinton, The First Shop Stewards, op. cit. p. 320. 
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restless and wanted to-kick, the danger was that it would dissipate 
its workers in disconnected strikes( 
12) 
. In the pre-xiar era,. it 
suggested, industrial and political democracy had been isolated 
from each other; the failures of trade union leaderships had 
nurtured the unofficial movement which had 'developed the weapon of 
industrial action' so that the industrial movement could now claim 
'an independence of and equality with political democracy ... the 
control of the workshop by Labour is as important as the control of 
Parliament by Labour' Yet the two problems could not be made 
separate: 'Socialism remains the guide ... under socialism the 
control of the workshop must be such as to give the worker a sense 
of liberty ... the full doctrine of workshop control and industrial 
democracy can be stated only when the community of the workshop is 
set in the wider commun ityl(13) . This article offered a defence of 
industrial action within a wider commitment to Parliamentary 
politics. Johnston, Forward's editor, later remarked direct action 
was 'justifiable in a democracy where a minority prevents the 
majority from exercising its will', and the justification was that 
14) 'it can compel constitutional action by a govermnentl( 
Surprisingly perhaps Ramsay Macdonald put himself at the head of 
this movement for the third way. While careful to say that he was 
? as far from being converted to anti-parliamentarism as I ever 
was'. he argued: 'this Parliament has no moral authority. When 
political opposition is crushed by fraud or force industrial 
15) 
organisation is the only defence that is left'( Macdonald was 
extremely 
12 Forward, February 1,1919. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Forward, September 28,1919. 




careful to state he was no syndicalist: 
For the Labour Party to say no politics, no Parliament, 
direct action and nothing else would not indicate the 
intelligence they would want in order to guide the 
country for the next twenty years. (16) 
Nevertheless he believed that: 
The problem of the political strike has nothing to do 
with the constitution. The only question is: Is it 
practicable? Will it be effective? In some cases it 
will fail, and in some cases pass beyond itself into 
revolution. ( 17) 
In September 1919, he argued that in the next six years, Labour 
must be in authority to carry out major reforms, and that direct 
action was 'a means of gaining a political end'and therefore a part 
of political action'( 
18). 
Maxton also at this time took the third approach: when he was 
asked to judge an essay competition, 'Can Industrial Action bring 
the Socialist Commonwealth? If so how? ', he concluded 'the more 
reasonable course is a combination of industrial and political 
(19) 
action' It was also the attitude taken by the leading members 
of the STUC. When they met in April 1919, the President claimed 
that on the Russian question they had: 'to use industrial action 
to break the Government ... As a constitutionalist he did not 
advocate this policy in a light-hearted fashion. Such a policy 
should not be necessary... but strong measures were necessary to 




17 Forward, July 5,1919. 
18 Forward, September 20,1919. 
19 Forward, July 6,1919. 
20 Forward, April 26,1919. 
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In 1919 the third way emphasised the use of direct action to bring 
Parliament and the Government into line with the majority in the 
country. But as time went on the emphasis changed: it began to be 
argued that a general election offered the more effective means of 
bringing about this end. Macdonald began to persuade Smillie and 
others to support political rather than industrial pressure for 
nationalisation of the mines. By March 1920 Smillie was arguing 
that nationalisation was a political question and ineffective 
strikes in an attempt to achieve it would seriously damage Labour 
politically. He added, however, that he would envisage a Labour 
government having to call a general strike in support of 
(21) 
Parliament Behind these shifting views lay the critical 
experience of events in 1919 and 1920. 
21 Forward, March 20,1920. 
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ii THE JANUARY 1919 STRIKES 
For all his exaggerations of the dangers of militancy leading to 
revolution, Sir Basil Thomson accurately judged the mood of Britian 
in late December 1918 and early January 1919. Writing at the end 
of 1918, he argued that 'the shadow of the general election has 
weighed heavily on, the revolutionaries. .. revolut , ionary meetings 
have been few'('). Later he added: 
The heavy defeat of the extremists at the general 
election is having the effect that was anticipated. On 
the pleas that the House of Commons cannot be trusted to 
give a fair hearing to the grievances of the working 
class, they are all for direct action and they are 
snatching at th 
'e 
opportunity offered by the unrest in the 
army to further corrupt its morale in the hope of 
bringing revolution nearer. (2) 
The widespread strikes in January 1919 were therefore extremely 
important. While events for a time threatened to move completely 
out of control of the official leaders of the Labour movement, in 
the end by managing, to regain control they set the course for the 
triumph of parliamentary politics in Scotland. The future shape of 
the left in Scotland was conditioned by the responses and reactions 
to the industrial militancy of the early months of 1919. The 
movement for strike action on the "forty hours" question threatened 
to cut off the official leaderships from the rank and file and 
increasingly the official leaderships had to yield to the demands 
of unofficial groups. The movement showed how the left would be 
split throughout the twenties - but the decision in January 1919 of 
the Scottish and British miners not to strike, the pressure of 
union officials, and the absence of effective leadership led to a 
dissipation of activity. With the defeat of 'direct action', a 
renewed interest in political and parliamentary activity developed. 
I Cabinet Papers, 'Revolutionary Organisations on the UK, GT 
6603, December 30,1918. 
Ibid., GT 6654, January 13,1919. 
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The "forty hours" strike was to be far more of a Scottisý than 
simply a West of Scotland event, than commentators haVe so. far 
acknowledged. Its history began not -with the end of the war but a 
long time before this. The 1916- Scottish Advisory Council of the 
Labour Party had supported a right to work bill 'which shall have 
for its object the legalising of a working day with a maximum of 
eight hours' . This was advocated 'in view of the disorganised 
state in which the Labour market will be af ter the war' 
(3). In 
1917 unions such as the Engineers began to mobilise in support of a 
forty hour we&k. Throughout 1918 a joint committee of the STUC and 
the Labour Party considered what action they might take. In March 
1918 at a joint conference in Glasgow the forty hour week was 
(4) 
supported While the STUC voted for a thirty hour proposal at 
their conference, a further joint conference in June decided to 
support a forty-four hour week immediately and a forty hour week 
(5) 
after the war . When the Scottish Conference of the Labour Party 
reconvened in September 1918, it was the ILP who made the running 
with a thirty hour week proposal. For the ILP, Stewart argued they 
wanted socialisfa, 'not a little reform here and there' , but Trade 
Union Executives, delegates were told, supported a forty hour week, 
and the 'Scottishý Executive's own recommendation for a forty hour 
(6) 
week was accepted by 46 votes 
Direct action was all the more inevitable because in 1918 there was 
no possibility of legislative action to secure a reduced working 
week. The Ministry of Labour believed the matter was entirely one 
3 Scottish Conference Report, 1916, p. 43. 
.4 Labour Partyj Scottýsh Council, Executive Report, 1918, 
- p. 16-17. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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for employers and workers in different trade unions who should 
negotiate on it separately. It told the STUC this in December 
1918. Following a special STUC meeting in December which agreed on 
a series of policy demands, the Labour Party's Scottish Executive 
and the STUC's Parliamentary Committee met jointly to resolve 'to 
use every means to unify the forces of labour to bring about a 
reduction in the working hours to a maximum of forty hours a week 
or eight hours a day'. The Parliamentary Committee of the STUC was 
(7) 
entrusted to deal with the situation 
The forty hour demand seemed to unify the whole movement but 
unofficial groups threatened to move far more quickly, and with 
more determination, than the STUC. The Ways and Means Committee, a 
product of the shop stewards' movement on the Clyde, called 
together on 18 January delegates from shop steward's committees from 
all over Scotland to consider strike action not for a forty but a 
thirty hour week. A Joint committee around the Glasgow Trades 
Council, on which the Clyde Worker's Committee and the STUC 
Parliamentary Committee were represented, also favoured a thirty 
hours demand, although only after a close vote, and Shinwell, then 
Chairman of the Glasgow Trades Council, reported that the matter 
was held over in order to try to unite on demands acceptable to all 
workers. He said the movement was 'not revolutionary in character' 
nor 'inspired by the legitimate demand ... for more leisure. 
'It 
was attributable solely to the fear of unemployment in the near 
'future and the desire to make room for the men from the army and 
navy'. He said that only the concession of a forty hour week - 
(8) 
with no loss of wages - could avert a stoppage 
7 Scottish Trades Union Congress, Annual Report, 1919. 
8 qlaýý_gow Herald, 23 January, 1919. 
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The STUC decided though only on the casting vote of 'the Glasgow 
Trades Council Secretary, Shaw, to retain their representativý- on 
týe joint committee; and it also called a consultative conference. 
The unofficial movements had seized the initiative from union 
leaders, the Labour Party and the STUC. While Hugh Lyon, Secretary 
of the Commercial and Motormen's Union who sat on the STUC 
Parliamentary Committee argued that 'the people were not divided on 
the forty hours question ... merely divided on the action to be 
taken', he had to concede that the rampant dissatisfaction on the 
Clyde made the position of officials extremely difficult. As Lyon 
was to suggest, strike action was 'to a certain extent hurried by a 
certain section' . In response the aim of the STUC's Parliamentary 
Committee's Consultative Conference was 'to make the general strike 
a complete success'(9). 
A number of unofficial and official disputes were already in motion 
in January, and official negotiations were taking place on demands 
from railmen, miners and engineers for better working hours, as 
well as wage increases. There were disputes in Dundee, Aberdeen, 
(10) 
and Glasgow as well as those involving soldiers in Stirling 
The railmen were negotiating for an eight hour day and the 
engineering and shipbuilding trades for a 47 hour week, the Iron 
and Steel Confederation for an eight hour day, textile workers for 
a 45 hour week, and municipal employees a 44 hour week. Miners 
were putting in a demand for a6 hour day and a 30% increase in 
wages In these circumstances it was hardly surprising perhaps 
that national unions like the Engineers (who were later to suspend 
their Glasgow District Secretary, Harry Hopkins) the National Union 
of -Mineworkers, and the Transport Workers and-, Scottish Union of 
(12) Dock Labourers were against immediate action 
9 Glasýow Herald, January 23,1919. 
10 Scotsman, January 10,1919, Also January 13,1919. 
11 Ibid., January 16,1919. 
12 
. 
LLýgoK H2ralý, January 24,1919. 
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But while the profile of industrial demands was confused and 
varied, some unions did come out in favour of a-general stoppage. 
The Association of Iron Moulders of Scotland was favourable towards 
this, the union's officials being some of the most militant in 
(13) 
Scotland ýhe Electrical Trades Union also supported the 
(14) * 
stoppage The Operative Bakers Union offered general support, 
although it also wanted to wait to examine the course of 
events 
(15). 
The National Union of Clerks favoured a 3Vi hour week 
* (16) but supported the forty-hour stoppage Af ter a meeting of 
delegates on 23 January the Scottish Brassmoulders Union supported 
strike action; 
(17) 
the Irondressers Union followed as did the 
Amalgamated Society of Toolmakers, 
(18) 
the Shop Assistants Union, 




the Dye Workers and Kindred Trades 
In Dundee the Trades Council favoured strike action 
(2 1) 
and the 
National Union of General Workers in Dundee 
(22) 
organised for the 
strike. In Aberdeen the Executive of the shipbuilding trades were 
defeated by their members on strike action and resolved to call for 
a joint committee of the Aberdeen Trades Council to organise 
action. Clydebank, Coatbridge and Dumbarton Trades Council all 
13 Ibid., Also January 23,1919. 
14 Ibid., January 27,1919. 
15 Ibid., January 23,1919. 
16 Ibid. 




Herald, January 25,1919 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, January 24,1919 
22 Ibid., January 25,1919. 
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gave support as did a Greenock Committee, formed af ter a mass 
(23) 
meeting attended by Shinwell In Arbroath engineers voted to 
strike as did the branch of the Workers' Union, if others were to 
(24) 
f ollow 
The position in Edinburgh was more confused. An unofficial Forth 
Workers' Committee was formed to organise strike action amongst 
(25) 
shipbuilding and engineering workers One of the moving forces 
behind it was Robert Foulis, who had been Labour candidate in 
Midlothian and Peebles at the 1918 election and was later to join 
the Communist Party (and to be involved in a dispute over his 
recognition as a candidate for the 1922 election). Edinburgh 
Trades Council endorsed the "40 hours" resolution and agreed to 
(26) 
wait for a decision by the STUC Edinburgh and Leith ASE and 
the Amalgamated Union of Labour also both favoured the "40 hours" 
(27) 
movement and agreed to wait for the advice of the STUC The 
ASE decision was that if the congress resolved on a general strike, 
the men would fall in with the movement. Plans for general 
stoppages to take place from 28 January at Leith shipyards were 
announced. But while a meeting of 2000 strikers took place on 29 
January, the Edinburgh Trades Council Executive decided not to 
support the strike. As this event was on, the brassfounders, 
electricians, engineers, ironmoulders, iron and steel dressers, and 
weighing machine makers in Edinburgh were out, some officially and 
some unofficially. But the Chairman of the Trades Council 
Executive argued that caution had been thrown to the winds with 
23 Ibid., January 24,1919 and the Bulletin No. 5. 
24 Ibid., January 25,1919. 
25 Ibid., January 23,1919. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., Also January 24,1919. 
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many trade unionists given no chance of expressing their opinions; 
: Lf there had been a slight delay a national conference could have 
decided the matter nationally; 'the manner of- the strike's 
(28) beginnings was a disgrace to trades unions' 
Outside Glasgow, the storm centre was the mining industry - despite 
the official decisions to have no strike action in January. The 
Executive of the Scottish Mineworkers completely opposed the 
(29) 
had voted for strike The Miners Federation Conference 
different demands - 30% wages increase, a6 hour day and 'Just 
treatment for demobilised and unemployed miners'. The Scottish 
Mine Workers Executive heard 'these three questions were already 
being negotiated by the Executive with representatives of the 
Government'. The Minutes record that in view of this 'the Scottish 
Executive entirely dissociated itself from the present erratic 
strike movement and recommended miners in Scotland to continue at 
work pending the reply of the Government ... so that in the event of 
an unfavourable reply being received from the Government, a common 




However before the Scottish Mineworkers Executive had made its 
views public, miners were out unofficially in Fife and Lanarkshire. 
By 24 January 14,000 miners and by 27 January 24,000 were on strike 
in Fife alone, although a ballot voted narrowly against official 
(31) 
action by the union In Fife the unofficial elements had 
28 Ibid., January 30,1919. 
29 
_Gl2, 
sgow Herald, January 28,1919. 
30 National Union of Scottish Mineworkers, Executive, January 
1919. 
31 Glasgow Herald, January 31,1919. 
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called for a six hour day. In Lanarkshire the same issue was 
argued, but far more bitterly. 9,000 Lanarkshire miners' downed 
(32) 
tools on the first day, with far more striking in future days 
While the Scottish Miners' Executive called the stoppage 
'unconstitutional', blaming it on irresponsible persons outside the 
miners' union, and urged its members 'to disregard the pickets', 
the Stirling and Lanarkshire miners forced the issue with their own 
union. As the, Minutes of the Lanarkshire Executive record: 
Meeting of the Executive Committee had not taken place 
owing to the premises being in the possession of a number 
of irresponsible parties who claimed to be sent as 
delegates from meeting that had been held in a few 
different districts. The mob of people had surrounded 
the building. The members of the EC were intimidated, 
coerced into submitting and agreeing upon the following 
programme. 
Thursday - idle day 
Further meeting next day 
Ballot on official strike (33) 
The Glasgow Herald argued that the picketing amounted 'practically 
(34) 
to terrorism' 
The pressure continued for several days, with the Lanarkshire 
Executive, unable to meet in its usual offices of Hamilton, 
32 Ibid., January 28,1919. 
33 Lanarkshire County Union, Miners Executive, January 29,1919. 
34 
_GlEsgow 
Herald, January 30,1919. 
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eventually removing itself to Edinburgh. When the Executive 
refused on 30 January to make the strike official, the miners' 
buildings in Hamilton had been invaded and 'to prevent loss of life 
and further damage to the property the Executive Committee 
announced that Friday would also be recognised as a further idle 
(35) 
day' It met in Glasgow a day later to complain of the 'action 
of outside agencies and irresponsible persons' and to advise a 
return to work. This advice went unheeded and most Lanarkshire 
(36) districts remained idle The Executive then met on I February 
in Edinburgh and refused to go ahead with a delegate conference on 
the grounds that it was 'impossible ... without the risk of 
intimidation and violence'(37). But, as the strike lost momentum 
in the next few days Lanarkshire followed Fife and Stirling in 
returning to work. On 3 February, the Executive could express some 
(38) 
satisfaction over the solution However, the offices remained 
closed for another week; some districts remained out for that time 
and the Reforms Committees did not disintegrate but became firmly 
established within the unions. 
The strikes which began on January 28 were viewed by the 
Conservative press as 'the first step towards that squalid 
terrorism of the Russian Revolution and it was claimed that the 
George Square events were inspired by 'Bolshevism' 
(39). It 
35 Lanarkshire County Union Miners Executive, January 30,1919. 
36 Ibid., January 31,1919. 
37 Ibid., February 3,1919. 
38 Ibid., February 1,1919.1 
39 LýasLiýw H2. r For other press views see A Nassibian, 
op. cit., p. 75. 
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evoked an over-reaction by the Government - the steps in which are 
(40) 
traced by Maclean 
The strikes threatened to escalate with the decision of the 
electricians to favour strike action and therefore a black otit in 
Glasgow, and, even after the George Square riots of January 31, 
continued for ten days more until a decision was reached on 
February 10, for 'a resumption to perfect the organisation of 
(41) forces ... on a national basis' With the return to work, there 
was initially no fehing that the strike was a turning-point or 
indeed a failure. According to Harry McShane: 
We regarded the forty hour strike not as a revolution but 
as a beginning. Other things would follow: it was but 
the first rank and f ile agitation to ýe led by the 
socialists after the war. (42) 
Shinwell was later to argue that the achievement of the miners, 
seven hour day, the continuation of rent restriction and the forty 
four hour minimum week (which came from the National Industrial 
Conference) were due to the action of the strikers: 
They had -the ef f ect of forcing the government to pay lip 
service to the welfare of the state ... there can 
be little 
doubt that these small concessions were given because of 
Red Friday in Glasgow. (43) 
40 For a fuller study of the events see I Maclean, 'Red Clydeside 
1915-1919'. in R Quinault and J Stevenson (eds. ). Pokulýjr 
Protest and Public Order (Six studies in British History 
1790-1920), (London, 1974)). Interestingly while Shinwell has 
claimed that he favoured constitutional protest throughout the 
dispute, he was accused by a fellow striker later of urging 
'terroristic methods'. Forward, January 22,1921. 
41 GlasgoF Herald, February-11,1919. 
42 H McShane, with J Smith, Harry McShane: No, Mean Fighter 
(London, 1978) p. 119. 
43 E Shinwell, Conflict without Malice, (London, 1955) p. 65-66. 
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And Tom Bell argued that there was little demoralisation 
immediately after the 1919 strike: 
We didn't think we would be defeated. I am sure that if 
there had been -another movement, a strike of the Triple 
Alliance for the miners, or some other national strike we 
would have come out again. (44) 
In Glasgow for example 150,000 attended the May Day demonstration 
(45) 
compared with 100,000 in 1918 
But there had been two problems that had crippled activity early in 
1919. The first was that the Scottish strike leaders had hoped to 
bring the miners fully into the 'forty hours' action. Maclean who 
was in England during the course of the strike argued that without 
(46) 
the miners, the 1919 strike could not hope to succeed . But by 
failing to win the support of the miners' union, for immediate 
strike action, despite the similarity of the miners' demands, the 
unofficial elements within the miners' union had to bow to the 
argument, that the miners would negotiate their own demands 
separately. The second problem was that Scottish leaders were 
hamstrung by their union leaders nationally. In the inquest on 
what had gone wrong in January, the leadership of London head 
offices was blamed. Indeed, the final Strike Bulletin summed up a 
widespread feeling. 
London Executives don't understand our aspirations here 
and never take the trouble to find out what is wrong when 
a strike occurs. We have to emancipate ourselves from 
the dictatorship of the London juntas by building an 
organisation which will be under our control and function 
when we want it to function. (47) 
44 T Bell, Pioneerkpg (London, 1941), p. 72. 
45 Forward, May 3 1918, See'also May 10,1919. 
46 The Call, January 23, January 30,1919. 
47 LOLý o iý. s Strike Bulletin, February 12,1919. 
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Certainly the strike lost momentum as leaders waited for the 
Trans port Workers Federation, the Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions as well as the miners' executive to take action. The growth 
of a centralized trade union bureaucracy was to become a major 
restraint on union militancy in the twenties, despite the growth of 
(48) 
the shop stewards' movement 
The Forty Hours Strike had threatened to isolate the official 
leaders of the Labour Movement, especially its political leaders. 
Many, like Patrick Dollan, who had doubts about the efficacy of the 
action could only act as aides to the strike committee, Dollan 
editing the I Strike Bulletin', whose circulation reached . 20,000 at 
(49) 
the peak of activity The resolution of the strike did not 
make traditional political methods immediately aciaeptable. John 
Muir was to argue in Forward that the unofficial movement was 'here 
to stay' . It was important to 'prevent a serious rupture in the 
whole movement' . he argued, and indeed he f elt that the Labour 
Movement could now 'emerge from the present crisis stronger and 
(50) 
better equipped' In the long run, the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress and national unions were to put their houses in more 
efficient order to allow them to retain the initiative. In the 
short run the STUC and the Labour Party's Scottish Executive had 
had to run with the crowd, the Executive for example demanding an 
48 Both the STUC and the TUC strengthened their central 
organisations in the post-war decade. For the TUC see V 
Allen, 'The Reorganisation of the TUC, 1918-1927, t 
British Journal of SociologX, 12,1960; For the STUC, see J 
Craigen, 
. 
The Scottish Trades Union Congress, Heriot Watt 
University, MLitt., 1975. 
49 Glasgow Trades Council, Forty Hour Strike Records. Through 
the paper's surplus, it was possible tý subsidise the Defence 
Fund for the strikers wh*o were put on trial and subsequently 
jailed. 
50 Forward, February 22,1919. 
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enquiry into the 'unwarranted and brutal police behaviour during 
the strike', and calling for public works to combat 
(51) 
unemployment 
Only gradually did official leaders begin to regain contkol. In 
March the National Executive of the Labour Party resisted pressure 
from Scottish organisations for a special conference on direct 
(52) 
action While the miners voted for strike action in March 
1919, and the Triple Alliance and the TUC supported direct action 
for the nationalisation of the mines in June, the immediate 
situation was defused because the miners agreed to the Sankey 
Commission and by mid-summer the miners' demands were winning less 
sympathy from other trade unions. In June the Labour Party's 
National Executive exercised a moderating influence on the Triple 
Alliance proposals for direct action. In October during the rail 
strike, the railway unions did not bother to call for a miners' 
strike in their support, 
(53) 
and in December 1919 the question of 
direct action in support of the miners was postponed. By March 
1920 an alternative proposal, the 'mines for the nation' campaign, 
was accepted but by then unemployment was beginning to diminish 
efforts at militancy. 
While both Scottish and National Executives of the Party spent much 
time considering what action Labour could take against British 
intervention in Russian, the Labour Party was careful to diminish 
the role of direct action. During discussions of the 'Hands off 
Russia' campaign in June 1919, the National Executive resolved that 
'the organisation of industrial action in pursuit of political 
(54) 
objects is not within the scope or powers of the Labour Party' 
51 Labour Party National Executive Committee Minutes, February 
12,1919. 
52 Labour Party National Executive Committee, March 5,1919. 
53 Ibid., June 5,1919. 
54 Ibid., June 25,1919. 
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The railwaymens' strike in 1919 saw a solidarity in Scotland, 
around the principle of a living wage. For Smillie the issue-was 
the reduction of wag es everywhere. But while the Scottish 
anti-socialist organisations equated the strike with incipient 
Bolshevism the issue was never the nationalisation of the railways 
or any other broader issue. As the Railwaymens' Strike Bulletin 
demonstrated, the railwaymen drew on widespread suppo. rt - from the 
engineers to the dockers - around wage demands. But if any 
political organisation was involved in their' support, it was the 
ILP with, for example, bollan editing the Glasgow strikers' 
(55) bulletin 
The railway strike is instructive of the new alignment of forces in 
the country. It was a strike that the Government allowed to 
happen, and a dispute which was partially solved through mediation 
by the Labour Party. In February 1919,1 the railwaymen were granted 
an eight hour day; in March concessions on equalising pay were 
made; in the next three months agreement was reached on the 
working day and week, as well as a week's holiday yearly and 
standardisation of wages. In July a 38 hour week was accepted and 
in August the government made a wages settlement with the 
locomotivemen, drivers and firemen. But in October the Government 
chose to fight the railmen on the grounds that whatever was laid 
down with regard to railmen would influence what was to be claimed 
throughout the country., Yet the Government were prepared to 
concede after the Labour Party National Executive intervened to 
promote a settlement for granting 5/- per day minimum wage. 
It was a sign how far the pendulum had begun to swing back to 
traditional political methods that when Smillie spoke in Scotland 
during the rail strike in October 1919, he argued that the 
Government could only be defeated if 'anything that 6avoured of 
revolution' was avoided: 
55 Glasgow and District Railwaymens Strike Bulletin No. 2, 
September 29,1919. 
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Let them be passive resisters, and let the Government see 
that they could not stampede the people with giving them 
an opportunity of shooting them down. If patience and 
forebearance were exercised, the government would be 
defeated and have to appeal to the country. The electors 
could then turn them out of office and return to 
parliament the men they desired to form the 
government. (56) 
Despite a desire for left unity, the most militant sections of the 
left were to spend much of . 1919 arguing amongst themselves and 
dissipating what strength they had. With the Third International 
formed in March 1919, neither the BSP the SLP nor the ILP could 
agreed on its attitudes to the call for unity around Russian 
leadership; nor in the 'unity' negotiations in Britian, could 
agreement among the ILP, BSP and SLP on questions such as Labour 
Party affiliation be secured. More than that, John McLean argued 
that a general strike could be organised that would defend both the 
Russian workers and Irish Home Rule, increasingly placing him out 
on a limb with his previous supporters in the BSP. McLean was 
eventually to refuse' to join the new Communist Party and was to 
argue *for a Scottish Republic. And when the conference of 
Communist unity groups*was held early in 1920 to prepare the ground 
for the Communist Party, it was not joined by McLean and only a 
small group of ILP defectors took part. While it included many 
leading members of the shop stewards' movement, it did not include 
(57) 
the Socialist Labour. Party . But by that time, the militancy of 
the immediate post-war months was being dissipated not only by 
victimisation 
(58) but by the reality of unemployment. 
56 Forward, October 4,1919. 
57 For an official account of the steps to the formation of the 
. 
Commun. ist Party see. J Klugmann, History o the Communist 
Par. ty of Great Britain, Vol. 1 (London, 1968). For a more 
critical analysis from a pro Maclean perspective, see W 
Kendall, The British RevolutionýM Moiiement, 1900-1921, 
(London, 1969), pp284-291. Perhaps the most succint account 
is contained in J Hinton, The First 
_Shop 
Stewards, and his 
later essay with J Hyman, Trade Union and Revolution: 
The Industrial Politics of the EariýY Communist Party (London, 1 -9F7 5 -). 
58 The Worker, February 22,1919. 
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III ELECTORAL SUCCESSESS 
The first test of Labour's strength came in April, 1919, with the 
Education Authority elections, where Labour stood on a specific 
programme that included free school meals, free boots and clothes 
to needy children, school baths, medical treatment for 
schoolchildren, decent teachers' salaries, and an education system 
which would sponsor 'citizenship. In Glasgow alone Labour 
delivered 44,000 election addresses, 15,000 handbills, and held 24 
meetings. The Scottish Executive of the Labour Party organised an 
education conference for candidates, and local organisations were 
urged to distinguish between four categories of candidates - those 
friendly to the party, those neutral and those hostile, as well as 
Labour nominees. In fact, Labour was able to Place 185 candidates 
in the. field throughout Scotland, including 21 in Glasgow (for 48 
seats) ,8 
(for 23 seats) in Edinburgh, and 18 (for 21 seats) in 
Aberdeen. But not only was the poll low (in Aberdeen, for example, 
12% and in Edinburgh 19%) but Labour did badly. There was, said 
Forward, 'miserably small polls and great indifferences amongst 
electors normally Labourt. On the other hand, 'The Catholics 
polled splendidly and exhibited a magnificent operation'. The 
problem in other words, was not only apathy, but religion which 
drew off support from Labour. The Labour share of the poll varied 
from one third, the high watermark in South Lanarkshire down to 
about an eightieth in many districts 
Labour won only 85 seats and even these were won with the 
acquiesence of the Catholic voters. The Catholic Socialist notes 
recorded on 12 April, 'It is doubtful if in any constituency 
outside of Shettleston and Bridgeton a Labour member could have won 
without the Catholic vote and in almost every division the 
Catholics could have carried another chndidate to victory had they 
preferred to do so instead of presenting the seat to Labour' . In 
Glasgow only Maxton's election, after redistribution of second 
Forward, February 8, April 12,19,1919. See also Labour 
Party, Scottish Executive, 'March 3,1919. 
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preferences, would have taken place without the Catholic vote*. In 
Edinburgh the 'position was similar. Herbert Heighton, the campaign 
Chairman wrote that, 'the election has surely driven home the need 
for a constant propaganda among the people of the Labour Party on 
education, local government and civic politics generally ... f inance 
is essential ... but everything depends on the rank and file who must 
be got to take an interest in their own affairs'. 
If this were insufficient proof of the challenge that Labour faced, 
on the left from industrial militancy and on the right from apathy 
and indifference amongst its potential vote, then two Glasgow 
authority by-elections were to drive the point home. Two 
by-elections early in June in Whitevale and in Jordanhill yielded 
equally depressing results. On the one hand, Martin, the defeated 
candidate in Whitevale, concluded that 'it was the same old story 
of our own people pinning their faith in meetings instead of 
depending upon organisation; ' and Regan, the Glasgow organiser, 
referred to the want of enthusiasm and energy on the part of many 
members of the Labour Movement. On the other hand the defeated 
candidate in Jordanhill, Rushworth, who was the Assistant Secretary 
of the Dyers and Bleachers, drew different conclusions: 'The loss 
of the seat was the strong inclination of the workers towards 
industrial action as they were beginning to despair of politics'. 
Even Regan was forced to conclude, 'the Glasgow Labour and 
socialist movement was under a cloud of depression as a result of 
the general election and also the failure of the 40 hour 
(2) 
strike' 
Two parliamentary by-elections in the first part of 1919, however, 
showed there had been a swing to the lef t on the part of the 
electorate. While Labour had been prevented from adopting new 
2 Forward, June 14,1919. 
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candidates in the last week of the election campaign in December 
1918, there was a determination on the part of Scottish leader's, in 
future to fight every seat if at all possible. The Party's 
National Executive was more cautious arguing seats be fought where 
'substantial improvements' on general election performance could be 
(3) 
gained But in Scotland the Executive were to fight every 
by-election between 1918 and 1922 with only four exceptions - the 
middle class seats of Glasgow Pollok and ýdinburgh South; and the 
rural seats of Inverness and Moray and Nairn - and even when it 
failed to intervene in these, there was considerable resentment 
within the Scottish Party that no candidature was pursued. The 
first by-election of the new Parliament came in perhaps the most 
difficult territory , possible, Central - Aberdeenshire, a 
constituency which was predominantly rural, with a large number of 
small villages, and little history of Labour organisation. In 
pursuit more of new members, than of electoral victory, Labour 
adopted Joseph Duncan, Secretary of the Scottish Farm Servants 
Union, who claimed that during 1918 and 1919 his membership was 
(4) increasing at the rate of one thousand monthly . With a national 
organiser, Egerton, Wake, as agent, the party managed to form local 
committees in at- least a dozen of the constituency's small 
villages,, and Dqncan argued that he was recruiting life-long 
(5) Liberals to the party's membership 
3 Labour Party, National Executive, Organisations and Elections 
Sub Committee February 4, *1919. One further proviso about 
contests was that adequate money and organisation be secured 
locally and that candidates should be of high calibre, with 
the Committee accepting that 'the experience of the recent 
election made the whole question now of the greatest 
importance'. 
4 Forward, March 29,1919. 
5 Ibid. April 19,1919. 
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Labour's vote in the by-election was the best it was to receive in 
the constituency in -the interwar years. While the independent 
Liberal, Wood, was a radical, 'who would not tolerate anything of 
the nature of profiteering in land', Labour managed to secure just 
under 3,500 votes - or 26.4% - of the vote, although it was bottom 
of the poll 
(6). 
Wake reported to the National Executive that 'a 
surprisingly good vote had been achieved despite the difficult 
circumstances' and while he attributed much of the success to 'the 
admirable qual'itites of the candidate'. 
(7 ) 
Forward argued that the 
performance was 'sufficiently encouraging to justify us in fighting 
every-rural constituency in Scotland' 
(8). 
The Bothwell by-election of July 1919 showed how far Labour's 
electoral prospects had been transformed in the early months of 
1919, and at the same time represented one further step in the 
shift from industrial to political action during 1919. While the 
Glasgow Herald claimed that the election presented a choice between 
IMr Smillie and the Triple Alliance, and the British Parliament', 
the reality was rather 
John Robertson, the key 






of the mines' 
than industr 
For the Labour candidate, 
'housing and the necessity 
and his preference was for 
ial, means of achieving 
6 The election result was: M Wood (Lib. ) , 4,950; L Davidson, (Coal. Con. ) , 4,764; J Duncan (Lab. ) 3,482. Both Conservative 
and Liberal votes declined despite a higher poll and Labour's 
share of the vote - 26.4% - was never surpassed in the 
interwar years and only marginally improved upon - 26.6% - in 
the 1945 election. 
7 Labour Party Scottish Executive Minutes, May 5,1919. 
8 Forward, May 10,1919. 
9. Glasgow Herald, July 9, *1919. 
10 Ibid, July 8,1919: Forward,, July 5,1919. 
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Robertson's opponent was a Liberal standing as a Coalitionist who 
opposed nationalisation Irish affairs were a complicating 
factor and the Coalition supporters included leading members of the 
Orange Order who were estimated to be 5,000 in number. According 
to the Orange Order District Master, miners would vote Coalition 
because of the Ulster issue, or at least abstain, since, in his 
view, 'between nationalisation and the interests of Ulster ... Ulster 
would come first'( 
12) 
. But Moffat, the Coalition candidate, proved 
to favour self -government as long as Ulster's rights were provided 
for and while Forward argued the Irish Protestants' vote was in 
disarray, the United Irish League, which favoured self 
(13) 
determination for Ireland as a whole, was plefted to Robertson 
The Irish issue was insufficient to divert attention from the major 
qqestion of the election, attitudes to nationalisation of the 
mines. The mining vote exceeded 10,000 and some thought it nearer 
15,000 in a constituency- with nearly 27,000 electors on the 
register. Robertson's campaign stressed nationalisation, asking 
miners if they were going to 'Blackleg' by voting for Moffat who 
(14) 
was a coalmaster The result was a 20% swing towards Labour 
from the Coalition, with a Coalition majority of 332 in 1918 
converted into a Labour majority which exceeded 7,000. Without a 
major increase on the poll of December 1918 - only 27. more voted - 
Labour received more than two thirds of the vote. Af ter the 
results, the Scotsman, was careful to distinguish Bolshevism and 
moderate socialism, arguing it had 'not beard the epithet Bolshevik 
applied to any of these advocating the labour principles' 
(15) 
. 
11 Ibid, July 4, 1919. 
12 Ibid. July 9, 1919. 
13 Forward, July 12, 1919. 
14 Scotsman, July 16, 1919. 
15 Scotsman, July 16,1919. 
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Even Forward was to admit that while, amongst miners there was a 
'growing consciousness of their position as a class', it would. be 




Labour's important breakthrough came with the local elections of 
1919, when they gained more seats than any other party has won in a 
single year in Scottish local elections. Labour stood on a 
municipal programme which concentrated on the housing question but 
also argued for municipal milk, insurance, entertainment 
facilities, food production and savings banks. It also argued for 
public works and better health care, including infant welfare 
(17) 
centres When the full results were totalled, the party had 
made 280 gains, including burgh and county council, and parish 
council, representation. The party took control in Kilmarnock and 
Kirkintilloch. In other places, such as Kilsyth, Cowdenbeath, and 
Bo'ness, they won every ward they fought. In Glasgow they made 
startling gains, winning 24 seats(18) In Aberdeen, the party 
which had originally wanted to contest every seat won five of the 
(19) 
six wards in which it stood Forward concluded: 
Go over these results as a whole and you will find an 
amazing record of success, wherever there is steady ILP 
propaganda and where there has been any pretence of 
organisation. (20) 
16 Forward, August 9,1919. The full result of the by-election 
was J Robertson (Lab. ), 13,135; J Moffat (Coal. Lib. ), 5,967. 
In 1918 the'result had been, D MacDonald, (Coal. Con. ), 9,359; 
J Robertson (Lab. ), 9,027. 
17 Forward, October 11,1919. 
18 Forward, November 15,1919. 
19 Phipps, op. cit. p. 174. Two other candidates later joined the 
new Labour Group. 
20 Forward, November 15,1919. 
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In the later part of 1919 and early 1920, however, Labour felt its 
position handicapped by the presence of extremists within the party 
on the one hand, and by the ineffectiveness of the Labour 
(21) 
Parliamentary opposition in the House of Commons on the other 
In 1920, the party was also to be hampered by the 'Coalition' 
tactics amongst the right wing parties, which, in the Paisley 
by-election campaign, saw the Conservatives desert their own party 
even for Asquith in an attempt to retain a united front against 
Labour. Labour's candidate in the by-electiL was a Co-operative 
nominee, Biggar, who was an ILP member but insufficiently radical 
to prevent the Socialist Labour Party considering placing a 
(22) 
candidate in the field . While Biggar received the United Irish 
League's support and it was generally believed Asquith bad an 
uphill fight on his hands, Conservatives like Lord Robert Cecil 
gave their support to Asquith. Forward believed that Labour did 
not win the seat because of Labour's poor record in the House of 
Commons and a popular reaction against more militant elements 
(23) for associated with the Labour Party But the main 'reason 
Asquith's victory was the defection of Tories to Liberals. While 
the Labour vote increased by more than 4,000, and ýabour's share of 
the vote rose to 39% as against 34% in the 1918 general election, 
the Coriservative candidate lost his deposit. Thus while Ramsay 
Macdonald believed the contest showed that Labour had emphasised 
'its distinctiveness from other parties', Forward predicted that, 
with Tories now supporting Liberals, there would be a split within 
(24) 
the Liberal Party, and radicals would join Labour 
21 Forward, January 31,1920. 
22 As early as May, Forward complained the Liberals were seen as 
the best alternatives to the coalition because 'The* Labour 
Party has not risen to the opportunities the session has 
presented', May 10,1919. 
23 Ibid, February 7,1920. 
24 Ibid, March 13,1920. The result was Asquith (Lib. ), 14,736; 
Biggar (Lab. Co-op. ), 11,902; and McKean, (Coal. Con. ), 2,705. 
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Labour could also derive some comfort from or excuse for their 
defeat in other by-plections in 1920. The Scottish Divisional 
Council of the ILP was to be severely criticised for the way it 
handled the Argyllshire by-election in March. With decisions on 
fighting the election made only by the Parliamentary Committee, the 
(25) Glasgow ILP threatened to disaffiliate . Two Labour candidates 
were. considered - the former Liberal, Dundas White, and the Rev. M 
(26) 
McCallum McCallum who was chosen, had left the Liberal Party 
over its small-holding proposals and was both the Chairman of his 
local parish council in Aigyll and a member of the local education 
authority. His programme, if not full-blooded socialism, was 
radical - home rule, higher pensions, nationalisation of 
(27) 
monopolies, and community ownership of land Maxton, Stewart, 
and other ILP propagandists went North 
(28) 
, and new branches were 
formed. When the results were announced, the Laýour vote had 
doubled on its 1918 performance, with the Coalition majority 
halved. The prediction from Forward was that it was a seat Labour 
could win in future 
(29) 
. 
Labour made less impact in the two by-elections in Edinburgh not 
least because of local splits within the movement. While Maxton 
was originally chosen as the candidate for North Edinburgh, his 
Bridgeton party would not release him for the fight. 
(30) Instead, 
the local Labour Party chose Graham Pole, who failed to win the 
25 Glasgow ILP Executive, March 19,1920. 
26 Forward, February 21,1920. 
27 Ibid., February 28. 
28 Ibid. March 6, and 13,1920. 
29 Ibid. $ March 20,1920. The result was: E Sutherland (Coal. Lib. ) 10,187; M McCallufa (Lab. ), 5,498. Labour's share 
of the vote was twi-ce as high as during the general election 
of 1918 and although it was secured in a two party c*ontest 
without Conservative intervention, the party was never to 
secure a higher share in the interwar years or even in 1945. 
30 Forward, April, 3 1920. 
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endorsement of the local militant shop stewards committee who 
issued their -own pre-soviet manifesto. Labour did not f ight in 
South Edinburgh. With Edinburgh a Liberal centre, Forward had felt 
it 'absolutely necessary' to contest at least one of the seats but 
the only comfort the party took was that their intervention had 
(31) 
prevented any Liberal revival 
31 Forward, April 17,1920. The election result was P Ford 
(Coal. Con. ), 9,944: W Runciman (Lib. ), 8,469; DG Pole, 
(Lab. ), 3,808. In Edinburgh South, the Coalition 
Conservatives held on to their seat. 
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IV THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL ACTION 
The early months of 1920 were the days before the cement finally 
set. In his fortnightly reports, Sir Basil Thomson expressed alarm 
that Scotland was moving leftwards: 
There is abundant evidence that the great mass of Labour 
is steadily shifti 
, 
ng to the left. One sign is the 
increased membership of the ILP, which in Scotland is 
becoming more extremist in its propaganda. (1), 
In fact during the first months of 1920 the left was divided over 
further strategy, with 'a tempest raging', as the Scottish 
Divisional Council of the ILP supported affiliation to the Third 
International against the advice of their national leadership. 
Even a motion to leave the Labour Party which had been proposed by 
six branches received 53 votes against 147. Patrick Dollan was one 
who was convinced that the ILP had not decided 'to abandon 
political action in order to concentrate on the methods of 
sovietism', but the decision in favour of the Third International 
had been taken against the advice of Maxton who saw it as 'a lazy 
means of escape from a serious problem' and Wheatley who railed 
against"unfortunate divisions on the threshold of a great national 
triumph' Maxton felt it quite wrong to suggest that the British 
(2) 
Labour Movement was 'ready for revolution along Russian lines' 
The Third International vote in January 1920 was the high watermark 
for the non-parliamentary left however, and during 1920 the left 
could make little headway. A further 'unity' conference which 
0 
Fortnightly Report, - February 1920, - 'Cabinet Papers, 
Revolutionary Organisations in the UK'. 
2 Forward, January 10,1920. 
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tried to bring together the British Socialist Party, the Socialist 
Labour Party and the ILP failed, after the SLP demanded the ILP 
leave the Labour Party. At the same time John Maclean was moving 
further from the mainstream, arguing for a general strike against 
unemployment and increasingly of the view that Scotland should go 
its own way. When the Communist Party was eventually formed during 
the negotiations of 1920 it could make little headway amongst the 
traditional elements of the Labour Movement in Scotland. While a 
group of ILPers - the ILP left wing Movement led by Mrs Helen 
Crawford, defected to the Communist Party - other left wing groups 
remained outside, such as John Maclean's supporters, the leadership 
of the Socialist Labour Party and some leaders of the shop 
stewards' movement (who were pursuing their own strategy for social 
committees in communities to rebuild where factory committees were 
being crushed) . Indeed in the summer of 1920 there was an attempt 
to form a Scottish Communist Party around Maclean, the Glasgow BSP, 
the rump of the SLP and several ILPers, as a soviet party committed 
to the Third International but also, unlike the new Communist 
party, with a policy of total independence from the Labour Party. 
But it did not get f ar. 
The Communist Party was formed in July 1920 as unemployment began 
to hit Scotland - and much of the post-war industrial militancy had 
evaporated as unions made concessions and the Labour Party and TUC 
reasserted their authority. One writer, Walter Kendall has argued 
that what he sees as a Russian imposition of a Communist Party in 
1920 was 'a betrayal of the growing revolutionary movement at a 
time when this tradition showed signs of breaking out of its 
sectarian isolation', and he suggests 'that the key leader was 
Maclean whose influence, he argues, was at its peak in 1920 and 
1921: 
The objective effects of the formation of the Communist 
Party was to destroy a previous socialist tradition which 
whilst imperfect showed every sign of developing towards 
more realistic and effective forms. (3) 
3W Kendall, The Revolutio! jar)ý Movement in Britain, 1900-1921 
(London, 1969), p. 301. 
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But Maclean's influence was diminishing in the period. By late 
1919 Maclean had come round to the strategic calculation that 
revolution, while impossible in England, could happen in Scotland, 
and inspired, and then deflated, by the turn of events in Ireland, 
he came out strongly for Scottish independence. In September 1920, 
Maclean argued: 
I favour a Scottish Communist republic as the first stage 
to world communism with Glasgow as the head and 
centre ... we can make Glasgow a Petrograd, a reýolutionary 
storm centre. (4) 
But this belief in the millenium on Clydeside arose from his sense 
of frustration that revolutionaries had already missed the boat in 
the rest of Britain. Yet by 1920 the same was true of Scotland. 
Maclean suffered not from paranoia, as those who opposed his 
decision not to join the Communist Party argued, but from a lack of 
working-class support. His importance was as a propagandist and 
educator, who was responsible for inspiring a generation of future 
socialists - and not as a revolutionary leader with an organised 
base of support. 
For Maclean suffered, as the Communist Party was to suffer, from 
the containment of the revolutionaries during 1919 and 1920, as the 
official leaderships of the trade union and political sides of the 
Labour movement regained the initiative. Murphy who joined the 
Communist Party was to write in January 1920 that 'since the 
armistice unemployment had decimated the ranks of the unofficial 
movement. 
4N Milton, John Maclean, (London, 1973), p. 243-4. 
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The forty hours strike was the last occasion on which the 
shop stewards initiated and played an important part in a 
great strike movement. (5) 
As such the decision to form the Communist Party owed less to 
growing support for revolutionary action as a need to consolidate 
the declining support that' was left. As Hinton and Hyman suggest 
'it is pe'rfectly clear that the only alternative to the formation 
of a CP in 1920-21 was theý fragmentation and complete 
(6) 
ineffectiveness of the revolutionary left' 
As the left outside the Labour Party argued amongst itself, from 
within John Wheatley made a forceful plea for uniting around 
Parliamentary action. In a speech, 'the Labour Party and its 
criticst, he argued that even propaganda must take second place 
temporarily to organisation. The Labour Party he said should rely 
on the force of reason, brains not bullets. 
When the majority wanted socialism they could take it and 
we had no right to impose socialism on them until they 
did want it ... The issue was not the relative merits of 
socialism or parliameiit. What they wanted now was not 
the best plan for working socialism but for winning it. 
Arguing that industrial action would yield only 'limited gains' as 
'a palliative and no solution', he rejected any further concessions 
to the 'direct action' movement. 
The policy of industrial action only meant peaceful 
starvation as a means of winning socialism or reliance on 
force. It assumed that people who did not want socialism 
would starve or die for it. If they did want it there is 
no need to do either. 
5 Solid&KAty, January 1920. 
J Hinton and R Hyman, op. cit., p. 8. 
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From a different point of view in February 1920, Maxton also issued 
a strong plea for unity within the Labour Party, during wha .t 
he 
called 'a testing time'. While he advocated 'full working-class 
control of the workshops under workers' control' and had done so 
for five years, he stated that there must be 'some organisation 
that could collect all the different opinions and embrace the 
different sections' . He did not want unity of opinion, he said, 
but without the ILP and the Labour Party there was a danger of 
'going on the wrong lines'(7). 
In fact the challenge to the official Labour leaders who supported 
parliamentary action never materialised to any extent during 1920 
in the way it had at the start of the interwar years. A call by 
John Maclean - supported by committees of the unemployed - for a 
general strike against unemployment came to little in February 1920 
-and the pressure to force the Government's hands over Russia was 
directed through official Labour channels. It was the STUC, backed 
-up by. the Labour Party which co-ordinated the Councils of Action 
Movement in Scotland. Their July congress in 1920 supported direct 
action on Ireland, Poland, and Russia, and on the cost of living 
(8) 
and rents . But as Julie Brotherston has pointed out: 
The leadership nationally was at pains to emphasise the 
strictly constitutional nature of the councils. They 
were to be firmly based on local trades councils or 
Labour Party branches. Their prime duty was to act as 
centres of information for the national councils. (9) 
7 Forward, February, 1920. 
8 Scottish Trade Union Congress, Report. of Special Congress, 
July 10,1920, Annual Report, 1921. 
A full account of the 'Councils of Action' is contained in J 
Brotherston, Internationalism and the Labour Movement 
1917-1920, Edinburgh University M. Litt., 1979. 
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It was for example a joint Trades Council and Independent Labouk 
Party rally that was held in Glasgow in August 1920 and spe-1kers 
(10) included Dolian, Macdonald and Wheatley 
The Russian campaign' demonstrated the leadership's ability to 
retain control of events by limiting action to pressure on one 
particular issue. The rent strike which was invoked in Scotland by 
the, ILP and the STUC in July 1920 with the intention. of using all 
possible weapons both industrial and political ultimately provided 
a similar-demonstration A rent strike had been a possibility 
from 1919. During the miners' agitation Smillie had said 'he would 
be prepared at any time to ask our people to declare a strike on 
the housing question' 
(12). 
Although in August a proposal at the 
Labour Housing Conference for a ballot on a strike on the rent 
issue had been turned down, the Glasgow factors were near the mark 
when they had concluded that 'the end of the European war marks the 
beginning of the rent war' 
(13). 
The pressure came from rises in 
the cost of living. In May 1920,1,000 delegates at a Scottish 
Labour Housing Association Conference, at what Forward called 
'perhaps the most representative conference of the Scottish Working 
class movement yet? 
( 14) 
, decided to pay no rent, 
( 15) 
and while the 
10 Forward, August 18,25,1920. 
11 STUC Report of Special Congress, July 10,1920. 
12 Forward, April 26,1919. 
f. 
13 Glasgow Property Circular, October 8,1918, quoted by M 
Englander, Scottish Labour Histoý; X Society Journal, 15,1981. 
14 Forward, August 7,1920 
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for defiange of the law The STUC organised a 
_special 
conference, which resolved to have a 24 hour strike, and local 
demonstrations against high rents and to refuse to pay rent 
(18) 
increases The ILP branches were asked to form rent strike 
committees 
(19). 
A manifesto by Wheatley argued: 'in this fight we 
cannot fail. Not a single family will be evicted. Any attempt to 
arrest wages can be answered immediately by a general strike. 
Trade Unionism protects your wages, it will now Idetermine rent and 
(20) 
prices' 
The rent campaign formed part of Labour's strategy to capture the 
initiative in Scotland, through combining industrial and political 
action. As Forward remarked, 'The rent strike 
_is 
not merely 
designed to save a few shillings from the annual house rent of 
every tenant. The rent strike is an indication of Labour's 
determination that an end must be put to the Government's policy of 
passing* on the burden of the state to the poor and allowing the 
(21) 
rich to escape' Reflecting dissatisfaction with price 
inflation, the Labour Party's Scottish executive argued 'no more 
crucial question requiring the fullest conce4tration and 
organisation of working class forces has arisen in this 
(22) 
generation' Initially, the campaign drew on considerable 
support with 100,000 attending a demonstration in Glasgow and 
10,000 
15 Ibid., May 28,1920 
16 Ibid., July 3,1920 
17 Ibid., June, 26,1920 
18 Ibid., August 7,1920. - 
19 Ibid., August 14,1920. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., August 28,1920. 
22 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Executive Report, -192'1. 
140 
a 
(23) in Edinburgh The miners supported a one-day strike on August 
27 and in Glasgow: 'its chief feature was a stoppage of . 
the 
corporation's tramway.. that the movement was entirely successful in 
these respects need not be questioned' 
(24) 
. But the movement to 
withhold rent was only successful in limited areas. It seemed to 
fail badly in Fife and in the poorer areas of Glasgow. By 
Septemýer Forward had to convince itself that 'the rent strike is 
not dead' 
(25) 
. But the strike 'had failed, as. the STUC concluded, 
because 'the extraordinary scarcity of housing accommodation seemed 
to be too great for the maintenance... of solidarity, the people 
being too much afraid of being rendered homeless to continue their 
resistance for any length of time' 
(26) 
. The rent strike was the 
last of a series of direct action measures which failed. In the 
early 1920s, industrial struggles were to be on industrial issues 
only. This was. to be confirmed by the failure of the miners to win 
industrial success in their 1921 stoppage, as unemployment besieged 
the Scottish economy. 
The 1920 municipal elections represented a consolidation of 
Labour's political strength. All the main newspapers used 'red 
scare tactics', with The Record urging people to 'rout the Reds 
today', and the Glasgow Herald later claiming its appeals had saved 
the city of Glasgow from socialism. According to Forward the 
position in Glasgow was that the Labour vote had increased by 
30,000 over 2 years, which showed that 5 of the 15 Glasgow seats 
would be 
23 Forward, August 28,1920 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., September 11,1920. 
26 STUC Report, 1921, pp. 38-39. 
141 
won at the election: "The present rate of progress is more 
dangerous to the existing order than would be a cataclysmic leap'to 
power". In total 120,183 votes had been achieved in 30 Glasgow 
wards and Forward argued: 
The parliamentary register is infinitely more favourable 
to Labour than the municipal register. Thousands of 
young men (and they are usually Labour supporters) are 
entitled to the Parliamentary vote on reaching 2i but are 
disenfranchised at the local poll through the absence of 
a property qualification. Again in the middle class 
parts of every ward there are large houses comprising 
young ladies who qualified for the municipal vote but who 
not being thirty years of age have no parliamentary 
vote ... again in a parliamentary election we will be 
justified in counting on a large slice of the support 
that went to independent candidates of democratic and 
unofficial labour sympathies in several of the wards. (27) 
The performance in 1920 was in fact more uneven than in 1919. In 
Falkirk Labour now had a majority in both Town and Parish Councils, 
but in Greenock results were 'indifferent' and in Fife Labour was 
(28) 
suffering from 'a lack of discipline and organisation' In 
Glasgow while the temperance issue was important - due to a poll 
for 'dry' and '. wet' areas - Forward argued Labour did well because 
it had 'succeeded in making housing the issue' 
(29). * Traditional 
politics were to dominate the next two years - despite two major 
stoppages, a miners' strike and an engineers' lock-out. 
27 Forward. November 13,1920. 




Labour's electoral success continued into 1920 with victory in the 
Kirkcaldy by-election, even. when there were difficulties. The 
choice of Kennedy as Labour candidate was not a popular one amongst 
left-wing activists. Although he was a former member of the Social 
Democratic Federation and later the British Socialist Party, he was 
regarded with suspicion for his attitudes to questions such as the 
nationalisation of the mines and he had opposed the ILPs anti-war 
attitudes. His lukewarm attitude to mines nationalisation was 
particularly embarrassing in view of the build-up of agitation 
amongst the miners in Fife at thý time of the election. But as 
Forward wrote, 'let no one at a time like this seek division ... the 
ILP policy is to do the utmost to secure a lar ge Labour vote for 
(30) 
the Labour candidate' 
Kirkcaldy was also one of the few places in Scotland wbere'there 
(31) 
were no ILP branches and no women's organisations . Labour was 
to benefit by the support of the Irish vote but Lockhart, the 
Coalition Liberal candidate who stood with Conservative support, 
was probably right to attribute his defeat to the loss of the 
mining vote. The miners, he told the Scotsman, had voted Labour to 
(32) fight off the-threat of lower wages. 
The 1921 Scottish ILP Conference reversed the support for direct 
action and the Third International which had characterised the 
decisions of 1920. 
(33) 
At the Conference a Isoviet' 
30 Forward, February 26,1921. 
31 Forward, March 9,1921. 
32 Scotsman, March 16,1921. The repults were: T Kennedy, 
(Lab. ), 11,674; R Lockhart. (Coal. Lib. ), 10,199.. The seat had 
been uncontested in 1918. 
33 Forward, January 8,1921. 
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motion for workers control won only a handful of votes and was 
rejected in favour of a Cole-style guild socialist approach to 
industrial democracy which recognised that 'the source of authority 
must be the whole body of citizens'. Even an attempt to change 
'citizens' to 'workers' was beaten down by 95 votes to 44, after 
Shinwell argued that 'attempts were being made to get the 
conference to accept camouflaged soviet resolutions'. In addition, 
the major source of previous contention - affiliation to the Third 
International - was resolved when conference rejected membership by 
(34) 
93 votes to 57 
Unity was the order of the day. Maxton welcomed the end to what he 
considered 'the waste of energy' involved in fruitless decisions, on 
matters such as the Third International at a time when unemployment 
(35) 
was growing In fact most sections of the ILP and the Labour 
Party in Scotland also accepted that the miners' leader, Smillie, 
was right to oppose a general strike in favour of mines' 
nationalisation, believing that the proper course was political 
pressure to secure the election of a Labour Government committed to 
that measure. The 1921 STUC Congress was told by its Chairman that 
unions had: 'never been in favour of a general strike to enforce 
demands which have a political solution. The ballot box is the 
finest weapon the working-classes possess and it is only by an 
intelligent use of that weapon that they will be able to secure 
(36) 
emancipation' . Nevertheless the failure of the Triple 
34 Ibid . 
35 Ibia. June 1921. Maxton argued, 'up till June of this year a 
huge amount of energy was wasted by the Labour Movement in 
Glasgow in fruitless decisions concerning the 
Int! arnationals ... We were only b6ginning to get into business 
when the heavy hand of unemployment laid its weight upon the 
workers'. 
36 STUC Conference Report, 1921, p. 61. 
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Alliance to act in defence of the miners provoked strong words, 
some arguing for q local Triple Alliance, others that the West of 
Scotland was 'solid' for a general strike and others suggesting 
that 'there would have been no Triple Alliance failure if the 
Scottish workers had been free to act by themselves'. But when it 
came to positive action, Congress voted only for financial 
(37) 
assistance to the miners 
But the left was being hit by the growing recession. As early as 
January 1921 the ILP was confronted with evidence of falling party 
memberships. While ILP branches numbered 231 in Scotland, only 98 
(38) 
attended their 1921 Conference If direct action was 
undermined by the attitude of Labour leaders, the growing threat of 
unemployment itself confirmed its rejection. By the middle of 1921 
Scotland had been severely hit by recession, and from then 
unemployment figures mounted, and increasing pressure on poor law 
authorities forced changes in government regulations which 
proscribed assistance to the able-bodied unemployed. The destitute 
able-bodied receiving poor relief jumped from 1,000 in May 1921 to 
32,000 in September and reached more than 100,000 in January 1922. 
In October 1921 the Government looking into 'unemployment and 
distress in Scotland' found that: 
So far as industrial Scotland is concerned the position 
is one of almost unrelieved blackness... Almost all 
employers interviewed took a very pessimistic view of the 
future... In duration and numbers involved, mining, steel 
and iron working are the worst, and the position is 
accentuated by the fact that in areas where these 
occupations are followed there are few other industries 
0 
37 Ibid. p. 64-65. 
38 Forward, January 8,1921. The ILP . Chairman had to concf-de 
that 'the purchase of membership cards indicated a fall in 
membership'. While 98 branches were represented in 1921, even 
less - 67 - were to attend in 1922 and the ILP's Scottish 
Report of 1920-21 found that 'unemployment had affected 
membership' Forward. April 30.1921. 
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of substantial dimensions. The coal mining areas come 
nearest to single occupation groups... it is estimated 
that roundabout 25,000 men employed recently in coal 
mining in Scotland are in excess of the capacity of the 
mines to absorb them for some years to come. (39) 
The report agreed that 'as resources diminish and distress becomes 
more acute ... particular areas will have to be very carefully 
watched' 
(40) 
. Fife, Lanark and Glasgow were the worrying areas. 
Some idea of the scale of f alling membership can be gleaned from 
the membership figures of some of the largest unions. 
TABLE 2.1 
Trade Union Membership 1920-23 
000's 
1920 1921 1922 1923 
ASE (Engineers) 52.3 50.8 40.0 25.0 
AS Woodworkers 16.5 13.9 
Jute and Flax 14.0 11.4 
NUGW (General Workers) 37.6 19.8 13.7 13.0 
Shop Assistants Union 14.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 
NUR (Railwaymen) 43.5 35.8 32.9 35.7 
Miners 75.0 - 35.0 50.0 
Horse & Motorments Union 15.0 13.3 13.1 
Ten of the larger unions had experienced between them a 35% fall in 
(41) 
membership between 1920 and 1923 
39 Scottish Board of Health, Memorandum on Unemployment and 
Di. stress in Scotland., SRO, HH 31/36/1. p. 2-3. 
40 Ibid. p. 7. 
41 Figures compiled from E Kebblewhite, op. cit. Appendix One. 
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Industrially, the Labour Movement was to become extremely weak, as 
membership of trade unions fell with rising unemployment and. as 
demoralisation set in. STUC affiliation was only 226,822 in 1922 
and 250,949 in 1923, 
(42) 
and industrial activity was now confined 
to defensive purposes. As Hinton and Hyman have suggested: 
The appearance of industrial militancy in the 1920's is 
in many ways misleading. From the onset of the 
depression the number of stoppages recorded in each year 
averaged some 500 - only half the level of the previons 
decade. What pushed up the totals of strike days was the 
occurrence of an unprecedented number of large scale and 
protracted stoppages, often involving whole industries. 
and they were invariably defensive in character. (43) 
In these circumstances the miners' strike of 1921 was a defensive 
battle for protecting living standards. While two special Trade 
Union Congresses of December 1919 and March 1920 had supported 
nationalising the mines, the eventual upshot 'The Mines for the 
Nation' campaign, which was an alternative to direct action, had 
little impact. By the middle of 1920 the miners needed help to 
fight wage cuts, rather than support for nationalisation. While 
the Triple Alliance failed to work, support for the miners united 
the Labour Movement in Scotland when they went on strike in April 
1921, as Ramsay Macdonald accused the Government of fomenting 
I civil wart 
(44 ) 
and the Scottish ILP urged its members to set up 




42 STUC Report, 1925, p. 70-71. 
43 J Hinton and R Hyman, op. cit., p. 17. 
44 Forward, April 30,1921. 
45' Forward, April 16,1921. The miners later acknowledged the 
ILPIsTelp. Through rallies and collections, nearly E800 was 
collected in Glasgow alone. Forward, May 28, June 4, July 23, 
1921. 
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Smillie was later to tell the miners' conference that their strike 
had been 'a defensive one'. This was despite the growth of, an 
(46) 
unofficial rank and file movement within the mining community 
Among the rank and f ile of the miners a movement that had begun in 
1919 during the industrial action and taken root in 1920, argued 
for full control over union officials, one union for Scotland and a 
five day week. By the time of -the 1921 strike it was organised at 
a Scottish and British level and 'a rebel miners group' existed in 
(47) 
every district But in spite of the rank and file militancy 
which was to develop during th& twenties, the miners were to be 
comprehensively beaten, Smillie admitting that their forces had 
been 'shattered' 
(48) 
. By 1922, the miners' affiliation to their 
own Scottish conferences had fallen from 114,250 to 66,050 
(49) 
. 
While the rank and f ile. movements which opposed the Labour Party 
remained in being, the defeat of the miners confirmed the drift to 
parliamentary action. The lessons the Labour Party sought to draw 
were clear. For Forward, the struggle had now moved 'from the 
industrial field to the Political field'. In an article, 'The 
Lessons the Colliers have learned', Forward argued that the miners 
now had to send their best men into*Parliament. Citing Smillie who 
was alleged to have said the miners were beaten as far back as the 
1918 election, it argued, 'the colliers are learning the unwisdom 
of leaving political power to the master class - learning it in 
sorrow and in anguish 1(50) . But the lessons of, the miners' strike 
merely confirmed what the main drift of opinion within the miners' 
unions themselves had been for some time. In February 1921, before 
the strike, Small, the Lanarkshire Miners Secretary, reported to 
his union the conclusions of a special Labour Party conference on 
46 Forward, Novembet 27,1920. 
47 Ibid., Apri*1'9,1921. 
48 Ibid., August 12,1921. 
49 National Union of Mineworkers, Organisation Committee, October 
2,1922. 
50 Forward, July 16,1921.148 
unemployment. The conclusions of their discussion were that 
'direct action was not a helpful proposition', with the only remedy 
to strengthen political organisation to support the return to 
Parliament of Labour Party candidates. 'Political action', it was 
concluded, 'was the only feasible course to adopt' 
(51). 
The shift can be seen in the attitude of the Glasgow ILP Federation 
which as Chapter One records had been debating 'soviets' in 
1917-18. When in 1921 the Federation was approached by John 
Maclean who asked the ILP 'to focus on the general strike. as a 
means of enforcing maintentance or work for the unemployed and to 
prevent a general fall in wages', the Federation took no action. 
The Minutes record that 'after a general discussion.. the previous 
question was carried, leaving the matter open for further 
consideration, by 25 to 211(52) . The party had in fact told its 
delegates to the Glasgow Unemployed Committee that 'they should 
refrain -from any action should the question of a general strike on 
the unemployment question be raised' 
(53) 
. The party went on to 
support the disbandment of the unemployea committee and 'the taking 
over of the work by the Trades Council', and further that the 
branches should discourage disruptive propaganda on their 
(54) 
platforms 
51 Lanarkshire County Miners Union Executive, February 26,1921. 
52 Glasgow ILP Executive, November 29,1918. 
53 Ibid, February 4,1921. 
53 Ibid., February 18,1921. 
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IV LABOUR ORGANISATION 
As the pendulum sTjung further towards faith in traditional 
political methods, the omens for success for Labour were uncertain. 
Membership of the ILP in Scotland was falling and in the 1921 
municipal elections, the party lost its impetus. Unemployment far 
from radicalising the poorest sections of the population seemed to 
be immobilising them, as the poll in the Glasgow elections fell by 
16%. The position was repeated throughout the country, and was not 
helped by splits within the Labour ranks over Communist 
interventions at the polls. But the lesson which the ILP leaders 
in Scotland took from the results was that 'destitution, hunger and 
unemployment are not aids to the Labour cause and even in the 
mining areas where if anything the iron has been thrust into the 
soul of - the workers, one found the old inability to connect living 
conditions with votes cast for legislation and administrative 
representatives'('). As unemployment continued to rise, one third 
of ILP members were said to be unable to pay their contributions 




The Labour Party began to mount a campaign to change the 
regulations . and administration of the poor law in Scotland as 
relief funds were drying up and the miners' strike of 1921 raised 
new questions of 'eligibility'. It was naturally led on to 
formulate a policy on relief in the aftermath of the changes. In 
particular it organised a conference of parish councillors and 
others which demanded a relief scale of El a week for adults and 
thirty shillings for married couples, and that education 
authorities should be-responsible for providing children's meals 
(3) 
seven days a week It was probably in this area alone between 
1 Forward, October 8,1921. 
2 Ibid., October 15,1921. 
3 Report of Labour Party Conference of Scottish Labour 
representatives on public bodies contained in Scottish 
Executive Papers, 24 September 1921. 
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1918 and 1922 that the Labour Party - as distinct from the ILP, the 
STUC and other bodies - took a leading role, with the Scottish 
Executive leading the way in March 1922 with its manifesto for 
adequate maintenance or work for the unemployed. - 
From 1920 onwards, the propaganda effort of the Labour Party in 
Scotland concentrated on the basic question of maintenance for the 
out-of-work. The extension of unemployment insurance- under the 
1920 Act and its later modification provided some protection to the 
unemployed but the poor law was the final safety net, even more so 
in Scotland than in the rest of Britain. This was true even before 
the formal removal of the legal powers which excluded the parish 
authorities from aiding the able-bodied unemployed. As the 
Scottish Board of -Health report for 1920 stated, 'the year has 
shown especially in industrial parishes an exceptional increase in 
the numbers of ordinary poor ... the proportion of these in receipt 
of relief from the parish council funds to ihe total population had 
in a number of areas reached a grave f igure' 
(4). As Levitt has 
shown, the pressure on government authorities was such that in 
April 1921 the Scottish Office had led the rest of Britain during 
the miners' strike by allowing the Poor Law authorities to assist 
the families of strikers despite the formal legal restriction. The 
Board of Health, themselves, admitted that they 'had gone a long 
way from the strict legal position out of sympathy with the people 
who were suffering. At first loans were sanctioned, then relief 
to the miners, before finally assistance to the able-bodied was 
given legal authority. By the end of 1921, formal legal 
constraints on granting outdoor relief to the unemployed had also 
been removed and in September the parish councils agreed on a 
uniform relief scale. Only two Labour-Communist -controlled 
authorities, Bonhill and Old Kirkpatrick went above it and both 
(5) 
were later brought into line by the threat of surcharge 
Report of Scottish Board of Health, 1920, p. 211-213. 
51 Levitt, 'Unemployment and the Poor Law, I in T 'Smokit (ed) 
OP-cit., p. 274. 
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Under pressure from local communities, and the parties to the left, 
the 
'Labour 
Party in Scotland took the initiative in a campaign. to 
change the regulations and administration of the poor law, as 
relief funds were drying up. It was led on to formulate a policy 
on relief, and in particular it organised a conference of parish 
councillors which demanded a minimum relief scale of El a week for 
adults, and thirty shýllings for married couples. It also argued 
that education authorities should be responsible for providing 
childrens meals seven days a. week. In March. 1922, the Scottish 
Executive of the party which made the relief campaign a central 
activity issued a manifesto arguing for adequate maintenance or 
work for the unemployed(6) 
Growing poverty and unemployment merely confirmed the swing from 
industrial to political action and the ILP and the Labour Party and 
even the trade unions placed almost all their hopes for improved 
conditions on electoral success. The main business of the Labour 
Party's Scottish Council it said was 'the securing of the 
parliamentary representation of Labour in Scotland'. By 1920, 
there were in addition to the Labour MPs twenty-one parliamentary 
candidates already adopted, making Labour ready for an election in 
(7) just under thirty of Scotland's constituencies By 1921 there 
were thirty-six parliamentary candidates in all in the field and 
the party claimed that it now had divisional labour parties in all 
but eight of Scotland's seventy constituencies (Dundee, being a two 
(8) 
member seat) 
Labour's support came from defensive struggles for unemployment 
relief and againsý bad housing and evictions as the revolutionary 
euphoria of 1919 gave way to a populist-style strategy for local 
and national politics. 
6 Labour Par-ty Scottish Council, Report -of Conference of Representatives on Public Bodies, September 24,1921. 
7 See Labour Party, Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1920. 
8 Ibid., Executive Report, 1921. 
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But although the Labour Party seemed able to field candidates in a 
future election, it was not as well prepared as it might have been 
in other respects. Finance was its major problem. Throughout the 
period two forces were at work - the National Executive of the 
party attempting to -gain more control over the Scottish 
organisation, and the Scottish Executive attempting to develop a 
more centralised and efficient organisation of the Scottish 
constituencies. In 1919 and 1920, the Scottish Executive attempted 
to constitute a special election fund for 'a centralised Scottish 
effort', but as the Executive heard in April 1920 the replies they 
received were 'few and otherwise discouraging, only two societies 
replying in a really encouraging manner'(9). The party bad no 
better luck in pursuing the question of trade union affiliations to 
local Labour Parties. The importance of trade union financial 
support for local parties was stressed by the executive in an 
appeal to conference in 1920, discouraging parliamentary candidates 
where little groundwork had been done: 
It is surely not too much to expect that 25% of the levy 
should be returned to the branches for the purpose of 
building up the necessary organisation to secure the 
election of Labour representatives to local governing 
bodies and Parliament. It is pennywise and pound foolish 
to spend huge sums of money ranging from E700 to E1000 or 
more on a parliamentary contest in which Labour is bound 
to be defeated simply because a few more pounds have not 
been devoted beforehand to the building up of the 
necessary local machinery. Besides in most 
constituencies it is essential that the seats on local 
government bodies should be largely captured by Labour 
before triumphant headway can be made with the 
organisation of the parliamentary vote. (10) 
But even before the full impact of the recession hit finances 
harder, the party had 
* 
to admit that 'it becomes clear that the 
local labour parties wýll require to depend upon their own efforts 
for finance'"').. 
Ibid 
10 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1920. 
Ibid. 
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A sign of the depression within the movement can be seen from what 
was happening in Ayrshire. With the miners' strike, and the rise 
of unemployment, Labour was unable to field any substantial number 
of candidates in local elections in 1921 and in almost all cases 
they were defeated. There was also an acute shortage of funds, as 
(12) 
trade union membership fell Political meetings excited small 
audiences, and it forced, as Trevis suggests from her study of the 
Independent Labour Party in Ayrshire, the local ILP branches to 
leavb an increasing number of issues 'on the table', or decide to 
(13) 
take 'no action' 
Roxburgh and Selkirk were one constituency which was insufficiently 
well organised or financed to be able to produce a candidate, 
despite the possibility of a by-election just before the 1922 
General Election was declared. In 1920 a year af ter the 
constituency party was formed the party had been so ambitious that 
its suggested candidates included Philip Snowden and Margaret 
(14) 
Bonf ield But the constituency's major branch, Hawick, which 
had been active through 1919 fell away and had to be completely 
resusicated in March 1922 and as far as the divisional labour party 
was concerned 'they had had no meetings of the divisional party for 
(15) 
two years' While they were optimistic that if a strong 
candidate would be found their chances in a by-election were 'very 
good', 
(16) 
their eventual choice - George Mathers of the Railway 
Clerks Association - was refused sponsorship by his union after his 
nomination and stood down. 
(17) 
As the Minutes record: 'this had 
12 Trevis, op. cit., p. 189-191. 
13 Ibid., p. 189. ASE membership fell from more 2,000 to only 763 
from 1920 to 1926. 
-14 Hawick Labour Party, February 16,1920 and March 22,. 1920. 
15 Ibid. March 18,1922. 
16 Ibid., July 4,1922. 
17 Ibid., September 26,1922. 
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meant the loss of valuable time and with only a week between this 
(18) 
and nomination day we-were unable to make a fight of it 
From 1918 onwards the National Labour Party was attempting, as 
McKibbin has shown, to centralise its organisation on London and 
the party regarded the special status of the Scottish Executive not 
as a matter of pride but as a matter of regret and at times a 
hindrance. Headquarters argued as early as November 1919 that an 
organisational scheme should be devised 'to bring the whole! country 
into direct touch with the staff, to ensure periodical visitation, 
consultation, inspection, and report, and bring every part of the 
country under the special charge of a chief agent with a 
responsible official in each area'. Thus the national organisers 
could argue that Wales was in a much more satisfactory position 
because it was under Headquarters control, whereas there was 
dissatisfaction with the position of the Scottish Advisory 
Council. 
(19) 
But between 1919 and 1922 the rural areas posed special problems 
for the Labour Party, as it sought to develop and extend its 
organisation. A radical tradition did exist in the Highlands, 
exhibited not least in the land raids which followed the war. 
(20) 
18 Ibid., December 5,1922. Mathers had only been selected in 
October. While the constituency decided in December 1922 'now 
was the time to prepare for the next election', they did not 
adopt their candidate for 1923 until August 1923, and found 
that they were short of finance for a campaign. (Hawick Labour 
Party, "August 21,1923 and November 2,1923. 
19 Report of National Organisers, Labour Party National 
Executive, November 11,1919. 
s 
20 J Hunter, The MaKýpg_ofthe Crofting Commu , (Edinburgh, 1976), provides an account of Highland land protests. 
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The main impetus for Labour came initially from the Highland Land 
League. While Joseph Duncan had argued that Highland Labour 
organisation could only develop from the activities of trade unions 
like his own, the Farm Servants Union, the Highland Land League had 
(21) in 1918 claimed to represent Highland radical opinion Trade 
Union leaders as prominent as Robert Smillie accepted the case for 
Highland Land League support by the Labour Party if the HLL agreed 
to self-government, land nationalisation, and the extension of the 
Scottish culture. In 1918 the electoral agreement which was 
accepted brought Labour support for *five Highland Land League 
candidates, despite the opposition of Duncan, and a joint programme 
was issued. But Duncan's point was taken immediately after the 
election, with the Executive reporting in 1919: that the Highland 
Land League was 'the shadow of what it once was and had little or 
no prospect of effective revival'. The report argued that the 
majority of the League's membership, which was only 500 was not 
even in the Highlands. Thus the Executive recommended that 'the 
only chance of self-betterment by political means of the conditions 
of the workers in the Highlands lies in their organisation on the 
lines of the Labour Party constitution'; the basis would be 'a list 
of close upon 100 branches of trade unions practically all of which 
are affiliated to the National Labour Party in the four Highland 
divisions alone' 
(22). 
It was Duncan in particular who continued a 
vehement opposition to the Highland Land League. From then most of 
the Highland activity came from the Highland Labour Party based in 
Glasgow and from the occasional incursions of the ILP into what 
they called 'the backward areas' 
(23). 
21 J Smith, Joseph Duncan, (Edinburgh University, 1976). 
22 Labour Party Scottish Executive, Report, 1919. 
23 Labour Party, Scottish ExecutiVe Committee, September 20, 
1919. 
156 
In practice the only two forces that concentrated f inance and 
organisation on Parliamentary candidates were the two groups that 
had been engulfed by the militancy of the immediate post-war 
years - the ILP and the miners' union. From 1918 onwards the 
miners were to place a disproportionate amount of their resources 
into the attempt to secure parliamentary representation. During the 
1918 election they. had four full time miners' organisers in the 
(24) 
seats they contested After the election, the Scottish miners 
adopted a comprehensive policy to increase their representation and 
their organisation in parliamentary constituencies. By the time of 
the Bothwell election, which was gained for th& miners, there were 
(25) five full time organisers And even with four MPs af ter the 
Bothwell victory, and an acknowledged right to contest seats they 
had fought previously, the miners tried to secure additional 
candidatures, in Kilmarnock and Stirling and Falkirk Burghs and in 
(26) 
Rutherglen where mining was only one of many industries 
24 Scottish Mineworkers Union, Executive, May 21,1920. 
Political Committee, May 26,1920; Executive, February 18, 
1921. 
25 Labour Party, National Executive Committee, Report of National 
Organisers, October 7- November 11,1921. 
26 Ibid., Executive, February 18,1921. 
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Smillie was one of a number of Scots miners' leaders who were to 
become totally committed to parliamentary representation as the 
major strategy for securing mines' nationalisation and other 
reforms. Speaking in October 1919 he had argued that: 'if patience 
and forbearance were exercised, the Government would be defeated 
and have to appeal to the country. The electors could then -turn 
them out of office and return to parliament the men they desired to 
f orm. the government they wanted' 
(27) 
Under a national system for 
a1locating parliamentary candidates by numbers of affiliated 
members, the British mineworkers' executive considered the Scottish 
miners to be entitled to seven candidatures. But in Scotland the 
miners' unions in many areas supplemented the standard political 
levy by a voluntary additional levy, with the aim of placing more 
candidates in the field. In addition, the miners preferred to 
assign their political fund directly to particular candidates 
rather than paying dues across the board to local constituency 
parties. Thus, the miners of Lothian decided in 1921 that they 
wished to fight both South Midlothian and North Midlothian 
constituencies, and because this would increase the miners' 
national candidatures beyond the seven allocated, it was decided 
that South Midlothian be fought as a Miners Federation 
responsibility and that North Midlothian be fought as a purely 
Scottish responsibility. In fact, Labour's National Executive had 
recognised as early as the autumn of 1919 the right of the miners 
to contest ten constituencies in Scotland. The National 
Organisers' survey of the political organisation in Scotland had 
expressed satisfaction that four miners' organisers were 
(28) 
cultivating ten constituencies for a future election 
In many places the miners were the Labour Party, and an example of 
their power can be seen in the formation-and development of a 
27 Forward, October 4,1919. 
28 Labour Party, National Executive Committee, Report of Work of 
National Organisers, October 7- November 11,1919. 
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constituency party such as South Midlothian and Peebles. Although 
there had been a miners' candidate in the 1918 general election, 
the constituency party was only formed after a decision by the 
miners in June 1919 and with a miner as the first Chairman. The 
first meeting passed a resolution urging the Scottish miners to 
contest the seat. 
(29) 
From the miners came a promise that if this 
was agreed, there would be an organiser, probably a full time 
(30) 
one . With first James Gold, a Miner, and then Joseph Westwood, 
the miners' organise . r, as the candidate, the only problem proved to 
be whether the British or Scottish miners should accept the 
(31) financial responsibility for the seat Constituencies such as 
South Midlothian amply justify the statement Westwood was later to 
make that 'in places where there was no local Labour Parties but 
where a miners' branch existed, the miners' branch functioned as a 
(32) local Labour Party' 
With five full time organisers in the field, there is no doubt that 
miners constituencies were far better organised than others. A 
survey carried out by the Scottish Miners' Executive in 1921 had on 
the whole expressed satisfaction with the state of organisation. 
Dunfermline it was reported, was 'in good organised condition' and 
West Fife 'well organised and in good condition'. South Midlothian 
had made 'good headway in organisation with the exception of one or 
two districts'. Hamilton was 'in a very good position all over the 
constituency' and the miners' presence was fully established in 
Bothwell, Falkirk and Stirling, North Lanark, South and North Ayr 
and Kilmarnock, making eleven seats in all that the miners were (33) 
cultivating 
29 Peebles and South Midlothian DLP Minutes, June 7,1919. 
30 Special Conference, January 24,1920. 
31 Ibid., February 26,1921. 
32 Scottish Mineworkers Union, Executive, February 20,1926. 
33 Ibid., Executive, August 1,1921. 
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However, by the end of 1921 and during 1922, the depression reduced 
the finance available for political purposes and this was to be 
accentuated by the political splits which were developing within 
the union. In Lanarkshire where the miners 'had acted on their own 
initiative in fighting political campaigns since the 1880's the 
position became serious. The Lanarkshire Miners who had been 
paying constituency affiliation fees as -well as expenses to 
candidates and councillors attending council meetings had decided 
to cut their financial commitments to candidates at local electioils 
and declined, as previously, to pay their constituency affiliation 
(34) 
payments in advance But even so, the Lanarkshire miners were 
prepared to consider additional parliamentary candidates. After 
Motherwell Trades and Labour Council sent a deputation requesting 
James Welsh, the Vice-Chairman of the Lanarkshire miners, as a 
candidate, in Motherwell, the union agreed to petition the national 
union for permission to run two additional miners' candidates for 
(35) 
Scotland including Motherwell This appeal was unsuccessful 
and prior to the election of 1922, finances were so tight that the 
Lanarkshire miners had to consider withdrawing two of their 
sponsored parliamentary candidates 
(36) 
. 
In addition to the miners, the Independent Labour Party were the 
other major force pursuing political representation throughout 
Scotland. From 1918 to 1920, Scotland had been the largest of ILP 
regions in Britain, its affiliation fees to the national 
organisation suggesting it had a membership of 30,000. But by 1921 
with a 25% decrease in affiliation fees, its size was surpassed by 
34 Lanarkshire Miners Union Political Sub Committee, Marcb 10, 
1922. 
35 Lanarkshire Miners Union, Executive, November 9,1922. Since 
August 1921, one of the problems was that the National Union 
of Scottish Mine Workers had been unable to contribute to the 




Yorkshire and Lanarkshire which paid almost twice as much in 
affiliation fees. Thus, while as a whole ILP finances were 
improving nationally, Scotland showed a fall, despite the raising 
of affiliation fees from ld to 2d. Even then Scotland's membership 
fees might hzýve been exaggerated. Other regions operated a system 
of stamp collections from members, which the Scottish ILP had not 
introduced, and as a consequence paper membership in Scotland was 
probably an exaggeration of the real picture. 
The Scottish Divisional Council -of the ILP had a unique 
relationship with the National Administrative Council of the party. 
While in other areas candidatures had individually to receive the 
full approval of the National Administrative Council, in Scotland 
the system which operated in the 1918 General Election was 
continued after the war. The National Administrative Council 
agreed in April 1919 that 'all Scottish nominees accepted by the 
Divisional Council be endorsed by the NAC, as on the occasion of 
the last general election, subject to the total grant from the 
national election fund to Scotland not' exceeding the amount given 
to any other single area' 
(37). 
But as subscriptions from Scotland 
fell in 1921, the arrangement became less acceptable. First, 
Scottish candidates became subject to a national decision that 
every election candidate receive only half the sum of money 
intended, E50 instead of E100. -Second, the ILP National 
Administrative Council decided to withhold confirmation and support 
for additional candidatures, thus ruling out candidates in both 
(38) 
East Renfrewshire and Roxburgh and Selkirk constituencies 
Nevertheless, the ILP in Scotland had been preparing for a major 
presence at a future general election. As early as January 1919 
Glasgow ILP branches bad bepn urged by the Glasgow Federation's 
Election Committee: 'ta týke steps immediately to prepare for the 
nýxt Parliamentary e166tion. This should include the early 
37 ILP National Administrative Council, April 2,1919. 
38 Ibid., May 18,1922.1 
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(39) 
selection of an ILP nominee' In August when the ILP feared 
the possibility of an unexpected general election branches were 
further urged 'to expedite their arrangement for nominating 
(40) 
candidates' But again as finances became tight, the Glasgow 
Federation refused to endorse candidatures where no guarantee was 
forthcoming of finances to pay at least the election deposit. In 
February 1920 Tradeston ILP were asked to consider their financial 
position before adopting a candidate, 
(41) 
and in August their 
supiort for a candidature in the Gorbals was withheld until 
evidence was received that the branch had the requisite E150 
(42) 
deposit in hand When the Camlachie ILP wanted to adopt a 
candidate, with only E50 in hand, the Election Committee demanded 
that E150 be f irst deposited with the Treasurer of the 
(43) 
Federation 
In March 1921 branches were urged to 'get their finances and 
(44) 
membership in order... in view of an early general election' 
But the finandial sýtuation had become so serious by December 1921 
that a special conference was held to discuss how many 
constituencies the party could afford to fight. The Election 
Committee recommended that 'not less than six or more than eight 
constituencies should be fought' and it was agreed that each 
constituency, which proposed to contest the general election 
required to have E200 in hand by January 1922 (45). A measure of 
the sýriousness of the situation was the decision by 23 votes to 16 
to delay endorsement of George Buchanan's candidature in the 
(46) 
Gorbals 
39 Glasgow ILP Federation, Election Committee, January 1919. 
40 Ibid., August 13,1919. 
41 Ibid,, February 2,1920. 
42 Ibid., August 10,1920. 
43 Ibid., September 17,1920. 
44 Ibid., March 4,1921. 
45 Ibid., December 9,1921. 
46 Glasgow ILP Executive, December 23,1920. 
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The scale of the difficulties which the ILP faced as a result of 
the recession was spelt out by Patrick Dollan, the Gla, 5gow 
Federation Chairman, when he addressed the Party's annual meeting 
in March 1922. The report of the Federation had admitted that: 
'the economic depression has reduced our paying membership. The 
number of members remains steady, the decline in income being due 
to unemployment' ; 
(47) 
and Dollan. added that 'the very bad times 
through which the workers were passing ... were affecting adversely (48) 
the financial membership of the party' Yet the ILP 
organisation in Glasgow rallied and had allowed nine candidates to 
be adopted by March 1922. With a Co-operative Party candidate in 
Tradeston, the party were confident still that four other 
candidates could be found for Partick, Hillhead, Kelvingrove and 
Central. Only Pollok was ruled out, the circumstances being 
* (49) 'inopportune' 
The problems of Glasgow were repeated throughout the country. 
Early in 1922, the Scottish Divisional Council of the ILP had to 
form a special committee to examine finance and organisation for 
the general election in the face of 'general apathy and 
depression'. The seriousness of the position was summed up by the 
Labour Party's Scottish Secretary, Ben Shaw, who accepted that 
unemployment would undermine the party's fighting efficiency. 
In fact while there were fifty more Labour candidates in Britain in 
the 1922 election than in 1918, Scotland could afford only to field 
four more. Most were to be either ILP or miners' union nominees. 
Labour Party membership was difficult to calculate given that no 
precise figures were compi'led before 1928. Labour Party branches 
increased in number however. There were only 193 branches in 
January 1918 but a year later there were 200. By 1922-23 there. 
47 Glasgow ILP Federation, Annual Report, March, 1922. 
48 Glasgow'ILP Federation, Annual Meeting, March 31,1922. 
49 Glasgow ILP Federation, Election Committee, March 1922. 
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were 150 local Labour Parties with 66 divisional Labour Parties but 
the Executive had to admit "some of these local Labour Parties are 
(50) 
not very active except at election time" It was the 
Independent Labour Party that made the running. Scottish 
membership was estimated to rise from- 3,000 in Janudry 1917 to 
9,000 in June 1918. While membership remained at this figure 
throughout most of 1919, that was the peak of ILP membership. By 
February 1921, as the depression began to hit Scotland, membership 
fell to 7,000. And for the year 1921-22 paying members amounted to 
only 3,200. Thus the ILP were probably right to admit that 
membership fell in the post-war period by around 7,000 members as 
depression hit Scotland and from 169 branches in 1918 the numbers 
fell to 158 in 1922. In the year 1923-24 membership recovered to 
just over 5,000. The ILP was strongest in Glasgow and Lanarkshire 
(with the numbers of branches in mining areas accounting for a 
third of branches, if somewhat less of the membership) and although 
the party was generally weak in the east of Scotland, in particular 
Fife, where the SDF was the main socialist sbciety, Edinburgh 
Central was the party's biggest east of Scotland branch. The 
Party's hope for membership offices throughout Scotland bore little 
fruit, with only a Scottish Office and Glasgow office in being. As 
with the rest of Scotland Glasgow membership figures were based on 
those who were fully paid up and -'paper' membership was always 
higher. For example, in March 1918 the party had only 1970 fully 
paid up members but it claimed more than 3,000 - 3,331 were 'on the 
books'. In 1919 the party was doing better than ever, with the 
Glasgow Annual report recording 'a period of progress' for the 
thirty branches of the party. 85% of ILP Glasgow members were 
(51) 
men The biggest branches were in the most skilled areas of 
(52) the city, and in Bridgeton and Springburn Thus in 1920 
pembership had risen 
50 Labour Party, Scottish Executive, Report, 1923, p. 4. 
51 Glasgow ILP Federation, March 29,1918 and Annual Report, 
March 28,1919. 
52 Ibid., March 28,1919. 
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from 2270 at the end of 1918 
(53) 
to 2,641, an increase of 371 in 
(54) fully paid up members, by the end of 1919 But in early 1§20 
membership was 'falling off' after an 'advance in monthly 
(55) 
subscriptions' While there was an inrush of new members after 
further Labour successes in the 1920 municipal elections, making a 
year end membership of 2,992, 
(56) 
the Glasgow Chairman Patrick 
Dollan had to admit 'the very bad* times through which the workers 
were passing and which were affecting adversely the financial 
(57) * membership of the party' The party's membership only 
(58) 
recovered after the boost of the 1922 elections Ironically 
the Glasgow Labour membership was far lower for the period than 
that of the Unionists, and the evidence suggests that while in 
1919, in particular, party membership was rising quickly, 'Labour 
and the ILP were never mass membership parties in Scotland. 
The industrial unrest of the period from 1919 to 1921 was the most 
serious faced by any government this century. Kendall has written: 
The reaction against all forms of political and economic 
authority was immediate and unprecedented. There was 
always a fear that the British working man would find the 
ordinary channels of political activity either inadequate 
or useless. (59) 
53 Ibid . 
54 Ibid'., Annual Report, March 26,1920. 
55 Ibid., March 22,1921. 
56 Ibid . 
57 Ibid. March 31,1922. 
58 ibid., April 6,1923. 
59 W Kendall, op. cit., p. 30. 
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The fear of prospective revolution was not restricted to the events 
of 1919 when the Scottish Secretary,, with Churchill, was 
sufficiently worried to send tanks into George Square. As late as 
January 1920 Armitage can write of the Cabinet Supply and Transport 
Committee's meetings when it discussed the 'Mines and the Nation, 
Campaign, that the Committee was 'more alarmed than any time in its 
history 'with members speaking of prospective 'coup 4'etats' in the 
major cities, and with Scots MP Horne, telegramming Lloyd George 
that the miners were poised to take the country 'at its weakest' in 
March. This is in accord with the account of Sir Basil 
(60) - Thomson As late as 1921 also the Goverment feared that in 
Scotland there could be a breakdown of law and order speaking of 
'inflammable elements' particularly in the mining area. 
What had in fact happened was that the Labour leadership had 
channelled working class activity into Parliamentary channels. By 
supporting and then guiding the militancy it had defused its 
impact - and softened its effect. There was, however, no 
significant basis for an industrial movement when thousands were 
unemployed and the fear of unemployment was high. But a militant 
political movement was possible - and it was diverted, as the 
miners' case showed into Parliamentary channels. Significantly, 
the independent Labour Party in Scotland had developed no new body 
of theory which made it any more than a party aiming at gradual 
control through Parliamentary and municipal elections. It is 
significant that it was James Maxton who later was to argue a third 
way to socialism - between gradualism and communism - Who showed 
himself as wedded to an evolutionary course as any when he wrote in 
1922: 
60 For further information, see B Gilbert, British Social 
1918-1939, (London, 1970) and S Armitage, The Politics of 
Decontrol of Indus Ees:, - -(Tondon, 
IF9 6-9 3. _try: _ 
Britain and the United SKa:, 
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We believe that an educated majority is the most active 
agency for the advancement towards the new order of 
society we call socialism. The party are not advocates 
of force as a means to socialism. It believes that the 
constructive power of intelligence is greater than the 
destructive power of force. It is evolutionary rather 
than cataclysmic. It keeps an open mind and is not bound 
by iron dogma. The party must not predict the complete 
realisation 'of its programme tomorrow or next month or 
next year. (61) 
It was this cautious moderation, concentrating on the long term 
creation of socialist consciousness (and short term, on the issues 
of poverty and unemployment) that was to triumph in 1922. Only 
later did the Labour left argue a bolder course. But by the later 
twenties their strategy for 'socialism with speed' was incapable of 
evoking mass support - and isolated them from Labour's Scottish 
leadership and the rank and file. 
61 Forward, August 28,1922. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LIBERAL AND UNIONIST PARTIES - 1918-1922 
I COALITION POLICY AND ANTI-SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA 
The socialist threat dominated the attentions of the anti-socialist 
parties in the immediate post-war period. In particular 
counteracting socialist propaganda was the basic aim of 
Conservative organisation in Scotland, as it fought what it 
considered to be a very real threat from Labour and socialism. The 
Labour Party's progress especially in the municipal elections of 
1919 shocked pro-Coalition forces in Scotland into a more 
aggressive support for 'fusion'. And while the Liberals were 
absorbed for most of the period in internal disputes, what lay 
behind these disputes in many cases was what political vehicles 
would be most effective in countering socialism. 
0 
it was, however, the Unionists in Scotland who made most of the 
running. The development of their anti-socialist campaign aimed at 
creating a party with full-time organisers and lecturers, and a 
propaganda machine which* would work through pamphleteering and 
meetings, not simply under the Unionist banner but through umbrella 
organisations. In local government it meant the formation of 
anti-socialist pacts, with the Good Government League of Glasgow a 
model for other areas to follow. Their campaign was to be at two 
levels, the first, a simple attack on socialism, which they equated 
with Bolshevism, and the second, a championing of social reform. 
The Glasgow Unionist Association, for example, accepted that 'far 
reaching reforms ... are required', 
") 
and most Coalition candidates 
in 1918 had supported substantial measures of social reform. But 
as the chances of a progressive reconstruct; on policy declined in 
1919, the Conservative emphasis centred increasingly on the 
constitutional threat posed by Labour extremists. 
Glasgow Unionist Association, 6th Annual Report, January 27, 
1919. 
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The Scottish Secretary, Robert Munro, a Coalition Liberal Member, 
was to claim in 1920 that the Coalition Cabinet had been 'the first 
government to tackle the housing problems' it had been responsible 
for 'the most radical and far reaching land act that had been 
passed in modern times'; and in general Scotland was benefitting 
from the far-reaching reconstruction policies of the Coalition 
(2) 
Government In their magazine People's Politics, which was 
intended to appeal to a mass working-class audience, the Scottish 
Unionists were to claim that industrial and social reform were 'not 
the monopoly of the Lab6ur Party'. They went on to argue that: 
Many items of social and industrial reform in the Labour 
Party's programme are already being carried out or are on 
the road to settlement by the coalition government. 
That the self-styled Labour Party is far from being the 
only party which understands the reforms needed in 
industry and social life. 
That no man or woman need vote for the so called 'Labour' 
party to get wise reforms. (3) 
But the achievement of the Coalition Government was minuscule in 
relation to the problem that Scotland faced. Rent restriction was 
continued, being extended twice with the result that in most cases 
the proportion of income allocated to housing in working-class 
family budgets decreased. National insurance was extended to new 
groups of workers, and the Government was forced to extend the 
payment of poor relief to the unemployed. But on major social 
issues, the coalition failed. 
Housebuilding schemes failed miserably. In the f irst months of 
1919 there was a spate of planning approvals which meant that by 
(4) November plans had been accepted for 13,500 houses . But by 
2 Scotsman, May 3,1920. 
. 
Leo_ple's Politics, 1919. 
Scotsman, November 1,1919. 
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December 1921 still only 21,344 houses had been actually approved 
for building. The Scottish Board of Health admitted that 115,000 
houses required to be built, and that 'it would seem ... that even 
making allowances for the houses being provided under the private 
builder's subsidy scheme, the needs of housing in Scotland will 
(5) 
only be met to the extent of about one fourth' 
People's Pol_it_ics went further and stated that 'one quarter of a 
1(6) million new homes must be built In fact between 1919 and 1923 
(7) 
only 25,000 homes wdre completed 
Behind the failure lay - the policy of retrenchment in public 
expenditure. As , the 1921 report of the Scottish Board of Health 
explained, 'the need for economy has dominated our policy 
throughout the year. In all the social services administered by 
us, expenditure has been severely restricted'(8), and social reform 
became even more insignificant as the scale of the recession became 
apparent. Unemployment mounted from the end of 1920 onwards, and 
it affected skilled workers as well as semi-skilled and unskilled. 
In many ways it was the resentment of the miners and skilled 
workers which was to be the most pronounced change in attitudes in 
the period. While the real wages for most of those at work did not 
fall substantially until 1923, the relative position of many 
skilled workers was being eroded by the post-war settlements that 
were made. The miners and engineers were to suffer most. 
5 Scottish Board'of Health, Report. 1922, Pp XIII (Cmnd. 1697) 
p. 77. 
6 People's Politics, 1919. 
7 C Harvie, op. cit., p. 71. 
.8 Scottish Boar of Health, Report 1921, PP 1922 XIII, (Cmnd, -1-69-73 p. 77. The 7ýj; ýrt continued -That: ýit was with speci-al 
reluctance what we found it necessary to curtail services or 
stop developments that but for the serious financial 
conditions of the country we should have- been bound, in the 
interests of the people's health, to encourage. ' 
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As a result of the recession the Coalition Government was forced to 
make major concessions in the administration of poor relief. . 
In 
particular, it made major changes in 1921 as unemployment mounted 
and local charitable funds ran out. With the miners' strike of the 
first few months of 1921, a new circular to the parish councils 
came from the Board of Health stating that a striker as well as his 
dependents could be helped. At the same time the parish councils 
under the pressure of growing numbers out of work gave what was 
previohsly forbidden - poor relief to the unemployed. In September 
1921 the Lord Advocate stated that relief could be given and 
promised that the Government would introduce retrospective 
(9) 
legislation to protect the positions of parish councils The 
Government was also forced to tolerate the payments of relief on 
higher scales than previously by some councils. The reason was 
admitted in a confidential report by the Scottish Board of Health: 
Distress is widespread and is especially marked 
throughout the steel and mining areas. As resources 
diminish and distress becomes more acute ... there are very inflammable elements which, while subjected during 
ordinary times to damping down by the saner and much 
larger section of the community, will not improbably be 
fanned into activity, as the endurance of that more sober 
section is broken . by the continued tightening of 
waistbelts round empty bellies. (10) 
Coalition policy had necessarily to vary between retrenchment and 
appeasement as the 1922 Board of Health report made clear: 
The policy throughout the year has been shaped mainly by 
two factors - the need for the economy and the distress 
amongst large sections of the population caused by the 
prolonged trade depression. The pull of these two 
factors in opposite directions has made this year a 
difficult one in the administration of social services, 
for while we have continued to carry out a policy of 
rigorous economy we have had to administer exceptional 
measures ... to relieve social distress. 01) 
I Levitt, op. cit., p. 262-282. 
10 Scottish Board of Health, Memorandum, loc. cit., p. 7. 
Report of Scottish Board of Health, 1922, op. cit., p. 6. 
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What went wrong? That Conservatives in Scotland could commit 
themselves to social reform in the 1918 election and during 1919 
was a measure of how far 'reconstruction' had entered the official 
Whitehall vocabulary. In his Land fit for Heroes, Johnson has 
shown how the highly complex plans of the Ministry of 
Reconstruction included abolition of ý-the poor law, building homes, 
extending insurance, rural development, education and health 
improvement. The failure of reconstruction and with it the 
decontrol of - industry and public spending cuts following the 
'Geddes Axe' have been assessed in a variety of ways: the politics 
and ideology of the Coalition Government and Parliament, the 
failure of administrators to grasp the new mood, the more limited 
extent of social participation during the war (in contrast with 
World War Two) which reduced the pressing need for concessionary 
legislation, or the economic downswing when plans for social reform 
had to be reassessed on the grounds of cost (as Lloyd George 
argued, 'the economy had run riot'). Certainly there is some truth 
(12) 
in all of these explanations 
But perhaps the view taken by Armitage sums up the naivety of 
coalition promises and the reasons for their failure: 
Reconstruction included not only measures of social 
reform but also measures to aid industry and other groups 
such as farmers. Social reform measures never had clear 
priority nor it seems clear were they meant to ... the 
working-class believed mistakenly that it 
(reconstruction) was a policy created to serve ONLY their 
interests where the Cabinet had a larger objective in 
view. It is vital to stress that the Cabinet believed 
until well into 1919 that it had the resources to meet 
the (reasonable) demands of all groups. The lack of 
clear priorities sprang from the belief that there should 
be enough for everyone. (13) 
12 For a further discussion, see K Morgan, Consensus and 
Lisunity, op.. cit.; PB Johnson, Land Fit for Heroes, ýCK cago, 
1968); and K Morgan, 'Lloyd George's Stage Army'ý7, --in A Taylor 
(ed. ) Lloyd_Geo. ýýjge_: Twelve Ess , (London, 1971). 
13 S Armitage, op. cit., p. 159. 
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Armitage suggests that 'there is no clear evidence that the Cabinet 
was following a deliberately devious policy of delay and concession 
until it felt strong enough to repress Labour. the evidence rather 
is that the Cabinet policy in early 1919 was too incoherent for any 
general policy to emerge'. The real problem was, Armitage 
concludes, that 'the idea of an interventionist government was too 
14) 
new to be generally accepted'( 
in Scotland as in the rest of Britain no coherent Conservative or 
Coalition ideology was formulated which could deal with 'the 
disagreeable facts of social conflict', recognising that there was 
conflict between different social groups and choices had to be 
made. Thus it was hardly surprising as Armitage records that 'if 
one accepted the assumption of the Balfour Committee report that a 
special effort was necessary to restore Britain's position in world 
markets, then opposition to wage increases and to heavy social 
expenditure followed logically'. Clearly, the Coalition Government 
was forced into compromises. The effect, Gilbert' suggests, of the 
provision of dole in 1918 was 'to admit a new principle... admitting 
that in effect an adult working man had a right to make a claim 
upon it (Society) 1(15) . But without a coherent ideology, the 
Conservatives were reduced to making concessions as long as these 
did not interfere too much with the market economy. 
It is not surprising in these conditions that the emphasis of 
anti-socialist activity became directed towards propaganda, rather 
than policy, to rhetoric rather than action. In the months 
immediately after the war ended, as the situation in Russia became 
more apparent, the perceived threat was Bolshevism, which many 
14 Ibid., p. 159-60. 
15 B Gilbert, op. cit., p. 60. 
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feared would be transplanted to Scotland; later the emphasis 
switched to an attack on socialism and in particular the threat of 
nationalisation and confiscation. In this chapter we examine the 
attempts by both Conservative and Liberal Parties to reconstruct 
their organisations in the new conditions of the post-war era. 
While the Conservatives made some progress particularly in the west 
of Scotland, the Liberals were so divided on the question of 
electoral arrangements that 'it was difficult for them' to present 
themselves as a credible alternative to the Uni6nists. % 
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II THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNIONIST PARTY 
The Conservative Party was alive to the new conditions created by 
the extension of the franchise and by the post-war social unrest. 
From 1918 onwards it adopted an active policy of attacking 
socialist propaganda. Its aim was to create through a building-up 
of mass membership, through lecture and pamphlet propaganda, and 
through full-time organisers and speakers, a modern party 
organisýtion that was capable of withstanding the threat it saw 
from the Labour Party. In the immediate post-war years Unionists 
in Scotland were almost totally committed to coalition politics. 
Without electoral arrangements they believed they would suffer 
defeat at the hands of Labour. Surprisingly perhaps they seemed 
uninterested in policy matters: while they defended the 
Coalition's social programme, they did not initiate any policy 
discussions of their own. Rather they concentrated all their 
energies on the attack on socialism. In this chapter, we shall 
examine how succet; sful the Conservatives were in reforming their 
local organisations; creating a propaganda machine; and building a 
mass party with full time officials. 
The quickness of the response to the new conditions created by a 
mass franchise was shown by the momorandum 'Representation of the 
People Act: Memorandum by Central Council', which was approved in 
private at the Unionist Association Conference in December 1917. 
Marked 'Urgent', it went 'as guidance' to local associations in 
February 1918. It argued that a mass membership had become 
essential and that organisation had to be modernised: 
The enlarged size of the constituencies and, even more 
than that, the spirit of the age render it absolutely 
necessary that Al classes. .. should have a share in the directiod of the affairs of the association and should be 
welcomed in its deliberations... Further it is obvious 
that, in order to ensure success', constant and much more 
intensive work will be required than in the past. In 
view of the fact that all elections are to take place on 
the same day each Association will require to rely more 
than ever upon the individual efforts of its members. 
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Unless vigorous and persistent propaganda work is carried 
out previous to an election it will be hopeless to 
attempt to make up the. leeway in the rush to an 
election. ( 1) 
The memorandum pointed out that electors would require 'education 
and wide guidance' which could only be achieved by 'effective 
(2) 
organisation' 
Despite the addition of women voters, the party also resolved that 
separate women's sections be disbanded; rather 'women should be 
admitted to all associations on the same footing as men', with the 
sole 'test of election being efficiency'. But while the Council 
had been unanimous in agreeing that the fusion of men's and women's 
associations be 'absolute', any association was still left free to 
appoint a Women'b Association, although it was careful to argue that 
'care should be taken to ensure that these committees were 
representat; Lve of all classes of the community', with this rule 
(3) 
applying to officebearers as well as members 
The raison dletre of the Unionists in the post-war years was to 
create a propaganda machine to counter socialism. As the Glasgow 
Unionist Association made clear in its first post-war reportq 'At a 
time like the present when these is such universal political unrest 
and when a ceaseless propaganda is being carried on in our midst by 
men of revolutionary opinions, it is necessary that those who value 
ordered progress and the stability of the state should organise 
themselves for combined action'. It then appealed on this basis 
I Scottish Unionist Association-Central Council, February 1918. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Western Divisional. Council, May 4 1921. 
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for new members, 'for all citizens who are in general sympathy with 
the coalition party, and who Aesire that the far-reaching refarms, 
that are admittedly required, shall be attained by constitutional 
and parliamentary means, to come forward to join its ranks and give 
it their support'(4) 
Counteracting socialism obsessed the party especially in the west 
of Scotland, and the Western Divisional Council devoted much of, its 
time to discussing how most effectively they could oppose socialist 
propaganda. At their second meeting of 1919, in June, the Council, 
for example, 'felt that there was an urgent need for the education 
of the people in sound economic doctrines and in the true 
principles of democratic government and that the Government being 
national and non-party in its composition might with great public 
advantage take action, on similar lines to those followed by the 
War Aims Committee, to counteract the efforts and teaching of the 
(5) 
revolutionaries' This sounded a theme that was to be 
pronounced in, the coming years, when for example, the Glasgow 
Unionist Association fulminated against 'theories subversive of all 
the established social and political order, which were being widely 
and assiduously spread', and called for 'a strong vigilant and 
efficient organisation of loyal citizens ... as a bulwark against 
revolution'. 
One of the foremost arms of propaganda amongst working class 
members of the population was considered to be the magazine, 
People's Politics. It had been started in 1914 and ran to four 
issues before it fell away during the war. When it was revived in 
1919, its mandate was that 'it should not be purely political and 
should contain articles of general interest'. particularly 
quesfions of concern to women, but its main emphasis was the attack 
on socialism 
(6) 
, identifying that ideology with*Bolshevism and with 
6th Annual Report, Glasgow Unionist Association, January 27, 
1919. 
5 Western Divisional Council, June 4,1919. 
6 Eastern Divisional Council, June 25,1919. 
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Russia, and deploying attacks on Labour Party activists by their 
own party members or by trade union leaders as its means of 
exposing the revolutionary aims within Labour. Articles exposing 
Russia and Bolshevism were legion. But at the same time the 
magazine attempted to show the positive achievements of the 
Coalition. In October 1919, the issue which stated that 'one 
quarter of a million new homes must be built', also attempted to 
show how rent control was operating in the interests of the working 
man. The magazine favoured land settlement schemes, admitting that 
the 1911 Small-hol-dings Act had achieved 'not enough so far', and 
insisting that the impediments to progress were being removed. 
Later editions attempted to chart the progress, but in 1921 the 
magazine had to admit that up till then land settlement had been 
'seriously hampered by the inadequacy of funds available', although 
(7) it predicted more m9ney was on its way Its general theme was 
that industrial and social reform were 'not the monopoly of the 
Labour Party', and to attack Labour as extremists and 
revolutionaries. - People's Politics had a chequered career. Its 
first 'experimental issue' had a print run of 100,000 copies after 
(8) 
grants had been agreed in October 1918 for its publication . This 
issue sold in shops; 30,000 copies were dis tributed in the west and 
25,000 in the east, well short of the 100,000 printed(9) with the 
result that numbers for the second issue were 'considerably 
reduced'(10) By October 1920 the Western Executive of the party 
found that only 6,000 were now being sold, and recommended that the 
associations should be charged for half the costs of 
publication 
7 Peoples Politics. 
8 Western Divisional 
9 Eastern-Divisional 
10 Western Divisiona 
Divisional Council 
11 Western Divisional 
Council, June 4,1919. 
Council, June 24,1919. 
Council, November 5,1919; Eastern 
Executive, November 24,1919. 
Council Executive, October 6,1920. 
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The East found its finances had been 'almost completely absorbed' 
in paying for themagazine and in April 1921 a decision was made in 
view of the 'steadily decreasing demand' to discontinue 
(12) 
publication It had, however, run to ten issues in the period 
when militancy was highest. 
People's Politics was only one arm of the Unionists' anti: -socialist 
propaganda, which aimed, firstly to narrow the differences between 
the lef t and right on the issues of social reform and thereby to 
defuse Labour's appeal, and second to equate socialism with 
extremism, Bolshevism, and the destruction of civilisation, though 
increasingly it was the second theme that became paramount. The 
paper was initially complemented and then replaced by the wholesale 
distribution of pamphlets, although the party also considered more 
sophisticated techniques such as 'the use of cinematograph films as 
valuable aid to propaganda'( 
13) 
. Leaflets in 1920, 
for example, 
took the form of pamphlets justifying profits and interest on 
capital and opposing Guild socialism and syndicalism. But the main 
interest in 1919 and 1920 was in opposing nationalisation. In the 
West of Scotland alone, 100,000 leaflets were issued before April 
1920 on the coal question and by the autumn it was reported that 
400,000 leaflets in all had been distributed. During the coal 
crisis of 1920, the party resolved to take 'immediate steps' to 
explain the government's position in mining areas(14) 
Meetings were also organised throughout the country in an attempt 
to counteract socialist propaganda and the practice of employing 
full-time speakers, usually working-class men, was begun to 'carry 
12 Eastern Divisional Council Executive, April 5,1921. 
13 Western Divisional Counqil, January 7,1920. 
14 Western Divisional Council, September 1,1920. 
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on a campaign against socialism and bolshevism and to instruct the 
(15) 
electorate in elementary economics' By October 1919 four 
speakers employed full-time by the Western Divisional Council had 
addressed 246 meetings during the year 
(16) 
, and with the numbers 
raised to seven, 71 meetings were held during November and December 
1919, although it was not always possible to find suitable 
speakers. The late months of 1919 saw the height of Unionist 
meetings, with the impetus falling away in thd first three months 
of 1920 as attention was taken up by the Paisley by-election. But 
in the Eastern Division in particular a decision was made to 
concentrate to the maximum possible on the employment of open-air 




The Conservatives were also close to a series of 'non-political 
organisations' which chose to play their part in attacking the 
Bolshevist' and socialist menace. The party supported for example 
the Scottish Economic League which sent speakers out to open-air 
(18) 
meetings With Unionist support two other organisations were 
prominent in anti-socialist propaganda between 1919 and 1922. The 
Reconstruction and Anti-Socialist Union was supported by 
industrialists and financiers and between 1919 and 1923, it 
estimated it had run just under 3,000 meetings in Scotland, one 
third of the 8,600 meetings it sponsored throughout Britain. It 
was a measure of the assumed socialist threat in Scotland and 
particularly the West of Scotland that 2,000 of these meetings were 
(19) 
held in Clydeside 
15 Eastern Executive, October 22,1919. 
16 Western Divisional Council, December 3,1919. 
17 Eastern Divisional Council, February 28,1920, July 28,1920. 
18 SU9 Western Divisional Council, March 3,1920. 
19 Monthly Journal of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, March 1923, 
pp. 59-59, cited in A Nassibian op. cit., p. 176-7. 
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Another anti-socialist organisation was the Middle Class Union, 
launched in London in March 1919 with its Scottish organisation 
formed in the same month. Its aim was 'to organise the middle 
classes' to co-operate in protecting their interests, achieving 
equitable taxation and removing unfair burdens on their businesses. 
It believed that even the coalition government was making unfair 
conces sions to Labour opinion, and was to be one organisation which 
(20) joined in anti-Labour pacts of the period 
Generally, however, the Conservatives were prepared to take on most 
of the burden of anti-socialist propaganda themselves, with lecture 
courses on Bolshevism and socialism, the most favoured activity, 
although the general conclusion of the Secretary of the Scottish 
Unionist Office, Blair, was that this had been 'wholly negative 
, (21) 
propaganda In addition, a separate summer school for 
Unionists in Scotland was organised first as an experiment, then 
continuously 
(22) 
Special concern was expressed by Unionists for the danger that the 
youth of Scotland would be influenced by socialist teaching. Thus 
in 1919 a decision was made to resuscitate the Junior Imperialist 
League, on the grounds that tthe young men of the party would be of 
great assistance in the work of counteracting the socialist 
(23) 
propaganda' The League whose membership grew immediately in 
1919 and 1920 was encouraged by the Scottish Conference of the 
Unionists in 1920 which unanimously resolved in a private session 
its strategy for anti-socialist propaganda. It voted that 'this 
conference is satisfied of the urgent necessity of continuous 
education of the people in the political and economic principles of 
20 Glasgow Herald, May 17,1919. r Thý fortunes of the Middle 
Class Union in Scotland are charted by A Nassibian, op. cit., 
p. 179. 
21 SUA Eastern Committee Executive, June 27, 1923. 
22 SUA Central Council Executive, October 6, 1921. 
23 SUA Western Divisional Council November 5, 1919. 
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the Unionist Party by means of organised political study and a 
comprehensive scheme of outdoor speaking, and recommends that the 
strong support of all Unionists should be given to the Worker's 
League and the Junior Imperialist League in their efforts to carry 
on the work and strongly approves of the institution of a summer 
(24) 
school of political study' In fact the League, Unionists 
claimed, went from strength to strength and a group for eight to 
fifteen year oldg, formed first in Bridgeton, had by April 1922 
expanded to sixteen areas with a child membership of 1,000 in 
(25) 
all 
The Conservatives felt that a mass membership was essential to 
meeting the socialist threat and they were to take much comfort 
from the Glasgow ILP's report of 1922 which showed that its 
membership was decreasing while theirs was improving. But 
increased membership was not an end in itself. The party's Western 
Divisional Council 
June 1920 that 'in 
local associations 
but should make 
educational kind' 
concentrated on ho, 
suggested to their constituency associations in 
forming their programmes for the next winter the 
should not confine themselves to social meetings 
arrangements for political lectures of an 
Discussion about womens' committees also 
(26) 
w to politicise members 
At the end of the war it was accepted in Glasgow that 'inevitably 
the membership is below what would be regarded as satisfactory in 
(27) 





SUA Scottish Central Council, Report of Annual Conference 
1920. 
SUA Western Divisional Council, April 5,1922. 
SUA Western Divisional*Council June 7,1922. 
Glasgow Unionist Association, 
1919. 
6th Annual Report, January 27, 
182 
Glasgow showed that membership grew rapidly in the early nineteen 
twenties. Table 3.1 shows the rising party membership until 1922. 
TABLE 3.1 
Glasgow Unionist Association: M2mhe 
. 
Lsýý2 
1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
Bridgeton 373 413 836 909 1175 1054 954 974 
Camlachie 825 1525 1400 1977 1982 1985 2250 
Cathcart 1800 1800 1600 
Central 243 1460 1710 825 1000 
Gorbals 400 
Govan 200 800 458 252 
Hillhead 1586 2625 2449 2493 2733 
Kelvingrove 232 1251 1991 2067 2044 2024 2455 
Miaryhill 1528 1534 2057 2231 2721 
Partick 525 520 490 668 1309 
Pollock 264 1870 1431 2122 2718 3054 3602 
St Rollox 400 523 1229 1215 1648 1209 1203 
Shettleston. 435 500 500 500 400 400 732 
Springburn 700 1007 800 839 1225 
Tradeston 1120 1752 1848 1973 1695 1865 2485 
Recorded 
Membership 1758 7861 11510 17713 20094 20972 21689 
Source: Reports of Glasgow Unionist Association, 1919-1926. The 
total figures are obviously an underestimate given the failure of 
some constituency associations to complete their returns. 
Behind this increase lay also an improvement in organisation. In 
Glasgow, in 1920, for example there were organising secretaries in 
eleven of 'f if teen divisions(28) In 1921 there was again 
'considerable growth', 
(29) 
and further improvement in 
28 Ibid., 7th Annual Report, January, 1920. 
29 Ibid., 8th Annual Report, January, 1921. 
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organisation. In , 19 2 2, also, membership had 'substantially 
increased' and only three Glasgow constituencies were without 
(30) full-time organisers In a few divisions in 1923 there was a 
small increase, in others a fall and the general impression was one 
of relative stagnation as the Conservatives suffered the effects of 
the recession. In Govan it was reported 'impossible to canvas for 
subscriptions among the working. people in the constituencies simply 
because for once they were not working'. Shettleston's membership 
was 'the smallest in our history' and in Springburn the loss of 
three hundred was attributed to 'the detrimentAl effect of' 
unemployment' 
(31). 
In 1924 the position was similar, as 'the 
industrial conditions have continued during the year to militate 
against increase in the numerical strength of the association. In 
the circumstances it is a cause for legitimate satisfaction that 
the membership has been maintained at its former level 1(32) . Only (33) 
in 1925, did membership again show a substantial increase 
In Glasgow the practice of requiring a small membership fee to be 
paid was adopted. In other areas recruits were not expected 
automatically to pay a subscription although in its report on 
constituency organisation in Edinburgh North, the organisation 
committee of the Eastern Council suggested that 'greater interest 
would be taken by the rank and file if they paid a small membership 
fee'. It was accepted, however, that this system had many 
opponents in the East of Scotland. Discussions on a membership fee 
led to a Chairman's letter encouraging it. 
30 Ibid., 9th Annual Report, January, 1922. 
31 Ibid., 10th Annual Report, January, 1923. 
32 Ibid., 11th Annual Report, January, 1924. 
33 Ibid., 12th Annual Report, January 1925. 
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The progress of the early twenties in Glasgow was mirrored by 
similar improvements in the West of Scotland as a whole. While -the 
same detailed figures for membership outside Glasgow do not 
survive, the Western Divisional Council heard in 1920 of 'a large 
increase in membership over the last year', particularly gratifying. 
(34) 
to the party since so many new members were women As in 
Glasgow the progress continued through until 1922, with the Western 
Divisional Council recording in February 1922, that 'the membership 
in proportion to the electorate was larger than at any time since 
the outbreak of war' 
(35) 
The East of Scotland where the battle 
against socialism seemed less immediate was not in such a happy 
state. During the same period, the East's Treasurer's Committee 
had to report difficulties in obtaining subscriptions and on the 
limited funds available for propaganda purposes. In May 1922, for 
example, the party recognised that 'a far greater effort should be 
made to meet the menace by counter propaganda', but had to 
recognise that 'such propaganda called for the expenditure of more 
money' 
(36). But in fact earlier, in 1921, a policy of 'reducing 
expenditure and activity' had already been agreed by the Eastern 
Executive, and in the event the Executives of local associations 
were asked 'whether they could not themselves arrange counter 
propaganda where necessary to meet the activities of the Labour 
Party'. The number of staff in the Eastern Office was also cut and 
smaller offices rented. 
How active the constituencies were was the subject of continued 
discussion and investigation 
(37) 
by the Eastern Executive between 
1918 
34 SUA Western Divisional Council, May 5,1920. 
35 SUA Western 'Divisional Council, February 1,1922. 
36 SUA Eastern Divisional Council. 
37 SUA Eastern Executive, June 22,1921. The conclusions of the 
eventual report are quoted in the following pages. 
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and 1924. Research reports for each constituency were 
commissioned, an Organisation Committee was created and f inall'y in 
1924 a scheme was proposed for local contacts between 
constituencies through regional conferences to secure 'an exchange 
of views upon matters of organisation and policy' with the primary 
aim, 'the framing in practical detail of proposed schemes of 
organisation'. The special organising committee was established by 
the Eastern Executive in June 1921 because of 'the unsatisfactory 
condition of party organisation in some of the constituencies 
within its province'. It soon reinforced the view that membership 
and activity were undesirably low in most areas. The committee 
found that little or no organisation existed in many of the seats 
held by Coalition Liberals and that a far greater effort was 
required to build membership and machinery in the other seats of 
the North East and Borders. 
Orkney and Shetland and Caithness and Sutherland were both 
recognised as to a large extent special areas, constituencies which 
'almost invariably returned its members on personal grounds' and 
especially since one of the seats was- recognised as a Coalition 
Liberal seat, Uriionist organisation was regarded as 'quite 
sufficient'. No such comforting conclusion was possible in many 
other instances. No organisation for example existed in Western 
Isles and almost none in Inverness where funds were 'zero'. In 
Banff however, 'no action was considered necessary meantime' since 
organisation 'on paper' was 'not too bad'. In South Aberdeen it 
was felt 'more strenuous efforts might defeat their own purposes'. 
Forfarshire was 'suitably organised, in a satisfactory position 
financially'; in Kinross and West Perth organisation was 'very fair 
under the circumstances and likely to work welý at an election', in 
Perth itself, where there was considered to be 'less enthusiasm' 
than in Kinross and West Perthshire, interference was 'necesýary'. 
Roxburgh-Selkirk constituency had gained a new organiser and 
although held by a Coalition Liberal organisation was considered 
'quite as good as can be expected'. 
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Edinburgh was regarded as being in relatively sound condition. In 
Edinburgh North organisation was 'good', and in South Edinburgh the 
real complaint was that the constituency funds seemed considerably 
below the level which seemed possible. As a Liberal seat, 
Edinburgh East, it was felt, could be left alone in the meantime. 
The same conclusion was reached in West Lothian where organisation 
was lquite satisfactory', although its financial position was 
unfortunate. In the more industrial areas, organisation was 
extremely patchy where no Conservative held the seat. In West Fife 
and Dunfermline, the organisation was 'extinct', and in Peebles and 
South Midlothian it was 'moribund'. 
Thus the general view of the Unionists was to concentrate their 
activities in the constituencies which they held, and particularly 
those where Labour posed a threat. Where the seat was held by a 
Coalition Liberal, there was a reluctance to bring their 
organisations up to the standard to fight an election, the view 
being that co-operation would outlast the coming elections. 
In general Unionist organisation seemed weak or non-existent in 
Liberal held seats, especially in the North, and this was one 
reason why there was little grass roots Unionist enthusiasm for a 
return to the old Liberal-Conservative contests in the post-war 
era. There were also other signs, which demonstrated to the 
party's national leaders, who made the running in discussion of 
'fusion' and electoral arrangements, that the general feeling, in 
Scotland at least, was that continued cooperation was desirable. 
An Anti-Socialist stance was one characteristic of the post-war 
Scottish Unionists; the other stance they took was support for the 
Coalition. 
The Unionists supported a series of coalition meetings in 1919 and 
1920 -in Scotland, where' speakers were ýrepresentative of both 
wings I of the Government. The Glasgow Unionist Association 
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expressed explicit support for a strengthened form of cooperation 
at their annual meeting in January 1920, and the Unionists 
supported Sir William Sutherland, the Liberal Coalition Whip, in 





unable to reach an agreement with the Paisley Liberals over a 
(39) 
Coalition candidate in January. In February 1920 the Scottish 
Unionist Association's conference endorsed the continuation of 
coalition 'without party prejudice' and went so far as to'accept a 
motion from- the Edinburgh Working Men's Association which was 
tantamount to support for fusion. The proposal called for 'closer 
cooperation of all supporters on the coalition ... as the best means 
of defeating the pernicious policies of the extreme socialist 
parties', although it also recognised that 'till this closer 
cooperation has been achieved the conference considers that all 
Unionist organisation should be maintained in a state of 
(40) 
efficiency' . The Western Divisional Council held discussion on 
the subject of fusion, cooperation, and the general political 
situation in the early months of 1920, 
(41) 
and their: Womens' 
Committee went further. As their minutes record, 'opinions were 
strongly expressed in favour of fusion or closer cooperation and of 
the promulgation of a definite policy'(42) 
one stumbling block to enhanced cooperation was the Irish 
situation. With the Western Divisional Council strongly in favour 
of the Ulster case, motions were passed throughout the period in 
38 Western Divisional Council, March 3,1920 
39 For discussion of Paisley by election, see below. 
40 Scottish Unionist. Association, Report of Conference, February 
10,1920. 
41 Western Divisional Council, April 7,1920 
42 Womens Committee, Western Divisional Council, April, 7,1920. 
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support of closer relations with Ulster; and eventually one result 
of the Irish settlement was to deprive the Conservatives in 
Scotland of the affiliation of the Grand Orange Lodge who up 
till then had nominated' members of the Western Divisional 
(43) 
Council But difficulties over Ireland were insufficient to 
discourage. moves towards fusion as a means of resisting the 
socialist threat; and the Western Divisional Council in October 
1920 felt that Asquith's increasingly independent line 'would 
create a feeling favourable to fusion between the Unionists and the 
Coalition Liberals, that the leaders of the party should be urged to 
take advantage of the opportunity this afforded them'. These 
(44) 
feelings were conveyed to the party leaders 
In the 1919 municipal elections it was felt by Unionists that 
anti-socialist alliances prevented greater Labour victories. In 
Edinburgh, for example, where the alliance operated, Labour won no 
seats at all. As the Scotsman remarked: 
The Scottish election may indeed have brought into 
existence a new coalition, a combination of all sections 
of Liberals and Unionists against collectivism in 
politics ... the coalition has as firm a foundation as 
Liberalism ever had. 
It went on to add that the Coalition would not be shaken by 
Liberals outside its ranks, whom it dismissed as 'a party which 
cannot find a policy. ' 
At a local level throughout 1919 and 1920 cooperation was being 
developed through joint Liberal-Conservative participation in local 
43 Western DivIsional Council, January 11,1922. 
44 Western Divisional Council, October 6,1920. 
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authority elections. The turning point came, in places where 
cooperation did not exist, with the November 1919 elections where: 
'the success of the Labour candidates-all over the country 
suggests that the time had come when the attitude of the Unionist 
Association should be reconsidered 
(45) 
. The Unionists were 
particularly worried about the possibility of Labour control of 
Glasgow and in a confidential memorandum in December 1919 Sir Lewis 
Shedden, the Unionist organiser in the West of Scotland, argued; 
'there is grave reason to fear that they (Labour) may obtain this 
object unless in the interval something effectual is done to 
organise the anti-socialist forces in the city'. A private meeting 
had already been held under the auspices of the Citizens' Union, 
which the Unionists considered privately to be 'inadequate to the 
task to be undertaken'. They took the initiative in forming a 
provisional committee, which contained representatives of the 
Glasgow Unionists, the Glasgow Liberal Council, and the Womens, 
Citizens Association, with Shedden arguing that Glasgow could 
export this model organisaýion to the rest of Scotland: 
If an organisation of the kind proposed is set up in 
Glasgow it will indicate the lines on which other burghs 
and districts throughout Scotland should be asked to 
proceed, and our branch associations might be recommended 
to take pari in or if necessary to initiate schemes of 
the same kind in their own areas, so that in every area 
there would be set up a joint organisation to work for 
the return of non-socialists in the various elections 
whether for town or county councils, parish councils or 
education authorities. (46) 
45 Glasgow Unionist Association, 11919 Memorandum' marked 
'private and confidential', Sir Lewis Shedden, December, 1919. 
46 Ibid. 
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The final upshot was the Good Government League, which not only 
included the Glasgow Unionist Associations and Liberal Council. but 
also the Rotary Club, the Citizens' Vigilance Association, and the 
Citizens' Union. It initially formed the Glasgow Municipal 
Electors' League and then, with the addition of women's 
organisations, the Good Government Committee 
(47) 
. 
The result was that the anti-socialist list groupings retained 
control of Glasgow throughout the twenties - and only lost control 
of Glasgow when the Scottish Protestant Party split the right wing 
(48) 
vote Glasgow took the lead in an advanced form of cooperation 
through not only political parties - but other organisations that 
could be considered 'non political' in normal times. The Unionists 
did press other local associations to do likewise, and at the 
Scottish Unionist Conference. in 1920 a motion was passed urging: 
'that the time has come when the Unionist Associations throughout 
the 'country should -actively concern themselves in local government 
elections, and that acting when and where possible in combination 
with other non-socialist organisations, they should endeavour to 
secure the return to"Town and County Councils, Parish Councils and 
education authorities of men and women of sound progressive and 
anti-socialist opinions'(49) It was a proposal which received the 
endorsement of the Eastern Divisional Council, as well as the West, 
and from there was born the tradition of local government 
candidatures under 'ratepayerl, 'moderate', 'progressive' and other 
labels. 
47 Ibid . 
48 Cook in Age of Alignment, p. 83-84, qhows that from 1920-ý6 the 
anti-socialists won 58% of all seats. ' 
49 Scottish Unionist Conference, 1920. 
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This new spirit was also shown in parliamentary elections during 
the first years of post-war Coalitioq Government. In Glasgow,. for 
example, there was a joint meeting of Liberals and Unionists to 
adopt a candidate in Kelvingrove. There were also joint meetings 
to discuss candidatures in both Hamilton and Bbthwell. The 
continued desire among Unionists for coalition arrangements was 
also seen in the case of Glasgow Cathcart. Here agreement between 
Liberal and Conservative had been impossible in 1918, but when it 
was realised the Coalition Liberal member would retire at the next 
election, the Unionist Association offered in December 1921 to meet 
the Liberals to 'discuss names of gentlemen acceptable to both 
associations', and warned that 'if the Liberal Association adopted 
without consultation it would be resented'. So keen were the 
Unionist Headquarters in Scotland to reach an amicable settlement 
that the Scottish Whip, John Gilmour, advised the local Unionists 
to accept a Liberal nominee. While its President recommended a 
Liberal, the Association declined to accept someone it had not 
chosen, although a breakaway group argued in a manifesto that 'the 
time is most inopportune for splitting the vote of holders of 
moderate opinion'. This group urged: 
An honourable understanding that the status quo in the 
constituencies should be maintained, so that moderate 
opinions of both parties might present a United front 
against the subversive principles of socialism and 
labour. This attitude has generally been adopted 
throughout the country and it would be most regrettable 
were our constituency to prove an unfortunate 
exception. (50) 
Unionist Headquarters resisted a Conservative nominee for Cathcart 
'on the grounds that they considered themselves bound by the pact 
entered into by the whips of both parties', and Gilmour threatened 
that if the *proposal to have a Liberal was 'not acceptable', 'no 
central assistance in finance or speakers' would be give'n 
(51) 
. 
50 Glasgow Unionist Association, Annual Report, January 30,1922. 
51 Ibid. 
192 
This Central Office pressure in the case of Cathcart showed the 
importance attached by the Scottish Party Leaders to pacts between 
Liberals and Conservatives. But most initiative for arrangements 
did come locally, and perhaps most illustrative of all examples of 
local 'coalitionism' at work came in St Rollox. Early in 1922, 
Gideon Murray, the sitting member, was quite simply dropped as 
candidate by his Conservative executive because of his strongly 
stated view that the Coalition had 'run its course' and his desire 
to run as a Conservative, rather than a Coalition candidate. In 
his place a Coalition candidate was chosen jointly by Unionists and 
National Liberals. 
In March 1922, the Western Council of the Unionists recommended 
that 'a continuation of alliance and cooperation.. is still 
essential', and at its conference in March, a motion expressed 'its 
deep sense of gratitude for the great services rendered by the 
(52) 
Prime Minister' In both East and West the prospective 
candidates who were being endorsed in 1922 were coalition rather 
than simply Unionist candidates. At the Scottish Associations' 
Conference in January 1922 Gideon Murray referred to the possible 
formation of a centre party and proposed that 'no steps be taken to 
commit the local Unionist and Conservative Associations in Scotland 
to support such a centre party without first assembling a full 
conference'. But there was so little support that the motion was 
(53) 
withdrawn Instead at the Central Council of the Unionists in 
April, a pro-Coalition motion was moved and passed. The full terms 
of the motion are significant because the motive for cooperation is 
set out explicitly, and because the Unionists support the maximum 
cooperation possible: 
That this council considers it desirable in our national 
interests at home and abroad that there should be no 
cleavage between- the Unionists and the National Liberals 
who have so far loyally. cooperated with them, and 
52 Western Divisional Council, April 5,1922. 
53 Scottish Unionist Association, Conference, January, 1922. 
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recognising on the other hand that the time is not yet 
ripe for any fusion of the party organisations of these 
two bodies, urgently recommends that the precedent of the 
Conservatives and Liberal Unionists from 1886 to 1912 be 
followed, and that the Unionists and National Liberals, 
while preserving their separate organisations and 
identities should loyally cooperate in policy and in 
arrangements as to representation in the country and in 
Cabinet, as the only possible means of defeating the 
subversive policy of so called Labour and independent 
Liberalism and securing the success of a policy that aims 
at the prosperity of all classes in this country and the 
Empire as a whole. (54) 
The only amendment, to withdraw the Liberal Unionists and 
Conservative analogy, fell after 'it was pointed out that the terms 
of the resolution specifically deprecated fusion meanwhile'. But 
the strength of the resolution suggested that the Unionists would 
go as near to fusion as was thought practicable. At the meeting 
Younger urged 'a unanimous verdict in view of the important 
(55) 
influence which such a declaration would have' 
Moreover though the motion condemned independent Liberalism as well 
as Labour, the desire for cooperation against socialism in 1922 
extended as far as potential pacts with the Asquithians and with 
Asquith himself. In September the Unionist Party Chairman Sir 
George Younger reported to John Gilmour that the Liberal, Sir 
Donald Maclean, had been trying to prevent Liberal opposition to 
Bonar Law in Glasgow Central constituency in return for a free run 
for Asquith in Paisley. In fact Maclean had not been successful. 
Younger fel t this was unfortunate although he believed Bonar Law's 
seat was safe and that as far as Asquith was concerned his view was 
that 'our people' should 'leave him alone' 
(56). 
54 Minutes of Central. Council, April 26,1922. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Gilmour Correspondence GD/383. /17. Younger to Gilmour, 
September 12,1922. 
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III LIBERAL DISINTEGRATION 
While the Conservative Party prospered, the Liberal organisation 
never recovered its pre-war position. Financially, the position of 
the Scottish Liberal Federation was to remain desperate. From 
2,000 subscribers who met the 'cost of central organisation, the 
list fell to 1300 in 1919 and never rose afterwards. Only 1922-23 
as we shall see, seemed a reasonable year for the Scottish 
Liberals. Organ isat ionally the party had problems also. Liberal 
Constituency Associations had never had strong local organisations 
between elections. Now in the age of the mass franchise, many 
associations were moribund; among those which were not, defections 
from independent Liberalism grew apace, and the splits on policy 
and attitudes to the Coalition rent the organisation from top to 
bottom asunder. Four major resignations, engulfed the Scottish 
Liberal Executive in 1920 and 1921 - including the loss of both 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman - and were followed by the embarrassing 
situation of appointing a new Chairman from an organisation that 
had dissafiliated itself. While there was criticism of the lack of 
a distinctive Liberal policy and an attempt at a new statement of 
Liberal aims for Scotland, it is difficult to resist the conclusion 
that the Liberals were philosophically unequipped for the modern 
era. The Paisley by-election of 1920 when Asquith was returned to 
Parliament provided no statement of the Liberal way ahead, as the 
Midlothian by-election campaign of Gladstone forty years earlier 
had done, and the most Scottish Liberals were sure of was what they 
opposed. 
The Liberals were to find themselves excluded from all of 
Scotland's mining and industrial areas throughout the twenties, and 
they had lost the burghs by 1924. The party never fully reappeared 
in Glasgow, except when a national Liberal- won Partick in 192f, 
when neither Conservative nor Labour intervened. In Lanarkshire, 
Renfrewshire and most of Stirlingshire and the industrial areas of 
"Lothian and Fife, the party lost all its roots. In Greenock 
however, the Liberals did survive, winning in 1922 and 
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1923 when there was no official Labour candidate, but Collins 
himself was no great supporter 0f independent Asquithian 
Liberalism. Only Leith showed a similar pattern of success. It 
was won in 1922 and even in -the 1927 by-election, when the Labour 
candidate was regarded as a Communist (the Stirling and Falkirk 
constituency was won in 1923, but without a Conservative 
intervention) . Paisley was, of course, won in 1920 but held only 
until 1924. 
With these exceptions, Liberalism in Scotland became an entirely 
rural party - and even in the rural areas it survived less be-cause 
of its own dynamism and more because either Conservative or Labour 
failed to appear in successive electoral contests. Ironically, 
before 1924, the most keenly fought contests in the rural areas 
were between National Liberal and Liberal. In 1922, 'no rural seat 
was won without either Conservative or Labour dropping out. Only 
Western Isles and Paisley were won in 1923 with- Conservative and 
Labour opponents, in three party contests. Again in 1924, it was 
only Greenock and Western Isles-which were won in three cornered 
fights. Indeed, seven Liberal losses could be attributed to Labour 
intervention in 1924, and there were only two seats won by the 
Liberals in 1924 where there was no Labour candidate - Fife East 
and Orkney and Shetland. In four seats the Conservatives had 
dropped out to make possible a clear Liberal run against Labour. 
The character of the Liberal Party that won in rural areas needs 
closer examination. In 1918, it was Coalition Liberalism that won 
the seats - not independent Liberalism. In 1922 most of the 
successful Liberal victors were prefixless Liberals who were not 
Asquithians. In 1923, it was the Lloyd George version of 
Liberalism that did best. And by 1924 Liberalism was consigned to 
the outlyiqg areas of Orkney and Shetland, Western Isles, 
Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, and Caithness and Sutherland. 
This parlous electoral performance is the backdrop against which to 
view the problems of Liberal organisation in the. post-1918 period. 
1 196 
In the first years after the war, Liberalism was split asunder by 
discussions and divisions over Coalition and indeed. fusion. From 
Paisley to the break-up of the Coalition the divisions within the 
party were never far from the surface. 
The immediate repercussion of the 1918 general election was an 
Indian Summer for Scottish Liberalism - as they won two of the 
first three by-elections that occurred in Scotland. In April 1919 
despite Labour intervention, the Liberals beat a Coalition Liberal 
candidate in Central Aberdeenshire and in January 1920 they won the 
Paisley by-election under Asquith. These were to be their only 
by-election successes before 1922 and they won under conditions 
that were not conducive to the strength of Liberalism in the 
future. In April 1919 the party considered Sir Donald Maclean 
rather than Asquith as a better President of the party in Scotland 
but agreed to continue with Asquith when Maclean refused the 
position('). The Liberal Associations of the East and West were in 
deep financial troubles, with the Western Federation moving towards 
support of Coalition Liberalism, and the East reliant on central 
party grants 'in order to give the association a chance of possibly 
1(2) becoming again self supporting An appeal was issued to old 
and potentially new members for finance. The party agreed after a 
discussion of organisation that 'a scheme should be prepared for 
the better organisation of the party in the East of Scotland'(3). 
One of the upshots of these discussions was a concern that there 
were insufficient 'trade union and working-class members of Liberal 
associations', a matter that was referred to the organisation 
1 Executive, April 16,1919. 
2 Eastern Finance Committee, May 1,1919. 
Eastern Committee, May 1,1919. 
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committee. But in 1919 the main hope was that Liberal unity could 
be maintained despite the coalition and the Annual Report of 1919 
strongly believed that the feeling of bitterness would soon 
(4) disappear 
The Bothwell by-election in July 1919, where a Coalition Liberal 
stood with the support- of both the Liberal and Conservative 
Associations proved disastrous. In Bothwell the candidate, Moffat, 
was a lifelong Liberal who stood with Conservative support. He was 
also supported by the Western Liberal Federation Organising 
(5) Committee of the Scottish Liberal Federation But a newly 
formed Scottish Radical Council urged radical electors to abstain 
from voting in protest against the cooperation of Liberals and 




The Radical Council fizzled out and the 1919 local elections 
demonstrated a drift that the Scottish Liberals were unable to stop 
even after their attitude to the Coalition hardened in 1921 and 
1922. In the elections in which Labour gained 119 seats, swept the 
board in mining areas, and threatened to gain control of Glasgow, 
it had only seriously been held back where there were coalition 
arrangements. In Edinburgh an anti-socialist union prevented 
Labour from winning a seat. The Scotsman pointed out the 
implications of these results. Its editorial concluded that the 
local elections had marked a watershed: 
The voting shows that Asquithian Liberalism has no firm 
foothold between the Coalition and Labour. There is no 
middle ground for it to occupy where distinctive 
principles of cardinal importance can be maintained. 
Executive, SLF, March 25,1919. 
5 Forward, 2 July, 1919. 
Scotsman, 10 July, 1919. 
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In Glasgow (as has already been shown) Liberals and Conservatives 
were now combining to fend off the socialist threat, but under the 
initiative of the Unionist Party. In these circumstances the 
Paisley by-election was a very ambiguous assertion of independence. 
Although Asquith won, the manner of his success demonstrated that 
coalitionism was strongly embedded in Scotland. While Asquith 
indicated through Sir Donald Maclean that lif... invited he would 
most willingly and very favourably consider the invitation to stand 
for the constituency', the Paisley Liberal Association which had 
urged the previous member, Macallum, to support the coalition was 
(7) 
by no means united on his adoption The Paisley Unionist 
Association had already suggested a coalition, preferably also a 
local, candidate to stand for both parties in this by-election, and 
while no meeting had taken place between the two parties, the 
Liberal Executive had gone so far as to give its 'expression of. 
(8) 
opinion' that. a nominee 'if Jointly approved must be a Liberal' 
When Asquith's name came forward, the sharp divisions within the 
Executive were resolved only by calling a meeting of all 
Association members(9). It was only by 93 votes to 75 -a decision 
albeit confirmed by a unanimous vote - that Asquith won the 
nomination in preference to an Edinburgh advocate who was a 
(10) 
Coalitionist In response the Unionists chose a local man, a 
septuagenarian, the Treasurer of the Burgh Council, who stated 
clearly that he and the members of his party had 'wanted a straight 
issue of coalition versus Labour. They had been disappointed in 
that'. He claimed the Liberals who had been coalition supporters, 
were 'hypocrites' to choose Asquith 
7 Scotsman, January 22,1920. 
8 Scotsman, January 20,1920. 
9 Scotsman, January 21,1920. 
. 
10 Scotsman, January 27,1920. The Unionist Provost of Paisley 
commented that 'the Unionist Association offered to the 
Liberal Association their full support if they would bring 
forward a Liberal Coalition candidate and they promised to 
work for him with the full strength of their association. 
That was declined'. 
11 Scotsman, January 27', 1§20. 
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By comparison, in Argyll in March, when Sutherland sought 
re-election as a Coalition Liberal, there were few problems. The 
local Liberal Association simply supported the Coalitionist MP. 
Even when Watt, the defeated Liberal member from College in 
Glasgow, offered himself as an independent candidate, he would have 
had no official support if he had gone ahead as a candidate. 
Sutherland was in fact unanimously chosen by the Argyllshire 
Central Liberal Council and while he was supported by the 
Unionists, locally and nationally, he also claimed the support of 
(12) 
the Scottish Liberal Federation 
Under Liberal standing orders, nominations were a matter for local 
Liberal Associations and the Scottish Liberal Federation or any 
other national organisation of the party had no powers to intervene 
to impose an official Liberal candidate, if that was not what the 
local association wanted. As long as the standing orders remained 
unchanged, local Associations could freely support Coalition-minded 
members, and claim their right to do so under the Liberal Party 
constitution. During 1919 and 1920 as a result Liberal 
associations drifted freely to the support of the Coalition - and 
eventually the National Liberal Party. But if the Liberal Party's 
rules stifled any direct clash between Liberal supporters and 
opponents of the Coalition, the party's personalities could not 
avoid airing their differences in public, especially as Asquith set 
himself on a strong anti-coalition course on his return to 
Parliament. He criticised the Coalition's Policy on Irish 
self-government, and the general course of its foreign policy, and 
he blamed the Coalition for inflation. After he had turned down an 
invitation from Lloyd George to discuss Liberal reunion in April 
1920 the Scotsman could remark of Scotland: 'The feeling of 
faction - and it is regrettable that it should be so - is stronger 
today than it was in December 1918 ... Liberalism is at the parting 
of the waysl(13) 
12 Scotsman, February 28,1920. 
13 Scotsman, April 8,1920. 
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An open breach had always been likely since mid-1919 when Churchill 
had floated the idea of a centre party. From December 1919 to 
March 1920, Lloyd George had held discussions on the possibility of 
a centre party, and in March and April 1920 Asquith declared war on 
the Coalition Liberals, committing the party to rival 
candidatures 
(14). The two Edinburgh by-elections - in North and 
South Edinburgh - in April 1920 brought the splits out into the 
open. In Edinburgh North the Unionists and Coalition Liberals 
jointly selected a former Unionist candidate and proceeded to form 
a joint election committee. And even when the Liberals placed 
Runciman in the field as an independent Liberal, it was alleged by 
coalitionists that Runciman had been forced on a Liberal 
constituency party which would have preferred a local candidate who 
(15) 
supported the Prime Minister and the Coalition In this fight 
between a Unionist supported by Coalition Liberals and- an 
independent Liberal, the war of, words between both sides of the 
Liberallforces escalated. The Lord Advocate, Morrison, who was a 
Coalition supporter, claimed that Asquith had only won the Pai-sley 
by-election with Unionist support and that now he was threatening 
to excommunicate Liberals who supported the Coalition. Ile went 
further to claim that Hogge, the Liberal whip, had threatened a 
Coalition Liberal MP that unless he ceased to support the 
Coalition, 'he would have the party machine turned against him' . 
Ile claimed that 'it was Mr Hogge's intention to have every Scottish 
Liberal Coalition member turned out of his seat' , and finally 
he 
saw the decision to place a Liberal candidate in Edinburgh North as 
'the first stage of an attack through the party machine upon all 
Liberals in Scotland who supported the Prime Minister'. That being 
so, he claimed that: 
14 The intricate discussions and negotiations are explained in 
. 
Ljm jac: Lof Labour, and in greater detail in M Cowling, Ih 
lesser detail in T Wilson, op. cit., pp. 197-200. 
15 Scotsman, March 24,1920. Lloyd George's joint 'message of 
support with Bohar Law claimed that 'there is ýnother 
candidate whose main stock in trade would appear to be the 
revival of the dead party'. 
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'if the ultimate issue came to whether the Liberals in Scotland 
were to be led by Mr Asquith or Mr Lloyd George, he had no do-ubt 
that the decision will be overwhelmingly in favour of Mr Lloyd 
George'. Hogge's reply was to deny the specific accusation of 
threatening the Liberal machine would be let loose on Coalition MPs 
but to equivocate on the more general issue, arguing that 'the 
Liberals in Scotland would look after the Coalition Liberals in the 
House of Commons at the next general election without any advice 
from him'( 16). % 
The by-elections coincided with the publication of the annual 
report of the Scottish Liberal Federation, which made favourable 
references to Asquith but excluded praise of Lloyd George or the 
Coalition Government. It brought an angry response from the 
Liberal Coalition Whip, Sir William Sutherland. Writing, he said, 
on behalf of Scottish Coalition MPs , he argued: 
'they hesitate to 
believe that the report is intended to create dissention in the 
Liberal Party, but there are passages in it and omissions from it, 
which should not be permitted to go unchallenged'. The Coalition 
MPs, he said, regretted the failure to mention Liberal successes in 
pensions, housing and land settlement legislation, 'and whilý 'they 
cordially. endorse references in the report to Mr Asquith', they 
felt that similar references ought to be made to Lloyd George: 
They think that Liberal opinion in Scotland is not 
prepared to destroy the present government ... Scottish Liberal members who support the Prime Minister, are 
anxious to preserve the unity of liberalism in Scotland 
and to maintain these principles which are common to all 
Liberals. ( 17) 
16 Scotsman, March 31,1920. Morrison's-re'ply to Hogge was that 
the threat had - been made against. Gardiner, the Perthshire 
member. See also, Scotsman, April 5,1920. 
17 Scotsman, April 8,1920. 
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The splits could no longer be kept to a minimum and engulfed the 
whole party. The Chairman, Sir William Robertson, had attempted to 
heal the wounds in the Edinburgh by-elections by arguing that he 
was tnot aware that the Scottish Liberal Federation has taken up an 
attitude of hostility towards any Liberal'. Then at the Scottish 
Liberal Federation's Executive meeting at the end of April, he 
proposed that the Liberals record their 'firm conviction that a 
strict adherence to týe principles of the Liberal Party was never 
more needed than now". and call for their application to the 
problems facing the country. But this compromise proposal - to 
allow Liberals to continue support for the Coalition - was beaten 
down with the Executive resolving by 27 votes to 19: 
That this meeting of the Scottish Liberal Federation 
records its strong opposition to any policy that would 
involve the fusion of Liberal and Unionist Associations, 
and to any action or proposal directed to that end, and 
declares that it is essential to the continued existence 
and usefulness of the Liberal Party and Liberal 
Associations that Liberals shodld give full name and 
unfettered expression to Liberal principles and ideas and 
avoid all entangling and compromising alliances with the 
other political parties in the state. (18) 
It was this proposal that was put to the Annual Meeting. 
The 'anti-fusion' resolution and the controversy over the Annual 
Report dominated 
_its 
proceedings, which, as the Chairman reminded 
delegates, were 'normally confined to strictly business matters'. 
With all the major Coalition Ministers from Scotland including 
Churchill present, the Scottish Secretary, Robert Munro, moved 'a 
reference back' motion on the Annual Report, arguing it was 'a 
highly ungenerous document': 
I 
18 Scottish Liberal Federation, Executive, April 30,1920. 
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What they complained of and what they had a right to 
complain of was the entire absence of any recognition or 
appreciation of all of the work of the Liberal Prime 
Minister ... The Coalition Government was the first 
government to take in hand the vital problems of housing 
and to deal with it in a sound and comprehensive 
manner ... The most radical and far reaching land act ... had been passed in modern times. (19) 
An4 he argued that 'the time had not yet come for the resumption of 
party controversies on pre-war lines and in the meantime their duty 
was perfectly plain, to go on with the programme of reconstruction 
now in the process of being carried out and which had received the 
benediction of Mr Asquith himself'. others, including McPherson, 
the solicitor general, and Churchill, urged the same course, but an 
executive member, Councillor Allan, from Edinburgh led the 
counter-attack, arguing that the report was 'too moderate-the 
prime minister had wrecked Liberalism. He did not stop doing so in 
1918 but had continued till April 1920. Yet they were asked to 
(20) 
send back the report and laud Lloyd George' 
By a large majority the reference back motion was defeated. But 
the Conference ended in confusion' when the motion supported by the 
Executive and which opposed any fusion, was put to the conference. 
It was defeated by 100 votes to 88, allowing the Coalition Whip 
Sutherland to claim that 'the outstanding fact was that a 
resolution condemning the coalition was defeated'. The Scotsman's 
Political Correspondent agreed that this was the mood of the 
meeting: 
Coalition Liberalism in Scotland will be all the stronger 
and healthier for yesterday ... the meeting was a warning 
to the extremists that the coalition had got more friends 
in the federation than they calculated ... It was in point* 
19 Scotsman, May 3,1920. 
20 Ibid. 
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of fact not an anti-coalition resolut. ion at all. It was 
an anti-fusion resolution. Yet it was lost 100 votes to 
88. The extremists who drew it up over-reached 
themselves and instead of submitting to a defeat on 
simple cooperation between the parties have engineered 
inferential approval for a policy of fusion. (21) 
That interpretation was hotly disputed, not least by letters to the 
Scotsman in response, with Professor Keith, a well known Scottish 
Liberal academic, arguing that 'the deliberate opinion of the 
federation can only be arrived at after a full examination of the 
position by the affiliated associations, few of which have as yet 
(22) 
had occasion to adopt a definite attitude to the issue' 
Asquith's response was unequivocal. tThe suggested movement in the 
direction of fusion', he told Glasgow University Liberal Club on 21 
May 1920, 'had been unhesitatingly repudiated by every Liberal 
organisation in the country. The repudiation had begun in 
Scotland, in Glasgow in fact, and carried out South of the border'. 
He continued: 'The Tory was to cease fighting the Liberal, and the 
Liberal was to cease f ighting the Tory, and each was to put his 
vote at the disposal of the other when and only when a Labour 
candidate came into the field ... The Tories were assured of a 
majority and that what the Liberals as a party were askied to do was 
to, commit political suicide ... that was what fusion meant when (23) 
translated into political practice 
Following the conference decision, and Asquith's statement, the 
Scottish Liberal Office-ýBearers could not find any formula for 
consensus. The first stage was the resignation of Mrs Waddell, a 
Vice-Chairman, 'on account of the views given out in the last 
21 Scotsnan, May 3,1920. 
22 'Ibid. 
23 Glasgow Herald, May 22,1920. 
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annual report and those that had been taken up by the majority of 
the executive at the last annual meeting'. She argued that there 
was no longer 'equality of expression' of the different Liberal 
wings. Her resignation was accepted by 21 votes to 5 and again an 
attempt from the Chair to conciliate met with little success. Sir 
William Robertson proposed that they write to the Liberal Coalition 
Whip to ascertain whether it was his intenti-on that seats held by 
tnionists would be contested by Liberals at the next general 
election. But the Executive could not agree to do this and 'as 
there was considerable differences of opinion regarding the 
, (24) suggestion it was dropped 
Events nationally were, forcing Scottish Liberals to clarify their 
position. In May the Lloyd George Liberals had walked out of the 
National Conýference of the Liberal Party and s'teps were being taken 
to form a National Liberal Organisation. - In Scotland, the 
Executive now found that 'it was difficult to get speakers into 




while the Executive felt that 'with a little more time matters 
would settle down' and that the main need was to set up-a special 
committee to lead to a new statement of policy, 'the policy-making 
conference of the 'Scottish Liberals in October could not avoid a 
new debate on the party's divisions. The Conference in Ayr had 
four different proposals before it. Cathcart Liberals expressed 
confidence in the coalition government; North Edinburgh Liberals 
expressed no confidence. A motion from Clackmannan and East 
Stirling rejected fusion, while one from Partick urged there be no 
interference with local Liberal Associations. First, the 'North 
Edinburgh motion was passed by 150 votes to only 31 for the 
24 Scottish Liberal Federation, Executive, June 29,1920. 
25 Ibid., July 29,1920. 
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Cathcart proposal. Then in the debate on -fusion and independence, 
the Partick Liberals urged that Conference 'decline to interfere 
with local associations in the matter of selection or joint action 
with other bodies for selection purposes' ; but the Clackmannan 
motion calling for new candidates who supported an independent 
(26) 
Liberal programme was 'carried by a large majority' On the 
next day Conference passed a motion congratulating Asquith and 
other independent Liberals on their criticism of the government 
(27) 'where they failed to meet the requirements' 
The task for the Liberal Office-Bearers was clear-cut. In 
pursuance of the conference decisions, a letter was sent to 
associations 'to ascertain what was being done in the various 
constituencies', and arrangements were made to draw up a new 
(28) 
statement of rules for local associations But the decisions 
could not bind the existing office-bearers together, and first the 
Chairman of the Scottish Liberals, Sir William Robertson, and then 
the Chairman of the Eastern Committee, Sir Robert Lockhart, 
tendered their resignations. Robertson who had been President for 
eight years had hoped, he said, that the 'Liberals would stand 
together' and could not accept 'a determination to force existing 
differences to the point where a split in the party becomes 
inevitable'. Lockhart argued that he had always discouraged and 
opposed every attempt to divide the Liberal Party forever. Going 
back into history, he said that he had 'deplored the secession of 
the Liberal Unionists and when an attempt had been made to form ... a 
Liberal League, he resisted the effort in his area'. In his view 
'the selection of candidates rested entirely with the local 
associations', and the Ayr decisions marked 'a breakaway from our 
(29) 
Liberal traditions' 
26 2Scotsman, October 15,1920. 
27 Ibid., October 16,1920. 




Two meetings of the Scottish Executive were convened to persuade 
Robertson and Lockhart to consider their decisions. Robertson 
informed the executive that 'he was strongly opposed to the setting 
up of a, rival Liberal organisation in Scotland', claiming 'he had 
condemned in conversation with the Prime Minister and Sir William 
Sutherland and in letters couched in the strongest possible 
language their policy in this connection'. The stumbling-block, 
however, was the implementation of the Clackmannan resolution'which 
had opposed fusion; in spite of the anxiety to find a compromise, 
the special executive meeting on 6 December, with Robertson and 
Lockhart in attendance, had to accept that 'the Ayr resolutions 
made it quite clear that the Federation could not in any way 
support Coalition Liberal candidates'. While Robertson accepted 
this intepretation, he felt that by refusing to support the action 
of local associations (the point upon which he felt most strongly) 
the Federation was 'running the great danger of causing these 
associations to break away. But the Executive believed that it 
could n6t depart from the Conference decision, 'it could not support 
coalition Liberal candidates'. Lockhart's position was more clear 
cut. He had already told the Kirkcaldy Liberals in his 
constituency, that 'while he retained his freedom to vote against 
the government in any measure brought forward that infringed 
Liberal ideas', he had agreed as an MP to give it general support; 




With Lockhart and Robertson's resignations now final, and the 
embarrassing appointment of a new Chairman from a disaffiliated 
organisation - Montrose - the Executive of the Scottish Liberal 
Federation issued its new statement of policy in January 1921. 
30 Scottish Liberal Association, Executive, December 6,1920. 
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While previously, it said, local organisations could expect their 
candidates to be automatically supported, there had been 
'developments which have made it necessary for the Federation to 
consider its position with regard to its policyv(31). While one 
factor was that Coalition Liberal MPs had supported Unionists 
against Liberal candidates, the setting up of the National Liberal 





George had been setting up a rival 
organisation, from the middle of 1920, and dividing the Scottish 
party, as the statement made clear: 
The Council is endeavouring to influence and control 
certain Liberal associations which are affiliated to the 
Federation, and is setting up Coalition Liberal 
Committees in constituencies in which there are already 
Liberal associations. The object of this can only be to 
oppose Liberal candidates selected by Liberal 
Associations and to cooperate with the Unionists. There 
are other indications which point to a determined effort 
on the part of coalition Liberals to destroy the 
influence of the Federation. It is known that attempts 
have been made to detach from the Federation certain 
officials by offers of better financial terms. One of 
-these attempts was successful. (33) 
The Federation had therefore', the statement 
'made 
clear, to adopt a 
new policy towards its local associations: 
The Federation cannot interfere with the action of any 
local association or enforce any recommendation and it 
has no intention of trying to do so. At the same time 
the Executive feel that it cannot be expected in view of 
the developments which have been referred to, and the 
declared policy of'the General Council at Ayr, to support 
Coalition Liberal candidates while the Coalition Liberal 
organisation and committee cooperate with Unionists in 
supporting Unionist candidates in opposition to 
ifidependeat Liberal candidates. (34) 
31 Scottish Liberal Federation, Statement, January 1921. 
32 The detailed negotiations are set out in M Kinnear, jk, ý. 
Fall of 
_ý! 
koy_d_ George, (London, 1975). However, an account in TeY detail is given in T Wilson, The Downfall of the 
Liberal_jLaLýX, p. 200-201. 
33 Scottish Liberal Association, Statement, January, . 1921. 
34 Ibid. 
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While the Federation still hoped coalition Liberal members would 
return 'to *a free Liberal Party', this was now unlikely and 'it is 
not a question of a difference between Liberals holding advanced 
and moderate views but a question as to whether or not the Liberal 
Party is to continue to exist as an independent political 
(35) 
force' 
So it was that the Liberals' new rules specifically insisted on the 
independence of the Liberal Party from coalition arrangements. But 
it was not clear how far the Liberal Associations at the grass 
roots would 'go in supporting this position. Reporting to the 
Eastern Organising Committee in July 1921, Webster, the organising 
secretary, identified four classes of constituency with different 
attitudes *to free and coalition Liberals. Apart from 
constituencies supporting the party line outright, there were, he 
said, nine constituencies where the free Liberals had a majority, 
although there were members who were coalition supporters still in 
the Association. There were six associations where the local 
Liberals. blatantly ignored the new rules (seven, if Kircaldy was 
included) and these were distinctly pro-Coalition. One association, 
Montrose, had definitely severed its connection with the 
Federation. In these constituencies where Coalition views 
predominated, free Liberals, he said, 'preferred to carry on in 
their own way for some time and it was resolved that the 
Secretary was to keep in contact with them. It was felt difficult 
to do anything else unless the affiliation of coalition Liberals' 
(36) 
constituencies was cancelled 
Nearly a year later the situation was no better. Only twenty-six 
associations had approved of the new rules. In seven 
constituencies no meetings had been held to discuss the rules, and 
35 Ibid . 
36 Scottish Liberal Federation, Eastern Organising Committee, 
July 1921. 
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three - Dundee, Bridgeton and Inverness - had rejected the 
(37) 
rules The situation was clearer but no more encouraging by 
the end of 1922, at the time of the election. In all, three 
constituencies had severed their connection with the Federation as 
a result of the Ayr decision and another three had gone as a result 
of the new rules.. One had decided simply to support the Coalition. 
Ten associations had not replied to the central circular, despite 
being reminded on this 'that if no reply was received within three 
weeks it would be taken for gr anted that associations had decided 
to detach themselves from the Federation'. Four constituencies had 
given 'indefinite replies. While it was agreed that 'no hasty 
action should be taken, the situation was lamentable. 
Twenty-eight constituencies were not in compliance. with the rules 
of the Federation and had detached themselves, disbanded, or 
(38) 
supported National Liberal organisations From an examination 
of the position it seems seventeen had simply gone over to the 
National Liberals one of them, Kirkcaldy, remained firmly in the 
National Liberal camp although it had not been expelled. In only 
(39) 
half of these areas had a new Liberal organisation been formed 
Almost without exception these were the seats which had Coalition 
Liberal Members in 1918 and were to return National Liberal members 
in 1922 and in only five of them did a Liberal candidate appear in 
the field, all of them significantly in constituencies where new 
Liberal Associations had been formed. - 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 The Liberal Associations that apparently went over to the 
National Liberals were: East Aberdeenshire . 
(June 16,1922), 
Inverness (June 22,1922), Dundee (June 22,1922), Bridgeton 
(June 22,1922), Kinross and West Perthshire, Haddington and 
Berwickshire (July 14,1921), Partick (October 10,1921), 
Argyle (October 10, 
. 
1921), Dumbarton Burghs (October 10, 
1921), Dunfermline (July 12,1923), Kirkcaldy-(July 13,1923ý, 
West Renfrew (October 10,1921), Ross and Cromarty (December 
8,1922), Cathcart (December 8,1922), and Banff (July 25, 
1922). In Banff, Inverness, Dundee, Montrose, Partick', 
Argyll, Dumbarton, West Renfrew and Ross and Cromarty new 
Liberal Associations were formed and in Moray and Nairn the 
decision to leaVe was rescinded. Dates in brackets are 
meetings of Scottish Liberal Association Committees when 
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If any indication be needed of the depths to which Liberalism had 
already fallen by the time of the - 1922 election, the party's 
performance in by-elections in 1921 and 1922 provides it. Despite 
the Liberal decision to opt for independence in the autumn of 19ý0, 
they were unable to place a candidate in the Kirkcaldy by-election 
of 1921, failed to win in the Inverness by-election of 1922, and 
then decided not to intervene in the Moray and Nairn by-election 
later in the year. 
The Kirkcaldy by-election proved to be a death blow for Liberalism 
in the industrial areas. When Lockhart was chosen as Liberal 
candidate, he was given immediate support by the Kirkcaldy Unionist 
Association 
(40) in December 1920. As he was to tell electorates 
during the by-election early-in 1921: 
I am standing in this election as a Liberal and as a 
supporter of Mr Lloyd George, whom I have always 
supported as a Liberal, and whom I hold as a Liberal 
today and has always been. That of course implies that I 
am a supporter of Mr Lloyd George's Government. I 
support that Government as a constitutionalist because I 
am a strong believer in the freedom of the individual and 
the freedom of industry. I am standing in opposition to 
socialists who would inake the individual a mere 
machine. (41) 
While there were Asquithians in the Kirkcaldy Liberal Party, the 
Scotsman reported none seemed keen to stand against Lockhart or 
support an independent candidate. In these circumstance the 
Scottish Liberal Federation was largely powerless. Its General 
Secretary, Webster, said: 
If there is any reasonably strong feeling amongst -the 
independent Liberals in the Burghs regarding a candidate, 
then there are friends willing to consider the question 
of an invitation. There is no desire, however, to 
40 Scotsman, February 24,1921. 
41 Ibid., March 17,1921. 
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interfere in any way unless those who support free 
Liberalism in the constituency desire to see their views 
set forth in the contest. I feel I should let you know 
that our position here is that, if any request were made, 
we would certainly in view of the decision come to at Ayr, 
help those who were anxious to have their case stated 
before the electorate. (42) 
Mason, previously MP for Tradeston, was prepared to come forward as 
Liberal candidate, a prospect which worried Lockhart who 'could 
hardly conceive it possible that his friends of the Scottish 
Liberal Federation from which he parted a month ago on the most 
friendly terms would send any Liberal candidate to oppose him in 
Kirkcaldy Burghs or that any of the Office-Bearers would approve 
(43) 
such action' Webster replied that the Federation had never 
given any assurance it would not intervene, and indeed that 'the 
whole difference between Sir Robert Lockhart and his colleagues was 
round this very point of not assisting Coalition Liberal 
candidates'. He stated that the Federation wanted to see the 
implementation of this Ayr decision and an independent Liberal 
candidate and programme supported by the Liberal Association or 
any representative body of independent Liberal opinion. Mason, 
however, in the end, stood down from the contest and 
(44) Lockhart's 
nomination papers were signed by the Vice-President of the local 
Liberal Association, by the Unionist Chairman and former Unionist 
candidate, Sir Michael Nairn 
(45) 
42 Ibid., February 19,1921. 
43 Scotsman, February 18,1921. 
44 Ibid . 
45 Ibid., February 25,1921. 
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The Unionist Association issued a statement to 'earnestly urge upon 
the Unionist electors in the present circumstances that it is their 
duty to give all support they can to Sir Robert Lockhart just as if 
he had been a Unionist Candidate'. This appeal was backed up by 
letters from both Lloyd George and Bonar Law 
(46). 
The only saving 
feature from the Liberal viewpoint was that Lockhart refused to 
stand as a Coalition candidate despite being asked by the Unionist 
Association to term himself such. He replied that he was a Liberal 
and 'could not abjure his political faith or renounce his political 
principles'. 
Lockhart advocated social reform while at the same time denouncing 
Kennedy, the Labour candidate , who was also Secretary of the Social 
Democratic Federation, as a revolutionary. But Labour won. 
Lockhart put down his defeat to an Irish vote of 2,000 mobilised 
against him (a conclusion partly justified by Kennedy who spoke of 
his victory as a ? message of hope to the Irish people') and to the 
cooperative and mining vote turning against him. Unemployment, he 
said, 'had a detrimental effect on his cause' and he argued that 
stories propagated about taxing coop dividends had had an 
(47) 
effect But the truth was that there was little Liberal 
organisation to talk of in the constituency. As Lloyd George was 
informed, it was especially weak in the mining areas of Methil and 
(48) 
Dysart and in the industrial villages 
46 Scotsman, 2 March, 1921. 
47' Scotsman, March 5,1921. 
48 Lloyd George papers F 22/3/37, report of James Parkpr MP, on 
Kirkcaldy by-election, cited in C Cook, op. cit., p. 36. 
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In Kirkcaldy no independent Liberal had stood but a year later in 
Inverness, Liberal and National Liberal fought each other. The 
Inverness Liberal Association had given support to Lloyd George and 
their candidate came forward on a Coalition-Liberal ticket. The 
Liberal Federation through the Fort William Liberal Association 
placed Livingston in the field. He had Webster, the Scottish 
Secretary, directing his campaign, with Lord Gladstone - in 
suppor 
(49) 
Sir Donald Maclean spoke of the Inverness by-election as 'the. death 
knell of Coalition Liberalism in the North'. He felt it showed, 
that as the Liberal Unionists had been swallowed up by the 
Conservatives' that exactly the same 'was happening to the 
Coalition Liberals', yet the Liberals had lost the contest, and 
when a by-election came in Moray and Nairn, the Eastern Committee 
found that: 'many good free Liberals had committed themselves a 
year ago to the Coalition candidate and felt they could not oppose 
him in the by-election. The Federation drew some comfort from the 
belief that free Liberals were determined to unite together for. the 
purpose of adopting an independent candidate for the general 
(50) 
election' In these circumstances the Coalition Candidate was 
returned unopposed. 
Divided over their attitudes to the Coalition and future 
cooperation with the Unionists, the Liberals were unable to develop 
a distinctive set of policies while in opposition between 1918 and 
1922. A Scottish Federation policy statement of January 1921 was 
vague, stressing the need for a compromise between laissez fair! j 
49 Scotsman, 'March 1,2,3,1922. 
50 Scottish Liberal Fed6ration, Eastern Committee, June 16,1921. 
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and collectivism, arguing for retrenchment and thus appearing to 
support public spending cuts, supporting an ill-defined capital 
levy, and advocating public ownership in certain cases of 
monopolies. It was middle way between Labour and Conservatism but 
(51) 
too ill-defined to suggest a party manifesto At the British 
Liberal Conference in Nottingham later in 1921, the party went 
further, supporting legislation for minimum wages and maximum hours 
in industry, an extension of unemployment insurance and the recall 
(52) 
of the National Industrial Conference . But in Scotland, while a 
committee was set up in 1920 to prepare a new statement of Liberal 
policy, little came of it, and discussions in conference and 
private party committee were dominated by which attitudes to take 
to the Coalition Government and its policy and actions. 
If Labour in Parliament was a disappointment, so too were the 
Liberal Parliamentarians. One assessment was that they were 'not a 
significant or influential group in the sessions of 1919 and 
, (53) 1920 Much was expected from 'the re-election of Asquith to 
Parliament early in 1920. From the middle of 1919 Elibank, the 
former Liberal Chief Whip, spoke for many Liberals when he urged 
upon Sir Donald Maclean, the Parliamentary Leader that: 'Asquith 
must take up the running not on sectional and old party 
controversial lines, but pointing out in his own inimitable manner 
the broad road which the country must travel if it is to avoid 
disintegration and damnation. ' That, he said, would bring a 
'resurrection of the Liberal Party'. Writing directly to Asquith 
51 K0 Morgan, Consensus and DLsunL ýy: The Lloyd George 
Coalition Government, 1918-1922, Oxford (1979) p. 203. 
52 Ibid., p. 203-4. 
53 Ibid., p. 194. 
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he warned at the same time that: 'very candidly I do not think that 
the country will listen a moment to what we call the Liberal creed, 
and the applause of the stalwarts may be mistaken for the voice of 
the multitude'. Elibank did admit that free trade might be one 
issue on which the Liberal Party might be reborn, 
(54) but he also 
urged Asquith to concentrate his attention on the main issue of the 
day, the relations between capital and labour, rather than on the 
(55) 
old issues dear to the. Liberal hearts The policy, he said, 
should be opposition to the control of industries and to 
unconstitutional methods of Government. 
But the real Liberal problem was that the Party could not put 
forward a position that distinguished them clearly enough from the 
Coalition on the one hand and the Labour Party on the other. When 
Asquith stood in the Paisley by-election of 1920, he failed to put 
forward a programme that revitalised Scottish Liberalism and his 
(56) 
subsequent parliamentary performance was disappointing Indeed 
he seemed to satisfy no-one. , Although he supported cuts in 
spending, he did not go far enough as an anti-waste candidate to 
satisfy, for example, Rothermere, who had supported him in 
(57) 
Paisley . Nor did he satisfy his traditional Liberal 
54 Elibank to Asquith, June 22,1919, Elibank Papers. Also 
Elibank to Maclean, June 10,1919, quoted by Matthew, McKibbin 
and Kay, op. cit., p. 749. 'Many a malcontent will join the 
Free Trade Cause but not the old Liberal Party ... The old party 
cries are out of date and only confusing and embarrassing'. 
55 Ibid., June 22,1919. 
56 J Kelley, Asquith at Paisley, Journal of British Studies, IV, 
No. 1,1964, pp. 
57 Rothermere to Elibank, December 22,1919, Elibank Papers. 
'I have been wondering why I supported Asquith at Paisley .... I 
do not wish to be impatient but if your old friend is so. 
oblivious to what is the only great issue in the country today 
he cannot get and will not get further press support. You 
know what this means in the West of Scotland'. 
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supporters. By the end of 1920, Elibank was stating that Asquith 
had 'entirely failed to come up to expectations-P 
(58) 
, and Gray was 
arguing that 'Asquith cuts no ice'. This feeling was not to change 
in the two years before the election of 1922. In September 1922, 
when the Unionists were discussing giving Asquith a clear run 
against Labour in his Paisley constituency, Younger was to dismiss 
Asquith's importance; 'I am perfectly certain', he wrote to Sir 
John Gilmour, 'his party will do no good as long as he is head of 
itv(59). 
By the time of the 1922 election the Liberals still lacked a strong 
distinctive policy which set them apart from the other parties, and 
the evidence of finance and organisation shows that they had failed 
to modernise their political machinery in the way the Conservatives 
had done. The emphasis remained on subscribers, rather than 
members: on local organisation rather than central direction; and 
unlike the Conservatives who forced their local parties to try to 
attract working-class members, the Liberals left the initiative to 
the local associations. In writing of the post-war Liberal Party, 
Matthew, McKibbin and Kay have argued that: 'its failure lay partly 
in its attitude to the political community and the nature of its 
political organisation. This is seen at two levels, in the 
reluctance of the Liberals to take electoral organisation seriously 
and more widely in their incapacity to make the necessary demagogic 
appeals to the mass electorate created by the 1918 Act' 
(60). 
Sir 
Donald Maclean, one of the party's leading members, had been warned 
that the party must develop a membership structure, a tighter 
central organisation and a staff of full-time agents who worked 
(61) between as well as at election times . But there is no evidence 
in Scotland that any action was contemplated until Lloyd George 
took over the party machine in 1926. By then it was too late. 
58 AC Murray's Diary, 23 December 1920, Elibank Papers. 
59 Younger to. Gilmour, September 27,1922. GD. 383/17. Gilmour 
Papers. 
60 Matthew McKibbin and Kay, op. cit., p. 741-2. 
61 Letter in Maclean correspondence cited in Matthew, McKibbin 
and Kay, op. cit., p. 742. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE 1922 ELECTION 
I THE END OF COALITION? 
According to Walter Elliot, later a Scottish Secretary, : Lt was 'in 
1922 the new line up in Parliament took place. The hard unyielding 
struggle has gone on since then. The political tenacity has been 
great and the changes have been slight'. 1922 was in fact the 
election in which Labour became the largest party in Scotland. 
gaining one third -of the votes and twenty-nine of seventy-one 
seats. It also foreshadowed what was to happen two years later, 
with the Conservatives establishing themselves firmly as the 
alternative party' of the right. But 6ven if Labour had obviously 
arrived, the pattern of politics did not seem as firmly set as it 
actually was. Twenty Labour and Conservative seats would not 
change hands again in the nineteen twenties. However, many on the 
right expected renewal of a coalition or at least further electoral 
arrangements between the groups of the right. only in retrospect 
did the 1922 election seem as critical as it in fact was. 
Labour's 1922 results were actually less impressive than their 
performance in local elections and indeed by-elections in the years 
before 1922. Labour did not fight eight of the constituencies it 
had contested in 1918 or in later by-elections for that Parliament, 
and another fourteen seats were not fought either in 1918 or 1922. 
Perhaps Labour's problems in 1922 were best summed up by James 
Maxton, their Bridgeton candidate, reflecting on the local 
elýctions just before the announcement of the 1922 general 
election: ' 
The morale of the working class has been lowered by the 
humiliation of their position and by grim want. The 
fight has lacked the courage and vigour shown by men sure 
of victory, and despair and hopelessness generally has 
taken the edge off the socialist sword. An apathetic 
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half-hearted defensive must be turned into a vigorous and 
courageous offensive ... to achieve the spirit of the 
pioneers of thirty years ago. (l) 
So weak in fact was the Labour Party in Scotland that the 1922 
election success came largely through a combined effort by the 
Independent Labour Party and the miners. 
But if Labour did not seem as strong as it proved to be, the same 
was true of Conservatism. The 1922 election was fought by the 
political right on an anti-socialist platform, and in Scotland 
there was little Conservative enthusiasm for 'going it alone', 
despite the fact that the new Premier was a Scots Conservative M. P. 
It proved possible to construct alliances between Conservatives and 
National Liberals, and in - many constituencies the Liberal 
organisation was so weak and insecure that it had become a National 
Liberal party, or those who controlled it quite simply were 
reluctant to challenge other right wing candidates. Labour fought 
only forty-three constituencies in 1922 but, despite the existence 
of three parties to Labour's right, there were twenty-four seats 
where only one candidate opposed the socialist. There were 
seventeen Conservative candidates with Liberal support, twenty-four 
'National' Liberals with Conservative support, and even two 
independent Liberals with Conservative (and National Liberal) 
support. It was primarily in the constituencies where Labour was 
absent that Liberal fought Conservative - twelve seats in all - and 
National Liberal fought Liberal - eleven seats in all. There were 
only two constituencies in which National Liberals and 
Conservatives could not agree - and fought each other. In these 
circumstances it was a measure of Labour's arrival that it could 
win thirteen seats in three cornered contests, and sixteen in two 
cornered fights. Most of these seats it was to holdthroughout the 
twenties and, with the exception of the 1931 election, for the next 
sixty years. 
1 'Forward, September 23,1922. 
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There was no enthusiasm in Scotland for abandoning the Lloyd George 
Coalition. The decision to do so was made on 19 October in face of 
advice from Scotland that opposed any change and with only five 
Scottish Conservatives - Bonar Law, Kidd, Gideon Murray, Adair and 
Sprot - in favour of the break with Lloyd George. 
(2) 
It was, said 
the Scotsman, in patriotic rhetoric, a revolt in the English 
constituencies that had deprived Scotland of the government it 
(3) 
required Only three Scottish M. P. 's were members of the 
Unionist 'Diehard' group and in Scotland the 'Diehard' conservative 
element was not important; -the threat of socialism was the issue 
which should unite the right, said the Scotsman: 
In Scotland this 'diehard' element need not be, a 
disturbing factor. Revolutionary socialism may gain 
where reaction loses and to combat this growing menace is 
a task surely in which Unionists and National Liberals 
can cooperate without qualification or reservation. It 
is the line marked out moreover by the clearest of signs 
for party divisions in the future. More and more the old 
issues recede into the background and revolutionary 
socialism emerges as the vital field of conflict. (4) 
in congratulating Derby on his advice to continue a 
Liberal-Conservative pact, in Lancashire, it pointed out that it had 
urged 'the same counsel upon Scottish Unionists ever since the 
rupture took place', 
(5) 
and its editorial of 26th October argued 
that, 'Scottish Unionists as a body do not approve of the Carlton 
Club decision though they accept it. They regret that the majority 
of the party in England decided to break with the National Liberals 
and they are resolved that cooperation in Scotland shall continue 
no matter what happens across the Border'. Bonar Law, the 
editorial 
2M Kinnear, op. cit., p'p. 222-242. 
3 Scotsman, October, 23,1922. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., October 30,1922. 
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said, must keep in mind that 'the desire of the Scottish Unionism 
was and continues to be an understanding with the National Liberals 
such as existed at one time between the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Unionists when the two parties though maintaining separate 
(6) 
organisations agreed not to oppose one another locally' 
The Scotsman reflected a mood traced in Chapter 3 that had existed 
since 1918 and had been confirmed throughout 1922. Many Unionists 
regretted the failure to agree to. a joint candidature with the 
Liberals even in the Paisley by-election and had advised giving 
Asquith a free run 
(7) 
while there had been disagreements with the 
independent Liberals in the two Edinburgh by-elections of 1920, 
there had been a united front in the Kirkcaldy by-election of 1921. 
Even with the failure of fusion, it had been generally accepted 
that the Coalition's two wings would not fight each other. , As 
early as May 1922 the Hamilton Conservatives had unanimiously 
agreed to coalesce in future elections with the Liberals, 
(8) 
and 
the Conservative desire to continue coalition arrangements can be 
seen most obviously in the cases of St. Rollox and Cathcart where 
the local party members were not so united. The Conservative 
Central Council for Scotland had agreed in April 1922 that 
arrangements between National Liberals and Conservatives be 
maintained and while, it said, the time was not ripe for fusion, it 
'urgently recommends' that 'the precedent of the Conservative and 
Liberal 
6 Ibid, October 26,1922 
7 Forward, December 2,1921. Sir John McLeod, MP for 
Kelvingrove had for example argued that 'what was wanted above 
-all things was a united front'. 
8 Ibid, May 27,1922. 
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Unionists from 1886 to 1912 be followed'(9). This was the 
background to the by-elections which threatened in Scotland on. the 
eve of the General Election of 1922. While in Inverness there was 
some discussion in 1921 of 'the position of a Unionist candidate in 
the event of the Lord Advocate vacating the seat', the local party 
had suggested no more than 'stimulating fresh efforts' in 
organisation 'after the shooting season' but 'only so far as it is 
(10) judicious to do so without upsetting the coalition Liberals' 
In the event the-. Invernessshire by-election was to see a 
Conservaiive-backed coalition Liberal candidate who defeated the 
( 11) Liberal Equally in Moray and Nairn where the seat became 
vacant in June 1922, the Conservatives allowed a coalition Liberal 
candidate a clear run. There the Unionists had decided earlier 
that all that was required was an organising secretary 'in order 
that the full strength of unionism on which the coalition Liberals 
must depend for the greater part of their support may be 
(12) 
available' So strong was the mood for cooperation early in 
October 1922 that not only Asquith but Sir John Gilmour had even 
considered* supporting an independent Liberal, Chapple, whose 
support for mines and rail nationalisation had not even endeared 
him'to Libeýal leaders. Chapple had been chosen by the Liberals in 
Dumfries as the successor to the Coalition M. P., William Murray. 
But Austen Chamberlain persuaded Gilmour that: 'you must support 
our Unionist candidate but upon terms. If he comes out as a 
diehard in opposition to the Leaders of the Party I do not think he 
has any 
9 SUA Central Counci, April 26,1922. 
10 SUA Eastern Exect4tive,. September, 21,1921. 
The result was Sir M Macdonald, (Co. Lib. ) 8340: A Livingston 
(Lib. ) 8024. 'The by-election was held on March 16,1922. 
12 SUA Eastern Executive, September 21,1921. 
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, (13) right to call for your assistance 
As the Scottish Conservatives put into practice the decision that 
there would be coalition arrangements in Scotland, they came under 
little pressure from the national party to change their mind even 
after the Carlton Club decision. Younger's letter from 
Conservative Central Office in London which informed constituency 
Unionist parties there was no centrally arranged pact, did not go 
to Scottish constituencies. It was this letter which fired a spate 
of Conservative interventions in seats held by many Coalition 
Liberals in England, but according to the Times the Unionist 
headquarters had positively advised the continuation of Scottish 
(14) 
co. alition pacts Certainly the advice from Scotland's leading 
politicians at Westminster was clear. The key figures were Sir 
Robert Horne and Sir John Gilmour, both of whom had been Coalition 
Government Ministers and had supported the continuation of the 
coalition. Gilmour's advice was crystal clear, when he spoke at a 
Scottish Unionist Association luncheon, a week after the Carlton 
Club decision. He said that: 
For the past few years as a whip of the party and leader 
of the organisation in Scotland he had worked steadily to 
secure for his party as great a measure of representation 
in the House of Commons and in the deliberations of the 
country as he thought it possible to do and he should 
regret exceedingly if all that work were to be upset 
today, and if they were to fight amongst themselves or 
with moderate opinion in the country ...... there were 
those in the country who by some wild measures would 
wreck the foundations of constitutional government as 
they know and understood it. There were no great and 
abiding principles which divided themselves and the 
National Liberals. (15) 
13 Austen Chamberlain to Gilmour, Gilmour Correspondence, October 
- 7,1922. GD/383/15. 
14 Times, November 1,1922. 
15 Scotsman, October 28,1922. 
224 
The position of Gilmour, the Unionist Whip in Scotland, in the 
events of 1922 is crucial. With the fall of the Coalition, 
Gilmour, who had supported Austen Chamberlain, told his 
constituency Party, 'The point at issue .... is that we believe that 
some form -of cooperation is essential, during and after the 
election .... we see the gravest objection to shutting out the 
possibility of working usefully with the coalition Liberals and 
even with Mr Lloyd George either as Prime Minister or in another 
(16) 
capacity' It was this support for Lloyd George and coalition 
arrangements that brought Gilmour, Horne and the younger M. P. 
Waltýr Elliot to attend Austen Chamberlain's pro-Coalition dinner 
in October, and to sign a declaration opposing the Conservatives' 
(17) 
ingratitude to Lloyd George and the Coalition Liberals 
Gilmour who in his election address sought to 'be free to resume 
cooperation with .... moderate parties in the state', 
(18) 
also 
rejected an invitation to be Scottish Secretary, despite the advice 
of Sir George Younger that 'it is ludicrous for you not to come 
into the new Government .... I have it in my pocket for you if you 
like' 
(19). In the event Bonar Law defused some of the controversy 
over the position by appointing the Liberal Viscount Novar to the 
post. But it appears it was agreed with Austen Chamberlain that 
Gilmour's and the Conservative coalitionists' attitude to Scottish 
seats should be based on three principles: 
I shall of course comply with [ writing unclear] practically 
all pledges given to Scottish Unionists and I shall supply the 
usual Central Office help. 
16 Gilmour to constituency Chairman, October 21,1922, Gilmour 
Papers, GD/383/15. 
17 Scotsman, October 23,1922 
18 Gilmour, *Election Addtess, GD/-383/17 Gilmour Papers. 
19 Younger to Gilmour, October 21, GD/383/17, Gilmour Papers. 
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2.1 shall support Unionist candidates wherever they are opposing 
or opposed by 'Wee Frees' or Labour. 
3. cannot support and as far as influence goes I must .... avoid 
any attack on Coalition Liberal seats. (20) 
The Scottish Unionists were more in tune with Gilmour; on 27 
October, when the Central Council of the Scottish Conservative 
Party finally met to consider Its position in the light of the 
Carlton Club decision it had before it three motions which in the 
words of their Chairman, Sir John Hope, had been 'carefully drafted 
and approved by the leaders of the Party in Scotland' 
(21) 
. While a 
prior meeting arranged for the 23rd had been cancelled, he said 'it 
now seemed desirable to convene at short notice' 
(22) 
The first 
motion simply congratulated Bonar Law on his elevation to the 
position of Prime Minister. The second and third 'motions were to 
express support for Austen Chamberlain, the Coalitionist. The 
second motion which, like the third, had already been supported 
publicly by Elliot, Buchanan, Watson, Baird, McLaren, Mackinder, 
Younger and McLeod among the leading Conservative dignatories in 
Scotland, embodied the key decision: 'The Council recommends that 
in order to further a policy which must commend 'itself to all 
moderate opinion, nothing be done to impair every possible 
cooperation with the National Liberals and in this matter the 
advice of the Unionist leaders be followed that all arrangements 
between Unionists and National Liberals working together in the 
various constituencies be scrupulously adhered tol(23). 
20 Document written on No. 11 Downing Street notepaper, contained 
in Gilmour papers GD/383/17.0 





It was passed unanimously, and it was also a measure of the 
continued desire for cooperation from the Conservative rank and 
file that a motion from the floor was presented and agreed, which 
read: 'This council desires to record its high appreciation of the 
distinguished service which Mr Lloyd George has rendered to the 
(24) 
country in peace and war' 
The Sco*ttish Council decision was supported by similar initiatives 
by Western and Eastern Divisional Councils. In the East where 
there seemed less need for a united front against socialism, the 
mood was still clearly for cooperation, and the Eastern Divisional 
Council decided that 'in pursuance of the advice of our leader and 
thus to prevent a division or a cleavage in the moderate vote, the 
council recommends that sitting National Liberal members and 
National Liberal candidates should be supported and no unionist 
candidate be put forward against them, in the understanding that 
there is a reciprocal action on the part of the National Liberals 
towards sitting Unionist members seeking re-election and unionist 
candidates jointly adopted' 
(25) 
. Earlier the Western Divisional 
Council had agreed a similar proposal, that sitting National 
Liberal M. P. 's and National Liberals jointly adopted by Unionists 
and National Liberals should be supported and in these cases no 
(26) 
Unionist candidate entered 
The National Liberals responded quickly and positively to these 
decisions. The Western Executive of the Scottish National Liberal 
Council agreed to recommend 'the honourable observance of all 
electoral arrangements with the Unionist divisional associations', 
and where none existed it wished to make arrangements 'to prevent 
24 Ibid. 
25 Scotsman, October 28-, 1922. 
26 Ibid., October 27,1922. 
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the loss of any seat at present held by either party' In Glasgow 
a joint manifesto was issued by Unionists and National Liberdls, 
with a list of official candidates. Outside Glasgow, the policy was 
'the fullest observance of all local electoral arrangements made 
(27) between the divisional organisations' 
Horne was a leading adVocate of Coalitionism and a moving force 
behind its retention at the 1922 election. He argued his case 
forcibly: 
The old party issues are at least for the moment in 
abeyance. The questions in controversy are social and 
economic rather than of a party character. And the real 
enemy, the real opponents of the views which we hold, are 
to be found not in the ranks either of the Unionists or 
National Liberals but in the ranks of those who wish to 
subvert the whole of the present fabric of society and to 
set up a new system .... I am happy to think, as Lloyd 
George has suggested, that in Scotland we are taking a 
different view of the situation. . Scotland is said to 
be 
a land of mist but I am glad to think that it is not a 
land of political mist. All the political mist that is 
available is at the present time lying over the southern 
counties of England where it is blinding men's eyes and 
choking the voice of wisdom ... there is no dividing 
line 
which separates us. We can work together still as we 
have worked during these last four years. (28) 
Lloyd George came to Glasgow to speak with Horne and Sir Andrew 
Duncan of the National Liberals. In expressing his hope that the 
Glasgow form of pacts would survive the election Lloyd George 
argued, 'Scotsmen do not change their minds very easily. When you 
make up your minds and get an idea into your heads you do not get 
27 "To the Electors of Glasgow". Statement issued by SUA Western 
Divisional Council and Scottish National Liberal Council 
(Western Division), contained in SUA papers. 
-28 Scotsman, October 30,1922. 
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rid of it quickly. We are changeable people in the south. You 
have got it into your heads that national unity is necessary 
* 
for 
national safety. Stand by that till the country is safe and 
(29) 
secure. You are quite right and I agree with you. ' Sir 
Andrew Duncan went further, and said he felt convinced that 'in 
this great city Mr Bonar Law and now Mr Lioyd George would have 
ascertained that the people of Glasgow thought there were no 
grounds for the change that was made' 
(30) 
* 
With Lloyd George promoting coalitionism and Sir Robert Horne and 
Conservatives encouraging it, even Bonar Law had to make 
concessions to the mood of Scotland. He had to argue in favour of 
his decision to break with the Coalition not on the grounds of a 
Conservative resentment of Lloyd George, nor of the desire to put 
forward independent Conservative policies, but on the grounds that 
two anti-socialist parties would be more effective than one. When 
he spoke in Glasgow during the general election campaign he was 
accompanied on his platform by both supporters and opponents of 
continued coalition. In explaining, somewhat defensively, that 
half the Unionist M. P. 's (and even more candidates) had stated they 
would not stand again except as Unionists and Conservatives and 
that he himself had considered resigning, he went on to suggest: 
The argument most strongly put forward that in view of 
the pressure from Labour and the danger from Labour it 
was necessary to keep up for ever the name of a coalition 
when the reality had gone ... is a profound mistake. If we had succeeded in setting up on the one hand one party 
representing everything opposed to Labour and the other 
Labour alone you could have done nothing which would have 
added more to the force of Labour and you must have made 
it certain that, as alternative government must come, the 
next government would have been a Labour Government. (31) 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Scotsman, October 27,1922. 
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They were, he, said, achieving 'no good by trying to get formulas 
which seem to bring views which are totally opposed togethe. r' 
However with respect to Scotland, he went on to state: 
I see no reason whatever why in individual areas the 
people concerned with the two parties who have worked 
together up till now should not continue to work 
together ... I should be very glad personally if something 
of this kind could be done in Glasgow but obviously it is 
not for me to attempt to give orders. (32) 
So strong was the desire for cooperation between Unionists and 
National Liberals in Scotland that Bonar Law had in fact to advise 
his friend Gideon Murray, one of only two leading Diehards among 
Scotland's Conservative Members, to stand down. The St - Rollox 
Conservative Association had already chosen a coalitionist having 
rejected their sitting MP, Gideon Murray, as a result of the views 
expressed by Murray in favour of independenc6. As Murray recounted 
later: 
When the general election came, Bonar Law rang up and 
asked me if possible to find a seat in England because he 
was going to find it a very difficult task owing to his 
being the only Scottish member besides myself who has 
gone out against the coalition. He felt he would be able 
to get on more easily in Scotland if he had not me by his 
side who for nearly a year had been working independently 
of the other Scottish Unionist M. P. 1s. (33) 
There were few difficulties about adhering to the agreement between 
National Liberals and Conservatives. In twenty constituencies 
which had been won by the Conservatives in 1918 the same candidate 
stood with the support of National Liberals, and in five other 
Conservative seats where there was a change ;f candidate, the 
Conservative Party made the choice without any objections from the 
32 Ibid. 
33 G Murray, A Man's Life, (London, 1936) pp. 266-7. 
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National Liberals. The Conservatives were just as obliging in 
Shettlestqn where the Conservative Diehard Captain Adair had won in 
1918. When he stood down it was the National Liberal candidate who 
was given a free run. In Motherwell held by a Coalition 
Conservative in 1918 the Unionist Association supported a National 
Liberal in 1922. Where Liberal Coalition seats were handed on to 
National Liberals to fight as candidates of the right there were 
few difficulties. Thus in eleven seats contested by sitting 
National Liberals, Conservative support was almost automatic. In 
other thirteeý where there were candidate changes, the 
(34) 
Conservatives gave the new National Liberals their support 
However in Berwick and Haddington, a Liberal Coalition seat in 
1918, the Unionists objected to the choice by Haddington National 
Liberal Association Executive of John Hope as candidate, 
(35) 
and 
when the East Lothian and Berwick Unionist Association met, it 
resolved to have a candidate 'representative of Unionist views. 
The position was more complicated by the fact that Balfour, who 
lived in the area, had already promised his support to Hope. 
Balfour wrote to Lloyd George saying that: 'I have had, I admit, not 
unreluctantly to withdraw from that position ... neither Unionists 
nor Liberals would look at him'. Lloyd George's advice to Hope was 
(36) 
to retire, but Hope insisted on pursuing his candidature The 
situation was thus resolved by the National Liberals bringing 
forward a new candidate, Waring, who gained Conservative support, 
In this case Unionist pressure had forced a change of 
(37) 
candidate Although Hope received only four votes, East 
Lothian and Berwick Unionists were still in favour of the 
coalition. 




35 Scotsman, October 26,1922. 
36 Balfour to Lloyd George, October 1922, contained in Gilmour 
Correspondence, GD/383/17. 
37 Ibid, October 30,1922. 
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The Unionists also supported the National Liberals' new choice in 
Roxburgh and Selkirk, which had been vacant at the time * the 
election was declared, although the candidature of Henderson was 
not popular with the Unionists. They had originally agreed to 
support him only at the by-election which was expected and not at a 
general election. In the end they agreed to support him only by 38 
to 33 after a motion to place a Unionist candidate in the field 
(38) lost only by 36 votes to 35 In Rutherglen, the Coalition 
Liberal seat also fell vacant, because the sitting member, Rodger, 
resolved to retire because of the collapse of the coalition in 
order to give both National Liberals and' Conservative associations 
the chance 'to shape their course' without embarrassment'ý The 
Unionist Executive initially agreed to bring forward its own 
candidate after a unanimous vote but, eventually, the candidature 
of the Liberal, Train, who claimed to be 'a Liberal with 
qualification', was accepted 
(40) 
The seats which Coalition Liberals 'or Conservatives did not hold 
were potentially more of a problem. In fact, however, there was 
little problem in reaching agreements even when both parties had 
candidates. In South Ayrshire, a Coalition Conservative had lost 
in 1918, in a four party contest involving Liberal and Independent 
Liberal, as well as the successful Labour candidate, who had won 
with only 38% of the vote. The Unionists in 1921 had 
38 Scotsman, October 31,1922. Roxburgh was one area where 
'Diehard feeling' was strong. The Scotsman editor was to 
write to Sir John Gilmour in June 1923 that Roxburgh was 
'almost the only county in Scotland from which I get Diehard 
letters and along the Borders there I know a pretty strong 
Conservative feeling in favour of throwing over Henderson at 
the next election. Dalkeith wanted to stand as a 
Conservative, Editor of Scotsman to Gilmour, June 7,1923 
Gilmour Correspondence GD. 383/18. 
39 Ibid, October 27,1922. 
40 Ibid 
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adopted a candidate, Wallace, while the Liberal Association, which 
was pro-Coalition, had adopted Sir William Reid. When the 
coalition ended the South Ayrshire Liberal Association and the 
Unionist Association both agreed to support Reid 
(41) 
on the grounds 
that, 'If socialism were to be combated those of moderate views must 
(42) be united' 
Kirkcaldy had been lost to Labour at the 1921 by-election in which 
a Coalition Liberal candidate had stood with Unionist support. 
Although the new candidate, Hutchison, favbured Free Trade and 
Lloyd George, he was adopted both by the Kirkcaldy and District 
Burghs Liberal and Radical Association, which was pro-Coalition, 
and by the Unionist Association, which argued that 'the only 
programme with which they did not agree was the programme published 
(43) 
by the Labour Party' In Dundee, the second seat had gone to 
the Labour candidate, Wilkie, in 1918. In 1922 the Unionists 
decided, although only narrowly, not to place a candidate in the 
field and to give support both to Churchill, the sitting member, 
and the new National Liberal candidate, Macdonald 
(44). In Bothwell 
a Coalition Liberal had stood at the by-election of 1919, but in 
1922 a Conservative candidate went forward with National Liberal 
support - exactly the same formula as in 1918 at the previous 
(45) 
general election 
In other cases, where the National Liberal-Unionist alliance failed 
to clear the way for one anti-socialist candidate, Unionists stood 
41 Scotsman, October 23,1922. 
42 Ibid., October 28,1922. 
0 
43 Scotsman, October 31,1922. 
44 Ibid., Octobbr 27,28,1922. 
45 November 1,1922. The candidate was. jointly chosen by 
National Liberal and Unionist Associations, and despite a 
threat by the independent Liberal, to intervene, nothing came 
of it. 
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against Liberals. This was true of Aberdeenshire Central which had 
been a Coalition Liberal seat in 1918, had been lost to the 
independent Liberals in 1919, and in 1922 found the Liber"als 
competing against the Conservatives. Equally in Greenock, the 
sitting member, Sir Godfrey Collins, who had asserted his 
independence from the Coalition, was to be opposed by a National 
Liberal who had been adopted, but when the election came he stood 
aside in favour of a Unionist. But generally the Unionist policy 
was to encourage National Liberals to fight seats where Labour or 
Liberal was well established as opponents. 
There were in fact only two constituencies where conciliation 
between National Liberals and Conservatives proved to be 
impossible - and in both the problems that engulfed the two wings 
of the previous Coalition had been deepseated, and existed long 
before the election was declared. Chapter 3 traced the attempts by 
Sir John Gilmour to persuade Unionists in Cathcart to accept a 
Coalition Liberal choice as candidate during 1920 and 1921. In 
fact when the Cathcart Unionist President had recommended the 
Liberal nominee to the Unionist Association, after a joint meeting 
with the Liberals, his Association had declined to accept him. 
Unionist headquarters then proceeded to resist the Unionist choice 
as an official candidate, 'on the grounds that they considered 
themselves bound by the pact entered into by the whips of both 
parties'. A small group of Cathcart Unionists issued their own 
Manifesto saying that 'the present time is not opportune for 
(46) 
splitting the vote of holders of moderate opinion' In the 
end, Cathcart Unionists placed their own candidate in the 
f ield (47) , but the Scottish Unionists preferred to offer support to 
46 Glasgow Unionist Association, Annual Report, 1923. 
47 Ibid. Cathcart Unionists continued their protest well into 
19.23, 'with a view to endeavouring to prevent . 
in future 
headquarters recommending to the electors again a candidate 
other than the one selected by the divisional association in 
accordance with the rules of Glasgow Unionist Association'. 
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the National Liberal, Sir Andrew Duncan, who appeared on Unionist 
platforms during the campaign and had been ratified by the joint 
(48) 
pact of the National Liberals and Unionists 
In Perth and East Perthshire the difficulties which led to Liberal, 
National Liberal and Conservative candidates in 1922 had been 
developing before the election when Conservatives had adopted their 
candidate and the National Liberals had favoured Gourlay as 'a 
restraining influence' against 'the Conservative Diehards and 
socialist extremists', and a supporter of Lloyd George who was 'a 
(49) 
heaven-sent leader' Even before the Carlton Club decision, 
Austen Chamberlain had rejected Gilmour's plea that either he or 
Lloyd George should intervene to prevent a fight between the two 
('50) 
wings of the Coalition 
While negotiations on candidatures proceeded, the National Liberals 
claimed to 'be strong and to be able to bring forward candidates 
against the Unionists should the word come from party 
headquarters'. But on the ground the party's organisation was 
never as strong as 'it appeared to be. National Liberal 
organisations which had emerged in 1920, existed at least on paper 
in forty-two Scottish constituencies. But according to the Lloyd 
48 Glasgow Unionist and National Liberal Associations, Joint 
Manifesto: To the Electors of Gl! ýsgqw, November 1922, 
contained in papers of Glasgow Unionist Association. 
49 Scotsman, November 3,1922. 
50 Austen Chamberlain to Gilmour, October 7,1922. '1 do not 
think the PM or I should accept an invitation to. tender advi ' 
ce 
to the Unionists. To arbitrate. would be an invidious task and 
must bring us into conflict with one or other party... we 
should have all the odium of an arbitration without the 
certainty of a settlement. Gilmour Papers, GD. 383/17. 
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George Liberal Magazine's reports of activities, work on the ground 
was thin in the industrial areas and in the far north of. the 
country. 
( 5 1) 
In fact the main strength of the National Liberals 
came from the defection or non-affiliation of former Liberal 
constituency associations. Altogether nineteen Liberal 
Associations had been found to be pro-coalition most of whom did 
(52) 
not affiliate to the Scottish Liberal Federation and in 1922, 
fifteen Liberal Associations supported or encouraged National 
Liberal or Conservative candidates at the 1922 General 
(53) - Election Thus, in most areas of Scotland, it was hardly the 
case that two Liberal organisations existed side by side: more 
often than not, the National Liberals existed in a constituency 
where the independent Liberals had collapsed. 
With thirty-one National Liberals in the field, a far higher 
proportion of, National Liberals stood in Scotland than in the rest 
of the country, but in every case but two where National Liberals 
stood, they had no Conservative opponent, and in almost every case 
51 M Kinnear, op cit. Kinnear suggests that only seven were 
extremely active, in Argyll, West Renfrew, Motherwell, 
Rutherglen, Kelvingrove, Edinburgh East and Kirkcaldy. In six 
of these cases, the Liberal associations had defected en bloc. 
52 The Liberal Associations that supported the Coalition were 
East Aberdeenshire, Inverness, Dundee, Bridgeton, Moray and 
Nairn, Montrose, Kinross, Haddington and Berwickshire, 
Partick, Argyll, Dumbarton Burghs, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, 
West Renfrew, Ross and Cromarty, Cathcart, Banff, South 
Ayrshire and Roxburgh and Selkirk. In East Aberdeenshire, 
Inverness, Dundee, Moray and Nairn, Montrose, Partick, Argyll 
and Rossshire, Western Isles, and Roxburgh new associations 
which supported the Scottish liberal Federation and Asquith 
were brought into being. Information from Scottish Liberal 
Federation, Eastern Executive and Organising Committee 
Minutes, June 16,1922; June 22,1922; July 14,1921; October 
10,1921; Julý 13,1923, December 19,1923; December 8,1922. 
- 53 The Liberal Associations that supported National Liberal or 
Unionist candidates at the election were: Dumbarton, 
Dunfermline, Bridgeton, Montrose, Stirling and Falkirk, 
Renfrew West, Hamilton, Lanark, Argyll, Berwick and 
Haddington, Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, Moray and Nairn, 
Dundee and South Ayr. Information compiled from newspapers 
and from Scottish Liberal Federation minutes, 1922-1923. 
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had the support of the Conservative Party. Indeed one of the 
reasons why there were so many National Liberals in the field was 
that the Coalition Liberals who had held their seats in 1918 were 
regarded as the best opponents of socialism, and where National 
Liberals did not hold their seats, and were in two party contests 
with the Liberals, the Unionists considered them to be the best 
challengers. Thus, one National Liberal was returned unopposed and 
twenty-three of the other thirty candidates appeared in straight 
fights either with Labour or Liberals. 
Liberal claims and Liberal realities were two different worlds. At 
the Liberal Federation's Annual Meeting Sir Donald Maclean, the 
Chairman, spoke of 'the remarkable progress of Liberalism in 
Scotland'. The Eastern Finance Committee had recorded that 'for 
the first time, in the last six months, we had started to increase 
(54) 
our subscriptions' And when the Executive of the Scottish 
Liberal Federation met just after the election, they had, the 
Chairman claimed, 'a meeting with a record attendance .... the 
meeting he understood was the largest in the history of the 
Federation'. But as we suggested in Chapter 3, the Liberal 
strength at the grass roots was limited. Of Scotland's seventy-one 
constituencies, at least 28 had Liberal Associations which were not 
fully constituted as members of the Scottish Liberal Association - 
and nineteen supported the National Liberals, although in some 
cases branches followed the official Liberal line. In July 1922, 
the Eastern Organising Committee - which at that time dealt with 
matters affecting all Scotland - heard that 'when consideration of 
two or three names was adjusted there would be forty Liberal 
candidates as against 39 Labour, 32 Unionist, 28 Coalition Liberals 
and nine 




But when the election was declared there was a rush 
to *endorse more candidates. The eventual list of forty-seven was 
1 (56) considered very satisfactory' 
Liberals were given a clear run in a number of constituencies, and 
escaped a National Liberal or Conservative opponent. In Kilmarnock 
Shaw who had stood as a Coalition candidate in 1918 stood as 'a 
Liberal without prefix' in 1922, but even in these circumstances he 
received Unionist help. In Banff, the Unionist local association 
bowed to Head Office pressure to leave the sitting member a clear 
run and he was returned unopposed. Negotiations to secure 
neutrality at least in respect of Asquith's candidature in Paisley 
had been proceeding during 1922, as has been traced in Chapter 3. 
When the election was declared, Unionist headquarters in Scotland 
advised Paisley Unionist Association not to run a candidate and 
(57) 
this advice was accepted by the local Unionists 
In Kinross and West Perthshire, Gardiner had received the National 
Liberal endorsement, then offered Bonar Law support 
(58) 
and was 
finally adopted by the Joint Committee of the two Liberal 
Associations as a Liberal and free trader, claiming as 'His aim and 
object to unite the two wings of Liberalism if possible and to work 
wholeheartedly with any government' 
(59). 
55 Ibid, July 25,1922. 
56 Ibid, October 20,1922. 
57 Scotsman, November 1,1922. 
58 Ibid, November 1,1922. 
59 Ibid., October 30,1922. 
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Thus, in 1922, Liberals stood in forty-seven contests, two-thirds 
of the seats of Scotland. In three cases, they were accepted by 
National Liberals and Conservatives, and thus were either unopposed 
as in the case of Banff, or were Labour's sole opponent as in the 
cases of Kilmarnock and Paisley. - In seventeen cases, Liberals took 
the field against Labour, with either a National Liberal or 
Conservative as the opponent. In the case of Perth there were 
National Liberal and Conservatives, and in Greenock, Conservative 
and Communist opponents. In Berwick. and Haddington there were 
three proclaimed Liberals in the field and in Motherwell where an 
independent Conservative joined the contest, the official Liberals 
were only one of three opponents to Labour. But half the Liberal 
Party interventions occurred in seats where there was no Labour 
opponent and where it seemed safer for the anti-socialist opponents 
to fight out their differences. 
The problem for the Federation, and for Asquith personally, was 
that not all the 'Liberal' candidates were anti-Lloyd George and 
anti-Coalition. Many stood as prefixless Liberals who refused to 
give support unequivocally to Asquith or his line. In Moray and 
Nairn for example, Guthrie, who spoke of himself as 'an independent 
Liberal' and survived a vote by both Conservative and. Liberal 
Associations to dispossess him of support, said it was 'unfair to 
ask a candidate to tie himself at the present time to any 
(60) 
leader' In Kincardineshire and West Aberdeen, Murray 
considered himself 'a Liberal candidate with pure and defined 
principles', but not an Asquithian. In Galloway Dudgeon spoke of 
himself as a 'free Liberal' not bound to either the Liberals led by 
Mr Asquith or the Liberals led by Mr Lloyd George. Macdonald who 
was the Liberal candidate in Inverness came out in support of Lloyd 
George. Sinclair in Caithness and Sutherland was 'a Liberal first 
and last' who would work for unity. In Kilmarnock Shaw was 'a 
plain Liberal j(61). 
* 
60 Scotsman, October 30,1922. 
61 These comments come from the candidate's election manifestoes 
and reports in Scotsman and Glasgow Herald. 
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Thus in Scotland as a whole, Asquith's hold on his own party was 
much more tenuous than it appeared. There were eight seats wliere 
prefixless Liberals stood (sometimes with no National Liberal 
opposition, but at other times even with it), 
(62) 
and there could 
be said to be only adozen seats where the Liberal associations and 
the candidates stood for the totally independent Liberalism which 
(63) Asquith claimed to represent In most other cases, Liberals 
were either dubious of Asquith's leadership or were dependent on 
National Liberal or Unionist support. 
62 The seats were Caithness, Inverness, Western Isles, Moray and 
Nairn, West Aberdeenshire, Banff, Galloway and West Perth and 
Kinross. 
63 These constituencies were South Aberdeen; Edinburgh South; 
Edinburgh West; Hillhead; Kelvingrove; Central Aberdeen; East 
Fife; Forfar; East Aberdeenshire; Orkney and Shetland; 
Paisley; and Kilmarnock, although in this last case Shaw stood 
as a 'liberal without prefix'. 
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II LABOUR PREPARATIONS 
Despite the hopes and promises of the immediate post-war years, 
Labour was not well prepared for the 1922 General Election. Indeed 
the declining membership, activity, and finance engendered a 
defensive rather than aggressive mood within the movement, as the 
recession began to bite. As early as 1920, the party's 'Scottish 
Executive had doubted the wisdom of exhausting money and resources 
on too many parliamentary contests unless the party had locally 
made some headway in local authority elections and had sufficient 
resources to fight(l). In failing to build a central Scottish fund 
for fighting elections, the Scottish Executive of the party had 
recognised that financing elections was now a matter for the 
constituency organisations, with the support of the I. L. P. and 
trades unions. While the 'party's 1922 Report to the Scottish 
Conference spoke of the 'state of healthy activity in Scotland', it 
had to admit that 'economic conditions prevailing in industry are 
affecting the resources of our movement' 
(2) 
Ben Shaw, the 
Secretary of the Scottish Council, estimated that 20,000 members 
had lapsed in Glasgow alone. Writing later in an article in 
Forward newspaper, Shaw accepted that 'the serious and protracted 
trade depression with the huge inroads made by unemployed members 
upon union funds will have an effect upon our fighting 
efficiency' 
(3). 
And while he could claim that 'we have sixty-two 
divisional Labour Parties with, definite organisations', he had to 
(4) 
concede that 'some of them want stirring up a bit' 
The general election omens that had emerged from the municipal 
elections of 1921 and the education authority contests of April 
1922 were not encouraging. Labour had lost rather than gained seats 
in most of the country with the exception of Fife in the municipal 
1 Labour Party Scottish Council Executive Report 1920. 
2 Ibid., Executive Report, 1922 
3 Forward, March 18,1922 
4 Ibid. 241 
elections of 1921 and Dollan had had to conclude that 'the big 
lesson of the present election is that destitution hunger and 
(5) 
unemployment are not aids to the Labour cause' The education 
authority elections of April 1922 were a further setback for 
Labour. Forward newspaper 's 'call to arms' in February 1922 
suggested that there should be five hundred Labour candidates, who 
would stand on a specific programme which demanded free books, free 
education, teaching on temperan ce, trade union conditions for 
teachers and the introduction of school baths. The election, the 
paper argued, presented 'a unique opportunity of rejecting the 
savage cuts into the rights of our children' imposed by the 
Government's economy programme, and the party should make every 
effort 'to make it perfectly clear that the issue is not the 
, respective merits of protestantism and catholicism 
(6) 
. However 
while far more electors voted in 1922 - 51% in Glasgow compared 
with 27% in 1919 - Labour's vote fell to what seemed its 
'irreducible minimum', as voting polarised on religious lines. In 
Glasgow Labour representation on the educational authority was 
reduced from fifteen to five: 27,800 first preference votes went 
to Labour, spread among the twenty-eight Labour candidates, which 
was certainly an increase on the 10,270 for twenty-five candidates 
in 1919 on a much lower poll. But there had been a strong 
Protestant turnout which meant that 'the Catholics could not even 
return their own nominees much less pass on their later preferences 
to Labour as was the case in 1919, 
(7). 
5 Forward, November 26,1921 
6 Forward, February 25,1922.85 members had been elected 
throughout Scotland in 1919. 
7 Forward, April 15,1922. 
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Around the rest of the country Labour did no better, although in 
Dundee one seat was gained. In Aberdeen Labour lost their only 
seat to a Communist candidate and in Fifeshire and Lanarkshire 
Labour suffered badly as the campaign was conducted on religious 
lines. Labour lost three of its nine seats in Lanarkshire and in 
Fife while two seats were gained, four of the sixteen Labour held 
seats were lost. There was said Forward a 'whoop of triumph with 
(8) 
which the reactionaries met the great defeat of Labour' 
While electoral dif f iculties beset Labour, the party was 
handicapped also by the left-wing activities outside the party, and 
in particular the emergence of the Communist Party. Forward was 
critical of the miners' reform movement, as a campaign which had 
been launched in the country by members of the communistic order, 
and the Labour Party itself was hit by an increasingly militant 
position taken by some of its affiliated bodies(9). In June 1922, 
for example, Glasgow Trades and Labour Council rejected the rule 
that Annual Conference Delegates could not be! members of an 
organisation which was pledged to secure the election of candidates 
other than those of the Labour Party. It forced the Scottish 
Executive of the Labour Party to intervene to explain that 'the 
g6neral purpose of the new rule was not to prohibit candidates like 
those of the cooperative societies which were run in association 
with the Labour Parties'. but to 'protect the political Labour 
Movement from its avowed opponents'. When a further reply from the 
Executive specifically excluded Communist Party members, the Trades 
(10) 
and Labour Council refused to comply In other areas, splits 
were developing within the Labour Party. Motherwell Trades and 
Labour Council adopted the Communist Party member, Walton Newbold, 
as their candidate and in Aberdeen, the Trades Council were asked 
to 
8 Forward, April 15,1922. 
9 Ibid., September 30,1922. 
10 P Liddell, Th Glasgow Trades Council, Strathclyde University 
M. Litt., 1977, pp. 33-35. 
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consider placing a Communist in North Aberdeen in preference to the 
eccentric sitting member, Frank Rose The party had also to 
deal with problems in Berwick and Haddington constituency where 
Robert Foulis, who had stood in the 1918 election, and was 
readopted as the candidate, was also a member of the Communist 
Party. Foulis resigned, but no such resolution could be effected 
. in Greenock where a Communist candidate stood. Thus, the Scottish 
Executive had to report that in two west of Scotland divisions the 
local Labour parties had run Communist Party members as candidates 
despite their repeated advice. The party concluded that 'however 
desirable the united front, it is impossible to obtain it by 
breaches of the constitution'( 
12) 
If there were anxieties about the infiltration of the far left, 
Scottish Labour were also worried about the possibility of Labour 
cooperation with Liberalism. The Invernessshire by-election brought 
this matter into the open, when Henderson was alleged to have 
telephoned Inverness Trades and Labour Council saying that 'in the 
absence of a Labour candidate, Labour's business is to vote against 
the Coalition Government candidate' 
(13) 
. At their meeting later 
in March, the Scottish Executive Committee instructed their 
secretary to protest to headquarters about this advice and a motion 
came from Glasgow ILP, insisting on Labour's independence and its 
'uncompromising hostility to all political parties standing for 
capitalism'. The Glasgow Trades and Labour Council took a similar 
line. The Scottish Executive unanimously approved this 
(14) 
position 
Scotsman, November 3,1922. The communist who had proposed to 
stand was also the editor of the newspaper of the miners' 
reform movement in Fife, and decided at the last minute that 
it was inappropriate to stand in Aberdeen. 
12 Labour Party Scottish Executive Report, 1923, p. 9. 
13 Forward, March 11,1922. 
14 Forward, March 11,18 April 1922. 
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But when the Glasgow Trades Council went further and instructed. all 
Divisional Labour Parties to exact such a pledge from parliamentary 
candidates, to oppose any sort of consultation with or 
consideration of candidatures of other parties, the National Agent, 
Wake, deprecated this move, and the Scottish Executive ruled it 
'unconstitutional' for Glasgow constituency parties to exact a 
(15) 
pledge of national character from candidates 
Matters had come to a head in March 1922 with the cooperation at 
Clayton and Bodmin by-electibns. In the first the Liberal withdrew 
for Labour; in the second, Labour for Liberal. Even in Scotland 
Labour was to be embarrassed by allegations of cooperation with the 
Liberals. When in Ayr the Liberal candidate, Raffan, claimed 
support from the Labour M. P., Joseph Westwood -a letter of support 
that was subsequently withdrawn under pressure - the Executive had 
to rule that 'both our constitution and our principles require 
absolute abstention where it is not possible for us to secure a 
, (16) candidate of our own The general effect of this was not so 
much to rule out any Liberal and Labour cooperation as to hold 
Labour back in its rural areas and, in seats it had not fought 
before. Labour stood aside in Invernessshire in the 1922 by 
election and it decided not to field a candidate in a subsequent 
vacancy in Moray and Nairn. The way was paved towards the 
situation of the 1922 election when Labour fielded only 43 
candidates and stood aside in 28 seats. 
Writing as has been stated early in 1922 the Scottish organiser Ben 
Shaw admitted that 'the serious and protracted trade depression 
with the huge inroads made by unemployed members upon union fund; 
will have an effect upon our fighting efficiency'. And while he 
could claim 'we have 62 Divisional Labour Parties with definite 
organisations', he had to admit 'some of them want stirring up a 
(17) bit' In fact most 
15 Labour Party Scottish Executive Report, 1923, p. 9 
16 Ibid., p. 8. 
17 Forward, January 14,1922. 
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were nothing more than 'shell' organisations with the practical 
work, if any, done by the Independent Labour Party or the 
sponsoring trade unions. It-meant that the Labour Party was itself 
not equipped to persuade candidatures to fight seats where the 
I. L. P. or a union was unable to fight. 
Chapter Two has shown how both the Independent Labour Party and t. he 
miners' union were: the principal agents of Labour activity in 
securing parliamentary candidatures in the period from 1918 to 1921 
and that both of them were facing severe financial difficulties 
from 1920, and in particular from 1921, onwards. The ILP were so 
worried in January 1922 that their Scottish Council had to form a 
special committee to re-examine electoral preparations, and in the 
event a special campaign of recruitment and organisation was 
(18) 
decided upon While grants to candidates had -to be reduced 
from an expected E100 for each seat to E50 for each seat, and the 
party had to withdraw from pursuing candidates in at least two 
constituencies, it was able even under pressure to f ield 21 
(19) 
candidates which were sponsored by the local ILP organisations 
The same problems engulfed the miners' union, where an additional 
complication - Communist activity within the union-affected its 
capacity to promote Labour representation. Even as membership 
fell, the miners had attempted to retain their four political 
organisers for the ten constituencies on which they had set their 
sights and which had been recognised as miners' seats by Labour's 
National Executive as early as 1919. But the financial position of 
the union had become so parlous by October 1922 that the Scottish 
Executive asked their political committee 'to consider the 
advisability of'withdrawing the candidates from two divisions owing 
to the financial position' 
(20) 
. After discussion, the 
18 Forward, January 14,1922. 
19 I. L. P. National Administrative Council, May 18,1922. 
20 Scottish Union of Mineworkers Executive, October 2,1922. 
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political committee recommended to the Executive that 'the 
constituencies should be fought as was decided some time ago', 
(21) 
but while the Executive accepted this decision, a committee was 
constituted to keep an eye on the expenditure of each agent and 
candidate and to interview them at intervals through the 
(22) 
campaign 
During 1922, however, the Scottish ILP made special efforts to 
recover the ground it felt had been lost as a result of the 
recession. In August 1922, a special revival campaign was launched 
in Glasgow. What was called 'The Great Push' was based on 
Forward's argument that 'political action will hold the field as 
the chief weapon for the workers for the next two years'. With one 
hundred and forty meetings in 'The Great Push', the party 
considered that new ground had been broken in many places 
(23) 
especially amongst audiences of women In September, the ILP 
launched a Scottish campaign, 'War on Capitalism', which emphasised 
(24) 
the party's new programme for workers' control in industry 
But while the party could claim 143 branches in Scotland it had had 
(25) 
to admit that 'some had lapsed" and it was recognised that 
their campaign could not prosper because the Scottish branches had 
(26) been suffering severely from trade depression 
21 Ibid., Political Committee, October 14,1922. 
22 Ibid., Political Committee, October 23,1922. 
23 Forward, August 19,1922 
24 Forward, September 2,1922. The ILP was more confident after 
the campaign arguing for the time being that 'things are on 
the upturn ... apathy and pessimism are vanishing and confidence 
and optimist are growing. Despair has given way to hope. 
Reaction is on the retreat'. 
25 Ibid., April 1,1922. 
26 Ibid., September 23,1922. 
\ 
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By the time of the 1922 election the situation was serious. As Pat 
Dollan recalled in his unpublished autobiography, 'we had little 
money in the bank and only a skeleton organisation in each 
division ... we borrowed most of the money for deposits and raised (27) 
the election expenses by collections at meetings' In the end, 
however, the ILP sponsored twenty-one of the forty-three official 
Labour candidates who stood in Scotland. 
Labour's intervention in the 1923 election was less therefore a 
full Labour party fight than a joint effort by the miners and the 
Indpendent Labour Party. Not only were forty-one of the 
forty-three candidates members of the ILP, but the ILP and the 
miners' union between them were financially responsible for 
thirty-one of the forty-th ree candidates. This point was not lost 
in the inquest on the election results. As Gallie of the Railway 
Clerks Association told the Scottish Labour Conference of 1923: 
It was no credit of tfieirs that so many seats were won in 
Scotland. The victories were due mainly to the ILP which 
had undertaken the spade work in the divisions and also 
provided the funds for most of the elections. Indeed had 
it not been for the ILP many of the seats would not have 
been contested. It was time the NEC was made to realise 
their responsibility towards Scotland. (28) 
The main conclusion was that trade unions other than the miners 
were not pulling their weight. Scottish Secretary, Ben Shaw, was 
to tell the STUC Conference after the election: 
27 P Dollan, ILnpublished Autobiogr4Rhyý, p. 49. 
28 Labour Party, Scottish Conference Report, 1923, p. 40. 
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The industrial and political activities of the movement 
cannot be separated ... Politics were , 
bound to rest on 
industrial organisation. 95% of the Labour Party were 
trade unionists. There were 62 Divisional Labour Parties 
in Scotland many not in an efficient state because trade 
union associations were not affiliated. (29) 
The 1924 Scottish Labour conference was told: 
Many of the larger unions did not pay their proposed 
quota towards-party work in Scotland. Their development 
was restricted for lack of finance and reform was 
imperative if they were to win Scotland for a Labour 
Government ... They could not do so on their present finances. (30 ) 
Glasgow, where the ILP were to sponsor almost every Parliamentary 
contest was symptomatic of the problem. When the Executive of the 
Glasgow Trades and Labour Council met local Labour constituency 
parties just before the 1922 elections, the Council could only 
guarantee to give E2.10p per annum to local Labour Parties - far 
below the guaranteed E50 the ILP was to give to its sponsored 
(31) 
candidates, although even E50 was insufficient 
Labour was unable to f ield candidates in Aberdeenshire Ceritral 
(fought in 1919) Ross and Cromarty, the Western Isles (fought in 
1918), South Aberdeen, the second Dundee seat, North Edinburgh 
(fought in 1920), Hillhead and Kelvingrove (fought in 1918), 
Roxburgh and the Scottish Universities seat (fought in 1918), and 
Communists stood in Motherwell and Greenock. Thus there were 12 
seats previously contested in which Labour had intended to fight 
29 STUC Report, 1923, p. 62. 
30 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, p. 4p. 
31 Glasgow Trades and Labour Council, Minutes, September 19, 
1922. 
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but did not. In Greenock, Sir Sankaran Nair had been the intended 
candidate but he had to pull out. In Dundee R Wallhead had been 
selected but did not stand in Dundee but in Merthyr. In Roxburgh 
the Railway Clerk's Association had originally intended to run a 




In Dumfriesshire although a meeting was held with JH Thomas to see 
if he might become candidate, it was decided in the end not to 
contest the seat mainly because Labour intervention at Parish and 
Town Council elections had met with little success. There was also 
talk- of a first Labour candidature in East Aberdeenshire, but 
according to the Scotsman 'The Labour Party decided that discretion 
(33) is the better part' In Forfarshire John Hendry considered 
(34) 
standing for Labour but withdrew But Labour did f ight in 
Pollok, North Midlothian, Kilmarnock and Perth where there had been 
no previous candidate. 
0 
A sign of Labour's financial difficulties can be gleaned from what 
. 
Labour actually spent on electioneering in 1922. Labour's average 
expenditure for its forty-three candidates was only E447 where the 
British average for all parties was E707. But that average 
concealed important differences between, for example, the finance 
the Miner's Federation put up for their candidates and what the ILP 
and other local Labour Parties could afford for candidates who were 
not union-sponsored. In the 
successful, only West Fife 
Coatbridge with a small expendi 
In Ayrshire North, James Brown 
and in Lanarkshire and the 
-expenditures ranged from E600 
(ý5) 
as the average 
mining seats, where Labour was 
where Labour was unopposed and 
ture of E250 were below the average. 
was to spend nearly EIOOO - E921 - 
Lothians, apart from Coatbridge, 
- E800, more than half as much again 
32 Scotsman, November 1,1922. 
33 Ibid., November 3,1922. 
34 Ibid., November 5,1922. 
35 Figures compiled from Labour Party Scottish Council Executive 
Report 1923, pp. 4-6. 
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Labour's 1922 programme was a bold socialist one, making the 
capital levy and nationalisation central to its campaign. There 
had in fact been some disagreement over strategy for the election. 
At a joint committee of Scottish Executive and Labour members of 7 
October 1922, Scottish MPs bad pressed for a more moderate 
approach. Rose for example wanted 'a lively electoral campaign 
without formulating a programme'. Graham wanted to emphasise 'a 
want of definiteness about Scottish policy' on the part of other 
parties. 'We must have a programme specifically applicable to 
Scottish affairs', he said, 'emphasising the necessity of Scottish 
Home Rule for the decentralisation of many questions including 
pensions, fishing, housing, agriculture etc. '. Kennedy was against 
Home Rule and separate estimates. A sub-committee was suggested to 
draft a programme, but in the end the Executive was appointed to 
carry out this task and send the programme to MPs. Kennedy 
emphasised that it should 'include only items that made a wide 
electoral appeal ... all-our spokesman at the general election should 
avoid home rule, prohibition and such matters and concentrate upon 
questions like housing, feeding of children etc., which would avoid 
fractious controversy and secure a wide sympathy beyond the 
ordinary members, of our own party'(36). 
There was little evidence that Kennedy's advice was heeded. The 
Scottish Programme that was issued in 1922 advocated land 
nationalisation and the nationalisation of mines, the banks and 
other means of exchange, water, electricity, gas, railways, 
tramways, canals, shipping and aircraft. There would be a capital 
levy on 'private fortunes over E50001. The manifesto stated: 
Unempýoyment is a national problem and ought noý to be 
made a local burden. It is the duty of the state to 
provide work or adequate maintenance for every willing 
worker. 
36 Labour Party, Scottish Executive, Minutes of Meeting of 
Executive with Scottish MPs, October. 7,1922. 
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There were to be pensions of El weekly for all over sixty and the 
people were to be housed in 'healthy-well placed dwellings owne. d by 
local government authorities at rents which the working people are 
able to pay'. National taxation would be 'based upon capital and 
income of private fortunes over E50dO graded in proportion to the 
means of the holders and f ixed at such rates as will meet all 
necessary government charges including service of the war debt 
1(37) (which should be reduced by the capital levy) 
Labour did not apologise for arguing for a capital levy and 
nationalisation and afterwards candidates were to suggest these 
issues had turned out to be popular. Stephen said that in 
Camlachie the capital levy was 'one of the most popular planks and 
won very many votes on that issue alone'. Captain Hay said in 
Cathcart 'the capital levy seemed to catch on. The more people 
talked about it the more they seemed to like it' . Welsh in 
Coatbridge said 'the capital levy was the most popular thing I ever 
-(38) remember as an election issue' . 
37 Labour Party Scottish Programme, 1922, Labour Party Scottish 
Executive Papers. 
38 Forward, October-December 1922. Reports of Constituency 
Campaigns. 
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III THE CAMPAIGN AND ITS OUTCOME 
In the sixty-nine constituencies outside the two member seat of 
Dundee (where ihere were six candidates) there were forty-four 
contests in which only two of the four major parties appeared. 
Three candidates in addition were unopposed. Thus a three or four 
party system was a reality for only one third of Scottish 
constituencies. The Labour challenge was the most important factor 
in restricting the number of candidates. Labour stood officially 
in only forty-three constituencies (excluding Dundee, where only 
one candidate was placed in the field and support was given in the 
other seat to Scrymgeour). In West Fife, Adamsom was unopposed. 
And in half the other contests, Labour faced a straight fight, in 
two cases with a Liberal opponent, in twelve cases with a National 
Liberal, and seven cases with a Conservative. The party fought 
only twenty three or four-cornered contests. In fifteen of them it 
fought Liberal and Conservatives only; in two it fought Liberal 
and National Liberal; in one, National Liberal and Conservative; 
and in two it was faced with four-cornered contests involving 
either a National Liberal or Independent Liberal in the field. The 
position is set out fully in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Generally, Liberals fought Conservative or National Liberals where 
it was safe to do so. More than half the Liberal interventions - 
twenty-six out of forty-seven - occurred in the safety of contests 
where there was no Labour opponent, or as in the case of Paisley 
and Kilmarnock where the Liberals were Labour's sole opponent. 
Equally, eighteen of the Conservatives in thirty-six candidatures 
were in seats where there was no Labour opponent or the 
Conservatives were the only opponent of Labour. In only two cases 
did the National Liberals stand in three or four-cornered contests, 
despite placing thirty-one candidates in the field. In twelve of 
their interventions they werb Labour's sole opposition. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Offical Labour Candidatures in 1922 (1) 
Unopposed 
Straight Fights: 
with Liberal 2 





Lab. /Nat. Lib. /Lib. 2** 
Lab. /Con. /Lib. 15 
Lab. /Con. /Nat. Lib. 1 18 
Four Cornered: 2 
Dundee 1 
43 
In Shettleston there was in addition an independent Communist 
In Gorbals there was in addition an independent Communist 
1) Labour did not stand in Motherwell and Greenock where 
Communists took the f ield. In Dundee, there was only one 
Labour candidate for the two member seat. In addition, Labour 
support went to the Scottish Prohibitionist Scrymgeour. 




General Election Contests in 1922 
Unopposed 3 
Two Cornered Contests: 
Labour v Liberal or Conservative or National Liberal 21* 
Liberal v Conservative II 
Liberal v National Liberal 12 44 
Three Cornered Contests: 
Liberal v National Liberal v Labour 2* 
Liberal v Conservative v Labour 15 
Liberal v National Liberal v Conservative 1 
Liberal v Conservative v Communist Party 1 19 
Four Cornered Contests 
Dundee 
For the purposes of this table two interventions by 
independent Communists are not included. 
Source: FW Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 





Socialism was clearly the dividing line in the election, despite 
the proliferation of parties and candidates. Forward proudly 
stated that 'for the first time in our electoral history Labour has 
set the issue of the election'. For the first time it was 'a real 
issue'"). For the Scotsman, 'a vote for a Labour candidate is a 
vote for a capital levy. It is a vote for the confiscation of 
private wealth and the destruction of thrift, for the undermining 
of British credit, for the ruin of British industry ... this foolish 
and dangerous proposal stands in the foreýront of the 'Labour 
(2) 
programme' 
The threat of socialism was the admitted reason behind the 
electoral pacts. As Sir Robert Horne said: 
For the last three years he had feared that if a division 
occurred between the Unionists and the National Liberals 
there were many constituencies in the country, and 
particularly in Scotland, where the socialist party might 
slip in between the ranks of those who stood opposed.. (3) 
In his election address in Hillhead he stated that he was: 
glad to think that in Scotland the Unionist Party takes 
the'view I hold, for were it otherwise a division between 
those two sections of moderate opinion* would at the 
present time almost certainly result here in the triumph 
of the subversive socialist policy which advocates mongst 
other things the distinctive principles of 
nationalisation and the capital levy. (4) 
Later Horne was to defend his electoral pacts on the grounds that 
'the moderate parties in the country could not afford to separate 
and divide in the circumstances of the present time'. In these 
1 Forward, November 18,1922. 
2 Scotsman, November 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Election Address, 1922. 
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circumstances it was the Liberals who found themselves in 
difficulties, since as Horne pointed out, they found it difficult 
to formulate a policy differing essentially from that of the 
Unionist Party. The mismatch of Liberal programmes belied the 
superficial unity around Asquith's independent Liberalism. 
Chapple, for example, supported miners and rail nationalisation(5) 
Smith. would recognise Russia and provide more security against 
(6) 
unemployment while reducing expenditure Donaldson wanted a 
(7) 
minimum wage settlement and a forty hour week dollins in 
Greenock argued for nationýl funds for unemployment benefit, work 
(8) for the unemployed, free trade, and social progress Hog ge in 
Edinburgh was not totally opposed to th e capital levy but 'would 
make most people pay income tax on a very graduated scale'(9). 
What united Liberals more than anything else was suppor! . 
for 
(10) 
national economy. Maclean made it his theme . Benn argued for 
peace, retrenchment and reform, against state management, and for 
curtailing unproductive expenditure Asquith argued against 
coalition, - for 'stern economy', which the 'only one live and 
independent party' could bring, and suggested that while the 
country had had enough of coalition in any shape or form, there 
were 'only two fixed bands in the whole political landscape - the 
Liberal Party and the Labour Party'(12). 
5 Election Address, 1922, Scotsman, November 1,1922. 
6 Ibid. 
lbid . 
8 Election Address, 1922. 
9 Scotman, November 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid . 
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So while Labour argued that capital levy and nationalisation would 
solve unemployment and bad housing, the anti-socialist forFes 
argued against extremism. Other issues did come to the forefront. 
The ramifications of the Clydebank test case on evictions was fully 
exploited by Labour 
(13). 
As Wheatley later said 'the rents' 
question was not allowed to be overlooked'. Maclean's slogan was 
'ditch the factors ,9 
(14) 
and the Scotsman reported that an eve of 
poll leaflet had promised that a Labour vote would ensure people 
would get their rent back. Later it was to suggest there 'never 
15) 
was as strong a card as the House of Lords judgement'( 
The campaign was a bitter one. If as Forward claimed 'the 
political leaders have all had to dance to Labour's piping' 
(16) 
the Scottish right made a contest of it. One Tory leaflet spoke of 
17) 
Labour's plans for 'the nationalisation of women'( In West 
Stirling, Hope claimed in a leaflet 'Socialism and Religion' that 
'socialist sunday schools taught class hatred ... taught to children 
despite all priests and ministers', and that the Labour. Party was 
18) 'hostile to the religion of Christ'( . In Central Glasgow, there 
was an attack on tRed sympathisers' with posters including that of 
a Bearded Russian, saying, 'He wants you to vote socialist: 
tDon't'; another said, 'Bolshevism is only socialism with the 
19) 
courage of its convictions'( 
13 Ibid., November 25,1922. 
14 Scotsman, November 16,1922. 
15 Ibid. November 17,1922. 
16 Forward, November 18,1922. 
17 Forward, 25 November, 1922. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Scotsman, November 16,1922. 
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The contest of 1922 was 'a fight against socialism'. This was 
emphasised by the fact that there were 21 straight fights aga#st 
Labour in the 43 constituencies the party had been able to fight. 
The results confirmed the fears of the Conservatives, National 
Liberals and Liberals. Labour won 29 seats, nine of these on a 
minority vote, and it received one third (32.2%) of the electoral 
vote. As the results became clear, Conservatives were unanimous in 
their condemnation of the verdict of the electors. The 
Conservative candidate in West Edinburgh suggested 'one had to go 
back to Flodden before we would find a similar national* disaster', 
and his colleague in South Edinburgh argued that, 'Scotland 
possessed three great qualitites -a love of liberty, of industry, 
and of religion. These were being assailed by the socialist 
party'. But another message was taken from-the fact Labour had won 
nine seats on a minority vote. 'The spirit of coalition is still 
alive' proclaimed the Scotsman, arguing there was a need for more, 
not less, cooperation between the anti-socialist parties 'if the 
(22) 
socialist menace is to be fought and conquered' 





That indeed was the mood of Liberals and Conservatives as the 
election campaign ended, and after the results were declared. From 
the Unionist side, Clark Hutchison, Thomson, Ford, Hutchinson, 
Mitchell Thomson and Weston argued for continued cooperation 
between Liberals and Conservatives after the elections; Jameson, in 
West Edinburgh, arguing he 'hoped it was not to be a long 
separation from his Liberal friends upon the other side of the 
1(23) coalition In North Edinburgh, Ford argued for a new 
(24) 
understanding with the National Liberals in the new Parliament 
Indeed the position of Gilmour and Walter Elliot in a new 
Conservative administration was in doubt until after the new 
Parliament met. At a strategy meeting of Chamberlain supporters on 
December 23, it was agreed however that Eliot accept an invitation 
to serve as Scottish Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Health, and 
Gilmour was also later to join the Conservative Government. But in 
1923, and 1924, both were to strive for the maximum cooperation 
with the Liberals wherever possible. 
On the face of it the Liberals did better than expected. 
Independent Liberals recorded fifteen seats in Scotland, a high 
number since only 62 seats were won in England. The party had put 
up 333 candidates, forty eight of them in Scotland, where from only 
eight seats in 1918 its representation virtually had doubled, and 
if the National Liberal victories were included, the party had won 
twenty seven Scottish seats in all -a strong grounding for a 
reunion if that were to happen. But the results belied the Liberal 
weakness. All the seats won by Liberals or National Liberals were 
in two party contests with the three exceptions of Greenock, Leith, 
and Berwick and Haddington and in this last instance there had been 
four candidates, though none had been Conservative. But even in a 
straight fight with Labour, 
23 Scotsman, November 1,1922. 
24 Ibid. 
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only four - Paisley, Kilmarnock, Montrose and Kirkcaldy - were won, 
the first by Asquith himself, the second by -a prefixless Liberal, 
and the last by a Lloyd Georgian Liberal. In one constituency a 
Liberal had been unopposed, and in twelve National Liberal had 
fought Liberal. Six only had been won-in straight fights with a 
conservative. 
Liberalism was left with little in industrial or mining Scotland. 
Greenock, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Leith, where the ýarty had been 
victorious, all had their own peculiar histories. In Greenock 
there had been no Labour candidate but a Communist; in Paisley the 
Conservative had stood aside to give Asquith a free run and 
Conservatives had also stood down in Kilmarnock. Although in 
Leith, there had been a Conservative the party had not fought this 
seat in 1918 - intentionally. It could be said that in those seats 
the Conservatives had allowed the Liberals to win. Liberalism no 
longer held any sway in Aberdeen or in Dundee, with the defeat of 
Churchill, and it was reduced to two seats in Edinburgh, where the 
East and West seats had been wo 
'n 
in straight fights with National 
Liberal and Conservative respectively. There had been no Labour 
presence and in 1924 both were lost when Labour intervened as a 
third force. 
In the country areas Liberalism had firmer roots. The Liberals 
were to hold Western Isles, Ross and Cromarty, Inverness, Caithness 
and Sutherland and Orkney and Shetland throughout the 1920's 
although with the exception of Orkney and Shetland in 1923 and 
1929, without opposition from the Conservatives. However, the 
North-East was not so promising. In East and West Aberdeenshire, 
Independent Liberals won in 1922, although it was a prefixless 
Liberal who won in West Aberdeenshire. Liberalism also triumphed 
in Banff and Moray and Nairn. However these 
' 
were seats which ýwere 
to fall to Conservatives with the exception of West Aberdeenshire 
in 1924, as Labour made its first general election interventions. 
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The Conservative base, though superficially weaker, was in fact 
much stronger than it appeared. The party had won only 13 sea-ts, 
despite contesting thirty six, half the Scottish seats. But they 
had won urban seats they would hold on to throughout the twenties 
and had secured their position as the party of the urban middle 
class. They were to hold Glasgow's Central, Hillhead, Pollok and 
Kelvingrove throughout, beating off, first, Liberal and, then, 
Labour opposition. Edinburgh North and South were natural 
Conservative seats from the 1920 by-election onwards. In Aberdeen 
the South seat was held throughout the twenties, and so too was the 
Ayr constituency. Their other areas of strength were in the middle 
class suburban rather than purely rural contryside areas - Peebles, 
North Lanark, Dumbartonsire, Ayrshire, Bute and North Ayr, and 
Perth. 
In 1922 the scale of Labour's advance in Britain as a whole has 
a 
been questioned by Cook: 
Since Labour did not coritest 135 seats in 1918 or 1922 
and with withdrawals in 64 and declining support in a 
further 85, there were no less than 284 seats in which 
even where a Labour candidate was seen, support was 
minimal. ( 26) 
I 
But in industrial Scotland, the election results testified to a 
dramatic swing from right to left. 
26 C Cook and J Taylor, The Labour Party, (London, 1979), p. 86. 
Cook's account is partially correcF. In Scotland, Labour 
stood aside in 12 they fought in 1918; in others their vote 
fell from their 1918 performance. 
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Labour were to be surprised by their successes in 1922. 
Predictions for electoral gains in the second post-war election had 
varied wiýh circumstances. Immediately following the 1918 
election, Central Off ice had made a calculation of probable and 
possible Labour gains. In addition to the seats already held, they 
had estimated Scotland would produce seven 'probable' gains out of 
61 'probables' in. Britain as a whole. As regards 'possible' 
Scotland was reckoned to have 18 constituencies. out of 123 
1possibles' in Britain. Thus, in 1919 Labour estimates were 
(27) between 13 and 31 seats in Scotland The local elections' 
results of 1919 and 1920 had given Labour in Scotland increased 
confidence. But by the beginning of 1922, economic depression had 
moderated Labour's ambitions. In January 1922 the Scottish 
Secre 
, 
tary Ben Shaw, made an assessment of Labour's possible 
successes. At that time he estimated 55 candidates - rather than 
the 43 who stood - would be in the field, but he expected only 
twenty-three victories although he did not see: 'why we can't 
secure 25 seats in Scotland. But in the event of a coalition split 
we would secure an advantage in many other constituencies and 
anything might happen'. He expected to win Bridgeton, Gorbals, 
Govan, Maryhill (especially if there was a coalition split), 
Shettleston, Springburn, and St Rollox in Glasgow. In Lanarkshire, 
Hamilton, Bothwell, Coatbridge, and Rutherglen were marked down as 
gains. Outside the Western Central belt, he expected to hold 
Edinburgh Central, Fife West, Ayrshire South, and their Aberdeen 
seat. Dumbarton would be Labour with 'a sporting chance in 
Linlithgow'. But he admitted that 'the serious and protracted 
trade depression with the huge inroads made by unemployed members 
upon union funds will have an effect upon out fighting efficiency'. 
Labour won n; --arly one in every three of the votes cast - receiving 
more than half a million votes in all. Yet Labour fielded official 
candidates in only 43 of the seventy one constituencies, leaving 
the right wing forces mostly unchallenged in most of the other 28. - 
27 Report of National Executive Committee on Electoral 
Organisation, NEC Files, March 1919. 
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While Welsh Labour received over 40% of the votes, their average 
vote per seat was 13,000. In Scotland the Labour average. was J. ust 
under 12,000 while in England it was less than 10,000. Labour in 
Scotland had not only won twenty-nine of the forty-three seats in 
which it had stood; twenty of these, it would hold throughout the 
twenties, without interruption. As Table 4.3 suggests the 1922 
election emphasised that the electoral politics of industrial 




28 Forward, January 14,1922. 
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TABLE 4.3 






National Liberal 17.7 







1922 Election : Aveýage Votes per candidate 




National Liberal 8,743 
Source: FW Craig, as cited above. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE 1923 ELECTION 
I LABOUR ORGANISATION AND POLICY 
1922 had been a turning point for. Labour. From being a fringe 
party, it wa s now Scotland's biggest single grouping at 
Westminster. As the Labour Party Scottish Executive reported to 
the 1923 Conference: 
Labour is now THE PREDOMINANT PARLIAMENTAgY PARTY IN 
SCOTLAND, having reached double the membership of the 
Conservative Party and exceeded by five the Conservatives 
and National Liberals added together. Continued 
organising work will doubtless give Scotland a clear 
majority at the next election over all the other parties 
put together. (1) 
Moreover, after the election, Labour's organisation improved, 
membership went up, and seats which had not been contested in 1922 
were assessed for the first time. By the beginning of 1924, there 
were to be 66 divisional Labour Parties for Scotland's seventy 
parliamentary constituencies (Dundee had a two member seat), and 
lone hundred and fifty local parties of one type or another'. But 
while progress was made, much of it was more apparent than real. 
As the Executive had to concede, 'some of these local Labour 
(2) Parties were not very active at election times' 
The dynamic for Labour remained that of the Independent Labour 
Party. In January it claimed 176 branches in Scotland - an 
(3) increase of 27 since the. calling of the election While the 
Labour Party Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1923, p. 2 
2 Ibid. 
3 Forward, January 27,1923. 
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Scottish organiser had to admit 'membership has fluctuated', he 
could claim an additional thirty-f ive branches by February 
(4) 
, and 
individual branches were increasing their membership, one, Exchange 
in Glasgow, -claiming a doubling (from 50 to 114) in the wake of the 
(5) 
elections 
There were to be troughs as well as heights for the ILP in 1923. 
The May Day celebrations . were 'disappointing in many places. 
Processions are no longer attractive and meetings such as we had in 
Glasgow have lost their appeal' 
(6) 
. But campaigns were organised 
in what were to be called 'the backward areas', and with Maxton and 
other Clydeside MPs campaigning in the Highlands, new branches were 
formed such as in Stornoway with 70 members 
(7), 
a decision was made 
by Inverness-shire Trades and Labour Council to contest the next 
elections 
(8) 
, and Forward argued that 'most if not all of the 
Highland constituencies can be won'(9). In Lanarkshire also the 
autumn propaganda campaign went successfully, with 'the general 
open-air propaganda ... the most successful ever experienced in the 
history of the Party'(10). By October affiliation fees in Scotland 
( 11) (12) had doubled in six months , and the ILP had 172 branches 
4 Ibid., February 27, 1923. 
5 Ibid., February 3,1 923. 
6 Ibid., May 1,1923 
7 Ibid., September 5, 1923 
8 Ibid., September 1, 1923 
9 Ibid., Septembýr 29, 1923 
10 Ibid., September 5, 1923 
11 -Ibid., October 13,1923 
12 Ibid. 
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In Glasgow' the yearly report, 1923-24, was to record the same 
improvement, leading Dollan to say the Glasgow ILP was now 'the 
people's party' . Membership had increased by 50%, a calculation 
based on the number of fully paid up members for the whole of 
twelve months and once unemployed members were included, it was 
(13) 
claimed membership had more than trebled during the year 
Throughout Scotland, by the end of the year the ILP had increased 
to 200 branches in all. 
The boost of the election was most evident in the West of Scotland. 
As Dollan recalls, 'when the election results were over we ran 
Sunday evening meetings for a season in the cinema and theatres. 
These were attended by record audiences who contributed liberally 
to the funds so that we ended the campaign with a large surplus 
which was banked and came in handy for the general election which 
(14) followed ten months later' . The ILP's Annual Report in Glasgow 
for 1922-23 was to record, 'an influx of members after the general 
election', which meant they 'maintained their membership strength' 
(15) 
which had been diluted previously by the effects of recession 
The mood in Scotland was undoubtedly more militant although it was 
scarcely one of confidence. The 1923 STUC Cong*ress were told by 
their Chairman that although it was possible to win temporary gains 
through trade unionism, they needed to depend for solutions to 
problems such as unemployment and poor housing on political 
(16) 
action . When the Unemployed Workers' movement demanded 
13 Glasgow, ILP Federation, Annual Report, 1923-24.0 
14 PJ Dollan, Unpublished Autobiography, p. 50. I 
15 Glasgow Independent Labour Party Federation, Annual Report, 
1922-23. 
16 Scottish Trade Union Congress, Report, 1923, p. 87. 
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affiliation, their spokesman, Harry McShane, argued that 
parliamentary action alone was insufficient and asked- for support 
from the Congress for a general strike to gain full maintenance for 
the unemployed. The proposal was remitted to the General Council 
by 83 votes to 36. But the Congress also passed -a motion giving 
the General Council powers to negotiate with trade unions 
considering a general strike in any industry, and to consider with 
other unions the possibilities for calling a national general 
(17) 
strike 
The STUC also passed motions for democratic control in industry, 
for a forty-eight hour week, a Royal Commi ssion into banking, for 
legislation to feed all children in need, for home rule for 
Scotland, for an enquiry into the Scottish cost of living, for 
control of railways, an extension of pensions, and against fascist 
movements in the country. They protested against the government's 
1923 budget, demanded action on unemployment, control of building 
materials and restoration of the housing subsidy, and for a 
widening of unemployment insurance to include all workers. They 
also protested against the legislation to end rent restriction and 
(18) 
against the plural vote 
If anything the Scottish Labour Party Conference was more radical. 
Many of the proposals were commonplace - the nationalisation of the 
railways, better war pensions, an immediate restoration of housing 
subsidies, unemployment to become a national charge and benefits to 
be adequate, and a demand for a new poor law enquiry in Scotland. 
But on some issues the party went much further. 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid., p. 11. 
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It was Patrick Dollan on behalf of the Scottish ILP who argued at 
the Labour Party's Scottish Conference for a general rents strfte, 
if parliamentary opposition to the government failed. He believed 
the Government were in danger of provoking 'a movement much more 
intense than that which gave rise to the Rent Strike of 19151. 
Opponents suggested that such a rent strike would be difficult to 
organise and could be a fiasco. But the amendment which opposed 
direct action on the rents issue gained only four votes - against 
(19) 
ninety four with perhaps thirty abstaining 
On unemployment policy, the Scottish Conference seemed even more 
prepared to tolerate militancy. After the Conference agreed to 
hear an unemployed workers' movement spokesman who argued that 
Labour MPs 'should fight the battle over jobs in the country, 
rather than in Parliament', conference agreed that the National 
Unemployment Committee should be allowed to affiliate to Divisional 
Labour Parties and Trades and Labour Councils. But the vote, 30 to 
(20) 16, implied most delegates abstained 
Clearly the Conference had moved far towards supporting Communist 
affiliation to, the Labour Party and the decision showed the 
conference to be to the left of the Labour Party nationally on the 
issue. In practice the Scottish Executive of the party frustrated 
the execution of the decision, rejecting a demand in January 1924 
(21) that there be affiliation of the movement . But as the Scottish 
Party divided over the question of Communist membership, lef t-wing 
activity in the constituencies was placing the Labour Party on its 
guard. Patrick Dollan believed that the effect of Communist 
infiltration and activity deprived Labour of the control of the 
Glasgow Town Council. However, the two major areas of Communist 
19 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Conference Report, 1923, 
p. 34-5. 
20 Ibid . 
21 Ibid., Executive Minutes, January 7,1924. 
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difficulty were Greenock and Paisley. In Greenock, a Communist, 
Geddes, had been endorsed as parliamentary candidate by the Trades 
and Labour Council in 1922 against the express instructions of the 
Scottish Labour Party. In May 1923 the Trades and Labour Council 
had unanimously decided to contest the seat in a future election 
and invited nominations from all affiliated bodies. In July John 
Paton was nominated by the ILP and when he became the sole nominee 
of August 4th, he went forward to be selected on October 4th. But 
on 27 September, Geddes - the former candidate - alleged that 
irregularities had occurred and moved that the selection conference 
be abandoned and that a new conference be held in January. This 
motion was carried by a majority. Geddes became chairman of the 
Trades Council. After a meeting with Shaw of the Labour Party on 
October 11th, Greenock ILP withdrew its delegates, (holding to 
(22) 
Paton as a candidate) The Scottish Executive refused 
endorsement of Geddes as Labour candidate for Greenock, 
disaffiliated the Trades and Labour Council, and took the decision 
to 'endeavour to reconstruct the local party on a separate basis in 
cooperation with the local organisations' 
(23) 
. The results of 
these events were seen in the split candidates on the left in 1923. 
In Paisley the dispute involved both Cooperative and Communist 
candidates, neither of whom seemed acceptable to the mainstream 
IýP. Biggar who bad been candidate in 1922 was refused endorsement 
by Paisley Trades Council early in 1923, mainly it seems on the 
grounds he was a housing factor, but he was prevailed upon by the 
Cooperative Party to continue his candidature and it was agreed 
that between them the Cooperative and Labour Party Executives 
resolve the matter. However, Paisley Labour Council selected a 
communist, who was not'acceptable to the Labour Party's Executive 
(24) 
although he agreed to accept tHe constitution 
22 Forward, October 27, November 3,1923. 
23 Ibid., November 24,1923. 
24 Forward, October 27,1923. 
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Communist-Labour divisions went further than this. At the 1923 
conference both Motherwell Trades and Labour Council and St Rdllox 
appointed Communist members as delegates. Tradeston delegates 
moved that Communist delegates be admitted, but when the Chairman 
ruled this out of order only nine delegates out of 132 delegates 
voted in favour of challenging this ruling. However, while the 
Conference accepted the decision to ban Communists, it was not 
prepared to accept a 'motion, supported by the Executive, which 
argued for expulsion of any who publicly supported any person who 
was not a Labour Party Candidate, either locally or nationally 
approved, which in essence was a motion expelling members who 
supported Communists. From Leith, it was argued that: 'the 
resolution would be used to discipline the independents within 
their own ranks. It would be used to push out the 'Reds. ' A 
motion effectively preventing discussion of the proposal was 
(25) 
passed 
It was not simply Communists who brought organisational and 
political problems. Problems also arose with respect to the 
Cooperative Party. Following a national decision, the Scottish 
section of the Cooperative Union and the Scottish Committee of the 
Cooperative Party had been separated from the Cooperative and 
Labour Council. The Scottish Executive was urged to maintain 
'friendly relations', with the Cooperative Party itself, but took 
the view that 'the creation of a separate party such as the 
Cooperative Party was likely to prove of doubtful value to the 
26) democratic movement'( 
25 Labour Party, Scottish Conference, Report, 1923, p. 31-33. 
26 Labour Party, Scottish Executive, August 13,1923. See also 
discussion in same body on May 28,1923. 
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The problems were never really resolved throughout the 1920s, 
although there was no further occasion when Cooperative and Laýour 
candidates stood against each other. The Scottish Executive, 
however, devoted a disproportionate amount of time to settling 
local disputes. 
Lef t-wing militancy increased the pressure on the Labour Party to 
take action on unemployment. Unemployed Committees wrote asking it 
to push for higher Poor Law allowances for the unemployed and 
suggesting an 'all in' conference, which would include the 
Communist Party. These proposals were fiercely resisted, and all 
that emerged was merely a decision by the Parish Council 
Sub-Committee to organise a conference which would demand an 
increase in relief allowances and provision for paying rent by 
government grant. The conference' was originally to include only 
Labour Parish councillors and representatives from divisional 
(27) 
Labour Parties But when it finally met, four representatives 
from the National Unemployed Woekers' Committee were allowed to 
take part. The conference agreed to resist any reduction in living 
standards and came out in favour of a government subsidy to parish 
councils, and for the parish councils to pay the Board of Health 
(28) 
minimum 
27 Labour Party, Scottish Executive Committee, October 1,1923. 
28 Labour Party, Scottish Conference, Executive Report, 1924, 
pp. 11-12. 
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Levitt has shown how popular pressure from the unemployed was 
forcing the Government's hands and forcing also the Labour Party to 
react. The twin issues of housing and unemployment were dominant 
revealing the great poverty in the country. Only 8000 houses were 
planned for building in the next two and a half years. Glasgow, 
which had been 57,000 houses short in 1918, was according to 
Forward, 70,000 short and only' 2,582 houses had been built between 
(29) 1918 and May* 1923 The pressure of these questions forced 
Labour's parliamentarians into action, - and revealed the splits 
within the Scottish Parliamentary group that were to dominate 
Labour's evolution throughout the twenties. The issue selected by 
James Maxton was the Circular 51 on the feeding of children by 
education authorities. According to Maxton the Circular deprived 
10,000 schoolchildren of free school meals, and it was in the 
debate on Scottish estimates that he made his attack on government 
economies in milk supplied under child welfare schemes and in 
hospital accommodation for children: 
I call the persons who s7ent that order murderers and the 
Hon. Gentlemen opposite who went into the division lobby 
in favour of that policy are murderers - cold callous 
murderers, with ttie blood bf infants on their hands. (30) 
Maxton's action was calculated and was followed by the suspension 
of Wheatley, Stephen, and Buchanan, as, well as his. It was the 
signal for a campaign by Forward in the country. While MacDonald 
was opposed to the Clydesiders' behaviour, and the ILP ignored it 
nationally, Maxton and his colleages had support in Scotland. 
Forward, Tom Johnston and Patrick Dollan backed their endeavours. 
29. Forward, *Jun. e 30,1923. 
30 House of- Commons Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 165, 
Col. 2302. 
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The agitation to emphasise the squalor of Scottish conditions was 
conducted through a campaign on child welfare and then on the slums 
and on unemployment. Dollan who considered himself 'the backroom 
boy during the campaign' wrote that 'we kept feeding them with 
questions from Glasgow, I used to draft an average of fifteen or so 
a week on local grievances' 
(31) 
. Dollan summarised the effect of 
the year's work in Parliament in this way: 
The Clyde Brigade hammered away for almost a year on 
topics arising from poverty. They alleged Scotland was 
the worst housed country in Europe. That its infant 
mortality was the worst in any civilised country. They 
alleged shipbuilding and engineering industries had been 
ruined by general indemnities. Wheatley and the others 
made a general case but James Maxton and George Buchanan 
chanted the poverty theme of Bridgeton and Gorbals in 
preference to any other theme. They made Bridgeton and 
Gorbals more notorious than the bowery of New York or 
Whitechapel in London. Correspondents came from America 
and London to study the so called blackspots of British 
civilisation. (32) 
a 
With th e Scottish Council increasingly an organisation for 
resolving disputes, it was left to* the Independent Labour Party to 
prepare much of the organisation for the 1923 election. While the 
Scottish Council claimed that 66 divisional Labour Parties were in 
existence, only 15 affiliated to the 1923 Conference, with only six 
trades and labour councils in addition. There were only seventeen 
affiliated women's sections and four men's sections. None of them 
was in a rural area and most were in areas where the ILP dominated. 
The weakness in organisation was complemented by financial 
impoverishment. Scotland was not only demanding throughout the 
period more representation on the National Executive of the Labour 
Party in Britain but also more help to finance election 
campaigning, although the National Executive would not budge, the 
31 P Dollan, Unpublished Autobiography, p. 56-57. 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
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National Agent, Wake, explaining on several occasions that 
additional funds could not be given. For example in May 1923 he 
was 're-emphasising the impracticability of the National Executive 
(33) 
giving preferential treatment' to Scotland 
The ILP nationally was not much better off financially in 1923 than 
in 1922. By November it was found for Britain as a whole that more 
(34) 
than one-third of its branches were in arrears . In these 
circumstances it was decided to grant election expenses of only E40 
to each selected cand: kdate and to refuse to guarantee financial 
assistance to any additional candidates. This time the E40 ceiling 
(35) 
was also to apply to Scottish candidates When the ILP 
Chairman, Clifford Allen, visited Scotland, his message was that 
'Scotland received a very much bigger grant than any other division 
although the affiliation fees received from Scotland were less than 
those received from at least one other division' . This had, he 
said, led to 'strong criticism' from other areas and as a 
consequence a uniform system for grants that was to apply to the 
whole of Britain had been introduced. Through Patrick Dollan, the 
Scottish ILP attempted to secure a return to the old system, but he 
(36) lost by f ive votes to three But it was agreed the decision 
would apply only from the next ILP conference, and the Scottish ILP 
secured some breathing-space. 
33 Labour Party Scottish Executive Minutes, May 28,1923. 
34 Independent Labour Party, National Administrative Council, 
November 15,16,1923. 
35 Ibid . The ILP nationally also sought to bring the Scottish 
organisation into line over complying with the practice of 
reporting regularly on membership and activity,. Ibid., March 
30,1923. 
36 Ibid., January 7,8,1924. 
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But while the Scottish ILP, were also to secure the extra concession 
of a grant for Central constituency, where a by-election had ýeen 
feared, they failed in their requests for support for a candidate 
in ýPollok and prior to the election they had been unable to secure 
a decision from the ILP nationally on their proposal for grants for 
a propaganda scheme in the Highlands 'with a view to running ILP 
candidates in a number of the constituencies at the next 
(37) 
election' By 1924, as ILP finances became more desperate, 
further restrictions on funding Scottish election e*xpenses were to 
be introduced. 
If the ILP had problems, the miners were in a more parlous state in 
1923. While the miners had been able in 1923 to retain three of 
their four organisers to organise the nine constituencies the 
miners held, they had to reject additional requests for 
(38) 
assistance When Fife miners requested assistance for Kirkaldy 
Burghs constituency in February 1923, they were turned down, 
(39) 
and when the Fife miners requestea an additional political 
organiser, it was decided after some hesitation that the existing 
political organisers must now have a more general remit throughout 
(40) 
industrial Scotland The miners, whose national membership had 
fallen substantially, were now clearly facing organisational 
difficulties, not least from the growth of Communist activity. 
With the combination of these problems Labour fielded only five 
additional candidates in 1923 than in 1922. Even then its 
proportion of candidatures to seats was less (48 to 71) than 
37 Ibid., January 25,1924. 
38 Scottish Mineworkers Union, Executive, January 5,1923. 
39 Ibid, February 5,1923. 
40 Ibid., May 22,1923. 
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in England (360 out of 485) and Wales (27 out of 35). Labour was 
still standing in only just over two thirds of constituencýes 
compared with three quarters in England and more than that in 
Wales. However, Labour fought all the seats it had contested in 
1922, and in addition South Aberdeen, Inverness-shire, Hillhead, 
Partick and West Edinburgh. In Partick the party was to win in its 
first contest. 
In 1923, average Labour election expenditure for forty-three 
candidates was only E428. But again the range in expenses betrayed 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Labour Party 
throughout the country. While Maxton spent only E113 in Bridgeton 
in securing his election, over E800-E821 was spent in Bute and 
North Ayr in the campaign. But again the picture is dominated by 
the miners whose expenses were all over E500. The miners spent 
more than E6000 in supporting their ten candidates at the 
(41) 
election 
41 Labour Party Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1924, pp. 4-6. 
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II THE ANTI-SOCIALIST REASSESSMENT 
For the anti-socialist forces, 1923 was a year for reassessment and 
reorganisation. The Unionists were stunned by their election 
losses in 1922 and spent much of their time analysinj and 
interpreting the new mood in Scotland. Within the Party, a shift 
in strategy took place from a purely propagandist attack on the 
menace of revolutionary socialism to preparing to adopt a 
commitment to social reform. But the process was not to be 
complete until the late nine teen-twenties, and even in 1923 the 
preponderant issue was organising propaganda work against 
socialism. 
One lesson that was not lost on the Conservatives was that despite 
electoral arrangements in 1922 Labour had won a majority of members 
in the West of Scotland 'due to the moderate vote being divided 
between two or three candidates' . Their Secretary's report to the 
Western Divisional Council concluded that in six seats 'there was a 
majority over the socialists of anti-socialist votes but these were 
divided'. The question that exercised the minds of Conservatives 
activists particularly in the West was how far the 1922 Labour 
victories had been a vote for socialist policies. The Secretary to 
the Western Divisional Council attributed 'the main causes of the 
Labour success in Scotland and the West of Scotland' to four 
factors: 
The continued unemployment of great masses of the people 
leading to privation and discontent and to a disposition to 
let Labour have a chance to show what it could do. 
2 The drastic ieduction in the wages of those at work (a: nd the 
suspicion tha-t these are the result of a deliberate policy on 
the part of the employers and are not really necessi-tated by 
economic*conditions). 
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3. The existing housing conditions, overcrowding, the slow 
progress in the building of houses. 
4. The confident expectation raised by the Labour Party among the 
working class tenants that if they voted Labour they would get 
back a sum equivalent to a year's rent of their houses. 
The last of these was probably the deciding factor in many of the 
constituencies, the report concluded, since: 
In these time of hardship ... it was this hope and 
expectation of an immediate pecuniary benefit to 
themselves which prompted many thousands of electors to 
vote Labour and not a sudden and wholesale conversion to 
the abstract doctrines of socialism. (1) 
The House of Lords judgement - and Labour's promise of returning 
rents if elected - was regarded by the Unionists as a major reason 
for their defeat. While the Glasgow Unionist Association 
recognised that 'continued and widspread unemployment in our midst 
and the deplorable housing conditions' were important, they 
concluded that 'these would not in themselves have been sufficient 
to bring about a change had they not been reinforced by the 
judgement of the House of Lords in the Rent Act Appeal case I. This 
decision provided a potent weapon in the hands of the Labour Party 
(2) 
which made fullest use of it 
In fact some Conservatives came to believe that Labour's victory 
amounted to electoral bribery and that: 'the result of the election 
could not be interpreted as meaning that there had been a wholesale 
conversion of the electorate to the socialist creed; the large 
(3) Labour vote was due to týe passing circumstances of the time' 





The Glasgow Unionist Association was undoubtedly clearer than the 
Western Divisional Council as to the way forward. The 
Conservatives 'needed a sound progressive policy as far removed 
from reaction as it is from revolution' , 
(4) 
and Scottish Unionists 
gradually came to be persuaded of the need for measures of social 
reform. The Party Chairman, Hope, himself believed that 'the loss 
of so many -seats bad been due to discontent', but that 'with 
(5) improved trade there would be a reaction' Groups like the 
Women's Committee demanded action and were particulArly concerned 
about the cost of living, especially the high cost of coal, as a 
(6) 
reason for socialist support At the 1923 Conference the 
Unionists considered motions dealing with housing, the state-of the 
economy , smallholdings, profit-sharing and pensions. However in 
1923 it was difficult to get agreement as to what the policy 
direction should be and housing especially showed how far there was 
a division of opinion between moderate and laissez-faire 
Conservatives. While the conference recognised 'the extreme and 
vital importance of the need to meet the growing needs of 'the 
people and so relieve the widespread discomfort and allay the 
discontent arising from the present housing conditions, '. it could 
only agree that 'in any new housing scheme which may be adopted, 
every encouragment and assistance be given to private 
(7) 
enterprise' A motion arguing that 'until greater progress is 
made in housebuilding a continuation of the rent restriction act 
SUA Glasgow Unionist Association, Annual Report, 1924. 
5 SUA Western Divisional Council, January 10,1923. 
6- Ibid. 
7 SUA Annual Conference, January 31,1923. 
0 
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without amendments. As necessary', was defeated. The Scottish 
Unionists could not even accept the proposal of the Glasgow 
Unionists, supported by the Western Divisional Council, that while 
decontrol of rents should be agreed, it should not be earlier than 
(8) 1925 
In fact the Conservative Government almost went further than their 
supporters in Scotland, mainly as a result of the influence of 
Walter Elliot who not only tried to defuse the militancy of the 
Clydesiders in the House of Commons, but also pressed within the 
Government for a better deal in the housing legislation for 
Scotland in Chamberlain's 1923 Housing Bill. While the f lat rate 
subsidy of the bill was to be E6 per house, the Scottish Office 
asked for separate assessments in Scotland. Elliot was to tell the 
House of Commons of his disappointment that Scotland did not 
(9) 
receive special treatment 
While there was progress in accepting the Conservatives' need for a 
policy, little was achieved in 1923. The emphasis in Unionist 
circles remained on propaganda and education. When Glasgow 
Unionists agreed they needed a policy 'far removed from reaction', 
they also stressed in the same breath the need for political 
education against the menace of 'socialism. At the Scottish 
Conference a resolution was passed Irecognising in the recent 
general election in Scotland evidence of the urgent necessity for 
the definite study of political, economic and social problems, 
especially amongst the younger electorate', but the answer was to 
commend the work of the Workers League and the Imperialist Union. 
The Conference also urged their divisional councils to give 
'immediate and careful consideration' to a 
8 SUAWestern Divisional Council, March 7,1923. 
9 Parliamentary Debates, April 24,1923. 
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'continuous effort towards informing the public regarding politics, 
economics, and constitutional history'(10). In addition to, the 
positive political education in conservative principles, anattack 
on organisations like socialist Sunday schools was demanded 'in 




When the Western Divisional Council invited a discussion on 'the 
best methods for the future combatinp- of socialism' a. number of 
propaganda suggestions were made. Conservative MPs were divided 
particularly over whether to hold party meetings or whether to work 
indirectly through other bodies. The People's League seemed a 
possible vehicle to some but in fact it went out of existence in 
(12) 
1923 The combating of socialist propaganda. in schools was 
demanded by others. The Women's Committee -attributed the generAl 
election defeat to socialist Sunday schools and socialist teaching 
in the schools. McLaren, one of the Glasgow MPS, wanted 'something 
(13) done to put an end to this practice However it was reported 
to a later meeting of the Women's Committee that in fact no 
concrete case could be found of socialist propaganda work in the 
scbools. 
In fact Unionist propaganda work in 1923 saw an escalation of their 
previous tactics, full-time speakers, economic classes and the use 
of open air meetings and pamphlets. The Junior Imperialists were 
used as the youth wing of the movement, organising a summer tour of 
350 meetings mainly round holiday resorts. A new leaflet 'Will 
Socialism Work', was produced for the West of Scotland 
(14). It was 
10 SUA Scottish Conference; January 31,1923. 
11 Ibid. 
12 SUA Western Divisional Council, January 10,1923. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., May 2,1923. 
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ag reed that at women's meetings political speeches would now be 
given and indeed the Western Divisional Council's women's commiýtee 
was particularly active in tightening up their organisation, 
demanding reports from constituencies 'giving a general idea of the 
work that is being done in the constituencies by Unionist men and 
women 1(15) . Members of Parliament were pressed to be more active 
in constituency work, 
(16) 
and the Conservatives also tried to 
centralise their organisation more tightly. Other organisations 
who were being financed through the Council were examined more 
closely to avoid 'unnecessary overlapping', and one victim was the 
(17) 
proposal to restart the Primrose League in Scotland 
One further conclusion that the party seemed to take from the 
election was the need to maintain as far as possible electoral 
arrangements. The Glasgow Unionist Association decided to urge 
upon 'all citizens of moderate and constitutional opinion the vital 
importance of active and combined effort to repel the forces of 
socialism'. During the Western Divisional Council's discussion of 
the matter, McLaren argued for 'fusion' between National Liberal 
and* Conservatives 'as there was so little difference in policy' 
between them. McLeod felt it at least as 'important that all 
moderate parties should work together'. 
Fusion was of course outside the power of the MPs and the Unionist 
Party in Scotland. But there was strong opposition to an early 
15 Ibid., Women's Sub Committee, June 6,1923. 
16 Ibid., May 2,1923. 
17 SUA Central Council, May 23, September 5,1923. This was 
'inexpedient, being of the opinion that the Unionist Party can 
best be served by the concentration of Unionist activity in 
the. hands of one united association as at present'. Central 
Council, 23 May. 
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election. While the Western Divisional Council welcomed Baldwin's 
decision for timely and adequate measures being taken to safeguard 
our industries, Scottish Unionists were unanimous in opposing an 
(18) 
election On 9 November the Central. Council Executive met to 
discuss 'the propriety of an, early general election' and resolved 
that: 
A general election before summer would be most 
detrimental to the party interests in Scotland where time 
must be given for preparation and education of fhe 
electorate and when the business community in their 
opinion is strongly against the disturbance of an early 
election. (19) 
Liberal efforts in the aftermath of 1922 were directed less at new 
policy-making than at the resolution of their own deep divisions, 
but Liberal reunion was to be a slow and painful process, 
complicated by the existence of three groups of Liberals - not 
simply those who supported Lloyd George and Asquith but also those 
w1io refused to side with one or other-. Asquith, it was alleged, 
wanted complete surrender, not reunion as an amalgamation of equal 
(20) 
partners But when Lloyd George came to Edinburgh in February 
1923, he urged the end to recriminations and unity against 'the 
(21) 
common enemy' But by the autumn of 1923 little had been 
achieved at a national level to reunite the party's disparate 
wings. Indeed in Scotland in July 1923, the Scottish Liberals' 
Secretary, Webster had reported to the Eastern Organising Committee 
of the Liberal Party: 
18 SUA Western Divisional Council, November 7,1923. 
19 SUA Central Council, Executive, November 9,1923. 
20 M Kinnear, The Fall R_f LjU! L.. 2E2y 
_Le, 
op. cit., p. 208. Kinnear 
suggested that Hogge, the Edinburgh MP who was. joint Liberal 
Whip and who favoured reunion was sacked to be replaced by the 
pro-Asquith Vivien Phillips, Ibid., p. 212-3. 
21 C Cook, Age of Ajý3 mn -cit., P-91. op 
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National Liberals were evidently making an attempt to 
improve their organisation in various constituencies and 
had been, through their officials, offering their 
services to certain of the associations that still 
remained affiliated to us and in other cases trying to 
set-up National Liberal organisations where-they had none 
and these movements were evidently causing irritations in 
the constituencies and instead of helping to create an 
atmosphere foK reunion were doing the very reverse. (22) 
But Webster was able to add that in no known case had the movement 
to recruit existing Liberal Associations to the National Liberals 
been successful. In practice the Scottish Liberals took a moderate 
line with recalcitrant constituency associations as they attempted 
to woo them back into the fold. In Kirkcaldy and Dunfermline where 
the local Liberal Associations had been pro-Coalition, no action 
was taken despite their preparedness as Liberals to cooperate with 
the Unionists. The reason that was accepted by the Scottish 
Liberal Federation was that 'independent Liberals within these 
(23) 
associations had made no breakaway themselves' In two 
Highland constituencies, Ross and 'Cromar"ty, and Moray and Nairn, 
the same caution applied, although Liberal candidates had worked in 
cooperation with the Conservatives iý defiance of the new rules and 
new Liberal associations had been created 
(24) This caution seemed 
justified because in seven constituencies Partick, Montrose, 
Dundee, Roxburgh and Selkirk, Aberdeen, Moray and Nairn, and 
Western Isles - local Liberals managed to 'adjust their 
(25) 
differencest just before the general election of 1923 In 
Ross-shire, Inverness and Argyll, where differences remained beyond 
22 SLF Eastern Organising Committee, July 13,1923. 
23 -Ibid. 
24 Ibid 
25 SLA Report by Webster, December 19,1923. 
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December 1923, the Executive were to postpone immediate action in 
the hope that agreement might still be reached locally, alth. ough 
the only associations affiliated to the Federation did not 
recognise the Liberal members of Parliament. Dumbarton Burghs 
Association was however out on a limb, although it applied for 
re-affiliation, because it had jointly selected a candidate with 
(26) 
the Unionists 
With caution the guiding principle of the Scottish Liberal 
Federation and its committees, much was left for local resolution. 
In Ross and Cromarty, for example, it was impossible for Liberals 
and National Liberals to reach agreements despite long discussions. 
While the Liberal Whip, McKenzie Wood, recommended Liberal support 
for the incumbent National Liberal MP, McPherson, (and indeed the 
one branch - Cromarty - that had led the breakaway, and McPherson's 
opponent of 1922 were in favour of reunion), the Easter Ross 
Liberals wanted to place their own candidate in the field. It led 
the Unibnists., who had wanted to support a Liberal candidate, to 
change their mind about withdrawal. But in the event there was no 
* (27) 
op. ponent prepared to make the challenge In Western Isles, 
similar difficulties were encountered as both Ramsay, the National 
Liberal, and McKenzie Livingston, the Liberal, sought nomination. 
While týe United Liberal Election Committee in Western Isles 
selected McKenzie Livingston as a candidate, it required Head 
Office intervention to achieve a mediation between the two sides. 
When a further Independent Liberal announced his intention of 
entering the contest, it was agreed after a joint conference of the 
(28) 
two Liberal wings that headquarters would select the candidate 
In Argyllshire, the real complaint of the Liberals was that Sii 
William Sutherland who had been a National Liberal Member had been 
adopted witbout consultation with them. Thus they disputed his 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ghýsgow Herald, November 21,1923. 
28 Ibid., November 22,23,1923. 
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adoption and gave him no active support 
(29) 
. But in Moray and 
Nairn it was possiblp for the Liberals to resolve their disputes 
without alternative candidates. Liberals in Moray and Nairn were 
unhappy with the National Liberal MP Guthrie's support for the 
Safeguarding of Industries Bill. But the Executive (by 29 votes to 
12) and the association (by 86 votes to 13) agreed to confirm his 
(30) 
adoption 
29 Ibid., November, 22,1923 
30 Ibid., November 23,28, '1923. 
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III THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Labour was pleased at the early dissolution of the 1922 Parliament. 
As Dollan recalls the Scottish ILP 'were delighted and believed 
they would return to Westminster in increased numbers'"). With 
Labour already the largest party in seats, there was little 
Conservative enthusiasm for a new contest. But, 'as Cowling 
suggests, Baldwin was anxious to use protection as the issue that 
would separate the Coalition Conservatives from the Free Trade 
(2) 
Liberals It would, Baldwin calculated, unite the Conservatives 
again. His Scottish Secretary, Viscount Novar, who was consulted 
only rarely, complained about the decision and argued for a 
referendum, warnipg that the election might result 'in handing over 
(3) 
the fortunes of the country to the socialist party' 
Younger advised Baldwin that the prevailing feeling in Scotland was 0 
against an immediate election(4) and the Scotsman reflected 
right-wing opinion when it argued for 'a 'Couýsel of delay': 
the demand for an early election creates a situation akin 
to that which developed out of the coalition over one 
year ago when Unionist feeling in Scotland was sharply 
divorced from Unionist opinion in the South. Among 
Unionist opinion in Scotland there is a strong- 
preponderance of opinion t6t an immediate dissolution - 
whoever was responsible for the idea - is not only 
inopportune but dangerous. That does not imply any 
hesitation in accepting the large policy of imperial 
trade development ... but unless the issue is made 
perfectly clear, it will be impossible to disentangle the 
true from the false, and while Unionists and Liberals are 
cutting each other's throats, under the impression that 
their difference is a matter of vital principle instead 
1P Dollan, op. cit., p. 25. 
2 For a fuller discussion see M Cowling, op. cit., pp. 275-330. 
3 Novar to Baldwin, November 8,1923. cited in C Cook, Age of 
AjLjýyneRtý. p. 116. 
4 Younger to Baldwin, November 7,1923 in C Cook, op. cit., 
p. 120. 
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of merely a question of expediency, the socialist party 
will escape the criticism ... and may attain a semblance of 
strength and authority which will seriously affect the 
stability of the position in the next Parliament. (5) 
Throughout the year in fact Younger had urged that whatever 
happened in England, Scottish Unionists should seek electoral 
arrangements with the Liberals and National Liberals. Writing in 
June 1923 to the Scotsman editor privately to explain his 
position, Younger said: 
If the parties in the North have any sense they will make 
a mutual arrangement with regard to seats at the next 
election. Wherever there has been a seat with a distinct 
Liberal tradition it should unhesitatingly be given a 
moderate Liberal who should be supported by our people, 
and in return wherever we have a hold, although it may be 
a smaller one, they ought to support our man. In no 
other way can Labour in many constituencies be defeated 
and so far as I am concerned I should gladly do anything 
to facilitate such an arrangement. (6) 
The Scotsman editor argued that: 
The Diehards have already made it very hard for us in 
Scotland. If their influence prevails in the future as 
it has in the past Unionism in Scotland will be 
ruined. (7) 
5 Scotsman, November 12,1923. 
6 Editor of Scotsman to Gilmour, June 4,1923. Gilmour Papers. 
Ibid., GD/383/18, May 29,1923. 
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Later he was to add: 
Scotland stands in very unpleasant relation to the 
Government. I have a note from Younger in which he 
admits the Scottish situation is very bad. (8) 
Younger was to be asked whether he had 'any practical proposals' 
for a pact. 
On 9 November, prior to the declaration of the election, the 
Central Council Executive had concluded that 'a general election 
before summer would be most detrimental to the party interest in 
Scotland'(9). and Horne, understandably, was 'much perturbed' by 6) 
Baldwin's 'ill-considered and hastily improvised action'" In 
Scotland, backbench opinion was also opposed. In these 
circumstances Younger's advice to Baldwin was clear. He had 
opposed an election and he wanted arrangements in Scotland with the 
Liberals. Writing to Baldwin in November he stated: 
I have been urging some arrangement with the Liberals 
towards three-cornered contests and I have gone so far as 
to discuss this with both Pringle and Hogge. Now 
however, that Asquith... is going to make the fiscal 
policy a party question I suppose all chance of any 
agreement has gone. (11) 
Younger was later to say as much in public. He had never been so 
uncertain about the outcome of any election, and he urged that: "the 
fight be made on not about protection or free trade but about 
socialism. He felt that Conservatives could win on the issue of 
the capital levy which ought to be played for all its worth by 
Conservative candidates'. 
8 Ibid., June-4,1923. 
9 SUA Central Council, Executive, November 9,1923. 
10 Macallum Scott Diary, November 13,1923, Cited in C Cook, 
op. cit., p. 122. 
Younger to Baldwin, November 7, Baldwin Papers, Cited in C 
Cook, Age of AlLgi 
. 
1ment, op. cit., p. 131. 
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What were the chances then of cooperation between Liberals and 
Unionists in 1923? The discussions in the Glasgow Cenýral 
constituency, where a by-election was expected prior to the 
announcement of the General Election, demonstrated the 
possibilities, but also problems, of cooperation. With agreement 
between the Liberals and National Liberals relatively 
(12) 
straightforward, Churchill was seen as a natural candidate 
But when he and later Sir Thomas Paxton declined, the qLýsg. (ýK 
Herald pressed for the selection of a free trade Unionist with 
Liberal support as the sole anti-socialist candidate. There was, 
said the Herald: 'a perceptible feeling in favour of some 
compromise being reached with the Unionists. In some quarters it 
was thought that if both Unionist and Liberal candidates entered 
the field there was nothing to prvent a Labour victory ... the 
Liberal view was that if the Unionists adopted a free trader they 
would stand aside'( 
13) 
The Scotsman was of the same view and 
indeed two free trade Unionist candidates were considered. But 
when the general election was declared over the issue of free trade 
and protection, cooperation became more difficult and eventually 
two candidates, one Liberal and one Unionist, stood in the contest. 
In Glasgow therefore, as the election campaign began, it seemed 
that despite a desire for cooperation, the competition over free 
trade and protection would make it impossible to achieve. But the 
Unionists made further attempts to secure agreements. As the 
Chairman of the Glasgow Unionist Association was to record, 'it had 
(14) 
been found impossible to get the Liberals to come to terms' 
12 (ýýzvspw Herald, November . 5,1923. 
13 Ibid., November, 13,15,1923. 
14 Glasgow Unionist Association, December 24,. 1923. 
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In fact, several constituencies did have only one anti-socialist 
candidate, and in others there were discussions to achieve that. 
In Govan and Shettleston, the Unionists stood down to leave a clear 
field to the Liberals. In Camlachie Unionists had a clear run. In 
Partick a free trade Unionist was chosen by the Conservatives, thus 
appeasing the Liberal Party on the question of protection. But in 
Springburn the Unionists had been prepared to stand. down and in 
Tradeston an unofficial delegation from the Liberals had approached 
the Unionists for an agreement that did not eventually trAnspire. 
What had been under discussion was a pact whereby the Liberals 
stood down in Gorbals in return for the Unionists standing down in 
Tradeston. Thus, when talks broke down, the Unionists adopted 
(15) 
their candidate in Gorbals But Glasgow found, as did other 
parts of Scotland, that the Liberals nationally wanted to encourage 
candidates even at the last minute. McKenzie Wood, the Liberal 
Whip, intervened in Central, Kelvingrove, Shettleston, and Govan 




In the circumstances of the election it was perhaps remarkable that 
any ýbasis for cooperation existed. But throughout Scotland it was 
possible to secure Unionist or Liberal withdrawals in a united 
front against Labour. - The Unionists showed themselves ready to 
15 Glasgow Unionist Association, Annual 'Report, January 1923. As 
the report stated for Shettleston, 'The Liberals had Mr 
Robertson prepared to fight and we agreed to support him 
rather than split the vote'. In Govan it was to 'the 
members' regret' they had been unable to field a candidate. 
16 LlasgLow Herald, November 19,1923. 
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withdraw in most cases. In the Highland and North seats, they were 
reluctant to pursue candidatures and four seats in Caithness, Ross 
and Comarty, Banff, and Inverness went uncontested at all. But it 
was in the constituencies where Labour posed a threat that most 
interest was taken. In Greenock, the Unionists supported the 
Liberal candidate Sir Geoffrey Collins, on the grounds that 
'communism would be ruinous'. and the socialists should be 
def I eated 
(17) 
. In Falkirk and Stirling Burghs, a sub-committee of 
the Unionists met the Liberals and agreed that they should both 
(18) 
support the formei MP, Sir George MacCrae In Hamilton, the 
Unionists stood down, believing that their action would encourage 
(19) 
the Liberals to reciprocate in neighbouring constituencies In 
the two member constituency of Dundee, Unionists at first rejected 
the advice of their President that there be only one Unionist 
candidate and by a majority agreed to place two Unionists in the- 
f ield 
(20) 
But the second Unionist candidate, Lady Baxter, a 
prominent member of the Unionists' Eastern Divisional Council, 
wrote to the President withdrawing, on the grounds that after 
'repeated consultations' it seemed advisable to field only one 
(21) 
Unionist Candidate 
Thus in the constituencies there appeared to be a willingness to 
consider pacts and arrangements, if proper terms could be agreed, 
In Glasgow, possible arrangements in at least five constituencies 
had been discussed. The Scotsman itself speculated early on in the 
campaign that arrangements might also be possible in Aberdeen, 
Perth, Ayr, Roxburgh, Galloway, Montrose, and in the two 
Stirlingshire constituencies(22) 
. In fact, there was 
17 Ibid., December 4,1923. 
18 Ibid., November 21,1923. 
19 Ibid., November 21,1923. 
20 Ibid., November 20,1923. 
21 Ibid., November 23,1923. 
22 Scotsman, November 14,1923. 
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considerable talk of an agreement in Stirlingshire whereby 
Unionists would stand down in the East constituency while Liberals 
stood down in the West. But the possibility of an agreement was 
ruined by the determination of the Bridge of Allan Liberal 
association to contest the West constituency. Equally, while the 
Unionists expected that their decision to withdraw in Hamilton 
might encourage agreements throughout Lanarkshire, they were to be 
(23) 
Unionist disappointed In the North Lanark constituency the 
Executive attempted to reach an understanding with the Liberals 
whereby in North Lanark Liberals would stand down while in another 
seat the Unionists would withdraw. But again t he possibility of a 
pact was undermined by the Liberals' decision in North Lanark to 
approach the Unionists with a view to securing Unionist withdrawal 
(24) 
in favour of a Liberal candidate they had already selected 
In contrast, while the Liberals accepted the Unionist support given 
them in straight fights with Labour, the Liberals were less keen to 
stand down in favour of Unionists. In Dumbarton Burghs however the 
Liberal Association agreed to joint meetings with the Unionists to 
consider candidates and a joint selection conference resolved to 
(25) - field a Unionist in preference to the Liberal Although the 
vote was 36 to 22, the Liberals gave the Unionist loyal 
(26) 
support As the Liberals' Scottish Secretary was to report 
later, 'The association actually joined on equal terms with the 
(27) Tory association to adopt a Tory candidate' 
23 Glasgow Herald, November 16,1923 
24 Ibid., November 21,23,1923. 
25 
. 
RlaaýKl HeraLý, November 20,1923. 
26 Ibid., November 23,1923. 
27 Scottish Liberal Federation, Report by Webster, December 19, 
1923. 
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What appears however to have killed chances of a wider pact was the 
determination 
. of 
Scottish Liberal headquarters to achieve a 
presence in as many constituencies as possible. Prior to the 
dissolution, there were only four Liberal candidates in addition to 
the sitting Liberal members, making thirty two candidatures in all., 
Within eight days another twenty eight candidates were placed in 
(28) 
the field, most by central office As the party's election 
report made clear, 22 were placed through the Edinburgh or Glasgow 
offices. The Liberal conclusion was that had there been more 
candidates available, five or six more constituencies could have 
been contested, but the party recognised that 'in most cases, they 
(29) 
were undertaking difficult and almost hopeless fights' 
There were in the end twenty-seven seats where no Liberal or 
Conservative stood together against Labour (including Dundee's two 
seats). In eleven it was a Conservative who stood - and in sixteen 
a Liberal. There was an equal number of constituencies where three 
cornered contests ensued between Conservative, Liberal and Labour. 
In not all of these were discussions held between the right-wing 
parties about one or other of their candidates standing down, but 
the evidence suggests that in at least another twenty three, 
regarded as being threatened by Labour, some form of discussion 
took place. 
It seems clear that even where arrangements were not reached the 
Unionists in Scotland did not push their support of protection as a 
major issue in the campaign. Even the Unionist Free Tr. ade Club of 
Glasgow and West of Scotland decided that while it adhered to its 
belief in free trade as the basis of the country's prosperity it 
recommended its members in view -of the danger of splitting the 
moderate vote, to support other candidates where they had no 
28 Ibid., December 19,1923. 
29 Ibid. 
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opportunity of voting for a Unionist Free Trader. In fact it seems 
that the Unionists adopted a variety of views as candidates on-the 
issue of protection, most of them nebulous. Some claimed they 
wanted 'a free hand', others an 'open mind'; others were 
'temporarily protectionist', and others 'free trade 
retaliators' 
(30) 
For Gilmour, 'strict adherence either to tariff 
reform or free trade as we have known them in the past was 




Protection was less the issue in Scotland than socialism. The 
Liberal candidate in Shettleston who was supported by the Unionists 
said, 'the issue in Shettleston is socialism. The tariff question 
(32) 
does not arise' In St Rollox, the Liberal candidate said: 
'many Liberals in St Rollox ... had told her they would rather vote 
for protection than socialism ... she was making it 
her business to 
(33) 
stand as a moderate candidate against socialism' In Hamilton, 
the Unionist candidate said that: 
There was a marked distinction between the question at 
issue at the present time - tariff reform - and another 
broader question that of socialism ... they were up against 
a form of socialism that would disintegrate society, 
abolish the sanctity of family life and create corruption 
and despair. (34) 
In some cases the issue between Liberal and Conservative was simply 
who was the best anti-socialist candidate. 
30 Glasgow Herald., November 22,1923. 
31 Election Address, 1923, Gilmour Papers GD/383/15- 
32 Glasgow Herald, December 4,1923. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid . 
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Cook has suggested: 
The election of 1923 rather than split of 1916, the 
coupon election or any earlier date, was perhaps the 
crucial moment when the Liberal decline became its 
downfall ... when the election came in 1923, the Liberals 
were still thought of as a potential party of government 
but not really so in 1924 and certainly not in 1929. 
Conceivably if the Liberals had become the second largest 
party in 1923 their subsequent history' would have been 
very different. (35) 
Yet on the face of it the election results of 1923 confirmed the 
Liberal hopes for a recovery. The results appeared to show that a 
three. party system in Scotland was a real possibility. Indeed the 
Liberals not only won their highest proportion of votes in the 
inter-war years (29.7%) but in the seats contested, their average 
vote - 9125 - was marginally higher than that'of the Conservatives. 
However a close examination of the picture casts doubts both on the 
significance of the recovery and the reality of a three party 
system.. In four of their seats, (Caithness, Ross and Cromarty, 
Banff, and Inverness) the Liberals were returned unopposed. And in 
only three seats did the Liberals win in a týree cornered contest, 
two of these wins being in unusual circumstances. While in 
Edinburgh West the Liberals did well to come top of the poll in a 
three cornered contest, in which Labour came third, Asquith's 
victory in Paisley was only achieved because of a damaging split in 
the Labour vote (with a Labour and Independent Labour candidate) 
and in Western Isles, the left-wing opponent was not an officially 
endorsed Labour candidate. All the remaining Liberal seats in 
industrial or semi-industrial areas - Leith, Greenock, Montrose - 
were won because of Conservative withdrawals, but even that could 
not retain Kirkcaldy which reverted to Labour in a two party 
contest. In the rural areas on the other hand, the party retained 
35 C Cook, op. cit., p. 341. 
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its seats because there was no Labour intervention. In 1924, yhen 
Labour intervened for the first time, almost all of the Liberal 
Party's North East, Eastern and Borders seats were to fall to the 
Conservatives. In three party contests, the party was in fact 
unable to hold Kilmarnock, even with the new candidature of Sir 
Donald Maclean, or Roxburgh and Selkirk. 
Interestingly, of the ten seats Labour won on . minority votes 
in 
three party contests involving Labour; Liberal and Conservative, it 
was the Conservative Party - not the Liberal Party - which was the 
runner up, with the exception only of the Kilmarnock constituency. 
To the Scotsman the election demonstrated the futility, rather than 
vitality of a three party system, as they argued 'the folly of 
recklessly splitting the anti-socialist vote'. 
TABLE 5.1 
Election Results in Scotland/Great Britain 1923 



















Source: FW Craig, British Parliamentaýý Election Results, 
as cited above. 
While the Scotsman adaed there had been a desire on the part of 
important representatives of the Unionist and Liberal Parties to 
avoid these, 'suicidal contests', unfortunately local difficulties 
(36) 
generally intervened 
36 Scotsman, December 8,1923.299 
The Unionists did badly. Their average vote was lower than at any 
election of the twenties and they won only 9010 votes on aver. age, 
contrasted with Labour's 11,090. But while the Liberals had won 
only three three-cornered contests the Unionists had won eight. It 
led the Scotsman to argue that 'Unionism in Scotland had held its 
(37) 
own but Liberalism had lost heavily to socialism' In fact the 
party did retain almost all its middle class constituencies, in 
Glasgow, Aberdeen, Ayrshire and Edinburgh although the Liberals won 
Edinburgh North. Success in Motherwell was the result of Communist 
intervention and could not be considered lasting. But four rural 
seats had completed their passage from Liberals to Conservatives, 
(Moray and Nairn, Roxburgh, Aberdeenshire West, and Kinross and 
West Perthshire). It was to be the shape of things to come. 
The 1923 election is seen by Cook as demonstrating 'an advance by 
Labour into the remaining Liberal strongholds in the Industrial 
areas'. In fact while in Britain Labour made forty-one gains in 
industrial c6nstituencies, only four of these were secured in 
Scotland. It demonstrated how much the Liberal vote had been 
(38) 
eroded in earlier contests But the Labour advance was 
daunting - winning not only eighteen three-cornered contests with 
Unionists and Liberals, but also sixteen in straight fights with 
either Unionist or Liberals. The Scotsman was in no doubt as to 
the main trend of the election: 
The advance of socialism in our midst is the most 
unpleasant feature of the situation. Formerly its 
strength lay mainly in Glasgow and the Clyde and the 
industrial parts of Lanarkshire but it has now spread its 
tentacle considerably in Eastern Scotland particularly in 
the mining areas bordering on the farms. (39) 
1 
37 Ibid 
38 C Cook and J Taylor, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 
39 Scotsman, December 8,1923. 
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Indeed the results belied potential Labour gains in other seats 
which as the Labour executive concluded were not won 'through 
unfortunate local circumstaýces'. In Greenock, Paisley, Motherwell 
and Kelvingrove the party considered that the Labour divisions 
which had produced Communist interventions had prevented 
(40) 
victory The party also believed that Falkirk and Stirling had 
been lost because of 'the old ruse of too successful an endeavour 
1(41) to emphasise differences of religion 
The Labour Party won twelve seats it would lose mainly as a r. esult 
of straight fights in 1924 (but recover again in 1929) but although 
the party won only one additional seat, Kirkcaldy, that it would 
not lose again in the twenties, the most important fact of the 
election results was that the party's hold on the twenty seats it 
had won either in 191 8 or 1922 was confirmed. These would not fall 
from the party's grasp throughout the twenties. Despite fighting 
only two-thirds of the Scottish constituencies, Labour's share of 
the vote was higher than that in Britain and its vote in the 
industrial areas was impressive. in twenty-seven of its thirty 
four wins, Labour had a majority of the votes cast. If the 
Liberals had come close to being the alternative to Labour in 
England, Labour had almost won an outright majority in Scotland. 




THE 1924 ELECTION 
I LABOUR ORGANISATION 
Few were in any doubt about the importance as well as the 
inevitability of a general election in 1924. Sir Robert Horne 
called it 'the most crucial election that has taken place within 
living memory'(1) It was 'not an ordinary political contest' said 
(2) 
Sir John Gilmour Labour had in fact only governed for nine 
months when it was brought down by the combined vote of Liberals 
and Conservatives. On the surface defeat came over the handling of 
the Campbell Case - the dropping of prosecution proceedings against 
the Communist editor of the Workers' Weekky- but an election had 
------------- 
been seen as inevitable for some time before. 
Ramsay MacDonald had resisted a number of options open to him as 
the first Labour Prime Minister. Liberals had expected MacDonald 
to request a form of pact or agreement on a parliamentary 
programme. That had not happened. Others like Maxton had hoped 
Labour would reject office outright and that there would be a 
Liberal-Conservative pact: 
The proper thing to do was for the statesmen to form a 
Liberal-Tory coalition. Let them call themselves the 
Centre or Moderate Party ... and prove that private 
enterprise was the right method of managing the 
industrial and commercial affairs of the country. Let 
them take one or two years to demonstrate thatfact. 
.1 Glasgow Herald, 16 October, 1924. 
2 ýrald, 23 October 1924. 
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Even Dollan was to argue that taking office was 'the biggest 
j(3) mistake of MacDonald's career Other sections of the left. had 
expected a Labour Government to set up a series of commissions to 
report quickly while the party dealt with the question of 
short-term distress amongst the unemployed. But MacDonald 
consulted none of the Scottish left in secluding himself in 
(4) Lossiemouth to make his decision to govern 
The Labour Government of 1924 was hardly a success by anyone's 
standards. The policy and achievement of the government might be 
divided into three areas -where the party had policies and there 
was limited success; where the party's policies were deficient and 
little was done except to muddle through; and where the party had 
ýolicies but for one reason or another no action was taken. 
Scottish Labour was pleased by the immediate recognition of Russia 
and the opening of negotiations for a trade treaty, and by the 
renegotiation of reparations from Germany under the Dawes plan. 
Equally internationalism flourished with the first steps towards 
the Geneva Protocol. In part, of course, the government benefited 
from an improved atmosphere internationally but MacDonald was 
following through lines of policy supported by the Labour Party 
since 1918. Where disagreement arose. was on how far MacDonald 
should go, for example, on a sanctions clause in the Geneva 
Protocol, the scaling down of reparations to cover only devastated 
(5) territories, and moves towards disarmament 
3P Dollan, ILnpublished Lu obio ra , p. 
25. 2ýobi(? A 
._ _ghy 
4 Macdonald's role is traced more fully in D Marquand, Ea _EaZ 
!n 
Maddonald (London, 1978). 
5 Labour Party (Scottish Council), Conference Report, 1924, 
p. 26. 
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In housing policy, Wheatley was acting on lines laid down by the 
ILP and indeed by the Scottish Council of the Labour Parýy, 
firstly, to encourage local authorities to build houses, and, 
(6) 
secondly, to build houses exclusively for rent To a lesser 
extent Wheatley achieved Labour's aim to halt evictions (but not 
without several outbursts from Scottish Labour members over rent 
strikes in Clydebank), and wben the Government felý, his second 
bill on rent controls was about to be introduced. In other areas 
of social policy welcome, if moderate progress was made. ' The gap 
between covenanted and insured benefits was abolished; the testing 
of applicants for uncovenanted benefits abolished; and the 
benefits for insured persons raised. But no new machinery of 
national -measures to help the unemployed was created, despite the 
demands made early in 1924 at the party's Scottish Conference. 
Conference urged then 'that the Government must deal with 
unemployment as a national charge and concern, by either providing 
work at recognised standard rates of wages or providing for the 
(7) 
adequate maintenance of the unemployed' Although a motion 
laying down specific sums for 'adequate maintenance' was defeated, 
Conference went on to urge that in the meantime parish councils 
should be provided with Government grants to cover the rents of the 
(8) 
unemployed 
In other areas Labour was to prove a disappointment to its own 
supporters. On Imperial questions, little progress was made. 'The 
Labour Party were proud and jealous of, and were prepared to 
maintain, the Empire', said JH Thomas. Despite the growing 
scepticism of free trade, little was said or done. But on economic 
questions as a whole - the Budget strategy and the relief of 
unemployment - Labour's measures were completely inadequate. 
6A fuller study is. included in R Middlemass, The ClydesiderS, 
(London, 1965), and R Lyman, The First Labour Government, 
(London, 1952). As Dollan later wrote, the 1924 Act was 'the 
death sentence passed an the Scottish but-and-ben house', 
(Dollan, Unpublished Autobiography, p. 26). 
7 Scottish Conference Report, p. 39. 
8 Ibid. $ p. 39. 
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At the outset the Labour Party in Scotland were vigorous in their 
defence of the Government, despite, as Dollan recalls, the Clyde 
Brigade's anger after failing in their desire that 'Tom Johnston 
and James Maxton at least should have been included in the Cabinet 
or in the Government'(9). Ramsay MacDonald had been unable to 
attend a mass demonstration planned to coincide with his taking 
of f ice. But Wilýiam Shaw, Chairman of the party, said: 'the 
accession to office of Ramsay MacDonald' and the firs. t Labour 
Government-was welcomed by the entire Labour Movement ... the leader 
is a man who in the past has had the courage of his 
(10) 
convictions' The March Conference of the Scottish Council 
pledged itself 'in every possible way to ensure the success of the 
present and the first Labour Government', 
"') 
and an extensive 
national campaign of support was organised with meetings throughout 
the summer in Dundee, Kilmarnock, Hawick, Aberdeen, Montrose, 
Inverness, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Stirling, Hamilton, Galashiels, 
Peebles, and Dumfries - in other words in rural as well as urban 
(12) 
centres . At the Scottish Conference Agnes Dollan could say the 
decision to take office had been 'justified by the government 
13) 
record of the first few months'( 
9P Dollan, Unpublished Autobiography, p. 26. it is not clear 
why Maxton was excluded. Dollan suggests Maxton was offered a 
parliamentary undersecretaryship but 'he declined on the 
advice of Wheatley who wanted him in the Cabinet'. Dollan 
suggests MacDonald was sensitive to 'the fear of the Anglo 
Saxons against too many Scots in the Cabinet'. 
10 Scottish Conference Report, p. 26. 
11 Scottish Conference Report, 1924, p. 30. 
12 Scottish Executive Report, 1925, p. 15. 
13 Scottish Conference Report, 1924, p. 28. 
305 
From Paisley John Gormley congratulated the party and government, 
arguing that 'the Labour Government was a credit to the working 
class and had achieved more in a few weeks than preceding 
(14) 
Governments had done in as many years' 
Even those who -had opposed taking power were anxious to show their 
support and backing for MacDonald against the anti-socialist press. 
For the first few months Maxton gave the Government support. He 
was impressed by MacDonald's responsibility, he said, and the 
Cabinet man for man was twice as good as any previous one. 
MacDonald and the Cabinet could rely that the Clydesiders would not 
(15) 
cause a split But from the outset Maxton also defended his 
right to criticise, and before Easter he was stating clearly what 
he considered to be the role of the Scottish and British Labour 
lef t: 
The Labour Government would have nothing but the most 
loyal and faithful support from the Clyde so long as the 
Labour Movement remained true to the great principles of 
the Labour and Socialist Movement. They would not harass 
the Government about the slowness of going forward, so 
long as they were going forward, but if for one moment 
the Labour Movement turned its back upon the great 
principles or the millions of men who toiled to put them 
there, he hoped the men from the Clyde would rise up and 
protest and demand that no consideration of expediency or 
office or personal vanities or dignities would be allowed 
to divert the great Labour Movement from the path it had 
been designed to tread. (16) 
Maxton criticised the appointment of MacMillan as Scotland's 
Solicitor General,, as well as the appointment of the Tory Lord 
Chelmsford to the Admiralty, results, as he saw it, of pressure from 
the Lords and the Faculty of Advocates. 
14' Scottish Conference Report, 1924, p. 31. I 
15 Maxton's comments appeared in the Glasgow Herald, Forward and 
the. Glasgow Eastern Standard. He was later to write a regular 
column in New Leader. 
16 Ibid . 
6 
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While Smillie chaired and Maxton was a member of the new 
Parliamentary Labour Party Liaison Committee of three Ministers. and 
twelve MPs to resolve differences, the Scottish left under Maxton 
were responsible for Government embarrassments in House of Commons 
votes. On three occasions tqithin the first three months, he voted 
against the Government over credits to Sudan, the Army estimates, 
and the trade facilities Bill, but as Maxton claimed he had only 
dissented 'when they (the Labour Government) had the enthusiastic 
support of Hon Members opposite and below the Gangway', and indeed 
he accepted the omission of the capital levy and other socialist 
measures from Snowden's first budget. However from Easter he 
complained about the slowness of the Government's progress. He 
wanted reforms 'at the earliest possible moment' he said in April. 
In July he demanded 'radical improvements', claiming 'the 
government were only being given time to deliver the goods'. 
A major Scottish question was the evictions in Clydebank of 
unemployed persons. When Parliament' rejected Wheatley's bill to 
halt evictions, Maxton urged MacDonald to hold an election, stating 
he was prepared to take direct action to halt the evictions. Maxton 
said: 'I warn our Front bench that unless they secure the homes of 
the people of Glasgow I will use force in the streets of Glasgow 
defending them'. 
Maxton was speaking for many of the Clydeside MPs when in August at 
the ILP summer school he concluded that: 
He did not think that the Labour Government should have 
office as a minority government to do little things in 
administration, which they could ao little better than 
the Liberals or Tories. They were returned to Parliament 
to make fundamental changes ... if there was a movement in 
which there has been fools, twisters and crooks it has 
been our movement-we in Parliament have to keep the 
pressure up on the Cabinet to ýeep them as common men. 
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The Scottish left within the Independent Labour Party were not 
alone in. Scotland in advocating a bolder course. The STUC in 1924 
demanded credit control, national ownership of oil, railways and 
other industries, an eight hour day and pensions after fifty five, 
amongst other proposals. With the Executive of the Labour Party a 
joint committee was formed to urge 'speedy action from the 
Government'( 17) Labour's Chairman, William Shaw, was demanding 
(18) 
national schemes of productive work and maintenance 
Týe growing strength of support for Communist membership and 
involvement in Scotland was illustrative of a further shift 
leftwards, which saw Scottish Conference move in 1924 much to the 
left of *the Scottish Executive and the Labour Party nationally. 
The key dividing line was communist membership. Communist 
involvement in the Labour Party remained something of an anomaly : 
while, they could not be individual members, it appeared they could 
be accepted as delegates through their trade unions and at the 1924 
Scottish Conference it was estimated by the party's Chairman that 




A motion for the affiliation of unemployed committees had been 
sponsored through the National Unemployed Workers Movement and 
indirectly by the Communists. In 1923 the motion to accept this in 
principle had been successful but its implementation thwarted by 
the Scottish Executive. In 1924 it was argued successfully that 
the proper role for unemployed representation was through their 
previous trade unions, but the vote was a narrow one reflecting the 
strength of the left, with forty-five in favour of the change and 
(20) 
sixty-nine against 
17 Labour Party, Scottish Conference Report, 1924, p. 27. 
18 Ibid.? p. 36. 
19 Scottish Executive Committee, 7 January, 1924. 
20 Scottish Conference Report, 3 6g24, p. 32-33. 
On the question of Communist Party membership, a compromise had, to 
be reached. In 1923 there had been little dispute over the 
exclusion of Communists. In 1924, however, the Aberdeen Trades and 
Labour Council again moved for Communist Party affiliation, arguing 
that for the last two years the party had been working 'quite 
harmoniously with the Labour Party in local and national elections. 
The point was also made that there were communists in the local 
Trades Councils and representing trades unions in ' local 
(21) 
parties William Shaw, the party's chairman at the time, 
argued that he did not object to Communist membership but the issue 
raised a question of discipline and that the Executive should be 
left to- consider an application by the Communist. Party as 'a 
question' for 'negotiation' 
(22). 
Hugh Lyon, of the Scottish Horse and Motormen's Association, went 
further: 
The Communists would put new vigour into the Party. A 
few months ago they were a working class party but now 
they had three Lords in the Cabinet. Even the ILP needed 
to be wakened up as it would appear the success of Labour 
had lulled them into inactivity. (23) 
The motion supporting Communist affiliation was first amended by 38 
to 26 votes, to include a qualification that Communists be accepted 
'on the same basis as other affiliated organisations' and then 
further modified by a resolution from Glasgow Trades Council that 
the National Executive negotiate with the Communists, which passed 
21 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Conference Report, 1924, p. 36. 
22 Ibid., p. 36. 
23 Ibid., *p. 37. 
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by 57 to 44. The final resolution embodying these proposals was 
accepted by 66 votes to 22 - making the party in Scotland far more 
(24) 
pro-Communist than the Labour Party nationally 
Local problems remained, however, to create difficulties between 
the parties. The Executive Report in 1924 referred to Greenock, 
Paisley, Kelvingrove, and Motherwell as 'all potential Labour seats 
1(25) which were not won through unfortunate local circumstances S 
implying that Communist candidatures had hurt the party's 
performance. But the Conference amended the report to stress that 
Paisley was 'the only division in Scotland in which 'two working 
(26) 
class candidates' had gone to the polls in 1923 . Greenock was 
a major and irresoluble problem. The Scottish Executive was asked 
by the National Office to reconstruct the Greenock Trades and 
Labour Party, with the ILP pressing for a distinct local Labour 
(27) 
Party separate from the Trades Council The bone of 
contention, however, that could not be resolved was the affiliation 
to the Trades Council of a Housing Association and an Unemployed 
Committee, both in the control of Communists. Greenock Trades 
Council was therefore disaffiliated. When Motherwell Trades and 
Labour Council were also under threat of disaffiliation, they 
compromised by banning their housing and unemployed committee 
delegations and were allowed to proceed with nominations for a 
(28) 
candidate 
24 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1924, p. 38. The 
motion that was passed read: 'in view of the decision of the 
Labour Party Annual Conference not to grant affiliation to the 
Communist Party this Conference urges the Executive Committee 
of the Labour Parýy to again consider the application of the 
Communist Party, should that party make application, believing 
that the question is one for negotiation in view of the 
conflict between the constitution and policy of the Labour 
Party and that of the Communist Party'. 
25 1924 Report, p. 8. 
26 Ibid., p. 30. 
27 Scottish Executive Committee, Minutes, January 7,1924, 
February 4,1924. 
28 Ibid., 10 March, 1924. 
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But while there were explicit pressures locally and at Scottish 
Conference for more representation by Communists in -the Labour 
Party, the Scottish Executive took a stronger anti-Communist line. 
Despite the party conference decision, calling for negotiations 
with the Communist Party, only four of the Executive voted to 
protest against the national decision to exclude Communists from 
(29) 
Labour candidatures, calling it 'premature and narrow' 
Nowhere was the split on the lef t more clearly highiighted than in 
the 1924 Kelvingrove by-election, the one Scottish election during 
the 1924 Labour Government and a defeat for the Labour Party. The 
candidature of Aitken Ferguson who had unsuccessfully stood in the 
1923 general election was hotly disputed afterwards. He was a 
member of the Communist Party, although nominated by the 
Boilermakers Society. When the by-election was announced both 
Patrick Dollan and Rosslyn Mitchell were mentioned as possible 
(30) 
candidates Dollan was in fact nominated by the Independent 
Labour Party but stood down ostensibly 'in the interests of' the 
unity of the party' 
(31) 
. The real explanation was that under no 
circumstances would the Kelvingrove Labour Party 4ccept an 
alternative candidate to Ferguson. Glasgow Trades and Labour 
Council wanted'originally to make the choice 
(32) 
, on the grounds of 
emergency and the shortness of time to the election, but were 
persuaded by Kelvingrove merely to ratify their choice. Their only 
nominee was Ferguson, and the Glasgow Trades and Labour Council 
Executive accepted him unanimously. The National Executive, 
(33) however, refused endorsement 
29 Ibid., ý15 September, 1924. 
30 Lla2gow (2raLd, 8 May, 1924. 
-R -- 
31 Ibid., 8 May 1924.1 
32 Ibid., 8 May, 1924. 
33 Ibid., 12 May, 1924. 
0 
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Aitken Ferguson, said Forward, was not like the Communist Newbold 
in Motherwell. He was 'a Labour Party candidate fighting for the 
full Labour programme' who would accept the majority decisions of 
the Party while endeavouring to win increasing support for his 
(34) 
point of view within it Tom Johnston felt he had given 
satisfactory assurances of working with the Labour Party in 
(35) 
Parliament . But Ferguson's campaign scarcely made this clear. 
As Elliot, the winning Conservative candidate, remarked there was: 
'not a sin . gle defender of the Labour Government in that campaign. 
Mr Ferguson'attacked itl(36). 
Labour's splits were hardly offset by the strength of its 
organisation on the ground. While the advent of a Labour 
Government did give party membership a boost, it was still 
pitifully low. Although 66 divisional labour parties, and 150 
local Labour branches, were claimed, very few were well 
(37) 
organised In fact only 17 DLP's and 5 Trades - and Labour 
(38) 
councils were affiliated to the 1924 conference In addition, 
although an executive report of January 1924 suggested there were 
44 womens sections and 13 joint men-women sections active in 
Scotland 
(39) 
. only 19 of 'these women's sections were affiliated to (40) 
the conf erence With few exceptions the divisional parties 
that were properly affiliated to the party were concentrated in the 
urban areas, but even there constituencies with strong Labour votes 
34 Ibid., 16 May 1924. 
35 Ibid., 16 May 1924. 
36 Ibid., 26 May 1924. 
37 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Conference Report, 1924, p. 4. 
38 Ibid., p. 22-23. 
39 Scottish Executive Committee, Minutes, 7 January, 1924. 
40 1924 Conference Report, p. 22-23. 
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such as Bridgeton were not affiliated. With the miners having 
their own organisations in the' mining areas, strong Labour seats 
like South Ayr, Hamilton and Bothwell, did not affiliate as 
(41) divisional labour parties 
In an attempt to improve membership and finances, two new financial 
schemes were introduced involving the sale of membership card books 
(42) 
. and a collecting card scheme for donations . However, generally 
it was admitted that some local Labour parties were not very active 
except at election times. The need as Labour approached power was 
undoubtedly for a more intensive, persistent and widespread 
organisation, with at least one such organisation in every polling 
(43) 
district 
In spite of this, in 1924, the Labour Party in Scotland was to be 
better prepared for an election. In previous contests it had been 
the case that far fewer candidatures than originally mooted were 
mounted. This time the position was the reverse. The Annual 
Report in March had promised 60 candidates - twelve more than at 
the previous election - tgiven a reasonable interval for 
(44) 
preparation' In fact Labour managed 64 candidates, as opposed 
to 48 in 1923, and there might have been more. The party was able 
to field candidates in seven seats for the first time, 
Aberdeenshire and Kincardineshire East, Banff, Moray and Nairn, 
Forfar, and Kinross and West Perthshire, Dumfries, and Edinburgh 
East. With the exception of the last instances all were in rural 
areas. Candidatures were also considered in other seats - 
41 Ibid .A 
42 Ibid., p. 41. 
43 Ibid. p p. 4. 
44 Labour Party Scottish Council, Executive Report, March 1924. 
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Edinburgh South, Ross and Cromarty 
(45) 
9 Caithness and 
Sutherland (46) and even OrImey and Shetland 
(47). 
But standing-in 
64 seats, Labour was only absent from seven contests. 
The party's preparations began immediately after the General 
Election of 1923. By February candidates had been readopted in 
Cathcart, Ayr Burghs, and Stirling and Falkirk, and procedures were 
underway in Roxburgh, North and South Aberdeen, West Edinburgh, 
Kelvingrove, Pollok, Central, and Hillhead - eight other seats. 
Local Labour parties were being organised for the first time in 
West Stirling, Moray and Nairn, Ross and Cromarty, Banff and 
(49) 
Central Aberdeen . As early as March, candidates were placed in 
Invernes s- shire, Hillhead, and Roxburgh and Selkirk. other seats 
for candidatures included East Fife, and East and Central 
Aberdeenshire. Women's sections were also' being formed. 
(49) And 
by April, 11 seats altogether which Labour did not hold had 
selected candidatures (Perth, West Edinburgh, Dumfries East, 
(50) 
Aberdeen and Pollok in addition) By August almost every seat 
the party was to f ight had either selected a candidate or was in 
(51) 
the process of doing so Unlike previous elections there was 
-little last minute anxiety over putting candidates in the field. 
. 
Llas E El 
.E_ 
45 %011; ý. Lld, October 8,1924. 
46 Scotsman, October 16,1924. 
47 Ibid., October 23,1924. 
48 Scottish Executive Minutes, February, 1924. 
0 
49 Ibid., March 1924. 
50 Ibid., April, 1924. 
51 Ibid., August, 1924. 
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The speed of activity was all the more impressive because 1924 was 
to see Labour's first wholesale intervention in rural Scotland. 
Throughout 1924 speakers' tours and organisational visits were 
taking place in the north and southern non-industrial areas of 
Scotland (51) . By September 1924 there were seventy additional ILP 
branches also (including either the resuscitation or creation of an 
Argyllshire Federation, a Northern Federation and a Dumfriesshire 
(52) 
Federation) In the cities, the Glasgow ILP claimed to have 
organised forty meetings weekly over the summer and to have held 
(53) 
500 open-air meetings in the four months since May Day, 1924 
But despite the impressive efficiency in choosing candidates, the 
Labour Party was suffering from financial problems which lessened 
its ability to fight effectively. For example, early in 1924, 
Roxburgh and Selkirk had been improving its organisation, after 
their candidate, George Dallas, of the Workers Union had accepted 
his nomination 'onlv on condition that there was a very much 
X __/ improved organisation in the constitutency' The members 
considered appointing a full time organiser through various means 
(55) 
of funding such as sales of work and voluntary subscriptions 
(56) 
But eventually they decided on a part-time organiser But as 
things deteriorated in 1924, the party found that 'they would have 
to economise as they would be left without any funds whenever the 
(57) 
next election came' 
51 Forward, August 8, September 9,27,1924. 
52 Ibid., September 13,1924. 
53 Ibid., September 6,1924. 
54 Hawick Labour Party Minutes, February 28,1924. 
55 Ibid., April 24,1924. 
56 Ibid., April 24,1924. 
57 Ibid., July 21,1924. By October funds were 'very low' . (October 7,1924). 
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Financial difficulties explained why Labour's leaders were fearful 
of the consequences of an election. Patrick Dollan recalls that 
he, with Arthur Henderson, 'opposed the proposal because we were 
exhausted financially by the 1922 and 1923 elections and did not 
(58) 
see how funds were going to be raised for the 1924 campaign' 
His forecast was to be proved accurate. 
58 P Dollan, op-cit., p. 23. 
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II LIBERAL DIFFICULTIES 
While Labour seemed ready the Liberal state of preparedness for the 
f ight was poor. Financially they were still reliant on a small 
number of large subscriptions and it was recognised that 'it was 
impossible to expect friends to continue giving donations as a 
number had been doing during the last few years, and it was 
necessary therefore for the general subscribers to-increase their 
subscriptions as far as possible'. While ýhere had in 1924 been an 
increase in amount from subscriptions there was a decrease in numbers 
(1) 
of subscribers 
In 1924 at least there were few difficulties in Scotland about 
f usion. In April at a meeting of the special committee of 
Federation Officebearers and the National Liberal Council under Sir 
Donald Maclean's chairmanship, the object had been 'to. exchange 
views and consider any adjustments that were practicable in regard 
to the appointment of officebearers and officials from the National 
'(2) 
. Council to the Federation It was to be agreed that the 
National Liberal council name six Vice-Presidents of the 
Federation, three from the East; and three from the West of 
(3) 
Scotland . The discussion had seen 'a very satisfactory exchange 
of views', Mclean concluded, and at a meeting in June between the 
Federation's Eastern Committee and representatives of the East of 
Scotland National Liberal Council, it was agreed that there was no 
difference of opinion in the Eastern sections about approval of the 
fusion proposals. At a local level the competing Liberal 
associations in Inverness-shire had adjusted their differences, 
(4) 
mqking the East of Scotland 'free from any complications' Only 
in Argyllshire in the West had matters yet to be resolved. 
SIF Eastern Finance Committee, May 13,1924. 
2 SLF Speciai Committee of Officebearers and National Liberal 
Counci, In SLF Minutes, April 4,1924. 
3 Ibid., April 29,1924. 
4 SLF Executive, April 29,1924. 
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Formal fusion was not complete until after the General Election. 
It was not until then that the formal acts amalgamating the Western 
Divisional Council of the Scottish National Liberal Council with 
the Scottish Liberal Federation were passed. That happened in 
December 1924. But the decision in principle had been made long 
before and, as Martin, Chairman of Western Division of the Scottish 
National Liberal Council said, the formal acts have been delayed 
through the suddenness of the election. The election itself had 
led to an immediate, if hurried, closing of Liberal ranks, and 
organisational readjustment had had to be postponed 
(5) 
The question that exercised Liberals was how to galvanise their 
local parties and the party in Scotland as a whole. A speaking 
campaign was considered by the East and West Committees and a 
limited number of meetings were held as a prelude to a major 
campaign in September and early October. However when an appeal 
was sent out to most of the constitutencies in Scotland, only 
twenty' two - gave any indication of 'arrangements' for local 
activity. The facts were clear: not. all constituencies now had 
Lýberal organisations and only a small minority - less than a 
(6) 
third - were in any active shape Another appeal to those 
associations 'doing little or nothing in connection with either 
propaganda or social meetings' met with little response and, by the 
end of the summer, arrangements for the campaign were still very 
unsatisfactory. The Eastern Executive heard in September that 
'only in one or at the most two cases were local associations 
(7) 
really organising their own meetings' It had been difficult to 




5 Sco! ttsýmýan, December 13., 1924. 
6 SLF Executive, 8 July, 1924. 
Ibid . 
8 SLF Eastern Liberal Executive, September 1,1924. 
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So what was the effective state of central Liberal organisation? 
Following the election of 1923, Webster - the Liberal's Scottish 
Secretary - had suggested further attention should be concentrated 
on fifty-five constituencies - thirty-two fought in 1923 where the 
Liberals were unsuccessful and twenty-three with Liberal members, 
although he felt there were others which had not been contested 
such as Coatbridge and Airdrie, and Lanark, which he suggested 
(9) 
might be assisted He stated that one or two organisers were 
needed to work, at 'strengthening and reorganising the Liberal 
associations in certain constituencies', but in January 1924 and 
subsequently in April it was decided that there could be no 
(10) 
increase in staf f By June 1924 the objectives had narrowed. 
It was recognised that: 'the efforts of the Federation so far as 
they could assist constituencies should be confined to those 
constituencies that were represented by Liberal members and five or 
six other constituencies that had candidates or were likely to have 
candidates. It was thought better to concentrate the limited 
speaking force available rather than spread it over the whole 
area'"'). Even so the committee found it difficult to supply 
speakers and had to ask constituencies to organise local orators 
(12) 
for the campaign 
SLF, Report by Webster, 19 December 1923. 
10 SLF Meeting of Officebearers, January 17,1924. While the 
National Liberal Council found money to employ the 
Federation's Eastern Organising Secretary, the discussions 
with the National Liberals did not lead to any new 
appointments of organisers. In April Officebearers considered 
the Federation was 'not in a position to fund any money for 
this purpose' . (Federation Executive, April 13,1924). See 
also Eastern orýanising Committee, May 13,1924 and June 2; 
1924. 
11 SLF Eastern Organising Committee, June 10,1924. 
12 Ibid., June 26,1924. 
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The planned revival campaign which was running into such 
difficulties was interrupted by the declaration of a general 
election. Liberals were however not without optimism. On October 
7, the Eastern Secretary, MacNicol, reported after a tour of 
constituencies that 'the state of organisation had certainly 
improved in recent months( 
13) 
, and the number of candidates seemed 
satisfactory, although there was a number of constituencies without 
candidates which it was felt should be contested. The most 
important of these seemed to be in Aberdeen, Dundee and Roxburgh. 
It was felt, however, nothing further could be done to organise the 
(14) 
constituencies until after the election 
A forecast of what was to be the Liberals' fate in the General 
Election was given by the one by-election in Scotland of- the 1924 
Parliament, which was disastrous for them. Their candidate Sir 
John Pratt, a former MP and Government Minister, forfeited his 
deposit, losing 3,000 votes on the poor performance of 1923, 
despite a bigger electorate and higher Poll- The Herald 
had expected Pratt to increase the Liberal vote although local 
Liberals had opposed standing and the decision to intervene was 
(15) 
made at the instance of headquarters at the last minute .. The 
party post-mortem admitted that Liberal votes had gone to the 
Unionists who would have found it very difficult to win had it not 
been for the great volume of Liberal'support they received. Pratt 
reached the obvious conclusion that he should not have stood and he 
was Iquite sure that the one result of the election would be a 
(16) 
thorough overhauling of the Liberal machine in Glasgow' The 
party, of course, was already very conscious of the need to improve 
local organisations. 
13 Ibid., June 26,1924. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Glasgow Herald, May 25,1924. 
16 G. Ias_gpýw He. r. a. 1d, May 26,1924. 
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It was the Scottish Liberal Federation's Conference which revealed 
the Liberal dilemma in its most acute form. There was noth. ing 
tangible in policy proposals that the Liberals could offer in 
contrast to the Conservatives other than a statement of Liberal 
principles in their most general terms. There was a division of 
opinion over the recognition of Russia, although a motion opposing 
(17) 
the Russian loan was in the end unanimously accepted On 
housing it wa Is agreed that * 'the housing position could not be 
solved by the repression o. f individual initiative and enterprise', 
and Sir George MacCrae accused Wheatley of being 'more concerned 
with killing private enterprise than providing houses for people'. 
The Conference did more positively propose that rates should be 
based on the 'sale price of land, that land monopolies should be 
broken, and that more labour and better construction methods were 
(18) 
needed in the building trade 
With discussion of policX for land and industry, the bankruptcy of 
Liberalism was revealed. One delegate from Fort William complained 
that the failure to develop a land policy placed the whole of 
Liberalism in the Highlands in grave danger. on industry, 
Councillor Allan from Edinburgh, stressed that co-partnership and 
profitsharing should be at the top of the Liberal agenda and said 
that: 'the failure of their leaders to move beyond such principles 
into detailed programmes for the miner, for the railway, workers, 
continuously lost them votes; they demunced the Russian Treaty, 
nationalisation and Ramsay MacDonald's wickedness but put nothing 
constructive in their place'(19). 
17 Glasgow Herald, October 11,1924. 
18 Ibid., October 11,1924. 
19 Ibid. 
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While the Liberals nationally were accused of allowing Labour to 
govern, in Scotland the Liberals were too near the ConservatiYes. 
When the Liberal Party's Scottish federatioý issued their report in 
April 1924, their defence of independence was based on the need for 
a wider range of forces than merely Conservatism, to fight against 
socialism: 
An appeal for a combination against the Labour Party was 
being made in certain quarters and if effected a 
dangerous situation would arise. The working man and 
woman, the majority of whom were not socialists, would 
feel that the hands of every other man and woman were 
against them. Everyone who was not Labour would be 
against Labour. There would be no opportunity ýor 
disagreement. It was here that the Liberal Party found 
its true function. It must endeavour to show to the 
working man and woman that the ideals of the party 
demanded radical and sweeping improvements in their 
conditions and to show that the interests of working men 
were bound up with the welfare of the whole 
community. (20) 
The Liberals believed throughout 1924 that the future lay 'with a 
three party system. The Scottish Federation's Annual Report stated 
that: 'the country will have to face and to adapt itself to the new 
conditions which had arisen -under the three party system. New 
difficulties would not be overcome by a reversion to the two party 
(21) 
system, with the parties divided into Labour against the rest' 
But even more so than in 1923 the 1924 election saw pacts between 
Liberals and Unionists. These were, however, last minute 
arrangements', agreed just as the election was declared. 
20 Uasgow Herald, April 10,1924. 
21 Ibid. 
322 
III THE CONSERVATIVE TRIUMPH 
The Conservative reaction to the advent of the Labour Government 
was to search for a policy in Scotland. The Unionist agent had as 
early as June 1923 'deprecated the production of nothing but 
negative propaganda, with Lady Baxter suggesting that Unionisi 
literature was 'not specifically and sufficiently answering the 
points made with such confidence by the socialists'('). In Mar ch 
1924, the point was made even more forcibly. After one member 
referred to the 'disadvantage the party suffered through lack of a 
definite policy', the conclusion was that 'effective work could be 
done if the party had a good fighting programme with which to 
approach people'. Consequently the Women's Committee formulated a 
resolution 'that in view of the uncertainty obtaining as to the 
date of an election, and the necessity for work and propaganda 
meantime, the women's sub-committee strongly recommends the 
executive to impress upon the leaders of the party the absolute 
necessity for an immediate declaration of policy, social and 
(2) 
otherwise' To the Propaganda Committee, one of the two 
committees- (the other was the Parliamentary Bills Committee), 
formed by the Western Council, Blench, the organiser, reported in 
the ýsame vein that 'in the preparation of literature at present we 
are handicapped by the lack of a definite distinctive Unionist 
(3) 
policy' While it welcomed the London Unionist Workers 
Handbook, the Committee agreed that 'the attention of the Western 
Divisional Council should be called to the urgent need and wide 
demand for a declaration of Unionist policy and the desirability of 
I SUA Eastern Executive, -June 27,1923. 
2 SUA Women's Committee, March 5,1924. 
3 SUA Western Divisional Council, Propaganda Committee, February 
6,1924'. 
4 Ibid., Marcb 19,1924. 
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(4) 
representation on the subject to the leaders of the party' it 
also requested their Edinburgh office when leaflets were prepared 
for general issue in Scotland, proofs should be sent through to 
Glasgow, so that if necessary, suggestions might be made as to 
(5) 
amendments The Women's Committee was partly assauged by what 
it called 'a stirring reply' on positive policy from Captain Blair, 
the Unionist Whip, and the MP, William Hutchinson. But the Eastern 
Committee was sufficiently worried about the policy and the appeal 
of it to form a new committee concerned with organisation and 
(6) 
policy 
The Conservatives had tried to f ind a social policy before. In 
1922, they favoured less public expenditure (and less taxation), 
discussed but had not accepted reforms in labour relations and 
legislation on picketing, union secret ballots and the political 
(7) 
levy (but had accepted in principle co-partnership in industry) 
Now in 1924 they moved towards a more precise statement of support 
for measures of social reform. Much was still negative.. 
Throughout 1924 the Scottish Conservatives in the West, at least, 
chose the ground on which they were to fight carefully. In April 
they protested against the Government's refusal to extend imperial 
preferences and its abolition of the McKenna duties. Thus they 
could hold 'the Government responsible for the damage* to home 
in4ustry and the increase of unemployment which will inevitably 
result' 
(8) 
. But Unionists took no action against the Public Health 
(Scotland) Amendment Bill or the No. 2 and No. 3 Unemployment 
Insurance Bill which made some concessions to the unemployed. 
Ibid . 
6 SUA Women's Committee, April 21,1924. 
7 SUA Annual Conference, January 19,1922.1 
8 SUA Western Divisional Council, April 30,1924. 
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When the Council considered policy recommendations from the 
Executive Committee it-agreed that 'a policy of Empire development 
be a leading plank in the Unionist programme, since among other 
things the policy would lessen unemployment and lead to lower food 
(9) 
prices 
Their concern for. protectionism was a sign they were worried by the 
industrial rather than simply the trading damage now being 
inflicted on the country, but it implied that co-operation with the 
Liberals would be less, rather than morý likely in the future. But 
in social policy matters the Conservatives moved nearer the centre, 
in that they accepted the urgency of the need to build houses. 
This was 'the most vital and pressing social problem of the day' 
they concluded, 'and a Unionist plan for dealing with it adequately 
is called for'. Thus, they did not mount an all-out opposition 
against the Labour Government's housing policy, did not oppose the 
Rent and Mortgage Interest Restriction Bill since 'owing to the 
great shortage of houses, the continuance of control was 
unfortunately necessary', 
(10) 
and they found it difficult to oppose 
the Wheatley Bill which primarily encouraged local authority 
housebuilding. The Parliamentary Bills Committee 'while very 
doubtful whether the housing scheme will achieve its objects owing 
to the insufficiency of the provision made for the increase of 
labour (was) not prepared in view of the great and urgent need for 
houses to recommend that it be opposed'"'). 
SUA Western Divisional Council, May 3,1924. 
10 Parliamentary Bills Committee, Western Divisional Council May 
28,1924. 
Ibid. . June 19,1924. A note of caution was however introduced: 'some provision should be made for the supply and 
control and remuneration of Labour' they argued if there were 
to be restrictions on employers, and 'every precaution should 
be taken that our policy is in no way bound to continue the 
scheme should it be at any time proved to be working 
unsatisfactorily'. 
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There were other' social policy initiatives. They wanted a 'well 
considered and actuarily sound scheme' for all-in contribuPory 
insurance. On industrial relations, views became more moderate, 
with a desire for legislation to encourage and facilitate 
arbitration 'with a statutory provision to ensure delay for a fixed 
period before a strike or lockout', although they continued to 
press for legislation to make trade union ballots secret and to 
encourage contracting in rather than contracting out as the basis 
(12) 
of the political levy 
It was a sign of this increased concern with-policy that with a new 
determination, local Unionists demanded to be, consulted by their 
leaders before any drastic change of policy was carried into 
effect, so that it might have 'received the consideration and 
approval of the party through its representative organisations'. 
While this motion referred to the problems of 1923 over the 
protectionist decision of Baldwin, clearly the emphasis was on 
social reform. In the 1924 election, two million leaflets were 
issued in the twenty-four constituencies in the west alone and 
while one women's committee member was to complain that seats were 
lost because 'a great deal of confusion existed as to the meaning 
of socialism and social reform', the Unionists were at least 
attempting a positive approach. 
12 SUA Propaganda Committee, June 18,1924. 
13 SUA Western Divisional Council, May 3,1924. 
14 Ibid., June 4,1924. 
15 SUA Western Divisional Council, Propaganda Committee, November 
5,19Z4. 
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Overall tactics and strategy were also the focus of concern. When 
the Glasgow Association met Unionist candidates two months after 
the election of 1923, discussion of pacts gave way to discussions 
of policy. The Duke of Atholl . who 
favoured Conservative 
candidatures in every seat next time was concerned that: 'The 
Labour Party were getting a good deal of the moderate support at 
present owing to the seeming mildness of their programme, but with 
the withdrawal of the restraining hand of the Liberal Party they 
would show themselves in a different light'( 
16). Elliot concluded 
that their housing programme meant 'enormous expense and that the 
present Labour leaders were not the real leaders but merely in for 
propaganda purposes'( 
17) 
. But Hutchinson recognised that the fight 
against Labour had to be a tactical one. With the Labour policy 
noW directed, he believed, to capturing the moderate* vote : 'the 
time had not yet arrived for evicting the Labour Government. This 
must only be done on account of some piece of legislation which was 
likely to have little support in the country. Otherwise the result 
18) 
would be to give them an effective election slogan'( o 
Propaganda activity became an obsession with the Conservatives 
during the 'period of Labour Government in 1924. The Propaganda 
Committee, set up by ihe Western Divisional Council, held between 
mid-January and the end of February, 39 outdoor and 33 indoor 
meetings and engaged four full-time speakers. The organiser 
reported 'an awakening of interest' since the election. More money 
came in to help (with E1222 raised in eight months to March 
16 SUA Glasgow Unionist Association. Meeting with Unionist 
candidates, February 28,1924. 
'17 lbid .0 
18 Ibid. 
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compared with E402 for previous year) and a large number of people, 
who previously had not assisted financially, began doing so(19). A 
new woman speaker was hired. Newspaper columns were used for 
'propaganda purposes'; University Labour propaganda was 
counteracted; 
(20) 
and canvassing classes held. By May, 174 
meetings had been held since January with 'still a big demand from 
the constituencies for speakers' 
(21) 
By June 'signs of greatly 
increased activity were greatly in evidence in the West of 
(22) 
Scotland' 
New propaganda material was considered, and the propaganda 
committee discussed the possibility of 'a unionist newspaper for 
Scotland' 
(23). 
By June a West of Scotland supplement to the 
national broadsheet, 'The Man in the Street' and two leaflets 'What 
the Unionist Party is and what it stands for' and 'Socialism means 
(24) less wages for the workers', were produced orders for the 
supplement were disappointing - only 5500 rather than the projected 
10,000 
(25) 
. Eventually 8600 copies were distributed. The 
Committee pressed on to issue another leaflet 'The Socialist 
Government and Railway Nationalisation, added a fifth speaker to 
its staff and organised 183 open-air meetings over the summer. The 
second issue of the West of Scotland supplement found 9250 
(26) 
orders 
19 SUA Western Divisional Council March 5,1924. 
20 SUA Western Divisional Council, Women's Committee, March 5, 
1924. Propaganda Committee, March 19,1924. 
21 SUA Western Divisional Council, May 7,1924. 
22 Ibid., June 4,1924. 
23 Ibid., Propaganda Committee, May 7,1924. 
24 Ibid.,. June 18,1924. 
25 Ibid., July 2, 1924. 
26 Ibid., October 8,1924. 
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Conservatism could congratulate itself on its quadrupling of its 
majority in the Kelvingrove by-election. With their 4321 major. ity 
came a Liberal lost deposit. While Walter Elliot, the Conservative 
candidate, had demanded first and foremost 'a vote against 
communism', he had argued in favour of a reforming conservatism or 
'progressive unionism'. For him the three main issues were the 
Government's abolition of the McKenna duties, the interruptions to 
the housebuilding programme (despite the Wheatley proposals) and 
the failure to implement the unemployment programme to which the 
(27) 
Labour Party had been committed The result was thus, Elliot 
said, 'a warning to the Government that they have been found 
wanting especially in the handling of the unemployment 
prob 
. 
lem 1(28) . However the Conservatives were still not closing 
their doors to future agreements with the' Liberals. When Walter 
Elliot was asked during the Kelvingrove by-election whether he was 
in, favour of Coalition with the Liberals, his reply was guarded: 
'That depends whether the Liberal Party believe the same thing that 
(29) 
I do' 
The Conservative strategy was thus a two- - fold one: to pursue a 
policy which empbasised a positive programme of social reform and 
at the same time to organise, educate and agitate against the 
socialist danger. When the Labour Government fell, it was on an 
issue that allowed the Conservatives to make the fight one against 
extreme socialism, and this is exactly what'they did. 
27 Glasgow Herald, . 'May * 16,1924. In a letter to Nancy Astor, 
f rom what Elliot called I in partibus Bolshevism', he 
complained that Unionist speakers 'had no presence to stand up 
to the Clydeside Bolshies' (Walter Elliot to Nancy Astor, 
Nancy Astor Papers File 424. Quoted in EMM Taylor, The 
Politics of Walter Elliot 1929-36, p. 30). 
28 Ibid., May 26,1924. 
29 Ibid., May 17,1924. 
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Election organisation was probably its best ever. The Women's 
Committee had recommended at Labour meetings there should 'be a 
Unionist present to ask questions and challenge stat , ements (30) 
made' Where Unionists were speaking, supporters . 
'should be 
ready to ask helpful questions arranged beforehand with the 
speaker'. In their election report it noted these means had been 
'carried out during the election'. 103 meetings were addressed by 
the men and 72 by women during the election, and 2 million leaflets 
issued in 24 constituencies in the West togetý. er with London and 
(31) 
Edinburgh leaflets 
The Unionists did not, however, have a full slate of candidates. 
Early in 1924 they had appeared to be determined to place 
candidates in the field, irrespective of potential splits in the 
anti-socialist vote. When the possibility of increased 
co-operation with the Liberals had been discussed after the 1923 
election, the Chairman of the Glasgow Association said: 'it had 
been found impossible to get the Liberals to come to terms. It 
remained to be seen whether the result of the General Election 
(32) 
would make them more amenable in future' When the Duke of 
Atholl, the Scottish Chairman, - spoke to the General Committee of 
the Glasgow Unionists 
, 
two months later, he spoke for the partyl. s 
policy through Scotland when he said: 
Unless in very exceptional circumstances, a Unionist 
candidate should be put forward in every constituency 
instead of Unionists giving their support to the Liberal 
candidate. Constituencies were assured of every possible 
support from headquarters in this connection. (33) 
30 SUA. Western Divisýoncil Council, Women's Committee, October 8, 
19 24. 
31 Ibid., November*5,1924. 
32 SUA Glasgow Unionist Association, General Committee, December 
24,1923. 
33 Ibid., February 28,1924.330 
Even so there was a slowness to adopt candidates which allowed in 
fact electoral arrangements with! the Liberals to be concluded with 
the minimum of difficulty. In June 1924 the party discussed but 
reached no agreement on how many of Glasgow's constituencies would 
be fought (34). Only in September -a month before the election - 
were candidates chosen in Kilmarnock, Lanark, Galloway, Clackmannan 
and East Stirling, three of which the Conservatives were to 
win. 
(35) 
Candidates who had been adopted in Ayr and Clackmannan 
and East Stirling were to withdraw just before the election was 
declared and as late as the f irst week of October - only days 
before the election was declared - there were no candidates in 
Bothwell, Hamilton, Rutherglen, West Renfrew, Greenock, Falkirk, 
Partick, and St Rollox, a list which included two seats, (Partick 
(36) 
and West Renfrew) which, the Conservatives were to gain 
The election was seen as a contest against Labour and required an 
anti-socialAt, crusade. Unionist slogans, urging people to turn 
out, included 'better risk a shower of rain than a reign of 
terror', and 'Under which Flag - the Union Jack oý the Red 
Flag' 
(37). Liberal pamphlets included one called 'We don't want 
socialism'. Thus, Labour felt Itself faced by the combined might 
of the enemy. For Stewart, the ILP's Glasgow organiser, the defeat 
of the Labour government would be 'the beginning of a Liberal and 
34 Western Divisional Council, June 4,1924. 
35 Ibid., December 3,1924, June 4,1924. 
36 Ibid., October 8,1924. 
37 GlýUow Herald, October 29,1924. 
331 
Tory Coalition and the linking up of the opponents of Labour in a 
common party' He felt that the Liberals seemed a dejected : ind 
disappointed party and were prepared 'to desert their free trade 
and other traditional principles to join with the protectionist and 
anti-democratic party in an attempt to resist the progress of 
Labour' 
(38). 
Wheatley argued likewise that: 'whether nominal or 
not' there was an alliance or coalition or an understanding between 
the Liberals and Tories. In Glasgow today Liberals and Tories can 
39) 
only exercise their differences as a luxury when it is safe'( 
Rosslyn Mitchell went further: I they were going to have a coupon 
election for the second time' 
(40Y. 
Both Scotsman and 21L! ýg Herald were firm advocates of cooperation 
from the minute a general election was possible. On 10 October the 
GlasaRw Herald argued: 
At the last general election there was an adequate reason 
for the emergence of the tariff issue on which 
Conservatives and Liberals should oppose each other, and 
in so doing permit in many cases the victory of 
socialists on minority votes. on the present occasion 
the issue is unperplexed by the fiscal or any other 
burning question. On the broad platform of hostility to 
socialism what is there to hinder a rational degree of 
cooperation in those constituencies where the triangular 
duel has been proven to be an advantage only to the 
common enemy? It is obvious that no sacrifice of 
principle is involved nor would any permanent agreement 
be implied by a series of understandings entered into for 
the purpose of defeating socialist minorities and 
chastening the megalomania with which its leaders appear 
to be afflicted. (41) 
38 Ibid., October 11,1924. 
39 Ibid., October 11,1924. 
40 Ibid., October 16,1924. 
41 
,ý Ilei !l . 
21aýjg. w H E,: 
_d, 
October 10,19 24. 
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The Herald was later to express its satisfaction that 'Scotland's 
lead in favour of co-operation between Unionists and Liberals to 
defeat the socialists is being followed in England, and this 
cooperation showed that the 'issue was whether to proceed under the 
Flag of Unionists and constitutional progress or under the Red Flag 
(42) 
of Revolution' 
What then was the nature of Liberal and Conservative co-operation? 
There can be no doubt that leading Asquithian Liberals who ian the 
party in Scotland favoured co-operation, although not at any time 
were the arrangements for co-operation discussed in the formal 
deliberations of the Scottish Liberal Federation or its organising 
committees, until after the election. But as the Chairman of the 
Scottish Liberals, Sir Donald Maclean gave the lead: 
The issue would not be the Communist prosecution but 
whether the country was to be plunged into the Russian 
morass, and whether they were going to support a party 
whose object was the destruction of the present social 
system. (43) 
The issue, he said, was socialism against constitutionalism and he 
hoped that 'the merely party point of view would be subordinated to 
the great national interest': 
There would be many three cornered contests which he 
supposed could not be avoided. Let there be as few as 
possible. Once the issue was made clear he had no doubt 
what the result would be. (44) 
For the Gljýsgow Herald this was the Liberal signal for 
co-operation - and it was later taken up by Asquith who gave 
explicit support to co-operation while denying his authorship of 
the arrangements: 
42 Ibid., October 13,1924. 
43 Glasgow Herald, October 10,1924. 
44 Ibid. 
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Personally I have nothing to do with the arrangements 
that have been made in this, and in other constituencies 
for the withdrawal of candidates whether Liberal or 
Conservative, whose competition with one another might 
have confused the issue, given to the Socialists a wholly 
desultory advantage and in some cases, through a minority 
of the electors, enabled them to capture a seat to which 
on democratic principles they had no title ... Both the old 
parties in this eleciion have found themselves as they 
believe confronted with a common danger which without any 
loss of identity or compromise or principle on one side 
or othe ' 
r, they are makirig reciprocal sacrifices to 
avert. (45) 
While Lloyd' George would concede only that there was 'complete 
agreement' with the Conservatives over Russia 
(46) 
1 Asquith 
embellished his explicit support for co-operation as the campaign 
developed: 'They were now reduced to an issue between socialism on 
the one side and anti-socialism on the other. In f act in this 
spell he threw overboard all the efforts that Liberals had made 
since 1923 to distinguish themselves from Conservatives. 
McCallum Scott, who had been the Liberal Member for Bridgeton, was 
later to join the Labour Party. In a letter to Asquith only a 
month after the election he complained that Asquith's 
anti-socialist crusade had. reduced the Liberal Party to a negative 
force in politics and an appendix of conservatism. The election, 
he suggested, had shown this far too clearly, with the party 
becoming 'more and more committed to a definitely anti-Labour 
attitude'. He continued: 
Under your leadership at the last election a pact was 
made with the Conservative Party which reduced the 
Liberal Party to the position of a spare wheel in the 
. Conservative car. The pact had all the disadvantages of 
coalition and none of its advantages. It was designed to 
behr no fruits in policy but merely to snatch a number of 
45 Glasgow Herald and Scotsman, 21 October, '1924. 
46 Scotsman, 24 October, 1924. 
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seats from the Labour Party which you described as 'the 
common foe'... No attempt has been made to apply Liberal 
principles to the solutions of the new and menacing 
problems, social, economic and industrial, which are 
springing up on every side. The Liberal Party has lost 
the initiative in policy. All you have to of f er is a 
mere blank negative to Labour as the 'common foe' or the 
hope that an equally sterile opposition to Tory reaction 
might once more induce the country to turn to. the Liberal 
Party in despair. (47) 
But if the Liberals were prepared to enter arrangements without 
making policy conditions, so too were the Scottish Conservatives. 
Younger, who bad been Chairman of the Unionist Party and was 
temporarily working from the Unionist headquarters in London, 
suggested a week before nominations had closed (two days after the 
election was announced) that he felt Unionists and Liberals would 
work together in certain constituencies simply for mutual 
advantage. 
(48) 
Of Scottish Members of Parliament, Horne was the 
(49) 
most prominent Unionist advocate of pacts . He said explicitly, 
that he ventured 'to urge all Unionists in every constituency where 
(50) 
no Unionist was standing to support the Liberal Party' . Widely 
acknowledged as the leader of the Scottish Unionists, Sir John 
Gilmour was careful to clear any obstacles to the working of 
electoral arrangements. In particular he advised Conservative 
national leaders that there should be no mentibn of tprotection' or 
ttariffsl, in any Scottish speeches, otherwise the much sought after 
(51) 
pact with the Liberals would be in danger 
47 S6otsman, 6 December, 1924. 
48 Scotsman, October 15,1924: 
ýwf i 49 
. 
21aý, g H2eraid, 'October 16,1924. 
50 Ibid., October 23,1924. 
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What then was the nature of the arrangements reached at such short 
notice? Birkenhead was to praise Asquith later for encouraging 
adherence not simply to the letter but the spirit of the pacts and 
"the example presented to slow-moving England by nimble-witted 
Scotland" 
(52). 
But it is unclear what the 'pact' consisted of, who had drawn it 
up, and what status it had. Forward implied it was intended to be 
a secret- and local agreement, but the Chairman of the Paisley 
Unionist Association blurted out the facts that in the West of 
Scotland 'the Liberals and Tories had come to an agreement for the 
(53) 
purpose of destroying the Labour Party' Forward claimed it 
was initially an agreement to save Asquith's seat in Paisley, 
(54) 
and then that it was extended. The Scotsman on 13 October referred 
to a London meeting which had taken place to discuss 74 
constituencies won in 1923 on a minority vote and stated that 
'negotiations with a view to a pact ... have been proceeding (55) 
quietly' On 17 October the GlýMow Herald said that about 
fifty straight fights against socialists were agreed mostly in 
constituencies which socialists had captured in 1923 on a minority 
(56) 
vote 
51 Gilmour Papers GD/383/20. Amery was one who reassured Gilmour 
by promising he had 'no intention of using the words 
'protection' or 'general tariff' in my speeches in Scotland 
but naturally I shall develop the need for safeguarding our 
industries against unfair competition. I do not think your 
friends need be alarmed'. October 31,1924. 
52 Glas ow Herald, 23 October. 
53 2.: LzjýEw Herald, 23 October. 
54 Forward, 25 October. 
55 Scotsman, 13 October. 
56 ElL! ýgow Herald, 17 October. 
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The first public announcement that there was co-operation in 
particular seats came in fact from Sir Donald Coates, Chairman. of 
the Paisley Unionist Association, on 13 October, when he reported 
after a meeting with Sir John Gilmour, the Unionist Chief Whip in 
Scotland, that an agreement had been made in London cover seventy 
seats in England and fifteen in the West of Scotland. Shaw, the 
Unionist candidate in Paisley, had also been present and had been 
asked to withdraw his candidature. They had been also told that if 
no agreement over Paisley was concluded, then the national ýact 
(57) 
would fall 
The Glasgow Evening Citizen however reported that the London 
agreement covered only 13 seats in the West of Scotland. 
(58) 
Lord 
Glenarthur, the President of the Unionist Association in Glasgow, 
informed a rally on 24 October that in fifteen divisions of 
Glasgow, and in all but three West of Scotland constituencies, 
there would be a straight fight against socialism, and he urged all 
Unionists to support Liberals where there was no Unionist in the 
(59) 
field 
The implication from statements by central office and national 
leaders was that pacts had been agreed locally: the implication of 
the statements made by local leaders was that pacts had been made 
nationally to which they had to respond. However, it is clear that 
Headquarters were responsible as far as the Unionists were 
concerned. In Paisley Sir Donald Coats stated his instructions had 
been received from Sir John Gilmour the Unionist Whip 
(60). 
In 
57 Glaýgow Herald, October 14,1924; Scotsman, October 14, 
Forward, October 17. 
I 
58 Glasgow Eveniný Citizen, October 14,1924, reported in 
Forward, October 17,1924. 
59 Glas ow Herald, October 24,1924. 
6p Glas ow Herald, 14 October '3 1? 24. 
Banff, Scottish Central Unionist organisation had intimated it 
could not see its way to support the Tory nominee, Templeton, 
although they had later to draw back on this instruction after 
(61) 
Templeton refused to withdraw In Tradeston, Major Lindsay, 
the Conservative candidate, stated he had 'instructions from 
headquarters' and local Unionists were 'unanimous' in their 
'condemnation' of the arrangement, while it was found St Rollox 
Unionist Association 'heartily approves of the action taken by the 
Unionist party in arranging with the Liberal Party to avoid three 
(62) 
cornered contests wheh possible' 
In Peebles and Midlothian South where there was a three cornered 
contest, the Unionist candidate telegraphed Unionist Headquarters 
to ascertain whether the Scottish Whip supported the continuation 
(63) 
of the candidature The key Scottish figure appears to have 
been Sir John Gilmour the Unionist Whip, whose role in what he felt 
was not an ordinary political contest, was clearing the way for 
(64) 
constituencies to have only one anti-socialist candidate it 
was a response to the situation at the last election that 
subsequently he felt that 'while the local Liberals were responsive 
(65) 
to reciprocal agreements, the Party Whips proved an obstacle' 
Central organisation played an important part in the transfer of 
the Unionist, McInnes Shaw, from Paisley, to-Renfrewshire where he 
had a clear run with no Liberal. The only Glasgow Liberal ready to 
61 Forward, 25 October, 1924. 
62 Scotsman, 14 October, 1924. 
L 63 Elasaow Herald, 16 October, 1924. 
64 Scotsman, 15 October 1924. 
65 Glasgow Herald, 23 October 1924. 
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be adopted in Hillhead, Major Donaldson, was transferred to East 
(66) 
Stirling where he had a clear run also Tradeston and St 
Rollox were at the time of the announcement of the election in fact 
the only Glasgow divisions where there was a Liberal candidate in 
the field, and in Tradeston the Unionists acceded to Central Office 
(67) 
pressure to stand down 
From all this it is clear that the Unionists and Liberal leaders 
agreed early in October on a pact which covered Paisley and twelve 
seats which Labour held - almost all of them won on a minority vote 
(68) in three party contests in 1923 
Subsequently the pact was extended to Partick and West Renfrew, 
since the Unionist candidates who had withdrawn from Tradeston and 
Paisley were accommodated in Partick and West Renfrew and given a 
free run by the Liberals. This definite pact covering fifteen 
seats was the basis for much wider Unionist and Liberal 
co-operation. 
Paisley was the key seat of the pact. While divisions in the 
Labour forces had prevented a Labour victory in 1923, the 
Co-operative Party had withdrawn to allow Rosslyn Mitchell a clear 
66 LlLý Iga Herald, 11 October 1924. 
67 LlE. ýg2. w HeE, ýýld, 11 October 1924. 
68 While no list was ever published, it seems the initial pact 
extended to the following seats, twelve of which can be stated 
with certainty: (1) Unionist withdrawals - Paisley, Greenock, 
Tradeston,, Hamilton, St Rollox and Clackmannan. and East 
Stirling; (2) Liberal withdrawals - Kilmarnock, Glasgow 
Central, Maryhill, North Lanark, Coatbridge and Airdrie, 
Hillhead and either Cathcart, Renfrew East or Dumbartonshire. 
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(69) 
run It made an anti-socialist arrangement imperative if the 
right were to hold the seat. While the Paisley local Unionist 
forces were unhappy about the lack of local consultation, their 
candidate, McInnes Sbaw, agreed to be moved to West Renfrew where 
he had no Liberal opponent. The Paisley Unionists' President 
supported Asquith as did the former Provost who was a leading 
Unionist (70) . and the Labour candidate, Mitchell, conceded that 
'practically all the Unionists in the constituency are likely to 
1(71) follow the official lead 
Clearly Glasgow was the main centre for co-operation. In 1923 
there had been 10 Liberal-Conservative contests in seats where 
Labour was standing and in many of these Labour had won on a 
minority. vote. At the 1924 election, only two Liberal qan*didates 
stood in Glasgow, in St Rollox and in Tradeston. In'St Rollox the 
Unionist Association found little difficulty in accepting the 
headquarters viewpoint, that they should support a Liberal. As 
their report suggested, 'support was freely given' in 'loyal 
compliance' with the view of the Glasgow Unionist Association. The 
President successfully moved at the Unionist meeting that 'in view 
of the political situation the Executive heartily approved of the 
action taken by the Unionist Party in arranging with the Liberal 
Party to avoid three cornered contests where possible and urge all 
members of the association to give their wholehearted support to Mr 
(72) Johnston, the Liberal candidate' 
69 The Local Co-operative Defence Committee agreed to withdraw 
'while holding to the moral claim to fight Paisley', Glasgow 
Herald, October 14,1924. 
70 Glasgow Herald, October 29,1924. Asquith welcomed Unionists 
on his platform and said that he 'gratefully acknowledged thd 
wholehearted loyalty' of the Unionist candidaie to the cause 
of the pact. 
71 Ibid., October 14,1924. 
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Tradeston was more difficult to resolve. Here there were both 
Liberal and Conservative candidates in the field. The Glasgow 
Unionist Association was later to include in its annual report the 
view of the Tradeston Unionists that they 'deeply regretted the 
unfortunate and unavoidable circumstances which deprived us of our 
(73) 
candidate' In fact when the Unionist candidate first told the 
association that 'owing to the arrangement' he was unable to stand, 
there was a revolt in the ranks. Members were 'unanimous' in their 
'condemnation' of an agreement about Tradeston that had' been 
reached without consultation and there was consideration of running 
(74) 
their candidate as an independent only on the day before his 
formal adoption did the withdrawal take place but Tradeston 
Unionists did put their organisation at the disposal of the Liberal 
candidate and the pact was 'loyally observed'. 
In the other thirteen constituencies it was for the Liberal 
Association to offer support to the Conservatives and although 
there were incipient revolts within the Liberal ranks, none was 
sufficiently strong to produce alternative nominees. 
In Maryhill, Shettleston, Camlachie and Kelvingrove, Liberals 
accepted they would not f ight the present election but resolved at 
the same time to put up candidates at the next one. Sbettleston 
went further, deciding that their Liberal Association would take no 
active part in the campaign, but were consoled to think that their 
candidate of 1923 had been adopted as candidate in Dunfermline 
(76) 
Burghs In Camlachie, although a decision was made to retain 
their organisation for a future election, Campbell Stephen, the 
Labour candidate, believed they were working together, talking of a 
72 SUA Glasgow Unionist Association, Annual Report, 1925. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid . 
75 Glasgow Herald, 27 October. 
76 Forward, 15 November. 
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I- (77) finite or definite Tory Liberal pact' In Partick the Liberal 
Association gave active support to the Unionist and did its utmost 
(78) 
to defeat Labour In Bridgeton the Chairman of the Liberal 
Party offered 'wholehearted support' to the Unionists and offered 
the Liberal Association as a working committee for the election 
(79) 
agen t In Springburn the Liberal Association urged a Unionist 
vote 
(80) 
and in Cathcart the Liberal and Unionist parties worked 
(81) 
together Govan and Glasgow Central Liberal Associations 
decided not to contest the seats, both passing the same resolution 
because 'the socialist communist policy of the Labour Party is a 
menace to national stability and ... damaging to the commercial 
interests of the city', they would refrain from nominating a 
candidate. Labour claimed the local Liberal Chairman in Govan had 
called on all Liberals to vote Tory. i 
In Glasgow then, co-operation was actually possible in all fifteen 
of the city's constituencies, and thus on the ground extended far 
beyond the confines of the original agreement between the parties. 
In the West of Scotland, the position was similar. First, there 
were few local difficulties about agreed seats for Liberal 
withdrawals in West Renfrew, Kilmarnock, North Lanark and 
Coatbridge; and Conservative withdrawals in Hamilton, Clackmannan 
and East Stirling and Greenock. outside Glasgow on the 
Conservative side, agreement with the Liberals was even simpler. 
While the Unionists had agreed to put forward a candidate in 
77 Scotsman, 8 October. 
78 GlasgRw Herald, 16 October. 
79 Scotsman, 27 October. 
80 Sla. ýgow Herald, 14 October, 
81 Glasg2w Herald, 21 October. 
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Greenock, the decision was rescinded to give Sir Godfrey Collins a 
(82) 
clear run with unofficial rather than official Unionist help .0 
Equally, in Clackmannan and East Stirling, the Unionist candidate 
resigned, and the Unionist Association agreed to recommend all 
Unionists to vote. for Major Donaldson, the Hillhead candidate, who 
(83) had been directed to their seat 
In the West of Scotland, co-6peration extended far beyond the seats 
mentioned in the 'pacti. In Bothwell, there was a joint selection 
(84) 
conference involving Liberals and Unionist Associations In 
Rutherglen, the Liberal Council urged local associations to support 
the opponent of socialism and a letter signed by seventeen 
prominent local Liberals including the former Liberal MP urged 
(85) 
support for the Unionist 
Indeed, the only seat which posed problems in Lanarkshire was 
Lanark itself, where what was regarded as an unofficial Liberal 
candidate took to the f ield at the last minute, and by doing so 
82 Scotsman, October 11 and 24,1924. The Unionist candidate had 
resigned for health reasons. (Scotsman, October 11,1924). 
The Unionist Association was unanimous in its support for the 
Liberals. 
ýý2 tierald 83 Ll aw H r l , October 13,14 and 18,1924. 
84 Glasgow Herald, October 14,1924. 
85 Ibid., October 25,1924. Liberal helpers were provided for 
the Unionist, SS2otsman, October 17) and after the election 
the Labour candidate clAimed the Unionist has 'open-support of 
týe Liberals through the contest'. Forward, November 8,1924. 
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divided his local association 
(86) 
. The Labour Party rightly 




On the Liberal side, there were few difficulties about securing 
Liberal support for Unionist candidates in the agreed 
constitutencies. In West Renfrew, where the Tory, Colonel McInnes 
Shaw, was brought from Paisley, the Liberal Association agreed to 
fight a united campaign with the Unionists, and prominent Liberals 
(88) 
, t, signed Shaw's nomination papers In North Lanark while the 
Liberal Association was not prepared to make a recommendation on. 
voting, they did decide to adhere to the position of 
non-intervention. In Kilmarnock while the Liberal Association had 
invited Sir Donald Maclean to stand again, and were initially 
annoyed by the Unionists' 'decision to place a candidate in the 
(89) 
field, local Liberals worked for the Conservative victory' 
But it was HamiAon that the Glas ow Herald applauded as 'a model 
pact'(90) There, co-operation was so firmly established that 
despite the pact's recommendation of a Liberal, the joint 
Liberal-Unionist selection conference produced a Conservative 
86 Scotsman, October 21,1924. 
87 Labour Party Scottish Council Executive Report, 1925, P-3. 
88 Scotsman, October 15. The Unionist incumbent who had fought 
the 1923 election resigned at the beginning of October. 
(Glasgow Herald, October 13), and while the Liberals Executive 
had a sub committee with full powers to decide on a strategy, 
ýUýw Herald, they resolved to support the Unionist. SG,,: L 
October 16). Murray, the beaten Labour candidate, later 
admitted the "pact worked more effectively than most of us 
thought, it would', (Forward, November 8). 
89 21LU 2w Herald, October 30,1924; also October 13,29,1924. 
After his victory McAndrew, the Unionist MP, said that tthis 
was to some extent a Liberal victory because without the aid 
of the Liberals they could not have achieved such a great 
successf, Uasg9w Herald, October 31,1924. 
90 LlftsgLii Herald, October 23,1924. 
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candidate. Candidate's nomination papers were signed by Liberals 
and Unionists and the Unionist agent worked from the Liberal Party 
(91) Committee rooms 
In the rest of the West of Scotland, the pattern was similar to 
that of Lanarkshire and Glasgow, with the extent of Liberal support 
for a Unionist candidate the only variable. In South Ayrshire 
(92) 
and. Ayr Burghs 
(93) 
. Liberal organisation was so weak that no 
candidates could be found and while there was no official support 
for the Unionists, Liberals were informally working for the 
Unionist candidates. But in Dunbartonshire the Liberals withdrew 
t heir candidate 'in view of the desirability of avoiding a three 
cornered contest at this time', and while they made no official 
recommendation as an association, local branches did explicitly 
(94) (95) 
recommend Uni6nist. support In Dumbarton Burghs and in 
West Stirling 
(96) 
Liberal endorsement of Unionists was complete. 
In the former there was a joint selection conference and in both 
the local Liberal Associations recommended Unionist support. In 
91 Ibid., October 16,1924. 
92 Scotsman, October 13,18,29,1924. 
93 Glasgow Herald, October 17,1924. Initially the Ayr Burghs 
Liberals decided by a majority to run a candidature, and after 
two possible choices refused, they thought better of it. 
94 L12. sA2w Herald, October 15,1924. One such local branch was 
the Helensburgh and Garelock Liberal Association, (Glasgow 
Herald, October 21,1924). 
95 2. ýLsS2. w Herald, October 13,17,1924. In 1918 and 192 '2 
the 
Unionists had supported a Liberal; in 1923 no agreement had 
been possible; now in 02-4 Dumbarton Burghs * had a Unionist 
challenger. 
96 qýaýSpK Herald, October 14,1924. The Liberal Association was 
barely functioning. 
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Falkirk and Stirling Burghs, the Unionists decided first not to 
oppose Sir George McRae, Ind then later, after an interview. wiýh 
(97) him, to urge full support for his candidature . In the West of 
Scotland therefore arrangements covered twenty-eight constituencies 
where either Liberal or Conservative withdrew with unofficial or 
official support from their organisations for the anti-socialist 
candidate. While the Conservatives were more likely to place their 
organisations at the disposal of the Liberal candidate, there were 
of course far more Liberal than Conservative withdrawals in the 
election. Thus in the west, six Liberals stood as the 
anti-socialist candidates, only two without the full 'weight of the 
Conservative machines behind them, and eighteen Conservatives were 
in the field, eight without the full endorsment of the local 
Liberal Association. But whatever the associations chose or chose 
not to recommend, there was no case where a Liberal association 
recommended either abstention or support for any other Party than 
the Conservatives. 
Cook has argued that 'the west of Scotland pact certainly did not 
extend to the rural areas or to Edinburgh ... Indeed in parts of 
Scotland Conservatives extended their attack to Liberals who had 
been unopposed a year before'(98). Yet while there were instances 
of Conservative opposition to Liberalt, they were almost wholly 
confined to seats where no Labour candidate was in the field, or 
where Labour presence was regarded as negligible, and the pattern 
in the east, as in the west, favoured an anti-socialist coalition, 
rather than a full-blooded three party contest. 
97 Glasgow Herald, October 13 and 20,1924. The Unionist 
- organisation in this constituency was at a low ebb. 
98 C Cook, Age of Alignment, p. 289. 
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In six varied East or Northern constituencies Unionists resolved to 
support the Liberal candidate and in six, Liberals withdrew their 
candidates or decided not to place a candidate in the field, in two 
cases offering full support to the Unionists. In almost all cases, 
the reason was either the fact or threat of Labour intervention. On 
the Unionist side, full endorsement of the Liberal candidate was 
forthcoming in Dunfermline, where the former Liberal candidate for 
Shettleston requested and received Unionist support 
(99) 
, Kirkcaldy, 
where the Unionists unanimously decided to support the Liberal who 
stood as a 'Liberal and Anti-Socia list candidate' 
(100) 
and in 
Montrose, where the Liberals who had refused to agree to a joint 
selection conference eventually held a joint conference with the 
Unionists where Sir ' Robert Hutchison received Unionist 
support 
(101) 
In other seats, Liberals stood. down without giving official support 
to the Unionists. In Edinburgh"s Central constituency 
(102) 
and 
Kinross and West Perthshire, organis ational weakness was compounded 
by fear of an anti-socialist split. In Kinross and West 
Perthshire, the Liberal candidate, William Hope, resigned to 
avoid a three cornered fight, arguing 'socialism was the supreme 
issue of the election', although there was no formal backing for the 
(103) 
Tory, the Duchess of Atholl Kinross is an interesting 
99 Glasgow Herald,, October 13 and 27,1924. In fact local 
co-operation -was so firmly established in some areas of the 
constituency that the Cowdenbeath Progressive Political 
Association which supported the Liberal candidate was an 
amalgamation of Unionists and Liberals. 
100 Glasgow Herald, October 15,1924. 
101 Glasgow Herald, October 11,1924. The Unionist request for a 
joint candidate had been made after the 1923 election and 
while Xhe Unionists decided on finding their own candidate 
(Glasgow Herald, April 14,1924), they eventually agreed to 
support Hutchinson. 
102 Glasgow Herald, October 13,1924. The Unionists hoped that 
'Liberals and Unionists w ould unite forces in the fight 
against socialism', but no official Liberal support was given. 
103 Glasgow Herald, October 13,1924. 
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case of how organisational problems and the socialist threat 
conspired to produce Liberal inactivity even in former strongholds. 
When Hope was chosen as a Liberal candidate he described himself as 
'an out and out Liberal' who would campaign against 'the 
(104) 
reactionary forces of landlordism' Six months later he found 
'very little effort had been made by any of the prominent Liberals 
in the constituency to place the organisation in such -a condition 
as to enable their candidate to contest the seat with reasonable 
105) 
prospect of success'( While the local Liberals sought an 
alternative and resolved to place a Liberal in the field at the 
next election, they were powerless to prevent their supporters 
voting Conservative 
(106) 
It is perhaps surprising that the Unionists found any need to 
support Liberals in the Highland constituencies but their decision 
to do so was not simply a reflection of their own poor organisation 
but also of a socialist threat. This was the explicit reason given 
by the Ross and Cromarty Unionist Association and a major factor in 
(107) 
the decision of the Caithness and Sutherland Association In 
Inverness the Unionists were unanimous in their continuing support 
for the sitting Liberal MP, Sir Murdoch Macdonald, who was 
prominent in arguing for support for Unionists where no Liberal was 
(108) 
in the field 
104 GlEsgow Eerý! ý, April 14,1924. 
105 Ibid., October 13,1924. 
106 Ibid., Octobdr 16 and 21,1924. Although the GlýEgow Herald 
reported some well known Liberals and had gone over to the 
socialists. 
107 Scotsman, October 16, GLýaow Herald, October 17,1924. The 
Ross and Cromary Unionist Association pledged the 'undivided 
force' of the Unionists against a possible socialist 
candidate. 
108 Glasgow Herald, October 
Liberals should in this 
Unionist candidate whe 
(Scotsman, October 29, 
LiberYfs- and Tories in 
amalgamating. 
17,1924. Macdonald urged 'all 
great national crisis vote f or the 
re there is no Liberal standing' 
1924). Forward was to claim that 
Inverness were in the process of 
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Liberals withdrew in favour of Unionists in Linlithgow and North 
Midlothian. In the former the Liberals revoked their decision. to 
find a candidate and, declaring the issue to be 'socialism versus 
anti-socialism', urged support for the Conservative 
(109) 
; and in the 
latter, while the local Liberals had set up a sub-committee to 
interview candidates, they eventually supported the 
(110) 
Conservative In other seats the Liberals did not pursue 
their candidatures without giving full endorsement to- the 
Conservatives. * In Aberdeen where the Scottish Liberals' Eastern 
Committee had sought a contest, the Liberal Association agreed 
initially to place only one candidate in the two seats of the city, 
but by the time of nominations, they found no one to stand. 
Equally in West Aberdeenshire, the Liberals withdrew, despite 
Labour's decision not to contest In Moray and Nairn, where 
the Liberals had wanted Sir Donald Maclean to stand, the Unionist 
received the endorsement of neighbouring Liberal MPs and of local 
(112) 
Liberals who signed his nomination form 
109 Scotsmýn, October 10, G asgow Herald, October 17,1924. 
Shinwell was later to argue 'the pact worked well so much so' 
that ardent temperance reformers' associated with the Liberal 
Party worked and voted for the Tory who was Secretary to the 
Brewers Association in Scotland'. (Forward, November 15, 
1924). 
110 Scotsman, October 15 and 21,1924. Labour's candidate claimed 
'most of the Liberal vote went against us'. (Forward, November 
8,1924). 
111 Glasgow Herald, October 14,17 and 20,1924. While the 
Scottish Liberals Eastern Committee decided Aberdeen 'should 
certainly be contested' only four Liberals voted for standing 
in both seats at the Aberdeen Liberal Association Executive. 
They were partly appeased by the fact that the Unionist in 
North Aberdeen had been a Free Trade Liberal (Scotsman, 
October 15,1924). 
112 Sc6tsman, October 10,16,18 and 29,1924. For example the 
Liberaf-Provost of Elgin argued 'they were safer under the 
Conservatives than under socialists'. 
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TABLE 6.1 
Anti-Socialist Arrangeme ts in 1924 
1924 




Stirling and Falkirk (20 October) 
East Stirling (24 October) 
St Rollox (16 October) 
Paisley (14 October) 
Inverness (17 October) 
Montrose (11 October) 
Dunfermline (27 October) 
Ross and Cromarty (S 16 October) 
Liberal with Conservative 
withdrawal or no candidate 
Tradeston (14 October) 
Greenock (18 October) 
Orkney & Shetland (15 October) 
Leith (16 October) 
(30 October) 
Caithness and Sutherland 
(23 October) 
W. Stirling (14 October) 
Rutherglen ( 13 October) 
Shettleston (23 October) 
Bridgeton ( 14 October) 
Glasgow Central (14 October) 
Govan (16 October) (S 30 October) 
Partick (16 October) 
Springburn (21 October) 
Hamilton (16 October) 
Dumbarton Burghs (11,17 October) 
West Renfrew (15 October) 
West Lothian (17 October) 
Linlithgow (21 October) 
Bothwell (S 14 October) 
Moray and Nairn (S 18 October) 
- Liberal informal support 
N. Midlothian (21 October) 
Conservative with Liberal withd 
Kilmarnock (S 30 October) 
Dunbartonshire (21 October) 
(Branches for Conservative) 
Hillhead ( 13 October) 
East Renfrew (13 October) 
Ayr (22 October) 
Aberdeen South (20 October) 
Aberdeen North (20 October) 
Moray and Nairn (16 October) 
Cathcart (16 October) 
Edinburgh Central (13 October) 
Kinross and West Perth (13 October 
South Ayr (13 October S) 
Dundee 
North Lanark (16 October) 
Kelvingrove (13 October) 
Maryhill (13 October) 
Source: GLaýgow Herald, Scotsman. The dates in brackets refer 
to the announcements of the arrangements during October 1924. 
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There were thus three types of 'arrangements'. In some seats, the 
Liberal or Unionist stood down or did not place a candidate in the 
field, but no official support was given by the other party, and it 
was usually resolved to keep the organisation on a 'war footing' to 
find a candidate for a future general election. In others there 
was informal support either through branches or local officials for 
the candidate of the other party. But in at least twenty of the 
fifty seats where there was no Liberal-Conservative contest, 
offical support was given to the candidate by the organisation 
which had no standard-bearer in the field. Table 6.1 shows how 
widespread in fact Liberal or Conservative support was for 
candidates who were not their own. 
But in some constituencies, where there was a Liberal incumbent, 
the Unionists refused to give way - in particular where there was 
no socialist threat of any substance. Unionists and Liberals found 
themselves in conflict in Galloway and Dumfries and in 
Aberdeenshire East although in all cases there was discussion in 
both camps of standing down and securing one anti-socialist 
candidate. In Banff the Unionists did place a candidate in the 
field despite pressure from Unionist headquarters to withdraw in 
favour of the Liberal, after it was feared a Labour intervention 
(113) 
was possible Independently of headquarters, the Unionist 
Association decided to support Templeton as an Independent 
Conservative without national endorsement and the Unionist 
headquarters eventually relented to give him official 
(114) 
sanction In Edinburgh no anti-socialist pact was possible, 
with Ford the Conservative member for Edinburgh North arguing that 
'while there are many Liberals with whom we would willingly 
113 Glas ow Herald, October 14 and 17,1924. 
114 Forward, Octobr 25,1924. * 
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(115) 
co-operatel , the Edinburgh Liberal MPs were not among them 
It did not prevent the Unionists thinking better of a proposal to 
oppose Wedgewood Benn in Leith and after his victory Benn was to 
acknowledge Conservative help, but elsewhere in Edinburgh there was 
(116) 
a full Unionist presence 
In both Midlothian South and Berwick and Haddington, where there 
was an acknowledged Labour strength, both Unionists and Liberals 
felt they were the most effective anti-socialist candidates. In 
the former, Unionist Central Office gave support to a continued 
Unionist fight 
(117) 
but in Berwick and Haddington -where the 
Unionists also pressed their case, the Liberals deserted their own 
candidate in sufficient numbers to allow a Unionist win 
(118) 
. 
only in nineteen of the seventy-one non-University seats in 
Scotland did Liberal and Conservative oppose each other. In four 
of these there were no Labour candidates. In other nine an offical 
Party candidate stood for the first time at a general election. In 
other four Labour's threat could be dismissed as negligible i. e. 
Argyll, Perth, Roxburgh and Selkirk and Edinburgh West. Indeed, in 
Roxburgh, Labour had more or less explicitly admitted that by 
running they offered no threat to the Liberals. Only in Lanark and 
South Midlothian therefore did Liberals or Conservatives risk 
losing a seat to the left by standing against the other. In 
Midlothian Labour did win, in Lanark the Conservative held on. 
115 Glas ow Herald,, October 16,1924. 
116 Scotsman, October 20,1924. 
117 Scotsman, October 15 and. LlMý2xý Herald, October 20. 
118 Herald, October 13. Spence the defeated Labour MP, 
claimed there had been 'a desertion of the Liberal candiddte 
by a section of his party who were drawn to support the 
Unionist candidaie'. He. argued that while in 1923 the Liberal 
had had one hundred motor cars at his disposal in 1924, there 
were 'less than a dozen'. (Forward, November 8. ) 
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IV THE CAMPAIGN AND RESULTS 
Labour did not expect to win outright power in 1924. But they 
expected to increase their numbers of seats.. Patrick Dollan 
recalls that 'Lord Arnold, an accountant, who had the ear of 
MacDonald had surveyed all the constituencies and advised.. that 
Labour would return with 250 seats'. But the campaign went 
strongly against Labour. The manifesto was comparatively mild, 
emphasising proposals for mining reorganisation, the taxing of land 
values and a national electricity generating system but not 
mentioning a capital levy, and concentrating on Labour's success in 
diplomacy and in building homes(l). Labour's style of campaigning 
in fact played into the opposition's hands. The general aim was to 
build the campaign around MacDonald's leadership. 'His campaign 
began on 13 October with meetings in Rugby, Crewe and 'Glasgow, 
followed on the next day by meetings in Edinburgh and culminating 
(2) in an evening rally in Newcastle He lost the initiative to the 
Conservatives at the outset. 
The Labour leadership suggested and the Party agreed - as 
Councillor Dollan was to remind MacDonald's critics at the inquest 
after the election - that 'the Campbell incident ... and the general (3) 
circumstances of the Russian Treaty' should be made the issue 
Ramsay MacDonald was to begin the campaign in Scotland. According 
to Lord Haldane his message was sound - but insufficiently 
inspirational to divert the anti-socialist cause from a campaign of 
'Red scare' tactics. Writing to his sister on 13 October Haldane 
was to say: 
0 
I Labour Manifesto, 1924. 
2C Cook, Age of Alignment, p. 298-299. 
3* 1925 Labour Party (Scottish Council) Conference Report, p. 32. 
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Ramsay has made at Glasgow a fine f ighting speech. But 
it has no great note in it like that of Mr Gladstone in 
1879. The Liberals and Conservatives have practically 
united too. HHA may not get in. But no one knows. (4) 
Six days later Haldane was sure of the outcome - and of Labour's 
loss of initiative in the campaign: 
We *shall be beaten. Ramsay made a bad start at Glasgow 
in his choice of a broad issue and Asquith pinioned. him 
skilfully next night. How differently Mr Gladstone 
opened his election campaign in 1879. (5) 
But if MacDonald was to allow the Russian issues to dominate the 
campaign, and thus allow his oppo! ients to equate Bolshevism with 
socialism in attacking both, Macdonald 'was to argue that Scotland 
had 'entered upon a contest of an absolutely unique kind'. 
We have fought Liberals and Tories before. .. and we have 
lifted up the banner of Labour as against both. But down 
in the constituencies there are no more Tories, no more 
Liberals. Yesterday the wolf agreed to lie down with the 
lamb, and issued a joint programme ... from now on in the 
west of Scotland they fight under the white feather. 
They have already run away. The Liberal Party has gone 
under the shelter of the Tory huns in order to prevent it 
being hopelessly wiped out round about Glasgow. (6) 
Despite 'the wild and wet weather' of polling day, the 1924 
election saw the highest national poll under the new franchise of 
1918. Turnout in Scotland, which was historically lower than in 
the rest of Britian, went up by 7.2% in contrast with 5.9% in 
Britain as a whole. Labour candidates increased their votes, with 
Haldane to his sister, Haldane Papers NLS (10/10/24). 
5 ifaldane to his sister, Haldane papers NLS (19/10/24). 
6 Glasgow Herald, October 15,1924. 
354 
only two exceptions, Peebles South and Montrose, and even in the 
twelve seats the party lost, its vote rose, in some cases by more 
than 1,000 such as Berwick and Haddington and East Renfrew. Labour 
polled just over 40% of the vote, and was the largest party in 
terms of votes. However it fielded seven more candidates than ýhe 
Conservatives and its vote per candidate was slightly less. 
Nevertheless Labour's representation fell to 26, and the 
Conservative representation rose to 36. Liberals were reduced to 
eight seats and in three of these there had been no Labour or 
Conservative opposition. 
The importance of the Zinoviev letter should not be underestimated. 
As Forward remarked: 'in the villages and the county districts we 
were swept away on the tide of the Zinovieff Red Plotism 1(7) . 
Climie in Kilmarnock spoke of 'money influence, mis-statements, 
misrepresentation and falsehoods', and Dickson in South Lanark of 
'the unreasoning fear of bolshevism rampant ... and the lack of 
political education among a large section of the working class'; 
Johnston in West Stirlingshire said 'the red plot stuntt could not 
be exposed in time in the outlying districts. In Camlachie Stephen 
(8) 
spoke of the Red Plot as a 'bombshell' 
The election performance of each of the parties is summarised in 
Tables 6.2,6.3 and 6.4. Labour's vote share was substantially 
above that of 1923, and with 41% of the poll in Scotland, the party 
performed much better than the party in the rest of the country. 




1924 Election: Scotland/G. B. Share of Votes by Party 
Scotland Great Britain 
Conservative 40.8 46.8 









Source: FW Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 









































But as the party intervened in less winnable constituencies in the 
rural areas, the party's average vote remained static. The real 
difference in 1924 was the concentration of the anti-socialist vote 
in one party- constitutency by constituency, and with 40.8% of the 
vote in Scotland, the Conservatives showed that they were the main 
beneficiary from this process. Even the average vote for each 
party reflected the Conservatives' pre-7eminence. Liberals could 
manage only an average of less than 8,500 in the seats they 
contested, less than in . 1923, wh-ere the Conservatives improved on 
their 1923 performance by a third, winning the largest average vote 
of the three parties. The distribution of new members in 
Parliament reflected this. While the Conservatives lost only one 
seat, Motherwell, they gained eleven from the Liberals and twelve 
from Labour. 
Cook has suggested that in 1924 the Conservative victory looked 
better than it was since in Liberal/ Conservative contests, the 
swing to ' Conservatism wa s relatively small, and in 
Conservative/Labour contests the swing was large only in the middle 
class areas, while negligible in mining seats. Cook suggests 
qualifications to this conclusion in his discussion of Scotland and 
there can be no doubt that here the Liberals crucially affected the 
whole outcome. Conservatives had either beaten Labour because of 
Liberal withdrawals or beaten Liberals in either two or three party 
contests. They seemed to have the best of both worlds, benefiting 
both from Liberal interventions and withdrawals, and it was to set 
the tone of Scottish politics for the next fifty years, until the 
swing to nationalism in February 1974. 
Conservative response to the election result was generally 
enthusiastic. The Central Council Executive believed that the 
'magnificent results' were 'greatly due to the large amount of work 
done in the constituencies'prior to the election'(9). While the 
SUA Central Council Executive, 3 November 1924. 
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Glasgow Unionist Association had less cause for rejoicing, the 
Eastern Division found itself 'successful beyond expectations I(i . 
0) 
. 
The election certainly encouraged the party, which already had 
fifty full-time organisers, to extend their work. The 1924 report 
referred to the 'awakening which had taken place in the 
constituencies after the previous election and the increased 
efficiency of the organisation generally 
As far as the Liberals were concerned, Cook has suggested of the 
1924 eiection results: 
The outcome of the crucial 1924 election was the virtual 
annihilation of the party. After this debacle with the 
Liberals reduced to a parliamentary rump, the party was 
never again to be considered as a party of government. 
This factor underlay Lloyd George's failure in 1929-02) 
The Liberals were victims rather than beneficiaries of the Scottish 
'pacts' which appeared to have been successful in concentrating the 
anti-socialist vote against Labour. Labour candidates such as 
Shinwell in Linlithgow, Murray in West Renfrew, Spence in Berwick 
and Haddington, and Clarke in North Midlothian believed that the 
pact was responsible for their defeat. Shinwell argued that 'the 
pact worked so well that most ardent temperance reformers formerly 
associated with the Liberal Party worked and voted for the Tory who 
was Secretary of the Brewers' Association in Scotland'( 
13) 
, and 
Clarke concluded that 'most of the Liberal vote went against him' 
and argued that the Liberal-Unionist pact 'worked more effectively 
10 SUA Eastern Divisional Council Report, 1925, p. 8. 
SUA Scottish Unionist Association, Annual Report, 1925, p. 5. 
The Glasgow Unionist Association, however found the 
vpositýon... still far from satisfactory'. 
12 C Cook, op. cit., p. 341. 
13 Forward, November 8,1924. 
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than most of us though it would' Even outside the industrial 
areas, McKay, the beaten candidate in Moray and Nairn, concluded 
(14) 
that 'the compact with the official Liberals was effective' 
The 'pact' that covered fifteen seats saved only Greenock for the 
Liberals. It meant that in addition to Glasgow Central, which they 
held already, the Conservatives won Maryhill, Partick, West 
Renfrew, North Lanark, and Kilmarnock. They did not win 
Rutherglen, Coatbridge and Airdrie. Through the wider co-operation 
they also managed to pull off wins in Stirling and Clackmannan, 
Linlithgow, North Midlothian, East Renfrew, Berwick and Haddington 
and Dunbartonshire. In ten of the twelve seats the Conservatives 
won from Labour, Liberals had stood down to allow a straight fight 
and the election was a pre-run for 1931 with Conservatism the sole 
opponent of Labour in seats where Labour could not yet or at all 
command a majority vote. In only two of twelve gains from Labour 
was there a three cornered fight, in Berwick and Haddington and 
Lanark. In the first, agreement with the Liberals had been 
impossible and in the second, the Liberal candidate made a token 
intervention. Cook suggests that in those English seats where no 
Liberal stood votes went from Liberal to Labour as well as to 
Conservative, but in Scotland, the swing to Conservative was twice 
as high in seats where Liberals withdrew, 9.2% against 4.6% in the 
rest of Britian. 
Apart from the pact, the second source of the Conservative triumph 
was a swing from Liberalism, especially in the rural areas. 
Liberals lost thpir urban base in Edinburgh (with Leith the nearest 
to power the Liberals now were in Scotland's capital), and it did 
look as if the urban middle class were moving further to 
r4 Ibid . 
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Conservatism, but they also lost established Libe'ral strongholds in 
the North East, the Highlands, the East coast of Scotland and the 
Borders. In eleven three cornered contests, Liberals were beaten 
by Conservatives and in nine of these (the exceptions were East 
Fife and Galloway) Labour interventions were the decisive factor. 
By winning radical votes that had previously gone to Liberals, 
Labour squeezed them out. If the Conservatives had not been so 
generous in standing down in other rural seats, Liberals might have 
lost more. So weak were they that they also lost all four straight 
fi; hts with the Conservatives. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LABOUR PARTY, 1924-1929 
I THE PARTY'S CHANGIRG CHARACTER 
The 1924 election provided Labour with a short term boost in its 
membership and a stimulus to its organisation. Labour had gained 
more votes and fought more seats than ever before despite its 
defeat at the polls. There were, of course, immediate differences 
of opinion on both the achievement of the Labour Government and the 
reasons for the electoral setback. At the 1925 Conference all 
views were reflected. While William Shaw, the Council's Chairman, 
accepted that unemployment could not be solved under capitalism, he 
argued that: 
The value and amount of legislative work accomplished by 
the Labour Government stood comparison with that of any 
other Government with the power of a majority and a long 
term of office. (1) 
Maxton however, was relieved by defeat in the election, and 
the opportunities it gave for propaýanda work for socialism: 
The Labour Government could not make capitalism work any 
more than any other Government. It could not solve the 
great problems that were facing the nation unless they 
had a mandate to enable them to put a socialist policy 
into full operation. If they could not get that mandate 
their place was not on the Government benches trying to 
run a machine which they knew they could not run but on 
the opposition benches propagating their principles that 
could get a mandate at an early date. (2) 
0 
Labour Party, Scottish Council, Conference Report, 1925. p. 27. 
2 Maxton's views were to be expressed in a regular column in 
New Leader. 
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Perhaps Dollan summarised the main view of the party, he wrote more 
than six months after the election: 
There was no socialist revolution in Britain in 1924 
because the conditions for revolution were not opportune 
and because there were too few socialists. There is much 
to do before we have educated a majority into accepting 
principles but the chances of educating that majority are 
more favourable than ever before. (3) 
The differences which were to beset Labour in the future, were 
highlighted by the ILP and the Labour Party Scottish Conferences in 
January and March 1925 respectively. In January the ILP agreed by 
only 127 votes to 86 to oppose Communist Party af f iliation to the 
Labour Party. While Maxton argued for it, Dollan saw Communists as 
'a disruptive influence' and argued Labour had only made headway by 
(4) distinguishing itself from the Communist Party 
At the Labour Party's Scottish Conference, the issue was not 
Communist membership, but another one that was to dominate the 
events of the next few years, Ramsay MacDonald's leadership. After 
the election Maxton had tried to encourage Lansbury, Henderson, and 
Wheatley to stand against MacDonald although in the end only five 
(5) MPs had voted against his unopposed reselection At the 
Scottish Conference, Dollan argued that MacDonald had- followed 
party policy in choosing to fight on the Campbell incident and the 
Russian treaty, and his speech led Maxton to accuse him of 'taking 
up the position that the leader of the party should be above 
(6) 
criticism'; in reply Dollan denied that this was what he felt 
Forward, May 2,1925. 
Glasgow Herald, January 12,1925. 
5 The debate over MacDonald's 'leadership' is discussed in D 
Marquand, Ram-say MacDonald, (London, 1975). 
6 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1925, p. 32-33. 
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These two issues, attitudes to the extreme left and loyalty to the 
leadership of Macdonald, were to be the key issues of the next five 
years in a political context that saw first the rise in militancy 
that preceded the General Strike, and then the decline in activity 
in the atmosphere of defeat which followed. The experience of 
Labour Government had raised broad questions about strategy, 
ideology, and the role of party factions which were not fully 
resolved 'by the time of the 1929 election. But by 1929 they were 
on their way to being resolved. With the failure of Communist 
Party moves to infiltrate and control both the trade union movement 
and the Labour Party in Scotland, the party was more firmly wedded 
to the right than previously. But really what moved Labour more to 
the right in 'Scotland was, first of all, the split in the miners' 
union, which deprived the left of a traditional bulwark, and, 
secondly, the defeat of the left wing within the Independent Labour 
Party in Scotland. The Independent Labour Party in 1929 still 
dominated the politics of the Scottish left. While on the British 
stage, Maxton and the ILP were interchangeable terms, in Scotland 
"the leadership, both ideological and organisational, had shifted 
from the Maxton-Wheatley group to the group around Patrick Dollan 
who were loyal to Ramsay MacDonald. The history of Labour's 
development in Scotland from 1924 to 1929 is, more than anything 
else, the story of the changing policy position of the Independent 
Labour Party. 
In this Chapter we will examine first the state of Labour Party 
organisation; - second, the difficulties the party faced over 
discipline, posed in particular by Communist and Minority Movement 
activity; third, the impact of the splits within the Miners' Union; 
and finally the battle for control of the Independent Labour Party 
in Scotland. Developments in all -four areas are intimately 
related, determining what sort of organisation the Labour Party 
would be in 1929. It is the argument of the chapter that while the 
Labour Party per se was very much a shell organisation even in 
1929, still reliant on the strength of the Independent Labour Party 
and the trade unions, the character of Scottish Labourism was 
established. In left-wing politics Scotland would never again lead 
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The years from 1924 to 1929 confirmed the pattern set immediately 
after the war: far from being a mass. membership organisation, the 
Labour Party in Scotland was a skeletal force, weak in membership 
and organisation. While leading England in Parliamentary 
representation, Scotland lagged dismally in individual membership 
figures. As Arthur Henderson told the Scottish Conference of the 
Labour Party in 1926, the Labour Party could be said to be not 
doing well : in Scotland, since its membership fell so- far below its 
(7) 
voting strength 
Membership figures for the 
compiled for the first time 
individual membership figure of 
every thirty of whom was in 
addressed the 1929 Labour Party 
general election, he reported 
rhole country were comprehensively 
only in 19 28. They suggested an 
300,000 for Britain 
(8) 
, only one in 
Scotland. When Herbert Morrison 
Conference immediately prior to the 
that Scotland lagged behind other 
areas of Britain, with only 11,099 members, an average of only one 
hundred and fifty per constituency. He said that he 'did not want 
to attack Scotland because all over the individual membership was 
bad', but it appeared that twhile England and Wales were not doing 
their bit, Scotland was even more backward'(9). 
Throughout the period there were attempts made to improve 
organisation. At the 1926 conference a Committee was set up to 
improve organisation with the particular aim of 'strengthening of 
individual membership and local ward committees'. Its proposer, 
from the National Union of Clerks, believed that: 'there were 
thousands of persons not yet prepared to join any of the socialist 
societies who would be willing to join the Labour Tarty as 
(10) 
members' In its report the Committee had urged all local 
7 Labour Party Scottish Conference Repott, 1926, p, 35& 
8 Labour Party Scottish Confýrence Report, 1929, *ý. 38. 
Ibid . 
10 Ibid., Report, 1926, p. 38. 
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parties to campaign for more members and to improve their contact 
with Scottish and National Headquarters. Leaflets urging 
house-to-house collections from non-members were also issued by the 
Scottish Executive Committee in the hope of raising additional 
finance 
The Scottish Executive was at its most vigorous in pursuing its 
long-standing request for representation on the National Executive 
Committee, as of right, Wake's 
ieply 
as National Agent as usual 
rejected- its request and asked it bluntly to put its own house in 
order: 
What is really required in Scotland is a wider 
development of our individual membership so that the 
strength of our constituency 0' rganisations may 
approximate more to our voting strength in the divisions. 
The constituency parties should be engaged by the 
Scottish Council to send their full representation to the 
annual conference, and if this were done, there would be 
no need for special representation through the Scottish 
Executive(12). 
In 1927 after a visit to Scotland, RaInsay MacDonald was so worried 
about the state of the Scottish Party that he had urged a meeting 
between the ILP and the National Executive Committee arguing that 
the state of organisation in Scotland in preparation for the 
(13) 
election required special and immediate attention 
11 Ibid., Report, 1927, p. 6-7. 
12 Labour Party, Report on request by Scottish Executive for 
Additional Representation, Scottish Executive Papers, June 20, 
1927. 
13 Labour Party, Meeting of Scottish Exeýutive and National 
Executive, Scottish Executive Papeis, December 12,1927. 
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The problem had not been resolved by the time of the 1929 election. 
In introducing in 1930 a new plan, urging more individual 
membership and affiliations to the party, the Scottish Executive 
spokesman argued that 'for once he wanted Scotland to follow the 
lead of England where there were some small towns who had 
14) individual membership of over 3,0001( At this time new 
collection schemes were being devised which contemplated the 
payment of a commission or salary to reliable collectors since 
voluntary collections seem a failure 
(15) 
. Labour's National Agent, 
JS Middletoý, could speak at the 1931 Conference of a vast 
membership 'lying latent in the large Labour votes', but one 
delegate introduced a note of scepticism by pointing out that a 
(16) 
very large majority of the existing members were also inactive 
Scottish Labour w4s also slow in organising women's sections and 
the women's vote. It was claimed in 1925 that in that year alone 
fifty new women's sections had been. formed and at this rate it was 
thought possible there would be scarcely any division without such 
(17) 
sections by 1926 Yet in 1931 the Scottish women's organiser 
concluded that 'as a rule progress in women's organisation depends 
on the general state of the party machine in a constituency and in 
certain constituencies any advance in women's organisations will 
18) have to wait on improved general organisations'( . Henderson was 
right in 1926 to suggest that, in this area too, Scotland lagged 
behind England and Wales and that although 'there had been a recent 
improvement... much remained to be done'(19). 
14 Labour Party, Scottish Conference Report, 1930. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., Report, 1931. 
17 Ibid., Report, 1925. 
18, Ibid., Report, 1931. 
19 Ibid., Report, 1926, p. 35. 
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There were of course women's conferences. One in 1925 had 
attracted up to 300 delegates for one of its sessions and-had dealt 
( 20) * 
with questions from pensions to education and co-operation In 
Glasgow the ILP's Women's Advisory Council had organised a 
conference on the question of food prices, with a motion passed to 
lorganise boycotts' against buying commodities which were 
overpriced. Further conferences were planned on health, child 
welfare, housing, and widows' and mothers pensions. There was even 
a plan for backstreet meetings with women in afternoons and 
(21) 
evenings At the annual Women's Conference in 1928 over three 
hundred attended the afternoon session and in the same year a 
series of local conferences and day schools were held round the 
(22) 
country When the Scottish Executive asked for women delegates 
to attend the National Conference of Labour Women and proceeded to 
ask for full voting representation on the Standing Joint Committee, 
the Women's Annual Conference, and the National Conference, they 
were told by the National Women's Organiser, Marion Phillips that 
tat the present time taking the number of women organised in 
Scotland in comparison with any other of the nine divisions in the 
(23) 
country, Scotland is not entitled to special representation' 
Table 7.1 makes it clear bow few women's sections were actually 
affiliated to the Scottish Council. 
20 Forward, March 14,1925. 
21 Ibid., May 9,1925. 
'22 Ibid., March 12,1928. 
23 Labour Party Report on Request by Scottish Executive Council 
for Additional Representation, June 20,1927. 
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TABLE 7.1 
Labour Party : Affiliation of Women's Sections 
Women's Sections Affiliated 
1927 13 (a) 
1929 23 b) 
1930 23 ( C) 
1931 26 (d) 
Source: 
a) Scottish Exe. cutive Report, 1927, p. 34. 
b) Executive Report, 1929, p-23 
C) Executive Report, 1930, p-25 
d) Executive Report, 1931, p-26. 
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Despite the activities of the Independent Labour Party and the 
conscious decision to place more candidates in the field in 1924, 
Labour also was still poorly organised in Scotland's rural areas. 
This formed part of Arthur Henderson's criticism at the 1926 
Conference. However it was still left to the Independent Labour 
Party to make whatever headway could be achieved in the 
countryside. At their 1925 Conference the ILP made a special 
appeal for E500 for rural propaganda. Stewart noted there was a 
Northern Federation, an Argyllshire Federation, and a grouping of 
ILP branches in Inverness-shire and Ross-shire, but he diagnosed 
the barrier to progress as a problem of policy: 
They were all agreed that the Highland land should not be 
used for sport but when it comes to the question as to 
how the land should be used, they were at variance. Some 
favoured crofts and small holdings and afforestation. 
Others advocated sheep farming and cattle raising, while 
others maintained that the one and only thing to be done 
was to nationalise the land. (25) 
At the 1926 Conference the Oban branch of the ILP proposed its 
scheme for local control of nationalised land and complained that 
Labour was losing the initiative to Liberals and Lloyd George in 
land policy. Unless something was done there would be 'a distinct 
(26) 
reaction towards Liberalism in the rural areas of Scotland' 
Land policy exercised even Ramsay MacDonald who wrote in Forward of 
the importance of securing a policy, but the difficulty of 
providing answers to questions raised about what that policy should 
(27) 
be 
25 Forward, January 1,1925. 
26 Forward, January 16,1926. 
27 Ibid., January 9,1926. 
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In March 1927 the Scottish Executive did agree on the need for an 
agricultural campaign and formed a committee to supervise- its 
organisation. It ran into financial problems, though a number of 
meetings were held which were judged to have been 'on the whole 
successful 
(28). 
It was -the Labour Party's most ambitious entry 
into the rural areas around a new agricultural policy pamphlet. An 
agricultural campaign launched by the National Executive was 
planned in two stages: persuading rural constituencies first to 
achieve 'the widest possible distribution' of literature prior to a 
second stage, eight local conferences in Perth, Galashiels, 
Haddington, Aberdeen, Elgin, Kilmarnock, Dumfries, and Lanark, all 
held between June and August 1927, with prominent national figures 
(29) 
as main speakers 
Almost immediately however the National Agent and the ILP's Scottish 
Council were asking the Scottish Executive to co-operate in further 
action, in organising work in rural constituencies, after MacDonald 
had singled out rural areas for 'special and immediate 
(30) 
attention' Consequently, a consultative committee of the ILP I 
and the Labour Party did meet but was hampered by the shortage of 
funds. 
The Labour Party's national agent had urged more attention to 
organising rural seats and with the assistance of Joseph Duncan the 
28 Labour Party, Scottish Executive, March 14,1927. 
29 Letter from Ben Shaw, Scottish Secretary to Constituency 
Parties, 22 April, 1927, contained in Minutes of Roxburgh and 
Selkirk DLP, April 24,1927. 
30 Ibid., December 12,1927. 
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Scottish Executive tried to prepare a scheme for the 1929 election 
in rural constituencies. A rural conference was held in June-but 
as the Executive reported, I the outcome has not been quite what 
would be desired, largely for' lack of volunteers in the country 
(31) districts' In 1929 the rural organisation was still almost 
universally poor. The Executive report spoke of 'an almost total 
lack of such organisation as we have in industrial districts, the 
impossibility of raising sufficient money locally as well as of 
securing men and womem of sufficient independence to take office', 
with 'locai propagandists conspicuous by their absences yet'. 
Consideration of expense and time made it impractical for 
industrial districts to make good these rural deficiencies and 'the 
ideal of one great national fund' to finance propaganda and 
(32) 
candidates was considered 'remote' . 
A measure of how big werethe problems of organising rural areas can 
be seen from the experience of the Roxburgh and Selkirk 
constituency from the mid twenties onwards. While it contained 
three large centres of population - Galashiels, Hawick and 
Selkirk - as well as a number of small towns-, the Labour candidate 
in 1924, Dallas, argued that 'there are so many places and the area 
is so scattered that unless there is someone all the time trying to 
link up and co-ordinate the work of the party there is no possible 
(33) 
chance of making progress' Nowhere did the party try to 
31 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Executive Report, 1930, p. 8. 
32 1930 Conference Report, p. 2-4. 
33 Roxburgh and Selkirk, DLP, November 14,1926. 
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organise itself in greater detail and with more enthusiasm. At 
their Annual General Meeting in 1926, the party's delegates he. ard 
that membership ran at 1250, with 700 men and 550 women, and that 
in addition twenty-six trade union branches, representing 926 
(34) 
members, were affiliated . While Galashiels boasted 500 members 
and Hawick and Selkirk 300 members, Jedburgh, Melrose, Newton, and 
Newcastleton claimed 50 members each. The party set on making 
itself a most modern party organisation. They planned to build 
their own hall, owned their own motor car, and for a time hired a 
part-time, then full-time organiser. Their constitdency scheme of 
organisation made 'each local Labour Party responsible for regular 
distribution of literature in adjacent villages'; they drew up a 
Icensusl of party sympathisers and what they might do to help; and 
(35) 
locally they attempted to base their organisation on streets 
But that was insufficient for any significant progress to be made. 
Their experience with the first full time organiser, JM Airlie -a 
former Labour candidate - was an unhappy one and the party, which 
terminated the contract for financial reasons 
(36) 
, and the organiser 
parted on less than amicable terms, with Airlie saying 'I have felt 
(37) 
uncomfortable all the time I have occupied the position' And 
without full-time assistance, the adopted candidate George Dallas, 
a sponsored candidate from the Workers' Union, found the going 
tough. 
34 Ibid., March 27,1926. 
35 Ibid., March 27,1926; May 4,1927. 
36 Roxburgh and Selkirk DLP, Minutes, November, 23,1925. 
37 Letter dated December 24,1925 to CLP Roxburgh and Selkirk CLP 
Minutes, December 20,1925. The constituency President 
complained that he was 'not satisfied at what was being 
accomplished ... not getting value for their money and what they 
wanted was something tangible done in the way of organising. 
It was all very well to say the results of meetings could not 
be seen at once but he contended that instead of things 
improving ... at present there was no local labour party branch in Jedburgh or Kelso'. (DLP July 19,1925. ) 
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In May 1927 he resigned when four of the branches refused to 
subscribe to the appointment of a new full-time agent: 'I do. not 
think the divisional party are doing justice to the party nor to 




With their own newspaper, The Borders Observer whose first issue 
was a 3000 print run made a profit, the- party reorganised itself 
(39) 
for propaganda purposes . But following the General Strike, the 
party membership fell substantially. By December 1927, it was less 
than 750, not much more than half what it had been in 1924. In all 
areas the constituency party had lost ground, particularly in towns 
like Selkirk where its membership was almost non-existent by 
(40) 
1928 By 1929 the party were unable to cover the full E830 
they had spent in the election campaign and their new candidate, 
(41) 
Robert Gibson, was out of pocket for his efforts 
Undoubtedly these rural difficulties of Labour should not be 
overemphasised, as Joseph Duncan was to remark after the 1929 
election. Whereas only six had turned up to a Labour meeting in 
1906 in Moray and Nairn, the party now had more than 6000 votes: 
'In 1906 we had eight branches of the ILP between Inverness and 
Edinburgh, North of Aberdeen there was a solitary outpost in 
Inverness held by seven of the faithful, and this year all the 
constituencies were fought by Labour candidates financed by the 
(42) 
parties in the constituencies' 
38 Roxburgh and Selkirk DLP, Minutes, May 1,1927. 
39 Ibid., November 14,1926. 
40 Ibid., December 3,1927. 
41 Ibid., October 13,1929 and December 8,1929. Things got 
worse. By 1931 the party's AGM recorded another 'fall in 
membership which had reached a very low mark so low that some 
branches have disaffiliated themselves from the CLP', Minutes, 
December 31,1931. 
42 Forward, July 13,1929. 
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However most candidates 
the central belt with 
many ... outlying divisior 
elections and little 
(44). 
Register' 
in rural areas were in fact brought from 
considerable difficulties(43), and . 
'in 
is there is hardly any propaganda between 
organisation in connection with the 
Weak amongst women and weak in rural areas, the party was also weak 
in industrial areas. With not much more than 10,000 members 
throughout the twenties the Labout Party in Scotland remained a 
skeleton organisation. Shaw of the Glasgow Trades Council told the 
1930 Scottish Conference in Glasgow that 'their past methods had 
failed' to reach thousands of people in Scotland who, he believed, 
(45) 
were prepared to support the party financially in fact there 
were never more than half, and normally less than a third, of 
constituencies affiliated to the Labour Party in Scotland as 
divisional Labour Parties as Table 7.2 shows. While Scottish 
organisers claimed there were divisional Labour Parties in almost 
every constituency from the early nineteen twenties onwards, they 
were obviously little more than shadow organisations, which masked 
in some cases control by trade unions or the ILP, and in others the 
absence of any activities between election times. When at the 1930 
Conference a motion urged increased affiliation to the party from 
the branches and constituencies, the Executive spokesman had to 
report that while in some cases non-affiliation might be due to 
apathy, in others it was due to iantagonism to the individuals 
43 Labour Party Scottish Conference, Executive Report, 1931, p. 6. 
44 Ibid., p. 4. 
45 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1930, p. 
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responsible for the local organisation'(46). By this he seemed to 
mean that local union branches could be squeezed out . of 
representation on divisional parties and abstain from local 
activity in some resentment. 
It was Arthur Woodburn who summed up the paradox of the official 
Labour Party in Scotland. When he succeeded to the job of Scottish 
Secretary in 1932 - 14 years after the war, he found: 
There was practically no Labour Party in Scotland. The 
Labour Party was largely a federated body and the real 
drive was in the Independent Labour Party. (47) 
With the disaffiliation of the Independent Labour Party, the 
problems were then 'immense'; 'My job was practically to build from 
scratch' 
(48) 
46 Labour Party, Scottish Conference, Report, 1930, p. 39 
47 A Woodburn, Unpublished Autobiography in Woodburn Papers, 
p. 66. 
48 Ibid., p. 68. 
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TABLE 7.2 
Scottish Constituency Organisation 
Labour Parties Affiliated 
1927 25 D. L. P. 
6 Trades and Labour Councils (T. L. C. ) 
1928 24 D. L. P. 
(2) 
3 T. L. C. 
(3) 
1929 25 D. L. P. 
I B. L. P. 
3 T. L. C. 
1930 27 D. L. P. 
(4) 
1 B. L. P. 
2 T. L. C. 
1931 25D. L. p. 
(5) 
1 B. L. P. 
3 T. L. C. 
Source: Labour Party Scottish Council. 
1 p. 33-35 Conference Report, 1927 
2 p. 21-26, Conference Report, 1928 
3 p. 21. p. 23. Conference Report, 1929 
4 p. 24-25,26, Conference Report, 1930 
5 p. 24-25, Conference Report, 1931. 
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Ii SCOTTISH LABOUR AND COMMUNISM 
For most of the time the concern of the central Scottish and 
British organisations was discipline - not only in relation to the 
Communist threat, but also to those on the lef t and r ight x4ho 
disagreed with the official party. From the evidence it seems that 
the Scottish Executive were far less conciliatory than the National 
Headquarters and often caused the National Pariy some 
embarrassment. 
For example at a special meeting in 1928 of the Scottish- Executive 
with Henderson, Lansbury, and Wake, representing the National 
Executive, problems were raised about a number of Scottish 
candidates. Rose, the Aberdeen North Member of Parliament, was 
unpopular with the Trades Council in Aberdeen; Johnston, the 
Dundee MP., faced similar problems with the Trades Council in 
Dundee. In the Leith constituency, there were difficulties with 
a left-wing candidate, Bob Wilson, and in Paisley, with a right 
wing Member of Parliament, Rosslyn Mitchell On top of that 
were the problems with the seats sponsored by the miners' union in 
Scotland. The Chairman of the Executive argued that 'if every 
candidate were allowed to go his own way there would soon be an end 
to the party', and Councillor Shaw, a former Chairman') who was 
secretary of Glasgow Trades Council, stated, that 'The National 
Conference laid down the policy of the party and if the candidates 
were not to conform to it we would be a mere rabble'. Another 
member of the Executive, Councillor Waugh, pointed out that if the 
ILP or other organisations were against the Party's constitution or 
policy, they too should be disciplined. While Lansbury appeared to 
be especially lukewarm, the Scottish Executive made the running of 
the issue of the demand for written pledges of loyaýty fr. om 
(2) 
candidates 
1 Labour Party Scottish Executive Meeting, April 14,1928. 
2 Ibid. 
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The battle over Communist affiliation and infiltration into the 
Labour Party was the major issue to occupy attention in Scotlarýd in 
the late twenties; it more than anything prevented proper 
attention being given either to policy or organisation. As one 
member. of the- Executive argued forcibly during one of many 
inconclusive discussions of the question: 'Time was being wasted in 
dealing with communist matters at every meeting and in submitting 
reports of Committees. They ought to spend it on dealing with 
housing and trade union questions and propaganda' 
(3). However, the 
Chairman believed that it was 'impossible to escape dealing with 
communist matters which were forced on them and were part of the 
duty of administration as laid down by the Scottish constitution 
and remit made to us by the National Executive' . Another member 
argued bluntly that 'the party would never be healthy until it had 
been thoroughly purified by the exclusion of the communist 
element' 
(4). 
The Scottish Party were only agents of the, Natignal Party in 
enforcing the constitution. But the problem occupied so much 
attention first because there was more communist activity (a 1926 
(5) 
survey found around 2000 Communists in Scotland) and more 
support within the ranks of official Labour for greater involvement 
by Communists in the Labour Party, aýd secondly because the party 
rules on-the matter were capable of more than one interpretation. 
The 1924 Conference had rejected decisively Communist Party 
affiliation. It had decided that no member of the Communist Party 
was eligible for endorsement as a Labour Party candidate or 
eligible for Labour Party membership. But that decision left 
3 Ibid., January 17,1927. 
Ibid. 
t 
5S McIntyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working Class 
Militýýjjcy in Interwar Britain, (Cambridge, 1980), p. 28. 
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unclear the position of Communists who were trade union and trades 
council delegates from sections of the Labour Movement 
. 
to 
constituency or trades council organisations. Both the National 
Executive and the Scottish Executive sent out circulars throughout 
1924 and 1925 explaining their positions on the matter 
(6) 
, and the 
latter expressed its dismay at the remaining strength of Communist 
influence as a result of these ambiguities. The Scottish Executive 
wanted in fact to go further than the 1924 Conference decision and 
proposed to the National Executive that men's and women's sections 
be given the same *status as branches of trade unions in order to 
reduce their delegates to constituency parties 'because of the 
swamping of certain local Labour parties by individual section 
delegations largely of a communistic kind' 
(7) 
. But to their regret 
their recommendation was not accepted by the National Executive 
(8) 
Committee 
At least nine divisional Labour Parties and the Edinburgh, Dundee, 
Glasgow, and Coatbridge Trades Councils, were unhappy with the 
(9) 
Executive circulars During 1925 the major problems that arose 
were from Trades Councils - Coatbridge and Greenock - and Glasgow 
whose delegation to the Executive could not guarantee they would 
(10) 
not support communist candidates 
6 Labour Party Scottish Executive, March 9,1925. 
7 Ibid., April 4,1925. 
8 Ibid., May 11,1925. 
9 Ibid., June 8,1925. 
10 Ibid . 
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The Scottish Executive had refused to receive a deputation from 
Greenock 'until satisfactory guarantees had been given that in 
future no nomination of a member of the Communist party would be 
accepted by them ... and that in all other aspects the constitution 
and rules would be adhered to'"'). When the Trades Council did 
reply the Executive were dissatisfied with its pledge and referred 
(12) 
the matter - 
to the STUC In the Coatbridge constituency two 
bodies were in existence: a Coatbridge and Airdrie Trades Council 
which admitted that 'the Communists had for a considerable time 
dominated' its proceedings, and an Airdrie Trades and Labour 
Council 
(13) 
Eventually ' the Coatbridge Trades Council was 
(14) 
recommended for disaffiliation The Scottish Executive seemed 
to feel that a solution to this sort of problem lay in separating 
(15) 
industrial and political activity . But from head office, 
Wake 
urged 'the importance of trades and labour councils combining both 
functions which was almost now universal and had succeeded 
16) 
well'( 
From, the 1925 Conference onwards rules were made harsher with 
respect to Communist involvement although some Scottish Members of 
Parliament and local parties-had become prominent in a campaign to 
rescind the 1924 decisions and tried to prevent an even harsher 
line. MPs who supported a circular against the expulsion 
11 Ibid., March 6, 1925. 
12 Ibid., August 10,1925. 
13 Ibid., May 11, 1925. 
14- Ibid., November 23,1925. 
15 Ibid., April 4, 1925, October 12,1925. 
16 Ibid., October 12,1925. 
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of Communists, included not only Maxton, Wheatley, Kirkwood, 
McLean, Stephen, and Buchanan, but also Tom Johnston; and Shinwell, 
who had lost his seat, was also known to oppose going further than 
the 1924 decision. 
At the 1925 Conference, however, a recommendation that Communist 
Party members could not be delegates from individual sections of 
the party, and -urging that trade unions refrain from nominating 
Communists as local or national delegates, was carried. It meant a 
tighter rein on membership and affiliation * from the Scottish 
Executive. The Glasgow Trades Council protested against this, and 
three constituencies refused immediately to comply, Bridgeton, 
Paisley and Coatbridge, and later Gorbals and Springburn. Thus in 
January 1926 it was recommended that Gorbals, Paisley, Bridgeton 
and Springburn be disaffiliated and refused credentials for the 
(17) 
Annual Conf erence Others like Maryhill and Paisley objected 
but were brought into line. After much dispute Glasgow Trades 
Council by a 'very large majority' decided to comply with the 1925 
(18) 
resolution . For its part the National Executive instructed the 
Scottish Executive to be flexible and to allow Peter Kerrigan to 
attend as a delegate at the 1926 Scottish Conference as 'temporary 
expedient to cover an emergency and not an admission of right'(19). 
17 Labour Party Scottish Executive, Minutes, January 8,1926. See 
also Minutes, November 23,1925. 
18 Ibid., March 22,1926. 
19 Ibid., April 12,1926. Kerrigan was a well known Communist 
from Glasgow Trades and Labour Council. 
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Trouble was widespread after 1925. In the end some constituency 
parties had to be re-constructed, not all of which had come out 
explicitly against the 1925 decision and the Scottish Executive 
(20) 
circular which attempted to implement it ., Mining 
constituencies were especially affected and in a state of some 
disarray. The Bathgate Trades and Labour Council seemed more or 
less to have 'fallen to pieces', as a result of the communist 
(21) difficulties The Falkirk one only agreed to comply with the 
1925 decision by 21 votes to 16 
(22) 
. The Aberdeen Trades Council 
had Minority Movement members on the Executive and their position 
required to be clarified by a more definite and conclusive ruling 
(23) from National Office which came in August 1926 When Denny 
Trades Council proposed to 'substitute a minority committee for a 
(24) 
local labour party' this was ruled unconstitutional 
20 Six constituencies in Glasgow, Bridgeton, Gorbals, Springburn, 
Kelvingrove, Tradeston and St Rollox, had to be investigated 
and reconstructed, and Greenock and Paisley Trades Councils 
faced similar difficulties. In Bridgeton, for example, it was 
alleged 'an individual section of fifteen men sending ten 
delegates of a communistic type held the balance of power in 
the Divisional Labour Party'. Similar situations operated, 
the Scottish Executive claimed, in Springburn and Gorbals. 
Kelvingrove was under 'the domination of the communistic 
element'. (Scottish Executive Committee, Minutes, 1925-1926). 
But even in Central Aberdeenshire a communist had been run as 
a candidate. 
21 Labour Party Scottish Executive, Minites, November 8,1926. 
22 Ibid., January 17,1927. 
23 Ibid., August 15,1927. 
24 Ibid., June, 1926. 
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The most illuminating revelation of the Communist difficulties can 
be seen from the experience of Glasgow Trades and Labour Council 
throughout the period. The Trades and Labour Council was 
reconstituted in 1918 as, the central Labour Party for Glasgow with 
powers to arbitrate and select. candidates for local parties in 
emergencies. Although it was both a political and industrial body, 
its delegate to the 1924 STUC Congress was to be absolutely 
accurate when he said the Trades Council were 'practically 
(25) 
dominated' by their political work for the Labour Party 
From the early twenties battle was joined between left and right, 
with the Council veering towards supporting Communist involvement 
in the Labour Party. In 1922 it opposed the rule that persons in 
other organisations could not be delegates to Labour's Annual 
Conference, and when Communists were 'specifically excluded, it 
delayed implementing the rule. When future Labour conferences went 
further, arguing no Communist was eligible for endorsement as a 
Labour candidate or to be a Labour member, the Trades Council again 
delayed implementing the rule and asked the Scottish Council 
whether an affiliated trade union could nominate Communists. When 
the Scottish Advisory Council stated that 'the logical application 
of the ruling' was to exclude Communists from individual sections, 
the Trades Council claimed the Scottish Executive were 'going 
outwith their powers'. Finally when the Labour Conference of 1926 
decided that no Communist was eligible to hold any Labour Party 
posts, the Council decided by only 103 votes to 102 to ask for 
'further interpretation' in preference to ignoring the rule. 
However, following the general strike Communist influence declined, 
and while local Labour Parties in Glasgow were being disaffiliated, 
the Communist Party lost its influence on the Trades Council and 
(26) 
its executive 
25 Glasgow Herald, April 18,1924. 
26 The history of Glasgow Trades Council in this period is 
examined by P Liddell, op. cit. * pp. 33-55. 
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It was in 1927 that matters in Glasgow came to a head. With a 
municipal by-election in Kelvingrove, (and the Kelvingrove 'Labour 
Party disaffiliated from the Scottish Council), the Trades Council 
Executive and the local Labour Party Executive met jointly to 
consider nominations. Aitken Ferguson, as a member of the 
Communist Party, was eliminated automatically and a railwaymen's 
union candidate was chosen in preference to an ILP nominee. But on 
av ote to endorse the candidature a majority voted against. The 
Trades Council Executive then proceeded on their own to ratify 
their choice, aný a breakaway group urged support for Ferguson, who 
was then nominated by Kelvingrove Labour Party. The outcome was a 
Conservative victory, disorder at Trades Council meetings which had 
to be suspended, a plebiscite of all affiliated organisations, and 
the reconstitution of the Trades Council, with only loyal 
organisations who supported the constitutional position sending 
delegates. This loyalist victory had been foreshadowed by the 
Council's detachment from its previous support for the Minority 
Movement. In 1925 it had voted to affiliate to the Movement by a 
small majority ýfter sending an observer to the Movement's 
Conference in January. It withdrew from affiliation after the 
(27) 
General strike 
With the passage of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act, the Council found 
itself forced to-separate industrial and political work. New rules 
passed in November 1928, limited the Trades Council to specifically 
industrial activities and the new Glasgow Burgh Labour Party, with 
a common secretariat but meeting on different evenings from the 
Council, was affiliated to the Scottish and National Labour Party. 
27. Ibi. d 
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That problems were not simply ones of Communist infiltration as was 
illustrated in this period by the experience of the Leith 
by-election in 1924, occasioned by Wedgewood Benn's defection from 
the Liberal Party. In a Forward article 'Why I Left the Liberal 
Party', Benn claimed that 'the final decision was taken when the 
Liberal Party agreed to take Mr Lloyd George's money ... the party 
will in effect be his party'. He argued that he favoured public 
ownership, progressive democracy and industrial democracy and 
stated that he had applied to join the Fabian Society and was 
(28) 
studying the ILP programme There was no doubt thai powerful 
Scottish and British voices wanted Benn to be adopted as the Labour 
candidate, and Arthur Woodburn, then a Leith constitutency 
official, later recalled that the National Executive were annoyed 
when he was not adopted. 
The Labour candidate was in fact Bob Wilson, a left-wing member who 
had only agreed under pressure to give an undertaking he would be 
bound by Labour Policy. Dollan considered Leith a certain Labour 
gain 
(29) 
, and MacDonald was confident 
(30) 
. and just before the 
by-election Labour had made headway in municipal elections in 
(31) 
Leith In addition the Liberals had found it difficult to 
secure an acceptable candidate after Benn's defection and his 
(32) 
resignation of the seat In the event in a three party contest 
Labour lost, it was alleged, as a result of Wilson's extremism. 
28 Forward, 12 February 1927. 
29 Forward, 19 February 1927. 
30 Forward, 5 March. 
31 Forward, 19 February. 
32 Forward 19 February, Forward, 26 February. 
386 
In the postmortem Henderson was later critical of Wilson's address 
and especially his refusal to make use of Benn's offer- of 
assistance. At one point in the election Wilson had seemed to come 
out in favour of 'confiscation'. which, according to Woodburn, 
caused a 'furorel and a feeling a disastrous blunder had been 
(33) 
made . One member of the Scottish Executive, Ritchie, summed up 
its general feelings when he said that Wilson's action had thrown 
the election away and allowed a revival of the Liberal Party. 
The continuilig problem of the extreme left was seen after the 
by-election. The Scottish Executive insisted on a pledge from 
Wilson, when he was adopted as prospective candidate for the 
general election, to support Labour policy. It voted by six votes 
to five in November 1927 (34) to exact this in writing in a form 
'without equivocation or alteration'. It had been felt 
insufficient for Wilson to give only 'a general acceptance of 
policy' or mere verbal understandings. The Party's Head Office, 
while admitting that 'in desperate circumstances a desperate remedy 
was needed' had pointed out that there was no precedent for asking 
(35) for such a pledge 
Woodburn claimed the situation was so delicate that he had 
persuaded Lansbury and Shepherd and Henderson, the National 
Executive Officers, at the 1928 Labour conference to accept that if 
Wilson told Woodburn he would adhere to the programme this would be' 
'Sufficient'. But this agreement was misrepresented at the 
constituency, and it was claimed that Woodburn had been asked by 
33 Ibid., 14 April. 
34 SEC 14 November 1927. 





the Executive to get Bob Wilson to 'give in' . In the end Wilson 
resigned his candidature, refusing to maýe a written pledge of 
loyalty, and in the end his nomination as a Scottish Conference 
(37) delegate was refused 
The Scottish Executive did not abandon its desire for 'written 
pledges' signed by candidates. They demanded a similar pledge to 
one Wilson had been asked for from the Rev. WD Stewart when he was 
(38) 
alleged to be 'reactionary' . Rose in North Aberdeen, who 
refused to give a loyalty undertaking, died in 1928 wh4e he was 
being replaced. 
Thus in 1928 when the Communist Party had adopted its 'new line' 
rejecting attempts to persuade or infiltrate the Labour Party-and 
championing an independent approach, the first test was in the 
strife-torn constituency of Aberdeen North where Frank Rose, the 
Labour member, had been disowned by the local Trades Council which 
itself had had a considerable Communist element. The breaking 
point had been minor, Rose's support Of the Stage Guild, an acting 
organisation, when the official actors' union had 'blacked' them. 
But his opposition to nationalisation and other cardiýal policies 
(39) 
was well known In October 1925, John Paton stood and then 
withdrew as a candidate for the seat; later a ballot of individual 
members on Rose's suitability had been held; and the National 
Executive 
36 A. Woodburn, Unpublished Autobiography. 
37 Conference Report, 1929, p. 32. 
38 Executive Report, 1929, p. 7. 
39 C Phipps, op. cit., p. 148. 
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Committee had opened negotiations for a reconciliation between Rose 
(40) 
and the local party But as Rose died in 1928 and the 
Communist Party decided on open war against the Labour Party, many 
of the problems inside the Council were solved. In the ensuing 
by-election, the Labour candidate, Wedgewood Benn, won a four 
cornered contest in which the Communist candidate, Aitken Ferguson, 
pushed the Liberals from third to fourth place. 
At Labour's 1928 Conference the rules on Communist and left-wing 
participation were again tightened up, with constituency parties 
urged to ostracise Communists from their platforms and meetings 
while the Communist Party's new line of hostility to Labour was 
pursued. In the circumstances the problems before the general 
election in 1929 in places like Govan were as much personality as 
political differences, although the concern with left-wing infiltration 
remained at the centre of the Scottish Party's activities. 
Throughout the whole of theý twenties, it occupied a 'considerable 
part' of the Executive's time 
(4 1) 
and was said to discourage 
membership, for the 1931 Report regretted 'many good people ... 
instead of realising their duty and acting boldly ... retire into the 
background and in some cases lapse their membership because of 
, (42) local troubles . 
40 Ibid., p. 150-4. 
41 Report, 1928, p. 6. 
42 Report, 1931, p. 5. 
0 
389 1 
III THE TRADE UNION CONNECTION 
The trade union involvement with the Labour Party was not what it 
should have been. There were difficulties for three major reasons. 
First the recession bit into union funds. Secondly, the trades 
disputes act and its contracting - in requirement for contributions 
to political 
* 
funds after 1927 meant 'a falling off of trade union 
subscriptions and affiliation fees'"). The annual income of the 
Labour Party nationally fell dramatically from E39,000 in 1924 to 
(2) 
E25,000 in 1929 . The third problem was the political complexion 
of some of the unions. Arthur Henderson argued to the Scottish 
Conference, that 'in preference election funds be raised in the 
division rather than by reliance on trade union funds 1(3) But 
this was, as we have seen not to be a practicable policy, at least 
so far as Scotland was concerned. 
Trade union membership deteriorated substantially between its 'high 
watermark, ' as Joseph Duncan of the Farm Servants called it, in 
1924 and 1929. Affiliation to the STUC was one incomplete but 
useful gauge of actual membership. In 1925, in the only survey 
that was conducted of the full extent of unionisation in Scotland 
there were found to be 536,432 members, representing one third of 
the Scottish workforce. One gauge of the deterioration between 
then and 1929 was figures for affiliation to the STUC. In 1924 
membership stood at 323,687 and in 1925 it was 327,805. By 1929 
(4) the figure was 20% lower, at 265,641 Most of the big unions 
suffered their most severe losses in the early nineteen twenties 
and Table 7.3 shows how membership remained relatively stable. But 
the exception was 
I Labour Party Scottish Conference, Executive Report, 1929, p. 9. 
2 Ibid., Report, 1930,. p. 10. 
3 Ibid., Report, 1926, - p. 35. 
4 Forward, April 27,1929. 
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the miners, whose paper membership of 30,000 in 1929 disguised the 
major splits in the mining community which had by then produced- two 
unions seeking recognition. In 1929 they were not affiliated to 
the STUC and Dollan argued that the ILP and other trade unions 
(5) 
should give the miners special aid to reorganise their forces 
TABLE 7.3 
Trade Union Membership 1925 and 1929 
000's 
1925 1929 
Engineers 19.1 18.6 
Woodworkers 15.9 16.2 
ETU 1.5 1.5 
General Workers 23.2 21.2 
Shop Assistants 9.4 10.7 
NUDAW 11.4 13.1 
Miners 38.6 30.5 
General Workers 26.0 27.7 
Commercial Motormen 9.0 9.3 
Patternmakers (1924)2.7 2.6 
Jute and Flax 13.0 13.0 
Typographical 6.0 7.2 
Source: E Kebblewhite, op. cit., Appendix One. 
5 Ibid . 
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The problem in Scotland was that few trade unions took an interest 
in Labour representation, apart from the miners, and even in 1930 
trade union affiliation to the Scottish Conference was poor. Few 
unions paid more than a nominal affiliation fee. The Transport and 
General Workers Union, the Scottish Mineworkers, the National Union 
of Distributive and Allied Workers, and the Railwaymen and Railway 
Clerks were the only unions which paid more than El in affiliation 
fees 
(6) 
, and few were keen to sponsor candidates. In the' 
029 
election, with the exception of the miners there were only three 
trade union nominees - Mathers (West Edinburgh) from the Railway 
Clerks Association; Buchanan (Gorbals) from the Patternmakers; 
Irwin (Montrose) from the Boilermakers. one other candidate had 
been nominated by the Dyers Society but did not eventually contest 
the election. 
Even when trade unions were involved in sponsorship it was not an 
unmixed blessing as they demanded full control in the 
constituencies. As far as trade union rights were concerned, Head 
Office was sensitive. With regard to the case of Rose in Aberdeen, 
an Engineering union candidate, Henderson said 'They did not 
recognise a prescriptive right to the candidature on the part of 
any organisation, but the AEU, an affiliated organisation, had been 
responsible in time past for the candidature and had spent much 
(7) 
money on it, which entitled them to some consideration' 
In addition many trade union branches simply omitted to affiliate 
to the party locally. The excuse for non-affiliation to local 
Labour parties, said the Executive was that 'trade union 
headquarters ire unable to send a share of the political fund to 
branches for that purpose' 
(8) 
. As the Scottish Executive 
6 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1930, p p. 22-23. 
7 SEC, 14 April 1928, Meeting with Lansbury, Henderson, and 
Wake . 
8 Ibid., Report, 1929, p. 9. 
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spokesman was to tell the 1930 Conference: 
Trades Councils or DLPs finding branches of a union 
entitled to be affiliated not being represented on their 
councils should make representations to the Scottish 
Executive ... until all bodies entitled to be in were 
actually playing their part the machine would not work as 
it should. (9) 
In Glasgow, despite the concentration of trade union memberships, 
the position was as serious as in some 14ss well organised areas. 
As Ben Shaw was to tell the 1925 STUC Conference: 'it was quite true 
that the trade unions were not taking the interest they should 
take-when he went to a local Labour Party selection committee he 
found that the trade unions were outnumbered by co-op 
(10) 
representatives' 
The miners remained the major trade union pushing the claims of 
Labour for political representation. And in many ways they 
operated like a party within a party - claiming ful-l conýrol over 
constituencies in which they placed their candidates. But the 
splits within the miners' union - with the breakaway groupings of 
the Miners' Reform Movement taking control of the union in Scotland 
for -some time - weakened Labour, not least because the party's MPs 
were leading officials of the old establishýd union, the only union 
the Labour Party was to recognise. But the background of a 
deteriorating membership is perhaps the key reason why the miners 
were never after the twenties to have the power they had during 
that decade in Labour's circles. Scottish miners, who numbered 
140,000 around 1920, had fallen to 90,000 by 1928. Unionised 
(11) 
miners were down to as low as 54,000 in 1927 In these 
circumstances the miners could hardly be the political force they 
had been. 
I 
9 Ibid., Report, 1930, p. 39. 
10 STUC Report, 1925, 'Discussion of Political Objects'. 
11 Scottish Union of Mineworkers, Executive, June 10,1927. 
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Throughout the twenties, the miners insisted on their control over 
the constituencies in which they were prepared to spqnsor 
candidates. In 1922 they had sponsored winning candidates in ten 
seats, through contributions both locally and from the Miners' 
Federation nationally. Even after the decline in membership became 
severe, they attempted to maintain their representation, at nine 
members. North Lanark, the tenth seat, had been lost to the 
Conservatives in 1924 but the Union had supported financially Hugh 
Murning, in Falkirk and Stirling, who had taken the tenth place. 
12) ýhe Scottish quota was thus 'complete'( 
The problems occasioned by the by-election in 1926 in Bothwell show 
how far the miners regarded some Labour seats as their seats, and 
how hard it was for the Labour Party centrally to assert control. 
With the death of Robertson, the sitting member, the first decision 
of the Lanarkshire Miners' Executive was to instruct 'their 
representative' on the Scottish Executive 'to recommend the 
adoption of a miners' candidate'( 
13) 
. The Lanarkshire Council then 
selected their own short list, after receiving a letter from the 
Scottish council stating 'that the miners had an indefeasible claim 
to contest the seat' and that no opposition was anticipated to 
(14) 
their claim . After the miners had selected IJ McKenna, one of 
their own members, by ah exhaustive balloting system, involving 
delegates' votes, branch block votes, and financial votes, he was 
beaten at the constituency selection conference by an ILP nominee, 
Thomas Dickson. As the miners' executive minuted, they felt 
betrayed. To them, 'the following facts were established': 
12 Lanarkshire County Union, December 1,1926. 
13 Lanarkshire Miners Executive, February 20,1926. 
14 Lanarkshire Miners Union, Council, February 25,1926. 
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That the Scottish Labour Party had stated that the 
miners had an indefeasible claim on the seat. 
2. That if the miners put forward a candidate they did 
not anticipate any other nomination. 
3. That Mr Thomas Dickson had indicated that he would 
not stand against a nominee of the miners. 
The strength of the miners' claim was one thing: the way Labour 
gave in to them was another. With the miners - at both the 
Scottish and British level demanding an enquiry, the ILP 
candidate, Dickson, withdrew and the Labour Party's National 
Executive accepted that 'Bothwell was a miners' seat and (that) the 
Secretary of the Scottish Labour Party had been authorised to call 
an adjourned conference ... at which the candidature of Mr McKenna 
should be confirmed'. When McKenna withdrew, Joseph Sullivan was 
chosen by the miners in preference to the Minority Movement 
candidate Allan, and after his candidature was confirmed at the 
selection conference in the constituency, Arthur Henderson came 
north to say that: 'the miners had a moral right to contest the 
seat as against the indefeasible right as stated by the Scottish 
Secretary of the Labour Party'. Despite Henderson's semantics the 
Labour Party had given in to the miners. Even so it had to face a 
further demand at both Scottish Executive and Scottish Conference 
for an enquiry 'into the circumstances connected with the putting 
forward of an ILP candidate into a seat which had always been 
contested by the miners( 
15). 
15 Lanarkshire Miners Executive, February 28,1926. Also March 2, 
1926, March 5,1926. 
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If miners always retained their ability to coerce or cajole the 
. 
Labour Party, much of their political control was in fact lost 
through the divisions within their own unions. The background to 
internal disputes of the Lanarkshire, Fife, and Scottish 
Mineworkers' Union which ended with rival and breakaway unions has 
been documented elsewhere 
(16) 
, although the detailed events await a 
full and comprehensive study. Divisions had started almost as soon 
as war was ended with the growth of the reform movement, and the 
constitutional wrangles which led to two unions and a bitter 
ideological dispute between Communists and Labour. The problem was 
not however merely a question of trade union politics: most of the 
ILP's branches were in mining areas, and most of the Scottish 
miners' MPs were identifiably in the right-wing camp, with -James 
Brown, John Robertson, Hugh Murning, Joseph Sullivan, and most of 
all William Adamson, and also the miners' union leaders the 
major targets of the Minority Movement and Communist groups. 
While the splits within the miners' union were part of the division 
between Communists and the Labour Party, which conference decisions 
were attempting to resolve, it could not so easily be set aside by 
discipline within the union. The North Lanark nomination 
conferences exemplified this very clearly and showed how the 
divisions within the union debilitated the Labour Party in 
Scotland. Without the support of the miners in Scotland and 
Britain, the Lanarkshire miners decided in 1926 they would place a 
candidate in the North Lanark constituency they had lost in 
(17) 1924 After a branch vote and af inancial vote (that is 
with branch contributions being the bases of the decision), William 
0 
16 See for example R. P Arnot, op. cit-, pp. 161-196 and I 
Macdougall (ed. ), Militant Miners, (Edinburgh, 1901). 
17 Lanarkshire County Union, Council, December 1,1926. 
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Allan, a Communist Party member, won an outright victory over three 
Labour Party members for the nomination and his name went foýward 
to the North Lanark Labour Party for consideration. When Allan was 
ruled out of order on grounds of Communist membership, the 
selection conference was held back to allow a new miners' nominee 
(18) 
but Allan was endorsed again by them Allan was initially 
refused nomination but again was endorsed by the Union after a 
further extension of time (from January to June) had been given. 
The miners argued that as his nomination was that of the 
Lanarkshire Mineworkers, it should be submitted to the selection 
conference for approval or otherwise, 
(19) 
after Allan had signed an 
agreement to accept the constitution of the Labour Party. Cleland 
Labour Party, a branch of the North Lanark constituency, organised 
its own conference to foster Allan's nomination, although the Union 
(20) 
agreed to dissociate itself from this action By the time 
Allan's nomination was finally ruled out of order, he had become 
Secretary of the Lanarkshire Miners and the dispute for control, was 
raging within the Scottish miners' union. In 1929 North Lanark had 
had two selection conferences because at the first there was a tied 
vote, before an ILP nominee, Jenny Lee, contested (and won) the 
seat for Labour. 
North Lanark was one seat that the miners lost from their list of 
sponsored candidatures. In fact there was no question in 1929 of 
additional candidatures, and the miners in Scotland found it 
difficult to finance their existing seats. It had been agreed that 
only the traditional group, Adamson's union, was eligible for 
Labour Party affiliation, 
(21) 
18 Ibid., January 10,1927. 
19 Lanarkshire Miners Executive, June 10,1927. 
20 -Ibid., June 17,1927. 
21 Scottish Executive, 16 September, 1928. 
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and when it was unable to bear the financial burden, the Miners' 
Union nationally devised a new scheme for helping the poorer 
regions to maintain their representation. The Midlands and 
Yorkshire areas in particular were asked to provide finance for 
candidates in Scotland, with grants based on a levy of membership, 
the aim being to secure at least as many miners' candidates as in 
(22) 1924 
Even then the miners had difficulty in meeting ýheir commitments. 
A week before the election there had been no final agreement to 
sponsorship in Stirling and Falkirk and in the end a smaller amount 
than normal (E200) was offered. The miners were determined to hold 
on to their representation and Falkirk delegates complained to the 
Scottish Conference of 1930 that the miners had had no right to 
rush them into a general election without knowing where the money 
(23) 
was coming from The Stirling Division of the party insisted 
for the future that they 'did not want to find a general election 
coming along with the DLP placed in the same position as it was on 
the last occasion'. 
It was a far cry from the years after the war when the miners had 
not only sponsored candidates, but provided full-time organisers 
and even constituted local parties. Now the miners, as one of 
their delegates told the 1930 Conference, had to ask the rest of 
the Labour Party for help: 
For reasons well known to all, the miners had not 
recently been able to do so much financially as they had 
done in the past ... The miners were going to maintain with 
all the power they could the representation they held. 
They would do all they could to finance their candidates, 
and 
22 LlaEýow Heraid, 12 January 1929. 
23 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1930. p. 38 
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until they could do so, they were entitled to ask other 
parties in the various divisions where the miners had met 
all expenses for many years to play their part ... It was 
only right that the other units should assist the miners 
at a time like this. (24) 
24 Ibid. j p. 37. 
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IV THE INDEPENDENT LABOUR PARTY 
It was essentially then the status of and the changing character of 
the Independent Labour Party in Scotland that was to determine what 
sort of Labour Party Scotland had in 1929 as the general election 
approached. And what we shall find in our examination is, firstly, 
that the ILP was conscious throughout the late twenties of how it 
lacked an industrial base in Scotland and was attempting to remedy 
this deficiency; secondly, that the ILP was itself partly 
exhausted by the failure of the miners' strike; thirdly, thai the 
ILP became embroiled in and weakened by the problems of Communist 
influence; and finally, and perhaps most important, that the 
victors in the battle for control of the ILP and the Labour 
Movement in Scotland were not the Maxton-Wheatley group and the 
left-wing elements but the centre groups. In 1929 Maxton may have 
controlled the ILP in Britain: his base was being eroded in 
Scotland, so much so that few went with him after the ILP 
disaffiliated from the Labour Party in the thirties. 
It was the Independent Labour Party that was the fulcrum of Labour 
Party activity within Scotland. Almost all Labour Party candidates 
in 1929 were members of the ILP. of the 68 candidates 67 were 
members and 30 were sponsored by them. According to the 1928 
Labour Party conference, three-quarters of Labour Party speakers 
were ILP activists. Even in 1932, Arthur Woodburn had to admit 
when he became Scottish Labour Party Secretary that 'the real drive 
was in the Independent Labour Party'('). 
The ILP's low membership reflected how far Labour was from being a 
mass membership party. In 1924, ILP membership in Scotland was 
dstimated to be 5,200 rising during and after the Labour Government 
to a peak of 8,030 in 1925. Standing siill at 7,170 despite the 
reduction in branches and membership during the miners' strike in 
1926, the Scottish Party became the largest regional membership 
IA Woodburn, op. cit., p. 68. 
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within the British ILP. By 1927, with only 5,440 it had fallen 
below Lancashire and although there was a leap in 1927-28, to 
6,010, membership stood only at 4,800 in February 1929, less than 
it had been in 19 24. 
(2) 
Nevertheless branches had increased in 
number from less than 200-171-in 1923 to over 300-321-in 1926 as 
the party moved into the backward areas of Scotland. But although 
the Scottish ILP throughout the period formed a disproportionately 
large section of the ILP in Britain, there were only 267 branches 
in 1929, most concentrated in the industrial centres of population. 
Areas like Stirlingshire, Galloway, and the Highlands were paying 
little or no affiliation fees. 
It was however a combination of the Independent Labour Party and 
trade union sponsorship of the party that kept back the development 
of Labour's local constituency organisation, according to views 
down south. There was clearly anxiety about the 'party within a 
party' problem. 
2 The figures are taken from A Marwick, The Shape of the Party, 
from his thesis on the ILP, op. cit. 
Scotland Britain Glaaaw Estimates 
1923-24 5260 25,976 (776) c4,300 
1924-25 8030 34,140 (1038) c5,100 
1925-26 7170 24,673 (1075) c5,000 
1926-27 5440 26,840 (900) c5,100 
1927-28 6010 25,320 c5,250 
1928-29 4800 20,850 (746) 
ILP Federation. 
But these f igures may in Scotland's case be an exaggeration 
and in Britain's case an underestimate, given the distinctions 
drawn finally in the rest of Britain between paying members 
(the numbers included in table) and members. For example, 
Marwick suggests that actual members of the ILP in 1926 was 
not 24,673 but around 56,000. 
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When the National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers' 
delegate suggested to Morrison that one of the reasons for low 
individual membership was that the Independent Labour Party was 
more active in Scotland than in certain parts of England, 
Morrison's reply was: 
They must be careful not to make this a question of 
conflict. The ILP had its own job and functioned in its 
own way and he did not want to do anything which 
suggested he might want to discredit it. All he was 
concerned about was the problems of the Labour Party in 
Scotland. 
But he was to add: 'The Labour Party on its old basis was a federal 
organisation and until they got the individual membership there was 
no actual body of individuals on whom they could rely as being part 
of the actual machinery of the party' 
(3) 
Earlier at the 1927 Conference the National Executive spokesman had 
reminded dalegatps that the Labour Party was not in the control of 
one section: 
No organisation in the view of the National Executive had 
an indefeasible right to any constituency. The 
organisation concerned in each case was the Labour Party. 
It was not the Miners' Labour Party in one constituency 
or an ILP Labour Party in another constituency. (4) 
The problem was that in Scotland it was exactly that. 
3 Labour Party, Scottish Conference, Report, 1930, p. 46. 
4 Labour Party, Report by Davies -and Shepherd on Scottish 
C, onference, 1928, Scottish Executive Papers, March. 11,1927. 
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There was no doubt that beneath the surface, there were major 
conflicts between ILP and the Labour Party organisation. When in 
1930 the Labour Party made a further attempt to' encourage 
individual membership the Executive spokesman had to add: 
It was just possible there might be some suspicion 
towards the resolution as ILPers might feel it was an 
invasion of their activities. That was not so. There 
was a vast number of people prepared to vote and work for 
Labour who were not yet prepared to join the ILP. 
When one delegate argued that -if the Labour Party spent all its 
time recruiting individual members and setting up propaganda 
machinery, 'the ILP would no longer be necessary', Dollan 
disagreed, but he warned on behalf of the ILP: 
It was only right to say ... they felt that in areas where 
they had built up a comparatively useful political as 
well as propaganda organisation, they sometimes found the 
Labour Party concentrating its efforts there, to the 
neglect of outlying areas where there was no organisation 
of any kind. He felt there was a need for further 
co-ordination between the Labour Party and the ILP to 
tackle the question of organisation in such areas where 
political work had not begun. (5) 
Choosing candidates was to be a problem which caused local 
disagreements and was not helped when the ILP claimed its funds 
were in its control and not under the control of the Divisional 
(6) 
Labour Party. The ILP also complained it was steamrollered In 
some areas complaints from the ILP were numerous about selection 
5 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1930, p. 39. 
6 Labour Party Scottish Executive, June 24,1928. . 
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conferences, particularly against the formation and 
over-representation af women's and men's sections. But. the 
Scottish Executive complained that 'similar questions had been 
raised with regard to branches of the ILP and suggested a period of 
probation might reasonably be introdu&ed into the local rules' 
(7) 
The situation grew more difficult throughout the twenties as local 
Labour parties came into existence. In 1929 Dollan complained that 
some local Labour parties were set up by the Co-operativý 'Party 
'with only a small membership', with the result that 'a handful of 
people had twenty representatives' on selection conferences 'as 
against two from the ILP although the latter might be raising the 
money 1(8) . However, even when the local finances of the ILP were 
in a poor shape, as they were in Glasgow, the party still continued 
(9) 
to seek and endorse candidatures 
The conflict was not simply an ILP-Labour one but of ten over the 
type of representation achieved. Labour's members from the ILP 
were mainly middle class. As one prominent Scottish trade unionist 
was to claim, it was 'the careerists' who came through the ILP: 
Anyone who could describe himself as an MA, BSc, could 
get all the wirepullers behind him and the ordinary 
members were told, 'Don't you bother about the local 
Labour Party: be loyal to the ILPI, and we will get 
somebody from the top, some new rich comrade to speak to 
you on public bodies. The composition of the ILP panel 
had always been a bit of a mystery to him. ( 10) 
7 Ibid., June 19,1929. Also Scottish Conference Executive 
Report, 1930, p. 10. 
8 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1930, p. 40. 
9- Glasgow ILP Federation Management Committee, June 22, 
September 4,1928. 
10 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1931, p. 44. 
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Even in 1930, however, there were only twenty-seven divisional 
parties registered at Scottish Conference, with three trades and 
labour councils standing in lieu of constituency parties. It meant 
that the main initiative for candidates was still coming from the 
ILP and the miners. 
On policy too, the ILP exercised the main initiative. Following 
the 1924 Government, industrial 4uestions came to the forefront, 
and the ILP attempted to lead.. While the 1925 Scottish Conference 
of the Labour Party refused to criticise the Labour leadership, it 
did represent a leftward shift in the support it gave the 
unemployed workers' movement, which was predominantly controlled by 
the Communist Party. When the Chairman of the Conference ruled out 
of order a motion which had come from the National Unemployed 
Workers' Committee, he was defeated, and Conference accepted a 
policy which demanded government intervention in creating jobs, a 
shorter working week, and rent reductions 
The ILP made the running increasingly as it came to see its role as 
a supportive one for militancy within the trade union movement. At 
its January conference in 1925 a motion was remitted to a special 
industrial conference which while . supporting nationalisation, 
agitated for a 'reform' policy based on a forty hour week, the 
abolition of overtime, the establishment of workshop committees, 
trade union amalgamation, and full maintenance for unemployed by 
(12) 
the state .. Drawing up an industrial policy was not so easy. 
At a special miners' conference there was disagreement over the 
steps towards the nationalisation of coal. Shinwell, who stated 
that a mines' nationalisation bill would have been in the 1925 
Queens Speech if a Labour Government had survived, said that Labour 
shoruld purchase, not confiscate the mines, that the miners' claim 
for 
Ibid., Report, 1925, pp. 39-40. 
12 Forward, January 17,1925. 
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controlling one half of the industry's governing body after 
nationalisation should be watered down to one third, and that the 
purchase price should be on the basis of outputs. His speech met 
with 'no applause' and a motion urging nationalisation along the 
(13) lines advocated by the miners was supported 
The ILP's increasing involvement in industrial issu. es was underlined 
by the Glasgow ILP which formed an industrial committee, for 
educational work amongst its members on the Clyde, and to plan a 
1 (14) reorganisation of Clyde industry As Dollan argued, 'pending 
national ownership there are palliatives' (such as a shorter 
working week, plant modernisation and higher wages), and as far. as 
nationalisation was concerned, trade unions were not equipped for 
their- administration as state services. The Glasgow ILP were 
particularly interested in, some form of reorganisation of 
shipbuilding. It also felt that as a priority ILP members should 
(15) 
be involved in industrial action Dollan, in particular, 
favoured closer links between the ILP and the General Council of 
(16) 
the STUC 
This new link-up between trade unionism and politics was hampered 
by the effect of the depression on both trade unionism and ILP 
membership. While the Scottish Labour Party and the ILP were to 
the left of the Labour Party nationally in their support for 
militancy, the weak Scottish trade union movement was, Dollan felt, 
tthe most conservative section' in Britain. He argued that the 
13 Ibid., January 31,1925. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., February 21,1925. 
16 Ibid., April 13,1925. 
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STUC leaders were 'too much concerned with what they call. the 
structure of trade unionism and neglect the spiritual. and 
propaganda aspects of the movement'. He believed that there were 
too many unions and too few trade unionists. 
The ILP at this time was responding to the threat of the Minority 
Movement and the Communist Party. During 1925 Forward, for 
example, became increasingly vitriolic in its attacks on the 
Communist Party and the Minority Movement, although it also gave 
space to debates between Emrys Hughes and Willie Gallacher on the 
(17) 
merits of revolutionary action Maxton, Wheatley, and other 
leading Scottish MPs were involved in supporting moves for 
Communist membership of the Labour Party, but others like Johnston 
were worried about both the reliance on industrial action and the 
influence of the Minority Movement. Wheatley wrote: 
We must guard against the agent provocateurs with their 
incitements to violence, E; ur ection and red armies. 
Such incitements even when bona fide are madness: they 
play directly into the hands o-f the capitalist party. We 
are 90% of the nation. When we will it, the parasitic 
exploitative system will go. But foolish incitements to 
attempt by the shotgun what we refuse to tak t 18ýy the ballot box can only end in tragedy and disaster. 
It was Wheatley who was mapping out a new course for Labour in 
Scotland, arguing that the varying views among the unions had to be 
(19) 
unified 
He was realistic about the situation: 'parliamentary action in 
present circumstances appeared practically futile, except to those 
who think that the starving workers should be satisfied with the 
prospect of another one shilling to old age pensions when Labour 
comes into office during the next generation'. 
(19) 
The Labour 
17 Ibid., February 7,14,1925. 
18 Ibid., August 22,1925. 
19 Ibid., August 8,1925. 
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party was 'powerless'. But while Wheatley, with Maxton, favoured a 
'united front' first around Lansbury's left-wing group, then around 
the Sunday Worker newspaper's call for left unity, there was little 
enthusiasm for it in Scotland. Newbold, a former Communist, warned 
that the Communists planned 'to use him (Wheatley) against Ramsay 
(20) MacDonald and the rest of his colleagues' 
Wheatley's new view of socialism was developed in a series of 
articles in the Glasgow EveLinLil Standard and Forward. He oprposed 
bo th free trade and protection and argued for an 
underconsumptionist view, that high government expenditure would 
increase prosperity and jobs, and suggested that what was needed 
was the regulation of foreign trade. The return to the gold 
standard and the bank rate decisions of Churchill he saw as leading 
(21) 
to an inevitable attack on working class living standards But 
Wheatley was for 'socialism by degrees'. He explained: 
I cannot believe that the people who have just voted 
Liberal or Tory, are quite ready to take up-rifles and 
shoot the men thay have just elected. In addition to the 
fact that it is very undemocratic, I think it is also 
hopeless and stupid. It is of course argued that in the 
event of a Labour Government being returned to power, a 
fascist army would at once be organised to resist our 
policies. We shall see. Then the majority of the people- 
will favour Labour's policy. Besides which, whatever 
party is in power controls the army and the navy. (22) 
His basic argument was that in the face of the attack on standards 
of living it was his, and the left-wing's job to end 'the 
despondency and tranquility', which were 'the dominating emotions 
of our movement, if it is correct to describe as a movement 
something which has ceased to move' 
(23). 
20 Ibid., August 29,1925. 
21 Ibid. *, February 28, March 21,28,1925. 
22 Ibid., December 5,1925. 
23 Ibid., August 8,1925. 
I 
408 
As the pendulum swung from political to industrial activity, there 
was no improvement in ILP or Labour Party membership. The yeaT to 
April 1926 was, Glasgow ILP organiser, MacLure, concluded, 'one of 
the most difficult in the history of the ILPI. He spoke of a: 
'general feeling ... of political indifference. There has also been 
a lowering of the general enthusiasm due to a great extent to the 
disappointment and reaction following the short term of office of 
the Labour Governmen't 1(24) , and it seemed that ILP membership in 
Glasgow had fallen below 3,000(25) 
In a referendum on Communist 
affiliation to the Glasgow Trades and Labour Council, 31 of 36 
(26) branches voted, involving 2292 voting members 
What in the end held together a disorganised and divided movement 
in these difficult circumstances was support for the miners. Two 
thirds of ILP branches were said to be in mining areas, and the ILP 
was in no doubt that a defeat of the miners would be a defeat for 
the whole Labour Movement. In August 1925 Wheatley had called for 
'unprecedented solidarity among the unions' 
(27) 
. He argued that 
If or the next nine months the workers must prepare on a new scale 
and on new lines for the greatest struggle in their history'. He 
warned of a fascist menace: 
The capitalists will get their fascists ready to carry on 
a transport system that will make them independent of the 
workers during a general strike. The navy will be 
ordered to man the mines. .. If working class soldiers can be relied on to shoot down working class strikers, 
capitalism will get a new lease of life by making Britain 
a land of coolies. (28) 
24 Ibid., April 10,1926. 
25 Ibid., February 20,1926. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., August 15,1925. 
28 Ibid., August 8,1925. 
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The ILP's policy was to-stand by the miners, and Emrys Hughes argued 
that: 
If the British Labour Movement is going to think of the 
future at all, it must be prepared to fight on this issue 
as it has never fought before, and must use all the 
weight of its political and industrial power to prevent 
the miners being defeated. (29) 
The party in Scotland could unite around the miners' issue, and 
despite different attitudes to MacDonald's leadership both the left 
and right could attack MacDonald for some of his views. When 
MacDonald blamed the loss of two by-elections in Ayr and 
Dunbartonshire, on 'some oratory at the ILP Conference in Edinburgh 
on the subject of confiscation versus compensation' 
(30) 
, the 
Scottish Council argued that the work in both constituencies was 'a 
moral victory' 
(31) 
and the elections were lost through the collapse 
of Liberal votes to the Tories. Patrick Dollan, one of MacDonald's 
supporters, stated that MacDonald and others were 'out of touch 
with Scottish organisation and activities' in saying that they 
could 'have been won for socialism if the candidate had pursued a 
different policy' 
(32). 
A better result he felt might have been 
obtained if the critics 'had come north and assisted in the 
1(33) campaign 
29 Ibid., June 27,1925. 
30 Ibid., March 13,1926. 
31 Labour Party Scottish Conference Report, 1926, pp. 3-4. * 
32 Ibid., p. 36. 
33 Ibid. 
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During the General Strike and the much more prolonged miners' 
strike the ILP gave full and unquestioning support to the minei7s, 
acting according to their Scottish organiser William Stewart as 'an 
auxiliary force', raising funds, organising food centres, placing 
branch rooms at the miners' disposal, and using its propaganda and 
(34) 
speakers to put the miners case throughout Scotland Indeed 
throughout the strike ILP branches collected more than E10,000 for 
1 (35) miners relief Nevertheless the effect of the strike was to 
leave the ILP weakened. It damaged the party finances and 
financial recovery was difficult. With two-thirds of the branches 
in mining areas, many were unable to pay their affiliation 
(36) fees While Labour did relatively well in the municipal 
elections of 1926, 
(37) 
the long-term effect of 1926 was to dampen 
militancy and to weaken resources. As the Glasgow Fie-deration 
recorded, 1927 was 'particularly difficult due to the general 
(38) 
apathy and the reaction of the general strike' 
This period marked a shift from the left in Labour politics, and 
was particularly characterised by the growing isolation of the ILP 
left, led by Maxton and Wheatley, not just in the Labour Party but 
also in tfie ILP within Scotland. Even Patrick Dollan, who was to 
be Maxton's adversary for the years to come, was astonished at how 
far to the right the trade union movement in Scotland moved between 
the middle of 1927 and 1928. At the 1927 STUC Conference, 
delegates had accepted a motion 'condemning the propaganda of 
industrial peace conducted by leading trade union officials whether 
individually or in co-operation'with leading employers'. In 1928, 
34 Ibid., August, 21,1927. 
4 
35 Ibid., January 9,1927. 
36 Ibid., December 12,19,26,1927. 
37 Glasgow ILP Federation, Minutes, April 1,1927. 
38 Ibid., Management Sub Committee, February 3,1927. 
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a motion attacking the negotiations between Mond and the TUC was 
defeated by a four to one majority. Similarly in 1927 a motion for 
a Great Britain-Russia trade union conference was accepted but 
rejected by 31 in 1928. A complete turnaround had been effected. 
It was in this atmosphere that Maxton and Wheatley attempted to 
stir the British Labour Movement leftwards. They have been since 
accused of misreading history, of assuming a radicalisation in 
Britain after the General Strike when none existed, although it is 
clear that they believed the opposite was true, and their self 
assumed role was indeed to remove the despair, despondency, and 
defeatism that characterised the working class movement in Britain. 
What they did misread was their support in Scotland. When Maxton, 
who became Chairman of the ILP in 1926, spoke of his role as 
qualifying the Labour Party's 'tendency to be entirely taken up 
with the immediately practical, which always creates the tendency 
to lose sight of ultimate ideals', he believed he was applying the 
lessons of Scotland to Britain: 'I see no reason why what we 
managed to achieve in Scotland, should not be achieved in all parts 
of the country. ' 
The ILP's policy programme, Socialism in our Time , had been 
produced by the ILP's intellectuals and owed little to Scottish 
influences. In its original and later forms it included provision 
for a National Health Service, non-contributory pensions, the 
nationalisation of key industries, and the reorganisation of 
banking. At it's core lay three policies: state control of money 
and credit; the granting of family allowances; and the guarantee 
of a realistic living wage through the setting up in each industry 
of a commission to specify wages for it. In the document's 1926-7 
form, while a 'living wage' was not to be legally imposed, an 
industrial commission could indirectly intervene, with a National 
Investment Board responsible for controlling credit. By 1929 the 
programme laid down that a living wage was obligatory on industry, 
412 
to be paid within two years of its enactment by a Labour 
government; that the key industries - coal, transport and 
banking - would be nationalised, and that Government control would 
be introduced over the bulk purchase of imports and exports; that 
other industries which failed to pay the living wage. would be 
nationalised; and that greater controls would be exercised over 
credit and prices, with major increases in taxation. In many ways 
it was the socialist complement to a Keynesian programme. 
It was Socialism in our Time that Maxton and the ILP left saw as 
the raison d'etre. As Maxton told the ILP conference in 1930: 
I was asked to use my Chairmanship to spread the ideas of 
'Socialism in our Time I by propaganda, - to urge its 
acceptance through the wider Labour Movement, and to get 
it accepted by the nation. This is the task which I have 
honestly and sincerely tried to fulfil. 
The bid to win the Labour Party Conference for Socialism in our 
Time failed in 1927, when MacDonald successfully persuaded the 
party to prepare its own programme, what was to become Labour and 
the Nation. From the left-wing point of view what was more serious 
was the loss of support within the ILP in Scotland. At the January 
1928 conference of the Party, left-wing motions for a 'return to 
the proposal for a capital levy', and opposing the talks on 
co-operation in industry were supported, but the ILP 'living wage' 
proposals were turned down. Dollan called at the 1928 conference 
for the essence of 'Socialism in our Time' to be a minimum wage. 
For Wheatley this was merely a plan to control the incomes of the 
poorest. But it was accepted by the conference in preference to 
the 'living wage' plan. 
The incorporation of the 'minimum wage' proposal into Socialism 
in our Time*meant that what had been a revolutionary programme-to 
make the payment of wages a basis for nationalising industries, and 
of course redistributing income and wealth, had become something 
which was little more than an extension of the trades boards 
system. Maxton who was later to accuse Dollan of disloyalty in 
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taking such an independent line, was clearly outmanoeuvred. When 
the ILP Conference met in Norwich in April, the Scottish Divisional 
Council's position was accepted. 
For Maxton and Wheatley it was a major blow, although nationally 
the ILP was to revoke the Norwich decision during the next year. 
Maxton explained the difference between his approach and that of 
-Dollan later: 
The old method of approaching the* living wage problem 
would be correctly described as patching up capitalism. 
The old method looks at a particular industry and lays 
down such a minimum as the industry can afford under its 
existing organisation. Our approach is fundamentally 
different. lie say that the miners, cotton workers, and 
railwaymen are serving the nation, and it is the first 
duty of the nation to insist that they shall be paid a 
living wage for their service. If their particular 
industry cannot afford them a living wage, the nation 
certainly can. 
The 'living wage' argument was merely the tip of the iceberg in the 
changing relationships between Maxton and the Scottish ILP. In 
Scotland the party was increasingly. prepared to be loyal to Ramsay 
MacDonald, and it was a measure of how far the Scottish Party were 
moving against Maxton's leadership when there was a major Scottish 
reaction to the ILP's decision in 1927 not to nominate MacDonald as 
an ILP delegate to the Labour Party Conference or to the 
Treasurership of the Labour Party. When the Executive made its 
recommendation against MacDonald, a 'round robin' letter of protest 
was signed by nine Scottish MPs, Barr, Duncan and Willie Graham, 
Mitchell, Shields, Westwood, Wright, Brown, and Adamson. Otbers 
who signed included Agnes Dollan, Joseph Duncan and the ex-MPs, 
Shinwell, Climie, Muir, and Hay. While Johnston remained agnostic 
on the issue' foý the time being,. the direction of support from the 
ILP's leading figures in Sýotland was clear. At the ILP National 
Conference the Executive recommendation was, however, upheld by 213 
to 118, providing English support for the decision at a time when 
Scotland seemed'to be moving back in support of MacDonald. 
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Increasingly Maxton came under criticism for his activities in 
opposing Parliamentary Labour Party policy in the House of Commons. 
In December 1927, McNeill Weir joined the public critics of Maxton 
and Wheatley, arguing in an article, 'Do Rows Help Labour', that 
the behaviour of Maxton, Kirkwood, and Stephen was equivalent to 
'disloyalty' (39) 
. He later elaborated his attack: 
Maxton knows what I am attacking began early in 1923 
suggest he cannot deny the following: 
That for months past the press have been proclaiming 
an open socialist split, socialist revolt etc. 
2. Time and time again a tiny handful of the party have 
flouted the party's decisions and contemptuously 
ignored the advice of the party... 
He claimed to have been astonished at the volume of support for his 
(40) 
criticisms from ýhe party both outside and inside the Commons 
The Cook-M4xton manifesto was the breaking point so far as Scotland 
was concerned. Maxton's liaison with Cook originated in the 
support the ILP gave the miners during the general strike, and in 
Maxton and Wheatley's realisation that the ILP needed an industrial 
base for political activity. Wheatley had seen Cook as the 
emergent hero of the Labour Movement. No leaders, he said in 1926, 
were 'more loved and trusted more than Smith and Cook'. 'During 
the Bothwell by-election', he wrote, 'I saw young men and women 
literally kiss Cook's garments. The mothers among the miners 
regard him as a deliverer' 
(41). 
on a number of occasions, 
t 
39 Forward, December 17,1927. 
40 Ibid., January 7,1928. 
41 Ibid., June 19,1926. 
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Cook came to Scotland and once visited the Highlands with Maxton 
and Dollan to recover after he had collapsed during a Glasgow city 
(42) 
hall meeting 
The Cook-Maxton manifesto contained only two basic points, that the 
Labour Party was a working class party and that its historic 
purpose was to replace capitalism by socialism. The occasion of 
its publication was the imminent exp ulsion of Cook from the TUC's 
General Council and the appearance of the Labour Party's new 
statement Labour and the Nation, which, Maxton felt, contained 'too 
much in the way of rhetorical flouriLh and too little in the way of 
S olid legislative proposals'. But behind its publication lay 
Maxton's and Wheatley's belief that they needed a wider audience 
and support outside the ILP, if necessary. It was not issued in a 
mistaken belidf that the revolution was round the corner, for it 
was felt that in any straight choice a working class majority would 
reject Socialism in our Time for MacDonald's and Thomas's 
'inevitability of gradualism'. In the fuller document, 
Our Case for a Socialist Revival, it was argued that: 
The Labour Party should scrap its existing programme and 
develop a vigorous socialist programme. It should retain 
its federal basis and allow scope within its ranks for 
all working class political parties and all members of 
these parties. In doing so it would avoid not only the 
danger of a split but would call forth the enthusiasm of 
the rank and f ile. 
Parliamentary measures were to be judged on whether they developed 
the class struggle, improved working class conditions, eased the 
transition to socialism, and helped eliminate the reactionary 
(43) bastions of capitalism 
42 Ibid., October 9,1926. 
43 A Cook, J Maxton, Our Case for a Socialist Revival, (London, 
1928). 
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The Cook-Maxton campaign was launched at a rally in Glasgow which 
by all accounts was 'disastrous' and left Wheatley fuming with 
rage. The other nationwide demonstrations went ahead in July, 
August and September - and a study of Kirkwood's balance sheets 
shows that a large number of people attended, and a large amount of 
(44). 
-Maxton correspondence supporting Maxton survives But the Cook, 
manifesto ensured the isolation of Maxton in Scotland, brought 
Ramsay MacDonald and the Scottish ILP closer than they had been for 
years, and was the beginning of the end for the left within the 
Scottish ILP. 
The manifesto laid bare the shif t in political opinion in Scotland 
towards Dollan and the more pragmatic elements of the Labour Party, 
and it gave opponents of Maxton the chance to isolate him, 
Wheatley, and the left wing. The first reaction to the manifesto 
was one of surprise and hostility. Hughes was 'left in doubt as to 
what Cook and Maxton meant' with a manifesto 'full of vague 
generalities', a 'violent, vigorous and entirely fut-Ile display of 
desperate shadow boxing'. Dollan was most angry of all. His 
motion that there be no co-operation at all with the Cook-Maxton 
campaign was narrowly defeated at the ILP's National Administrative 
Council, but it won unanimous support in Scotland. Dollan's 
position was clear: 'Speaking as Chairman of the divisional 
council in Scotland he regarded the manifesto as the most serious 
interference with ILP organisation and standing that had happened 
(45) 
in his time' 
At the Scottish Divisional Council meeting there was unanimity that 
I they disagreed with the spirit and purpose of the doqument', and 
Dollan went on to state confidently that it 'was unlikely that 
44 Cook-Maxton Campaign Papers, 1928, contained in Maxton Papers. 
45 ILP National Administrative Council, July, 1928. 
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there will be any more unofficial campaign meetings in Scotland' in 
its support(46) . While he was factually wrong, since an Edinburgh 
rally was held in September, he was right in that Scotland played 
little part in the attempts to swing the 1928 Labour Party 
Conference behind Maxton and against Labour and the Nation. 
Maxton realised that he was out. of touch with the Scottish 
leadership of the party. He wa s to tell the National 
Administrative Council that he could not rely on the ILP to help 
him organise a Scottish campaign for the manifesto, which was why 
he had acted unofficially with 'the support of two old friends and 
(47) 
old members of the ILP, John Wheatley and John Cruden' His 
explanation to the Scottish NAC was the same. The offence caused 
by the private organisation of the Glasgow meeting was unintended, 
but 'the local ILP leaders were hostile' and 'therefore it became 
necessary to appeal over their heads to the rank and file'. 
The problem, as Dollan saw it, was that Maxton's connection with 
Cook and his open invitation to other groups seemed to achieve what 
the ILP in Scotland had spent years avoiding: an open association 
with the Communist Party and the Minority Movement. Maxton 
vigorously denied this, he strongly resented the idea which he 
detected among some of his colleagues that he was 'a disguised 
Communist' who intended to further 'the interests of the Communist 
Party'. He said he had experienced pressure from both minority 
movement and communist organisations to let them adopt the 
proposals and put a newspaper press behind them; 'this he had 
definitely turned down to avoid starting new movements and 
factions'. However 
46 Forward, July 28,1928. 
47 ILP National Administrative Council, June 30,. 1928. 
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Dollan saw the matter anothpr way. The ILP Chairman had called 
conferences outside the ILP which had included 'extreme 
elements ... and he stressed the extreme difficulties which had beset 
the Glasgow movement in withstanding Communist Party attacks'. He 
believed that the Chairman had innocently associated himself with 
these events which nevertheless constituted setbacks to the party 
in Scotland. 
The Cook-Maxton campaign continued but outside Scotland. While it 
fizzled out, it was not the failure people had argued it would be, 
with a number of enthusiastic meetings around the country. But it 
failed in its major primary purpose, to prevent the acceptance of 
Labour and the Nation at the Birmingham Conference. Maxton 
accepted defeat. Both he and Wheatley argued 'that their role now 
was to ensure that those elements of Labour and the Nation that 
were radical appeared in the programme of the next Labour 
Government. As Wheatley put it: 
If our enemies think that Maxton or I or any of our 
friends are going to leave the party, they are as far 
wrong as they usually are in things political. But we do 
intend to use our influence in the movement to keep it on 
the direct road to socialism. 
The duty of socialists was 'to concentrate on the selection from 
the Birmingham programme of the socialist items and make them as 
far as possible the programme of the next government, and in 
accepting defeat Maxton outlined his four immediate demands that he 
would fight for in the future - more nationalisation, the living 
wage, family allowances, and price controls. The only comfort for 
him and Wheatley was that the 'living wage' demand was remitted for 
(48) 
a further report by the National Executive 
48 Maxton and Wheatley's comments were widely quoted in the 
national newspapers of the day. See in particular 21ý. sgqK 
Herald, October, 1928. 
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In Scotland, Dollan found simply that there' was common cause 
between the 1928 Conference decisions and the ILP programme, a 
position that led him to believe Maxton and Wheatley were in 
disagreement with the mainstream of the ILP and Labour Party, and 
also with each other: 
An examination. of the ILP programme and the Labour Party 
programme shows clearly that there is much in common 
between the two programmes and that there is absolutely 
no reason why the ILP should not give its wholehearted 
support to nine tenths of the proposals with which it 
agrees. The Labour Party programme is nearer the ILP 
programme than the whole hog revolutionary programme that 
Maxton has outlined in collaboration with Aj 
Cook ... Wheatley's programme on the other hand is 
different from Maxton's. (49) 
The pressures from Scotland against Maxton were continuous 
throughout 19 28. The Scottish ILP Council complained about the 
collection of funds for the Cook-Maxton Campaign 
(50), 
and about the 
(51) financial appeal made in The New Leader for funds With 
Shinwell's support, Dollan was to become a Scottish voice on the 
National Administrative Council of the ILP in opposition to the 
majority. He was to object to the new 'living wage' report, 
(52) 
asking that his dissent be recorded, and the breach was to grow as 
Maxton led an internal opposition to the official Labour policies. 
49 Forward, October 6,1928. 
50 ILP National Administrative Council, September 21,1928. 
51 Ibid., February 9,10,1928. 
52 Ibid. 
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Increasingly therefore the Scottish ILP leadership and the official 
Labour Party leadership were 'united in opposition to the Britýsh 
ILP leadership of Maxton. MacDonald, who 'had been under attack 
from Dollan in 1926 over his attitude to left wing influence in 
Scotland, could say in Forward in December 1928: 
The ILP cannot go on as an independent party laying down 
political policies for its own, trying to impose a 
spurious allegiance for itself and defying the decisions 
and the policy of their colleagues in Parliament. (53) 
Dollan, however, could never win over the ILP nationally. When in 
1929 he and Shinwell stood for the Chairmanship against Maxton, 
(54) 
they, were defeated by 284 to 39 for Shinwell and 38 for Dollan 
The rift between Dollan and Maxton became increasingly bitter. 
When disaffiliation became the issue in 1931, Dollan and the 
Scottish Council of the ILP were adamantly opposed. They believed 
that 'In Scotland the effect of disaffiliation would be to split 
the party from top to bottom' with a probable six to four against 
disaffiliation, probably only one third of the branches favouring 
(55) 
it 
While the changing character of the Scottish ILP only became 
crystal clear after 1929, the direction in thinking and position 
was clear by that time. What Dollan was to say in 1931 on the 
question of ILP disaffiliation was what had guided his movement to 
become independent of the Maxton and Wheatley left since 1928. 
53 Forward, December 15,1928. 
54 Ibid., April 6,1939. 
55 ILP National Administrative Council, November 7,8,1931. 
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Maxton's position was so weak prior to the 1929 election in 
Scotland that although, the National Executive called it a 'minor 
matter' he was accused by the Scottish Executive Committee of 
accepting a mandate from Bridgeton, a disaffiliated party, and 
associating himself with 'confiscation' proposals, with the 
Anti-Imperialist League (which had been 'specifically condemned' by 
the Labour Party) and with 'publicly' encouraging the Leith 
candidate, Wilson, and others 'to defy the Labour Party'. He had 
also sponsored the Sunday Worker newspaper which had been 
'officially condemned' by *the party early in 1929. The Scottish 
Executive Committee decided to ask Maxton for 'an undertaking of 
loyalty for the future', 
(56) 
although at a later meeting it'was 
'agreed to drop the matter' 
(57) 
apparently because of 
(58) 
headquarters' advice 
But the splits within the ILP had taken their toll. On top of the 
recession, there had been a drain in membership for other reasons. 
At a Glasgow Organising Conference of the ILP in December 1928, 
where it was reported membership was 'down all over the country' it' 
was finally agreed that fallen party membership was due to: 
1. Industrial Depression 
2. General apathy among the workers 
3. The competition of the Labour Party 
4. The feeling that the ILP as a separate party was no longer 
necessary ... The Cook-Maxton manifesto had also 
had a 
(59) 
disturbing effect upon the work of the party 
56 Labour Party, Scottish Executive Minutes, March 18,1929. 
57 Ibid. , June 10, 19 29. 
58 Ibid., April 15, 19 29 . 
59 ILP Glasgow Federation Management Committee, January 18,1929. 
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Ironically as the ILP seemed less relevant as the organising group 
for individual activists, the Labour Party and the ILP were both 
losing members. But even in 1929, all but one of Labour's Scottish 
candidates were ILP members and twenty nine were sponsored by the 
ILP. This was in contrast to England where a majority were now 
(60) 
sponsored by local constituency parties 
60 Labour Party Scottish Conference, Report, 1930, p. 37. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE RIGHT IN SCOTLAND 1924-29 
I, A LIBERAL REVIVAL? 
A period of turmoil followed the Liberal Party's disastrous showing 
in the election of 1924. By December 1924, the final steps had 
been taken to Liberal reunion, with the coming together of the 
Scottish Liberal Federation and the Scottish National Liberal 
Council, but at the same time Lloyd George's election to; the 
position of Parliamentary Chairman sparked off new divisions. 
While 26 MPs supported him, seven opposed and seven abstained. The 
Radical Group formed under Runciman, expressed the fear that too 
many Liberal MPs had been elected with Conservative support and 
would not offer regular opposition to the Govýrnment. Benn in 
Leith and McKenzie Wood in the Western Isles joined it,. both later 
to resign as Liberal MPs( 
1) 
However, the immediate situation was dominated by a new 
by-election in Dundee - which reflected the new course Liberalism 
was to take for the next five years. Nationally the party machine 
was to push for independence - despite the fact that locally there 
were some doubts. When the death of Morel brought about a 
by-election, there was in fact no great Liberal enthusiasm locally 
for fighting. So close was the co-operation with the Unionist 
Party that a meeting of Unionist and Liberal Associations, with six 
on each side, was held and a majority of Liberals agreed that the 
(2) 
seat would not be fought An anti-socialist association was in 
the process of being formed in Dundee which would have provided a 
more permanent link between the two associations. - It was the 
The divisions within the Liberal Party in Parliament are 
traced by T Wilson, op-cit., p. 337-374. 
2 Scotsman, December 2,1924. 
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ensuing initiatives of the Unionists that forced a Liberal 
intervention, for the Unionist Association resolved that if -the 
Liberals intended the seat to go by default the Unionists ought to 
stand and the Liberals give way to an anti-socialist candidate from 
(3) 
the Unionists . That decision met 
ýiith disapproval amongst local 
Liberals and led them to choose John Simon as their candidate. 
In response to a Liberal intervention the Unionist nominee, 
Wallace, pulled out and eventually on the advice of Colonel Blair 
from the Unionist Whip's Office, it was resolved not to split the 
anti-socialist vote. While the Unionist Association was 'convinced 
that Mr Wallace had a much better chance of winning the seat for 
moderate opinion than anyone else', 'rather than split the moderate 
vote', it was prepared 'to withdraw from the contest and allow the 
Liberals a clear field for a straight fight against the 
socialist' 
(4) 
. Although the Orange Tory, Ferguson, threatened to 
stand as an independent Unionist, the field was eventually left 
clear for Simon. However, the local Unionists, said their 
Chairman, would not give any instruction or advice on voting, and 
they would not make available any help, not even a motor car, to 
the Liberals. 
(4) 
His view was that most Unionists would 
abstain 
(5) 
although Wallace who had stood down, did urge a 
(6) Unionist vote for the Liberal in a telegram to the electors 
Ibid . 
4 Scotsman, December 2,1924. 
5 Ibid., December 20,1924. 
6 Ibid., December 22,1924. 
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The Dundee election gave the Liberals a chance to propagate -an 
independent policy. Simon, who called himself a new Liberal, 
stressed he was 'not co-operating with any other party', arguing: 
The new Liberalism realises that while we stil 1 require. 
electoral reform the people now have the power in their 
hands to get what they want. We have now to go ahead and 
use the political machine to get the economic and social 
reforms which all want - equal opportunities for all. 
While he did not oppose nationalisation in principle, he said that 
it did not provide the benefits intended, and he urged a social 
security system for each family, widow's pensions, slum clearance, 
(7) 
new house building, and a solution to the land problem 
But the Liberal initiative was hardly successful, losing heavily to 
Labour on a low poll (42.4%) despite the fact that Johnston, the 
Labour candidate, did not receive the endorsement of the 
prohibitionist MP, Scrymgeour, and the local Catholic press was 
(8) 
against him In addition Gallacher the former Communist 
(9) 
candidate was lukewarm in support for him Forward concluded 
that in these circumstances 'Dundee has dug the grave of new 
Liberalism as Paisley has dug the grave of the old Liberalism' 
(10). 
The Dundee by-election showed how far Liberalism had to travel in 
Scotland to re-establish its credibility. While Asquith pondered 
his future, in particular the offer of a peerage,, the Liberal 
Committee of Enquiry into the Party's organisation which had been 
constituted before the general election toured the country to 
7 Ibid . 
8 Ibid., Decembe-r 12 and 24,1924. 
9* Dundee Adver. tiser, December 24,1924. 
10 Forward, December 27,1926. The result was T Johnston 
(Labour) 22,973, E Simon (Liberal) 10,234.. 
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take evidence on the state of the party. In Scotland it found 
plenty to ponder about. In its meeting with the Committee, Ahe 
Scottish Liberal Federation concentrated on party organisation, the 
placing of candidates, the need for unity, and the formation of -a 
party policy. 
Firstly, speakers were 'unanimous against any form of pacts or 
understanding with other parties'. Second, the Scottish party 
wanted a clear statement of policies. They emphasised Jthe need 
for party leaders to keep in touch with the ýarious organisations 
throughout the country in order that their views on important 
questions of policy should be considered. ' In particular they 
emphasised 'the desirability of those who were responsible for 
framing party policy, consulting with those who were responsible in 
Scotland, in order that the problems that affect Scotland should be 
11) dealt with in any manifesto that was issued'( 
Third, the party was. concerned about organisation, because of a 
special need for reorganising the local associations'. Indeed this 
was the main point on which the Liberals in Scotland would have 
concentrated their energies. Junior Liberal assoýiations should be 
developed, and there should be far better representation of women's 
sections and junior sections in making party policy. There should 
(12) 
be an increase in the supply of speakers to local associations 
Fourthly, candidates should be 'adopted as quickly as possible'. 
It was argued that it would be 'an advantage to give preference to 
local candidates', to be placed 'as soon as possible and not just 
immediately before an election'. Finally, more finance should be 
raised in Scotland. It would be 'unwise to depend on subsidies 
11- Scottish Liberal Federatioli, Minutes of Meeting of Conference 




from headquarters' and there should be local fund-raising through a 
(13) 
monthly subscriptions' system 
The Scottish Liberal Federation were in line with the comments the 
party enquiry heard throughout the country. It had found 
'emphasis' throughout the country on 'the lack of candidates at the 
last election', the 'need for a forward fighting policy adopted by 
the party as a whole', 'the avoiding of pacts with other parties', 
and 'above all a deep desire that all differences that have existed 
between Liberals in the past should now be sunk in a unity that is 
real and effective throughout the whole party'. The enquiry argued 
that the party needed new personnel, younger officers (with one 
third of executives under thirty-five years of age), adequate 
representation of industrial and agricultural workers, fund-raising 
average E650 yearly in each constituency to pay election expenses 
and full-time agents: 
Every constituenLy in Great Britain should have a Liberal 
candidate as soon as possible and the constituency 
associations should endeavour to secure its own 
candidate,. provide an efficient organisation, including a 
whole-time agent and funds for propaganda. 
All these recommendations had special relevance to a Scottish 
organisation which lacked credibility. As the Liberal Whip, Vivien 
Philips, was to tell the 1924 convention, that was specially called 
to reorganise the party, the failure at the last election was due 
not to 'some unexplained defect' in the organisation but to 'the 
failure of the party 
electoral battle-f ield 
Sir Henry Ballantyne 





because of lack of money to put into the 
the full fighting line of candidates'. As 
remarked: It was no use goina into an 0 
andidates. They wanted -candidates all ovey 
14 qlýs2qw Herald, April 25,1925. 
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As a result of the enquiry a Liberal fighting fund was set -up. 
Originally Scotland had planned to go it alone with a fund of its 
own but both the Scottish repýesentatives told the British 
Convention that Scotland would now join with the rest of 
(15) Britain But Scotland did establish its own financial 
committee, chaired by Sir Henry Ballantyne. Amongst its schemes 
were monthly collection cards - the aim being to raise E500 and 
E1500 from each constitutency over three years. 'A penny a week 
from every Liberal would do itl(16). The scheme, said Vivien 
Philipp was 'a bold and daring departure on their part'( 
17). 
In 
addition the women's section was revitalised through the Scottish 
Liberal Women's Educational and Social Council, which was a part of 
a national not a women's federation but strictly within the 
(18) 
SLF However the Glasgow Liberal Council was almost defunct 
(19) 
and did not respond to resuscitation 
At their General Council Annual Meeting in 1925, Sir John Anthony, 
who became the new Chairman, remarked that party funds were in far 
better shape than ever before, but he urged there should be unity 
among Liberals. He did so by pointing out that they were few 
enough in numbers without having any lukewarm supporters in their 
midst 
(20) 
, and by the end of 1925 the 'million pound fund' campaign 
to be sponsored by the rank and file had withered. 
15 Elas ow 1 January 31,1925. 
16 Ibid., April ý5,1925. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., Marcb 1,1925. 
19 Ibid., June 5,1925. 
20 Ibid. , April 25,1928. 
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The aim, in addition to improving finance and organisation, was to 
give the Liberal Party a new pctlicy. At a national level a new 
statement of policy came in January 1925 with an economic, 
industrial and agricultural programme, couched in general terms. 
It was then put to the Scottish Party's Joint Organising Committee 
to consider Scottish amendments. It was agreed there that the 
Scottish issues requiring emphasis were: the taxation of land 
values, land settlement schemes, security of tenure for 
smallholders (and the promotion of allotments) as well as 
temperance reform and the creating of local parliaments. In their 
draft in fact the Scottish party opposed public ownership, although 
approving land settlements for ex-servicemen with fixity of tenure, 
and a Land Commission with compulsory. powers to create 
smallholdirfgs. It also wanted improved housing in rural areas, and 
to 'cease penalising private enterprise' it wanted a switch from 
rating to taxing land values on all land. These recommendations 
which came from the organising committee were approved by the 
Executive 
(21) 
The proposals were put to a special Liberal convention in April. 
On most issues it was accepted British and Scottish Liberals were 
at one, and in general terms the statement of principles and aims 
was accepted. Additional proposals for the reform of fishing 
regulations were incorporated into official policy and there was 
some disagreement over education with some arguing that it should 
be compulsory for those out of work, who were between fourteen to 
sixteen years old. But there were fundamental divisions raised 
over the limits and extent of state control. One of the beaten 
candidates of 1924, Major Donaldson, argued that unless the- party 
supported the miners' case for nationalisation the Liberals would 
have little credibility in industrial areas, and he proposed that 
Scottish Liberal Association, Joint Organising Committee, 
January 13,1925: Executive, February 10,1925. 
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mining assets be nationalised with the right to work the assets 
leased out to private companies which would be obliged to involve 
miners in the management of the pits. His proposal was not 
(22) 
accepted 
A major disagreement, however, later appeared on land reform, and 
this was to allow opponents to exploit Libý--ral differences. At the 
April conference the proposals for a Land Commission to encourage 
small holdings, and give tenure for smallholders, for tighter game 
laws, for the provision of allotments reached much less radical 
(23) 
conclusions than the British Liberal Party had proposed 
It was Lloyd George who brought the land issue back on to the 
agenda-when he visited the North of Scotland in the autumn of 1925, 
just after the detaildd Liberal land proposals for Britain were 
published. His suggestions promoted -the idea of resettlement and 
fixed rents but also nationalisation, a far more radical scheme 
than the Scottish policy. Lloyd George told a Highland audience in 
Inverness that there were 700,000 landless people, and that 'the 
landlord system was breaking down hopelessly-landowners could not 
meet their responsibility'. And if state help was needed, he said, 
'the state required some more direct interest in the soil 
itself 1 
(24) 
. He was careful to add that he 'had not presumed to 
inquire into the Scottish conditions and that was a business for 
, (25) Scottish Liberals to undertake 
But his remarks brought an angry and immediate reaction which gave 
the party great difficulties in the Galloway by-election then in 
progress. At their policy-making conference, the Liberal General 
22 Glasgow Herald, April 5,1925. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., October 10,1925. 
25 Ibid. 
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Council had been adamant that land purchase must take second place 
to taxing land values, which it saw as the way out of the 
commercial and industrial depression. It had insisted that any 
treatment of the land question 'inconsistent with this emphasis 
would not have the support of Scottish Liberalism'. There were at 
once complaints that Lloyd George's land proposal had not even 
mentioned taxing land values, but it was left to Sir 
* 
Henry 
Ballantyne to deliver the major indictment. Lloyd George's coal, 
power, and land programmes were, he feared, 'trying to enter into 
competition with the Labour Party', and he was near to supporting 
(26) 
nationalisation The support for Ballantyne was unanimous, 
Lloyd George backtracked, arguing in favour of a Scottish Committee 
to examine the issue, and saying when lie toured the Borders: 
I flung out my proposals as a challenge to people to 
think about their position. If anybody had a better 
scheme let him think it out and just as fearlessly tell 
it .( 27) 
The national land report and the land convention held in February 
1926 considered land nationalisation. But Lloyd George had to 
accept that 'cultivating tenure' which was to be state owned was 
only to be established gradually as land came on the market and 
cultivating tenure was only one of many forms of land tenure. 
26 Glasgow Herald, October 12,1925. Ballantyne said, 'if they 
thought that by advocating policies of that kind they were 
going to get back some of their best radicals who had been 
driven out very largely becasue of the failure of the Liberal 
Party to go ahead with taxation of land valdes they would find 
themselves bitterly mistaken'. ' 
27 Ibid., October 13,1925. 
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According to McCallum Scott, writing in Forward, Lloyd George's 
land policy was in ruins: 'He has had to whittle it away by 
compromising concessions in the vain effort to conciliate implacable 
(28) 
enemies' 
This suited the Scottish Liberals who formed their land enquiry 
committee only in June 1926 after meetings with both Lloyd George 
and Asquith. The committee in Scotland comprised Liberal 
landowners and 'farmers as well as smallholders and farm 
(29) 
workers While there is evidence of activity on the part of 
the Scottish Land Enquiry Committee (meetings for example with 
Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel in April 1927) 
(30) its report was 
slow to appear, taking almost two years to complete. A committee 
was set up to write a report by the autumn on rural land and a 
small committee of three to examine the Brown Book on urban land 
'to see how far any of these (proposals) could be fitted in to 
(31) 
Scottish conditions' When eventually a report was ready and 
the officebearers of the party met the Executive of the Land 
Enquiry Committee there was dissatisfaction with relatively mild 
proposals on land nationalisation. Criticisms were made'on the 
'undue emphasis' on 'principles of purchase', and it was Sinclair 
who said 'the state at the present moment in Scotland were amongst 
the largest if not the largest landowners' and 'he undertook to 
28 Forward, June 5,1926. 
29 Scottish Liberal Federation Executive, June 29,1926. 
30 Scottish Liberal Federation Executive, April 30,1927. 
31 Ibid., June 29,1927. 
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see that the committee would do everything in their power to 
endeavour to tone down the questilon of purchase in the publiphed 
report'. While some expressed 'entire satisfaction with regard to 
the report" there was even criticism of taxation of land values and 
(32) 'the strong way it was referred to in the report' When the 
report was eventually published in April 1928 just before the 
Linlithgow by-election, it did not appear to break much new ground. 
All tenants were to have security of tenure, and fair rents; there 
waz to be a reform of game and deer land; and there was to be a 
land department. While the Scotsman acknowledged that the Scottish 
Liberals had refused to go as far as the English Green book, they 
spoke of the Liberals' 'faith in more machinery' as 
(33) 
unacceptable 
Only the subject of education seemed to excite the same enthusiasm 
as land but again the Scottish Liberals offered no new departures 
in policy. An Education Committee was formed on the 9 December 
1927 
(34) 
. with a remit to cover 'universities, rural education, 
finance, nursery schools, the education of the adolescent, and 
juvenile employment' 
(35) 
* While Principal Lawrie's statement of 
aims was grandiose, that 'one of the first objects of the Liberal 
Party has always been the development of education with a view to 
enabling every child to obtain the fullest moral, mental, and 
physical development without respect to class or social position, ' 
32 Scottish Liberal Federation Meeting of Land Committee with 
Officebearers, February 21,1928. 
33 Scotsman, April 5,1928. 
34 . Scottish Liberal Federation, Education Committee, December 
9, 
1927. 
35 Ibid., January 13,1928. 
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the resulting measures were merely for training of unemployed 
juveniles and for more provision for rural education, public health 
education, and women's education; and it was agreed to look later 
at the school leaving age and technical, industrial, and commercial 
(36) 
education 
The Scottish Executive were also. asked to set up af ishery inquiry 
in the autum of 1927 by Headquarters, and while it was set up, one 
candidate, Duncan Miller, wished it to be stated that this 'had not 
been neglected by Scottish Liber*als'(37) . The inquiry*was supposed 
to report by February 1928 but the Executive was told in March that 
it was not at work. A small committee was also appointed to deal 
with urban land on the same basis as rural land, but by March 1928, 




Scottish Liberalism was hardly a vibrant intellectual force in its 
own right. Conferences of Scottish Liberals had to be postponed 
either through lack of prominent speakers or lack of support in 
(39) 
Scotland A focal point of Liberal discussion, the Liberal 
Summer School, which had been revived in 1925 fell into disrepute 
through lack of support. Great difficulty was found in attracting 
speakers and students for the schools and in 1925, as in subsequent 
(40) 
years, it encountered financial difficulties A special effort 
36 Ibid., November 11, February 17,1928. 
37 Scottish Liberal Federation, Executive, October 17. 
38 Ibid., March 6,1928. 
39 Scottish Liberal Federation Executive, September 9,1926. 
40 Ibid ... Summer School Council, March 24,1925, April 23, ý925t 
July 22,1925, and September 19,1925. 
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was made to revive activities in 1926. Liberal Associations were 
asked to send two representatives each and pay their expenses, with 
an ambitious programme planned on subjects, including proportional 
representation, Ireland, India and the dominions, temperance, 
(41) 
social insurance, family allowances, and housing policy 
(42) 
Samuel, Beveridge, and Ramsay Muir were asked to be speakers 
but eventually only local figures were secured. The school was 
eventually postponed and even the organising committee, the Summer 
(43) 
School Council, could not meet, because it was inquorate 
Plans for 1927 were no more successful and an atmosphere of 
discouragement prevailed so that the Liberal Executive recognised 
(44) 
the schools were virtually dead 
By-elections continued to go badly. After the defeat in Dundee, 
the failure in Ayr Burghs was a further embarrassment to the 
Liberals. The Conservative candidate, Moore, successfully made his 
fight one against Labour, arguing for social reform without 
socialism, on the grounds that 'the fight was against 
(45) 
socialism' There was no Liberal Party that he could attack. 
Pringle, the Liberal candidate, was severely handicapped by the 
state of local Liberal organisation 
(46) 
, although the Liberals 
centrally threw their weight into the election and provided a 
(47) 
constant stream of speakers and bands of canvassers But in 
the end the Liberal revival, concluded the Glasgow Herald, was 'the 
vain imagination of Liberal orators' 
(48) 
41 Ibid., November 25,1925. 
42 Ibid.,. May 7,1926. 
43 Ibid., April 17,1927; April 25,1927. 
44 Ibid., June 14,1928 and Federation Executive, September 7, 
1928.. 
45 Glasgow Herald, June 11,1925. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Scottish Liberal Federation, Eastern Committee, June 19,1925. 
48 Glasgow Herald, June 15,1925. The result was: T Moore 
(Conservative) 11,601; P Dollan (Labour) 8,813; W Pringle 
(Liberal) 4,656. 
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The Calloway by-election of 1925 was a bigger disappointment since 
it had been a traditional Liberal seat. The Liberals had'los-t it 
in a straight fight in 1924 because of, they thought, 'inefficient 
campaigning arrangements' 
(49) 
But after the gener. 11 election, a 
reorganisation had been set in motion, with a full-time organiser 
appointed, area associations reconstituted, and social rallies held 
to raise money. Dudgeon seemed a popular Liberal candidate. He 
was a former MP for the constitutency and Chairman of the Stewartry 
(50) Farmers' Union . The Liberals were ready for a byýelection. In 
the first instance it was believed that Dudgeon, who had voted 
consistently with the Conservatives while in Parliament, might be 
left a free run by the Conservatives. 
According to the Glasgow Herald's political correspondent, this was. 
the 'moderate view' on the Conservative Advisory Committee, * and 
(51) 'Liberals would have been glad to have discussed the matter' 
But as in 1924 overtures were cut short with the sudden appearance 
Of a Conservative candidate, a local farmer from 
Kirkcudbrightshire. 
The Labour Party considered for some time whether or not to take 
part. While the local organisations wanted to fight, the Scottish 
Council was unhappy 
(52) 
after consultations the ILP chose a 
(53) Lanarkshire miner as their candidate Dudgeon during the 
campaign was to be embarrassed by Lloyd George's land proposals, 
which were, said his Conservative opponent, 'nationalisation in 
disguise'. It was obvious that the Liberal Party was 'by no means 
at unity within itself' and agreed on Lloyd George's new 
(54) 
poliLy 
49 October 9,1925. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., October 12, 1925. 
52 Ibid., October 10, 1925. 
53 Ibid., Octobdr 13, 1925. 




But on a high poll (83% compared with 77% at the General Election) 
Labour's intervention was sufficient to allow the Conservativq to 
retain the seat. What ought to have been a by-election victory for 
the Liberals turned out to be 'extremely disappointing' for 
Liberals 
(55) 
, despite the popularity of their candidate. While 
Dudgeon claimed that the cut of one third in the Conservative 
majority was evidence of a revival 
(56) 
, Liberalism clearly had a 
long way to go. 
In 1926 the Conservatives won Dunbartonshire and East Renfrew in 
January, and Bothwell was won by Labour in March 1926. In East 
Renfrew the Liberals were unable to find a candidate to place in 
the-field. In Dunbartonshire, the Liberal selection committee also 
decided not to fight 'having been unable to secure the services of 
a candidate, a prominent or local liberal 1(57) . However, a group 
of local Liberals unofficially agreed to put forward the radical 
lawyer, Reid, the Secretary of the Scottish League for the 
Taxation of Land Values. The Chairman of the campaign was given 
the use of Liberal Association funds and had to say: 'we ourselves 
are the machinery. Dunbartonshire is not so well organised as they 
(58) 
should be' . In explaining his defeat Reid said: 
It was the timidity of members of my own party that let 
me down. My opinion is that Mr Martin, the Labour 
candidate, received as many Liberal votes as the 
Conservative did. The effect of the refusal to fight at 
the last election and the hesitation in the beginning of 
this occasion has been to send a proportion of Liberals 
into other camps... it was not so much political opponents 
whom I had to f ight as the unhappy situation of the 
demoralisation of Liberalism at the moment. (59) 
55 Ibid., November 19.1925. 
. 
56 Ibid., November 20,1925. The result was S Streatfield 
(Conservative) 10,846; C Dudgeon (LibEiral) 9,918; J Mitchell 
(Labour) 4,903. 
57 Ibid., January 7,1926 
58 Ibid., January 12,1926. 
59 Ibid., January 22,1926. 
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Dunbartonshire Liberals then decided not to accept an invitation to 
(60) hold the Scottish conference there 
The Liberals did no better in Bothwell where the candidate was 
pushed into the field and argued that he 'never anticipated he 
would get much support in such a by-election but he wanted to keep 
(61) 
up the Liberal influence' 
Bothwell produced a second lost deposit for the Liberals. At the 
Scottish Executive, Major Donaldson spoke of 'the deplorable state 
of local organisation in Bothwell'. He suggested that if in future 
party headquarters. wanted constituencies to fight by-elections in 
difficult seats, it must provide properly qualified agents and see 
(62) 
that campaigns were efficiently run in every way possible 
Lloyd George's accession to control over the party came in stages. 
But his aim was to turn the party into an electoral machine as 
impressive as that of other parties. Where the 'Millioh pound' 
fund failed, Lloyd George hoped to succeed, and to push 
, 
Liberal 
Associations into raising money to support candidates. In the 
years after the 1924 election, the party in Scotland faced large 
financial difficulties and these were only partly resolved by Lloyd 
George's money. Constituency organisation was so poor that in 1926 
the Eastern Organisation Committee was told by the organiser that 
(63) he had discontinued his visit to the constituencies . Over the 
whole country it had been stated earlier there was 'want of 
60 Scottish Liberal Federation, Executive, June 29,1926. The 
result was J Thom (Conservative) 12,680; W Martin (Labour) 
11,610; W Reid (Liberal) 2,146. 
61 Scotsman, March 29,1926. 
62 Scottish Liberal Federation Executive, March 31,1926. The 
result was J Sullivan (Labour) 14,830; A Mackay (Conservative) 
8,740;. E Young (Liberal) 1,276. 
63 Scottish Liberal Federation, Eastern Organising Committee, 
September 23,1926. 
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interest' in Liberal organisations in about two-thirds of the 
constituences 
(64) 
. In the East of Scotland subscribers, who had 
numbered 1200 in 1914 had fallen to just over five hundred (505) in 
1923-24 and 481 by 1925, while in the West 'a special effort to 
(65) increase their contributions' failed to arrest their decline 
By 1926 the position was even worse, for although in the East there 
had been -an increase of 125 sub6criptions, the Federation's 
expenditure was 'about double the normal income' Its credit 
balance would only last till the end of the year' and a special 
(66) 
appeal was launched but in a spirit of pessimism 
Especially given its own financial weakness, the Federation had 
little option but to accept Lloyd George's terms for support. 
These were agreed by 28 votes to 2 in January 1927 but left the 
Federation extremely unhappy at the virtual loss of financial 
independence. Webster, its representative on the National 
Administrative Committee, which had hammered out the arrangements, 
offered to resign 
(67) 
. but in the end the terms 
ý7ere accepted 
although only with an explicit statement that they would 'endanger 
the independence of the party'. This meant* that hýadquarters' 
money continued to be available to fight by-elections in 
(68) 
Scotland 
64 Ibid., Eastern Finance Committee, May 7,1925. 
65 Eastern Finance Committee, 7 May, 1925. 
66 Ibid., May 20,1926. By September the situation was no 
better, as the Committee was told, "the industrial troubles 
and the party troubles made it almost impossible to approach 
men or women for pýrty contributions. He was by no means 
despondent about the future but -until -men and women saw goQd 
reasons why they should subscribe-to'the party, very little if 
any headway. could be made and he. expressed the hope that after 
Lord Oxford's pronoun-cment in Greenock the air might be 
cleared". 
67 Meeting of Officebeariers, January 21,1927. 
68 Scottish Liberal Federation, Executive, February 24,1927. 
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It did nothing however to relieve the Federation's own poverty, 
which was worsened by the loss of subscribers. The number- of 
subscriptions had in fact halved since 1918 and the party was 
(69) dependent on special donations 
A first test for Lloyd George came with the Leith by-election in 
March 1927. Lloyd George's aggressive Liberalism made it difficult 
for any coalition behind a 'moderate' candidate to faceýLabour. In 
the event, after what Forward described as 'reluctance on the part 
of prominent Liberals without a seat in parliament' to come 
forward, the Liberals chose Ernest Brown, and the Conservatives, 
(70) 
Beaton The Conservatives, however, were anxious to minimise 
the divide between Liberalism and Unionism. 'The only difference', 
it was claimed, between the two parties was over the taxing land 
values, free trade, and self government, and 'apart from that the 
Liberal candidate's policy was that of the Conservative 
(71) 
Government' 
Since the election had been caused by the defection of the sitting 
Liberal MP, the victory was described as 'the torch of the revival 
of Liberalism', by Sir Robert Hutchison and as 'the new impulse to 
(72) Liberalism throughout the land', by Lloyd George But the 
69 Ibid ., February 24,1927. See also Scottish Liberal 
Association Joint Finance Committee, June 7,1927. The party 
heard that 'up to 1918 the income of the federation was made 
up entirely of subscriptions and the subscribers in these days 
numbered over 2,000 whereas in the later years a very large 
proportion of the income was made up of special donations, the 
subscriptions not meeting the expenditure and the subscribers 
had dropped to less than half'. 
70 Forward, March 12,1927. 
71 Scotsman, March 17,1927. 
72 Ibid., March 25,1927. 
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Liberals benefited from two things, firstly, from the extremism of 
the Labour candidate, exploited by the Conservatives and Liber. als 
alike, and used by MacDonald as the explanation for Labour defeat, 
and, secondly, from the defection of Unionists to Liberals to avoid 
a Labour victory, the second being more important. The Labour 
candidate, Wilson, claimed that the Liberals won the seat by the 
defection of 3,000 Conservative votes. The beaten Conser-vative 
candidate was clear that the Liberal victor had to 'thank at least 
five thousand Conservatives for returning him'. He continued that: 
There were Conservatives who thought that in order to 
defeat *socialism it was better to have a half-baked 
defender of private enterprise and therefore they voted 
for Mr Brown ... There was another point of view that ought 
to be kept in mind. If their Liberal friends were going 
to make a point of pleading for united support for the 
candidate of private enterprise, who was most likely to 
defeat socialism, they must recognise that the Unionists 
were going to keep what they had at the present time, the 
majority of the- seats in Scotland. Because the Liberals 
held that seat through conservatives voting Liberal to 
keep the socialists out, in all the other industrial 
seats the Unionists held at the present time the Liberals 
would require to vote conservative in order to keep the 
socialists out. (73) 
This was the Liberal problem. To rely on Unionist votes to win was 
merely a policy of protecting the few seats they had. 
But with the impetus of Leith, new organisers were employed to 
create electoral machines in the constituencies. As Colonel Tweed 
told the Federation's officebearers at a meeting on I September 
1927, 'London insisted upon the E4000 being spend upon what they 
described as new work but which was ultimately construed as being 
work of organisation in the constituencies" 
(74) 
. By November 1927, 
13 of the East constituencies were still without candidates, the 
73 Ibid . 
74 Scottish Liberal Federation, Officebearers Meeting, September 
1,1927. 
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Eastern Organiser, McNicol, reported, and constituencies that 
required special work included formýr strongholds such as East 
Aberdeenshire, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, North Midlothian, West 
Lothian and East Edinburgh. There was also concern that 'the 
Borders had been neglected j(75) .A later report orf the state of 
these constituencies in December spoke of 'peculiar difficulties' 
(76) 
in Dunfermline and a shortage of money in others 
The Central Organising Committee in January 1928 was told of 
meetings and visits to 23 constituencies. In eighteen 
constituencies the General Secretary had met candidate's committees 
(13 in West) and found that 'the real difficulty was in getting the 
candidates who were willing to stand to take constituencies in the 
west of Scotland'. Webster reported: 
The staf f were f inding certain difficulties in 
reorganising constituencies that were more or less 
derelict. While the constituencies were willing to. 
reorganise they were unable to do so for want of funds 
and in some cases they were in debt ... it was a very 
delicate question especially in the west of Scotland to 
pick out the type of constituency as it really meant, if 
a grant was to be given, that they should be fought. (77) 
An examination of likely constituencies was agreed. Candidates 
were chosen in Dundee and North Aberdeen. Perthshire and North 
Midlothian applied for assistance and work was continued in 
Berwick, Fife, and Aberdeen. A list of 'derelict constituencies' 
(78) 
for whom grants would be advised was to be submitted . By 
75 Scottish Liberal Federation, Eastern Organising Committee, 
November 3,1927. 
76 Central Organising Committee, January 20,1928. 
77 Central Organising Committee, January 30,1928. 
78 Ibid. 
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March, the Central Organising Committee found, candidates were 
adopted in North Aberdeen, North Edinburgh, North Lanark, 
Motherwell, Coatbridge, and Cathcart. Paisley were practically 
fixed up, constituencies in touch with candidates included 
Kilmarnock, Clydebank, Dumbarton Burghs, and Ayr. In all, 
practically 26 candidates were 'fixed'. The list , of of 
tsemi-derelict constitutencies' was sent to London, with a 
recommendation that headquarters give a E50 grant to each. Webster 
also advised an honorarium for part-time organisers with a grant 
for propaganda. 
By March 1928 there were 30 candidates 
(79) 
, and shortly afterwards (80) (81) 33 candidates In May there were 36, by June the number 
had declined again to 33. Four others were considering. A 
memorandum from headquarters suggested conferences in difficult 
areas to help constituencies but it was felt the proposal would be 
a little dangerous in Glasgow and 'unnecessary in Edinburgh'. 
However, the Eastern Committee (82) decided that meetings should be 
held all over Scotland in the early autumn, 'stirring up interest 
in view of the approaching general election' 
(83) 
and a conference 
was held in Glasgow 'to review the whole position' 
(84) 
. But the 
increased pace did not satisfy headquarters. In December Samuel 
79 Scottish Liberal Federation, Central Organising Committee, 
March 2,1928. 
80 SLF Executive, March 6,, 1928. 
81 Executive, 22 June 1928. Two had fallen out, Pringle ?2 
Kennock withdrawing by July (Special meeting, 
Central Organising Committee) but West Lothian selected Orr 
(27 July 1928)% 
82 SLF Central Organising Committee, June 27,1928. 
83 SLF Eastiarn Committee, June 6,1928. 
84 SLF Central Organising Committee, October 3,1928. 
444 
was writing asking Scotland 'to speed up the adoption of Liberal 
candidates', to which Webster replied that he was 'making every 
effort ... the difficulty was to get proper adjustment between 
constituencies and individual candidates'. There were now 32 
candidates in the field, although others were possible in five 
other constituencies, Argyll, Paisley, Maryhill, Berwick and 
Haddington, and Kilmarnock. When the Executive asked for 'quicker 
1(85) progress Webster said he found 'the real difficulty was to 
(86) 
get the type of candidate who was acceptable' In January 
1929, with an election imminent only 10 of the 38 western 
constituencies had Liberals contrasted with 36 each of Labour and 
(87) 
Conservative 
Samuel's pressure on Scotland was maintained. Writing in February, 
1929, he spoke of 'regret that the Scottish position with regard to 
organisation, candidates, and propaganda was not so satisfactory as 
any of the other areas in England', and that 'staffs were not 
functioning as they ought to function except one' 
(88). While there 
were new candidates in Kilmarnock, Berwick, Forfarshire, 
Kelvingrove, and Argyll, making 37 in all and there were two or 
three other constituencies 'in touch with possible men' Webster 
advised that at best there might be 40 candidates at the election. 
Scotland's quota under the national mean to field 500 Liberal 
candidates, was 48 and it seemed impossible to reach this figure. 
Webster felt this was 'the most important grievance London has had 
with Scotland. He insisted, however that, 'the seriousness of the 
85 SLF Central Organising Committee, December 7,1928. 
86 Ibid., October 3,1928. 
87 January 31,1929. 
88 SLF Central Organiging Committee, * February 27,1929. 
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situation was as well known in Scotland as in London'. 
Constituencies who were adopting candidates were finding finances a 
problem. Forfarshire for example 'felt they could not fight the 
election on the grant given on working and raising money unless 
they were -going to get a candidate' , and Webster 'knew of no one 
that they were likely to accept' 
(89) 
. However, by April 1929, the 
number of candidates had in fact been raised from. 37 to 43 with 
others 'possible' in spite of possible financial probl ems in many 
(90) 
constituencies EVen so by this time the Conservatives had 64 
and Labour 62 candidates in the field(91). 
In 1925 it had been a Liberal dream to have a candidate in every 
constituency of Scotland. Lloyd George in 1926 -promised five 
hundred candidates for the United Kingdom and in the 1929 election 
the Liberals actually fielded 512 candidates. But in Scotland the 
party managed only 45. In Glasgow Liberals were absent in 11 of 
the 15 seats, and the party's strength was concentrated in the 
rural areas. 
89 Ibid 
90 Ibid, April 23,1929. 
91 April 22,1929. 
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II THE NEW CONSERVATISM? 
Between 1924 and 1929 the Conservative Party became a modern 
political party in Scotland to its anti-socialism was added a 
positive social policy. This does not mean that the work of 
propaganda, organisation, and education against socialism did not 
continue unabated. It did, through classes, speakers, lectures, 
publications, and most of all leaflets. But the Conservative Party 
also zýdjusted itself while in government to putting forward a 
policy on economic and social affairs. In the late twenties the 
Conservative Party was able for the first time in Scotland to act 
as a party of Government, working out policy, defending its leaders 
and organising for electoral victory. Prior to that it had all the 
features of a movement against socialism. The transition was aided 
by the change that was taking place in the Labour Party, as the 
revolutionary left was pushed out and the ILP radicals defeated. 
There appears to have been a consolidation rather than improvement 
in party membership and financing. While membership rose from 
20,000 in 1922 to 39,000 in 1929, subscriptions (for example, those 
to the Glasgow Unionist Association) remained relatively stable"). 
The Western Divisional Council retained rather than expanded its 
speakers and employees. In January 1925, it had 5 men and one 
(2) 
woman speaker who in all in 1925 addressed 800 meetings. By 
(3) 
using additional speakers, 1461 meetings were held . The Eastern 
Divisional Council was far less well-organised. Publications took 
precedence over organisation. Indeed in 1926 there was 
dissatisfaction expressed at the Central Organisation in the East. 
Scottish Unionist Association, Papers of Joint Executive 
. Committee, Subscription list. 
2 SUA Western Divisional Council, January 8,1925. 
Ibid., January 6,1926. 
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A questionnaire on the organisation of constituencies met with 
(4) little response One delegate at an area group ýneeting cqlled 
to improve co-ordination complained 'nothing was ever done and it 
was a waste of time attending council meetings' 
(5) 
. However, most (6) 
constituencies had an organiser only in a few like Caithness 
was organisation poor or non-existent, and in places like East 
Aberdeenshire, Banffshire and Ross and Cromarty and Montrose, where 
organisations seemed capable of improvement, special action was 
considered. In 1927, the East launched 'a scheme of work' to 
farouse interest in the constituencies between now and thd General 
Election', which included speakers' classes and rallies in each 
(7) 
constituency Finance remained a problem for the east and 
indeed throughout Scotland. Proposals to introduce a constituency 
affiliation fee were beaten back by the Chairman and agent, Colonel 
Blair. A minimum of E5.5s. had been suggested but Blair preferred 
informal pressure to raise money for central organisations to 
(9) formal constitutional provisions 
There were full-time organisers in 50 of 70 constituencies in 1925 
(10) 
according to the Annual reports of 1925 Even so the council 
4 SUA Eastern Divisional Council, Executive, April 22,1925. 
5 Ibid., February 16,1926. 
6 Ibid., February 27,1927. 
7 SUA Eastern Divisional Council, July 27,1927. 
9 Ibid., Julý 28,1928. 
10 SUA Central Council Report, 1925, p. 5. 
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wanted' organ ise rs in every seat, stressing 'the vital necessity of 
making good this defect with the least possible delay'. In -the 
west 26 of the 34 constituencies had full-time organisers. In 
Glasgow in 1925, organisers were absent only in Cathcart and 
Govan. In the east's 33 constituencies there were 24 men 
(12) 
organisers, with women organisers, also in 7 
In 1926 the official reports spoke of 'a general and marked 
improvement in the organisation throughout the whole country'. By 
then only six constituencies were without organisers. In the east 
in addition there was a 'missionerl at the disposal of 
(13) 
constituencies Even then a special committee had been formed 
to examine organisation and promote new schemes 
(14) 
, and more 
organisers were being pressed for. In 1927 organisation had been 
, fully maintained' although 11 constituencies were without 
full-time organisers -4 in the east (Orkney, Western Isles, 
Caithness, and Central Edinburgh), with three omissions - Banff, 
Kirkcaldy, and Inverness-shire - now rectified. By 1928, the east 
had 28 men organisers with 8 women out of 32, with only Orkney, 
Central Edinburgh, Western Isles, and North Aberdeen without 
organisers. In the West only Cathcart, Shettlestont Springburn, 
Paisley, Bothwell, and Motherwell were without organisers 
(15) 
. By 
1930, there were 
11 Glasgow Unionist Association, Annual Report, January 26,1926. 
12 SUA Central Council Report, 1925, p. 10., p. 16. 
13 SUA Central Council Report, 1926, p. 9. 
14 Ibid. 
15 SUA Central Council Report, 1928, p. 16. 
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still 28 men in the west of Scotland and with now 25 men and 12 
women organisers in East, only 
_seven 
seats were without organiqers 
(Orkney, Western Isles, Caithness, Ross and Cromarty, North 
(16) 
Aberdeen, Montrose, and Dunfermline) It can be assumed where 
there was no organiser there was little organisation. 
Constituencies such as Ross and Cromarty, the Western Isles, Orkney 
and Shetland, Caithness, and Montrose were almost invariably 
without organisers during the whole period, and this reflected an 
absence of activity *which allowed the seats to remain in Liberal 
(17) hands for most of the time 
Various organisations were encouraged as vehicles of conservatism 
in action. The Junior Imperialist League was so successful in the 
west of Scotland that the number of branches had jumped to nearly 
(185 
100 by December 1925 The East tried to repeat the success of 
the West and from a survey they found that 11 constituencies either 
had branches or were on their way to setting them up, and by 1929 
90 Junior Associations with 7000 members existed in the whole of 
Scotland. Colonel Blair, the Unionist Agent, still felt 
(19) 
nevertheless that there was room for further improvement . The 
progress of this Junior Lgague was to be a repeated interest of the 
Eastern Committee 
(20) 
16 Ibid . 
17 SUA Eastern Divisional Council, April 28,1926, June 24,1925. 
For example organisation was non-existent in Caithness and 
schemes of improvement had to be drawn up for Banff, East 
Aberdeen and Ross and Cromarty constituencies. In Montrose 
Lady Baxter recommended that 'if at all possible headquarters 
should be allowed to run a candidate as otherwise nothing 
would be done'. 1EDC June 24,1925). 
18 SUA Western Divisional Council, December 2,1925. 
19 SUA Eastern Divisional Council, January 22,1930. Sýe also 
Optober 28, and December 18,1925. 
20 Scottish SUA, Central Committee, Report, 1929, p. 11. 
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When Colonel Blair - the Unionist agent in Scotland - carried out 
his own personal enquiry into the state of Unionist organisation 
after the 1929 election, he was to acknowledge that much had been 
achieved in improving Unionist organisation, through making 
literature available, organising meetings, and raising money. But 
he believed that Conservative local organisation was still 
insufficiently flexible. Socialists, he found, did 'far more 
unpaid work' especially in canvassing, and Blair felt that 'efforts 
spent in this direction ... would be more valuable than the holding, 
for example, of conferences which pass resolution, upon political 
questions'. He was unhappy that so much of Conservative 
organisation was in the hands of lawyers. 'The personal touch' was 
needed. He also wanted to expand the existing number of 
subscribers on the grounds that 'a large number of small 
subscribers is far more valuable than a small number of large 
subscribers'. He finally wanted to make the party publications 
both 'more ambitious' and more appropriate and applicable to 
(21) 
Scotland . Between 1924 and 1929 the Scottish Conservatives had 
gone a long way to creating a modern party organisation but they 
still recognised they had a long way to go. 
The more positive side of Scottish Conservatism was a greater 
attention to the detail of policy. There was still a broad 
anti-socialist crusade and a distaste, especially in the East, for 
any criticism of the leadership of the party, but the Conservatives 
did try to anticipate the problems their government faced and did 
try to press for a more constructive conservatism. In particular 
they moved towards a commitment to 'sound, progressive, 
constructive policy of social reform', 
(22) 
although the verdict of 
the election in 1929 was felt to show that the party had not yet 
committed itself firmly enough to this course. Policy-making 
varied from the support of positive measures of social reform to 
demands for economies in public expenditure, and for strong action 
21 SUA Report by Colonel Blair on 1929 General Election, Gilmour 
Papers GD/383 
22 SUA Scottish Conference Report, 1929, p. 5-6. 
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against trade unions and in favour of protection. Immediately 
after the 1924 election the Scottish Conservatives put forward 
their most coherent set of policy proposals of the decade, urging 
one comprehensive national insurance scheme to achieve better 
social conditions, new housing schemes for both urban and rural 
areas, a reform of the rating systems, and an enquiry into the cost 
of food. This offered support for even more ambitious social 
reform than the Conservative Government's Housing and Health 
Ministry under Neville Chamberlain or' the Scottish Office was 
promising. The issue which the Scottish Party was especially 
concerned about was housing. Their attitudes represented a 
development of the concern they had shown before 1924 when they had 
advised against the decontrol of rents. In 1925, they expressed 
support for the Scottish Secretary's housing efforts, 'being deeply 
(23) 
concerned at the urgency of the housing problem' In 1926 they 
wanted action 'to concentrate for the present on the provision of 
houses of a class most suitable to clear these evils (slum and 
(24) 
overcrowding) from 'our midst' By 1927 they could record 
'gratification at the increased progress being made in Scotland 
during the administration of the present government in the decrease 
(25) in the shortage of housing for the people But in 1928 they 
(26) 
urged that slum clearance be pushed forward The wisdom of 
further progress seemed to be confirmed by events, since they felt 
that at the 1929 election the government's record had been harmed 
'by the undoubted fact that in spite of all efforts houses were 
(27) 
still too dear for the poor working people' 
23 SUA Central Conference, November 13,1925. 
24 Ibid., November 11,1926. 
25 Ibid., November 3,1927. 
26 Ibid., November 22,1928. 
27 SUA Scottish Conference Report, 1929, p. 9. 
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The other plank of social reform was contributory pensions and 
insurance. In 1926, the party in Scotland urged 'an -improved 
system of old age pensions on a contributory basis while preserving 
the rights of old age pensions -under the present scheme' with 
sickness and unemployment insurance overhauled and provision made 
(28) 
for women and children They welcomed the 1925 pensions act 
but not without ieservations, and they felt it still left 'certain 
'inJustices to be rectified', which the Government should quickly 
(29) deal with And again, in 1929 they were to record that support 
had been lost* because, of 'the carefully fostered grievances of 
those who just fell outside the new old age and widows' pensions' 
benefits'. They regretted the failure to issue any definite 
statement of policy on this matter. 
A more negative aspect of policy was their concern for spending 
cuts. In 1927 as the Conservative Party moved to the right in the 
wake of the general strike, they resolved 'that this conference is 
of the opinion that excessive high taxes and rates are still the 
chief obstacle - to recovery, that the widespread discontent 
consequent thereupon gravely prejudices the prospects of Unionists 
at the next general election, and that therefore relentless economy 
and a reduction of national expenditure are the prime duties of His 
Majesty's Government' 
(30) 
. Early in 1927 the Western Council 
wished to approve a list of drastic cuts but Blair warned against 
being too explicit about particular reductions in spending. 
In fact concern about spending came to a head during the miners' 
strike, when Gilmour and Elliot at the Scottish Office were hauled 
over the coals, so to speak, for allowing the illegal payment of 
poor law assistance to strikers. These payments were made 
. 28 SUA Scottish Confer. ence, 1924, November'13,1924. 
29 Annual Conference, Scottish Unionist Association, Minute, 
November 12,1926. 
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retrospectively legal against the wishes of the western 
conservatives. Propaganda work, the Conservative Western Coun. cil 
was told, had been 'severely impeded by the dissatisfaction which 
existed because ... of the enormous expenditure of parish councils 
under the authority of the Scottish Board of Health ... it involves 
an almost intolerable bu rden upon the ratepayers' 
(31) 
. Elliot 
tried to reassure the Conservatives that the Parish Councils were 
under an obligation to 'give food to any starving person', but the 
Executive asked for 'an immediate enquiry' despite his 
reassurances. While the matter was under Cabinet disi: ussion, the 
Council argued that the payments 'alienated the sympathy of many of 
the party's supporters', and unanimously offered their 'considered 
opinion that it would be extremely inexpedient to introduce 
legislation for the purpose of legalising what the courts have 
decided to be an illegal act'. 
Unemployment, however, was an important concern of the Scottish 
Conservatives, with support for more interventionist policies than 
the Government was pursuing. They had wanted to go further than 
Baldwin in 1924 when he rejected protectionist tariffs for 
safeguarding industries, although they refused to rock the boat, 
and merely asked for 'more education on empire trade and imperial 
(32) 
preference' But in 1925 they were demanding that the 
Government 'take immediate steps for the further protection of the 
work and wages of our people from foreign competition', 
(33) and 
30 Ibid., November 3. 
31 Propaganda. Commitee, September 1,1926. 
32 SUA Scottish Conference, 1924, November 13,1924. 
33 Ibid.., 1925, November 13,1925. 
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they asked for a simplification of procedures for help under the 
safeguarding of Industries Act. While the Executive had accepted 
for consideration a motion drawing attention to underconsumption as 
a reason for the economic slump, and calling for a 'bold policy 
upon Empire development', it could not be discussed as conference 
(34) 
ran out of time At the 1927 Conference a motion accepting 
there was, to be no general tariff but calling for more protection 
against unfair competition was dropped ýn favour of a milder 
(35) 
resolution to extend the safeguarding of industry act The 
(36) 
Government's response was welcomed But in the wake of the 1929 
election defeat, the Executive offered the unanimous advice that 
Baldwin 'should at an early date make a declaration that we would 
ask the electors' authority at the general election not only to 
call an imperial conference but to put its decision into immediate 
effect, even should these measures include duties on foreign 
(37) 
foodstuffs' 
Behind support for protectionism was a concern about reviving of 
the economy - and the social disorders that would result from high 
unemployment. The 1925 conference went so far as to talk of 'the 
large and deplorable amount of unemployment' and to record its 
'earnest hope that no stone would be left unturned by the government 
to remedy this evill(38). They went on to stress that unemployment 
was a 'matter for national industrial policy', rather than simply a 
localised problem which awaited the revival of the market through 
the invisible hand. The 1926 Conference proposed that there should 
(39) be more local representation on Ministry of Labour Committees 
34 Ibid., November 12,1926. 
35 Ibid., November 3,1927. 
36 Ibid., Novembpr 22,1928. 
37 SUA Central Executive, September 10,1930. 
38 SUA Conference, July 25,1925. 
39 Ibid. November 12,1926. 
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The 1927 one discussed emigration as a means of reducing 
unemployment. Their proposals spoke of a 'temporary state. of 
overpopulation' and suggested that higher emigration be encouraged 
with money from the Unemployment Insurance Fund used to bring men 
into agricultuial work and to advance capital to suitable 
(40) 
emigrants 
The Unionists however did not deviate from their concern over 
'extremism' and its manifestations In industrial militancy. In 
1925, and before the General Strike, the issue of trade union 
reform was already the subject of discussion amongst Conservatives 
in the west of Scotland. There had been calls to end the legal 
immunities granted to trade unions under the 1906 Act, and the 
private member's bill, introduced by McQuisten, himself a west of 
Scotland MP, which sought to change the basis of the political levy' 
from contracting out to contracting in, produced a considerable 
debate. When the Council canvassed the views of local constituency 
Chairmen, they found ten favoured the proposed legislation and 
twenty-nine were against 
(41) 
0 The Council thus accepted the 
Scottish Unionist Agent's advice that 'if the question was better 
understood trade unionists would take up the matter for themselves', 
and issued a leaflet explaining how to contract out 
(42) 
. While 
resisting calls for an end to immunity, the Council wanted changes 
in the law 'with a view to preventing intimidation and to enable 
the members of trade unions to have the opportunity of fully 
(43) 
expressing their opinion' 
40 Ibid., November 3,1927. 
41 SUA Western Divisional Council March 14,1925. 
42 Ibid., September 2,1925. 
43 Ibid., November 13,1925. 
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Throughout the year they expressed concern at 'the scope given to 
extremists' and had to be reassured that 'the government was. not 
blind to what was going on', and would take action when the time 
(44) 
was opportune When it was proposed that the matter of secret 
ballots, and 'communistic activities' be raised with the Prime 
Minister, the Council agreed to await Baldwin's speech at the party 
(45) 
coilference in October But following the Conference, the 
Western DivIsional Chairman confessed he 'did not feel confident 
that the. Government would tackle any of these subjects, (trade 
disputes, peaceful picketing, and the secret ballot), as the 
council would like and that organisations must just keep pressing 
(46) 
for the desired reforms' 
Support for a more repressive anti-socialist policy was grounded in 
the assumption that voters and workers were being indoctrinated and 
misled by agitators. Support for trade union reform did not 
prevent Conservatives supporting trade unions if properly led, and 
behind the view of the Western Council was the assumption that if 
ballots were held before strikes and if union leaders were 
controlled, then stability would ensue. It was in part an 
extension of the policy of propaganda against the socialist and 
extremist menace. The western divisional council became so worried 
in 1926 that they demanded deportation as a solution. A motion was 
passed in September asking the government to suppress revolutionary 
talk and conduct 
(47) 
, at both indoor and outdoor meetings. 
44 Ibid., October 7,1925. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., November 4,1925. 
47 SUA Western Divisional Council, September 22,1926. 
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While Conservatives believed in organised preparations against the 
General Strike, the matter was regarded as too sensitive for -the 
Party to place itself at the disposal of the government. Both the 
Western Convener and Sir Charles Cleland warned that 'it was not 
desirable to take part as a party organisation' 
(48) 
. During the 
strike they had to suspend their open-air meetings and a procession 
of Young Unionists planned in Glasgow in view of the hostile 
(49) 
attitude of strikers In the East they recognised that 
literature in mining areas would have to be distributed by 
post 
(50) 
, and a leaflet was sent out explaining 'Miners? Wages and 
Coal Prices', after they were urged to continue leafleting by the 
(51) Unionist Whip Immediately after the strike, the Western 
Council urged 'an early and authoritative enquiry into the 
operation of the law affecting trade unions and into the method 
which might be adopted to remedy any defects'. They wanted in 
(52) 
particular an obligation to have secret ballots before strikes 
At the Scottish Conference, motions were passed to make strikes 
illegal without secret ballots, to make mass picketing illegal, and 
to ensure that trade unions were forced to accept full 
responsibility for actions by their officials and members. There 
was also a proposal to give the right to request a ballot 'in any 
matter affecting his workt but it was dropped in favour of a more 
general statement that present laws 'constitute a menace to 
national security while depriving the individual of political and 
industrial freedom', warning of 'the danger of hasty and 
precipitate action', and urging legislation 'to restore the 
political and industrial freedom of individual trade 
48 SUA Yestern Divisional Council, May 5,1926. 
49 Ibid. 
-50 SUA Eastern Executive, May 28,1926. 
51 'Ibid., June 23,1926. 
52 SUA Western Divisional Council, June 2,1926. 
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unionists and to safeguard the nation against the danger of trade 
(53) 
unions being exploited for political purposes' In 19 27 the 
Western Council issued a leaflet to show the 'futility of strikes 
and the importance of means being adopted for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes' 
(54) 
. There was naturally support for the 
trades disputes bill, and 200,000 leaflets wer6 distributed to 
(55) 
explain it On the political levy, a leaflet was issued with 
(56) 
the title 'Don't Sign' Support was also eventually expressed 
for an industrial peace conference to 'reduce to a minimum the 
possibility of industrial conflicts such as have proved so 
disastrous in the past'. 
The new policy-making interests of Scottish Unionists made them 
complain at times that the Conservative Government had no policy 
that was sufficiently positive to win support. This was hardly 
fair to the Scottish Office, however, and by the time of the 1929 
election considerable changes had taken place both in the 
Conservative Party and the Conservative Government in Scotland. In 
1924 Gilmour's elevation to Scottish Secretary had been regarded as 
a victory for the progressives. The Duke of Atholl wrote that 'we 
ought to be able to have a real forward Scottish programme' , 
especially if Elliot was second in command. Sinclair, the Liberal 
member, wrote 'no possible appointment by your party could have 
given as much satisfaction to me personally or, I believe, to most 
(57) 
Liberals in the Highlands' Even Rosslyn Mitchell, admittedly 
53 SUA Scottish Conference, November 12,1926. 
54 SUA Western Divisional Council Propaganda Committee, January 
5,1927. 
55 Ibid., April 4, May 5,1927. 
56 Propaganda Committee, September 9,1927. 
57 Sinclair to Gilmour, Gilmour Papers, November 12,1924. 
GD/383/20. 
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unpopular with his Labour colleagues, told Gilmour that he believed 
the rigidity of party divisions was slackening: 
You Tories - if I may still call you that when your 
actions so little resemble the Toryism of my youth - are 
doing some splendid things. You are making it very 
difficult for an opposition to function at all. (58) 
While the emphasis of election manifestoes in 1924 was the failure 
of Labour, the Russian menace, and . 'the socialist bolshevist 
bankrupt state' Labour would create, as Gilmour put it, 
Conservatives also promised slum clearance, new housebuilding, 
improved contributory insurance and pensions, and security of 
tenancies when rent restriction lapsed in June 1925 
(59) 
. In 1929 
Conservatives claimed they had quadrupled the output of new 
houses - from just over 4,000 a year in 1924 to 20,000 in 1929 -and 
carried out slum clearance. 'No problem', Gilmour stated 'has been 
more energetically tackled by the Government. ' Conservatives also 
claimed that through local government reform thý health services 
were improving, and that nearly 200,000 Scots were benefiting from 
(60) 
the new widows' and old age pensions 
After the 1929 election, Blair believed that, despite Gilmour's 
position, the Government's achievements -had been misrepresented or 
misunderstood and that the Government had been blamed for poor 
housing and unemployment. He felt that the party might have relied 
too much upon 'past achievements' and had lacked a 'definite and 
attractive future policy which could be grasped by the electoratet. 
Defeat naturally produced what the Annual Report of 1929 called 'a 
clamour for more spectacular action'. A large number of the rank 
58 Mitchell to Gilmour, n. d. GD/383/20. I 
59 Gilmour Election Address, 1924, GD/383/11. 
60 Gilmour Election Address, 1929, GD/383/15. 
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and file agreed with Blair that the party 'had suffered through not 
having a definite policy for the future' and these feelings 
expressed themselves at the 1929 Scottish Conference although it 
was pointed out they came near to being a vote of censure on the 
(61) leaders Nevertheless by 1929 the Conservative Party had 
changed substantially since 1924. It was a different Conservative 
, as well as Labour Party which fought the election. 




THE 1929 ELECTION 
1929 marks Labour's accession to power as the largest party in 
Britain but without a majority over all the other parties in 
Parliament. In Scotland Labour's position was even better : with a 
majority of seats Labour would have gained power in an independent 
Scottish parliament. But the steps to the victory of 1929 were 
difficult ones, involving changes in the Labour Party in Scotland, 
and changes in the alignment of Conservative and Liberal opponents. 
In the conflicts of the period 1924 to 1929, the Labour Party in 
Scotland had shed much of its leftward stance and the Conservative 
Party had committed itself more positively to a policy of social 
reform as a complement to its anti-socialist crusade. 
The two by-elections which opened in 1929 showed what was to be the 
shape of the general election results to come : Liberalism caught 
between Conservative and Labour. In Midlothian, the Liberal who 
could manage less than half the vote of the Conservative and Labour 
candidates ensured nevertheless a Labour victory. Churchill 
argued: 
It seems extraordinary that the Lloyd George fund, which 
was built up for the direct purpose of enabling the 
Conservatives and Liberals to stand up against socialism, 
should be used with the consequence of deliberately 
multiplying socialist representation in the House of 
Commons. (1) 
So far as issues were concerned, Clarke, the Labour candidate, had 
argued for nationalising the mines, and the Conservative candidate, 
a businessman, Colville, had wanted. protection and derating, and 
had been prepared to support employment schemes such as building a 
(2) Forth Road bridge 
I Glasgow Herald. February 13,1929. 
2 Ibid., 12 January, 1929. 
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Similarly, the Liberals were squeezed in North Lanark. They had 
had no candidate when the by-election was declared because of -the 
(3) 
withdrawal through ill-health of their nominee For a time it 
seemed possible that. the radical, former Liberal MP, Cunningham 
Graham, would stand as a Nationalist(4), and there were suggestions 
that Labour's candidate, Jenny Lee, was so unpopular with the Roman 
Catholic Church because of her attitude to birth control that she 
(5) 
would be opposed -by a Roman Catholic candidate But when 
nominations closed, only Liberal, Unionist, and Labour candidates 
were in the field. In fact the birth control controversy, on which 
Jenny Lee refused to be drawn during the campaign, arguing the 
matter was 'best kept out of politics', was the only side-issue in 
a campaign dominated by economic issues and the question of 
(6) 
unemployment When Labotir won the seat with an increased vote, 
the Unionist candidate, Lord Scone, felt the swing against the 
Conservatives was 'due to depression ... in the iron and steel (7) 
industries' . But the Chairman of the Political Committee of the 
Scots Conservative Club regarded the by-election as a watershed, 
showing the , necessity' for 'steady instruction of the electorate 
in simple economics '(8) , and the Glasgow Herald felt the results 
demonstrated that the Unionists had been 'slow to wake' and pointed 
out how short the time was for them to prepare for an election. 
3 Glasgow Herald, February 13,1929. 
Ibid. 
5 Ibid., February 27,1929. 
6 Ibid. 





The results in North Midlothian and Lanark gave the Labour Party a 
new conf idence. Hopes were high even in non-socialist Edinburgh 
and the Lothians. The Edinburgh Labour Standard, a Labour 
newspaper, which had been running in the city from 1927, believed 
that four additional Labour seats could be won, North and West 
(9) Edinburgh, Leith, and Berwick and Haddington 
It was not surprising therefore that the Conservative, Sir Robert 
Horne, made an early appeal, as in previous elections, for 
do-operation between Liberals and Conservatives wherever possible. 
'I appeal', he said, 'to every Liberal to do what they did in the 
last election ... there is every reason why the Liberals should act 
along with the Unionists ... the necessity for co-operation was more (10) imperative at the present time than ever before' But there 
were to be no pacts, agreements, or coalitions at a national level. 
Indeed in an editorial the Scotsman was to accuse the Liberals of 
I pursuing 'a suicidal policy ... it would almost seem as if seats held 
by Unionists on a doubtful tenure from the socialists have been 
specifically singled out by the Liberals for attack? 
"'). For the 
Liberals, centrally at least, there could be no going back on the 
Lloyd George policy of independence as the means to recovery. The 
advice was reiterated by the General Council of the Scottish 
Liberal Federation when Sir John Anthony said: ''Liberal associations 
existed for one purpose only - to propagate Liberal principles and 
endeavour to return Liberals to Parliament. In the absence of a 
Liberal candidate the associations should in his opinion not make 
any recommendation as to how Liberals in the constituency should 
vote and thereby save friction and trouble at a future 
(12) 
election' 
9 Labour S-t- and 
-a- 
rd. February-April, 1929. Copies are contained 
in the Woodburn Papers. 
10 Scotsman, April 25,1929. 
11 Ibid., May 18,1929. 
12 Ibid., April 20,1929. 
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The Liberal dilemma on agreements was acute. They were determined 
to be 'wholly independent' as Sir Herbert Samuel put it, having 
accepted that agreements with Conservatives in October 1924 had 
made their position electorally impossible. But they were also 
determined to avoid the charge. tfiat they would again allowý a 
minority Labour administration to govern. Throughout the election 
campaign Liberal leaders promised there would be no repeat of 1924. 
In January Samuel had told the Liberal Federation Council that: 
I progress ive-minded people who voted Conservative at the last 
election may safely vote Liberal for both he and Lloyd George had 
made it clear that the experiment of 1924 will not be 
13) 
repeated'( 
This brought an angry response from Horne who had been an architect 
of so many electoral arrangements in the past. He charged Samuel 
with 'deceit' and argued that Samuel was fishing for conservative 
votes upon the implication that in the event of a deadlock in 
parliament after the nexi election the Liberal party would be more 
inclined to work with the Conservatives than the socialists: 'It is 
much more likely if it were a question between socialist and 
conservative government that Mr Lloyd George would rather support 
Mr Ramsay MacDonald than Mr Baldwin'( 14). Samuel had to explain in 
reply that the Liberals 'made and contemplated no pact or 
understanding of any kind with any other party': 'We made it clear 
that in the event of no majority, the Liberal Party would not again 
lend support to the installation and maintenance in office of a 




Herald, January 28,1929. 
14 Ibid., January 29,1929. 
15 Ibid., January 29., 1929. 
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Labour had to deny evidence also that there was a Lib-Lab pact. 
Speaking in Scotland during the early stages of the election 
campaign, Morrison said it was 'utterly untrue', and Johnston 
argued that such an arrangement, if true, 'would wreck the Labour 
(16) 
Party' On the other side, the L3,2jUnHerald reported 
allegations that 'there are twenty-two Liberals, whose names I 
could give you, who have given a pledge to the Tory party that if 
they are not opposed they will not support putting a Labour 
Government into office and t1fat they will stand by the Tory Party 
at all costsv(17). 
* 
Undoubtedly there was a powerful Unionist drive for some agreement 
to protect seats from Labour. Early on in the campaign the 
Unionists issued a list of seats which they did not propose to 
f ight. They had decided not to contest North Aberdeen, Leith, 
Montrose, Paisley, and Ross and Cromarty: they stood aside only in 
(18) 
fourteen in Britain and of these five were in Scotland . Later, 
(19) 
they decided to fight only one of Dundee's two seats In 
addition eleven Liberals were given central Unionist support, 
although only one of them, Sir Murdoch Macdonald in Inverness, was 
standing in Scotland. This central action was endorsed by the 
local Unionist association with its President, Lochiel, stating: 
'I need hardly say how important it is that every anti-socialist 
vote should be recorded and how essential it is to the interests of 
20) 
sound government that all socialist parties be rejected'( 
16 Ibid., April 8,1929. 
17 Ibid., May 3,1929. 
18 
. 
Scotsman, May 3,1929. 
19 Ibid., May 15,1929. 
2w tier2. L(_. 20 Glasý H rald. May 21,1929. 
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Although no documentation survives, it seems likely that the 
Conservatives would have given more Liberals their support- if 
pressed. When after the election one delegate to the 
Conservatives' Eastern Divisional Council raised the question of 
'amalgamation with the Liberals', and asked both the Scottish 
Conservative Chairman, Sir Patrick Ford, and the agent, Colonel 
Blair, 'if it would not be possible for arrangements to be made in 
certain constituencies with regard to candidates', he was told: 
'there was no lack of desire on our part to make such 
arrangements 1(21) 
The Conservatives withdrew in seats where they had in fact little 
or no organisation. But they hoped that by standing down, the 
Liberals would be persuaded to stand down for Conservatives 
elsewhere. The Conservatives stood down, for example, in Ross and 
Cromarty, with the Unionist Association backing the Liberal 
candidate and issuing an invitation to its members to vote against 
(22) 
the socialist In Dundee, only one Unionist stood in the two 
member constituency and, -as the Scotsman reported, 'though no 
question of a formal pact arises a strong despite for reciprocity 
exists'. While the Unionist candidate, Wallace, who had stood in 
both the general and the by-election in 1924, said he would 'be a 
party to no agreement', he called himself 'an anti-socialist first 
and last', 
(23) 
and went on to argue: 
Many of you are to be asked what is to be done with the 
Unionist second. Make a broad answer. We ask the 
support of all moderate parties in Dundee and we are 
prepared to do the same with such anti-socialists as 
support. (24) 
0t 
21 SUA Eastern Divisional Council, July 24,1929. 
22 Scotsman. May 9,1929. 
23 Glasgow Herald, May 15,1929. 
24 Scotsman, May 11,1929. 
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There was in fact some reciprocity for Unionist gestures at a local 
level. In Dunfermline the Liberals supported the Uniopist 
candidate who argued he was 'in a position to call for the support 
of all people whether Unionists or Liberals who were opposed to 
(25) 
socialism' On the ground Liberals were active in helping his 
candidature. The same thing happened in Kirkcaldy - yet another 
seat where the anti-socialist challenge had been borne previously 
by Liberal not Conservative parties. Kirkcaldy Burghs Liberal 
Association had no candidate and decided by a majority to support 
the Unionist, defeating an amendment leaving the decision to 
(26) 
Liberals' own discretion While the League of Young Liberals 
deplored the decision, 
(27) 
the move by Kirkcaldy Liberals which had 
had Liberal candidates in the field throughout the twenties 
reflected how far Conservatism was established as the right wing 
party in the urban constituencies. 
While there was no arrangement in Aberdeenshire the Liberal Party 
was Labour's right wing opponent in Aberdeen North and the 
Conservatives the sole opponent to Labour in Aberdeen South and 
Aberdeenshire East. The Liberal candidate in North argued support 
for Conservatives elsewhere in preference to Labour, and Boothby, 
the Conservative member for East Aberdeenshire, urged support for 
(28) the Liberal in North Aberdeen 
25 May 20,1929, Scotsman, May 9,1929. 
26 Scotsman, May 17,1929, Glasgow Herald, May 17,1929. 
27 RL; ýAjaqýL. RerýIL( !!, May 21,1929. 
28 Scotsman, May 28,1929. 
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However, as the Liberals decided to place. last-minute candidates in 
the west of Scotland - in Shettleston, Camlachie, and Lanark 
constituencies - Unionist tactics shifted from a soft to a hard 
line. The decision to leave the field free for the Liberals in 
Paisley was overturned, and matters came to a head over Lady 
Baxter's proposed Conservative candidature in Montrose, seat of the 
Liberal Whip, Sir Robert Hutchison, a seat which had gone 
uncontested by the Conservatives since 1910. Hutchison was a 
prominent supporter of Lloyd George on his unemployment policy, had 
strenuously opposed the controversial Conservative Local Government 
(Scotland) Act and had been instrumental in bringing forward 
increasing numbers of Liberal candidates. It was his 
responsibility for candidates that almost brought forth a 
Conservative opponent, on the initiative Qf Conservative party 
headquarters rather than local Unionists in Montrose. When Lady 
Baxter, who had been pressed by headquarters to go forward, met the 
local constituency party she faced a divided group. Only eight had 
t urned up and the President, who unsuccessfully proposed that the 
seat should be left uncontested, later resigned 
(29) 
. He protested 
at the way ' headquarters takes away the freedom of the electors'. 
And it was the action of Unionist headquarters in the situation 
that is significant. As they later explained they had hoped that 
Hutchison would 'secure reciprocity in constituencies where Liberal 
candidates have no chance of success and where their standing 
causes a grave danger of the capture of seats by the Socialist 
Party', but with Liberal candidates in many seats threatened by 
Labour, the Unionist policy of self-denial was 
29 Scotsman, May 17,18,1929. At the Montrose meeting where 
Lady Baxter was initially adopted the Chairman who opposed a 
contest was defeaied, despite the fact that another member of 
the Unionist Executive. Committee in Montrose argued that 'if 
headquarters would undertake to get a Liberal for the county 
to withdraw on the understanding Lady Baxter was to withdraw 
it would be a very good thing' (Scotsman, May 17,1929). The 
President argued, 'our committee can only be ruled by one 
authority', and resigned over the pressure from headquarters 
to intervene in the election. But there were, of course, only 
eight persons present. 
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(30) 
no longer justifiable In fact Lady Baxter withdrew when she 
found little support in the constituency and Unionist headquarters 
argued it was 'most regrettable that this attitude is not 
(31) 
reciprocated by the Liberals' 
Unionist Headquarters in Scotland argued that in several 
constituencies 'in Scotland where Liberal chance of success is 
thought reasonable no Unionist candidate has been put forward to 
obviate the danger of a socialist gain through the splitting of the 
(32) 
anti-socialist vote' But with the Liberals pursuing 
additional contests, no further progress could be made in 
consolidating the anti-socialist forces and thirty-eight 
three-cornered fights, involving Conservative and Liberal opponents 
to Labour, occurred. Although this meant that in half its contests 
Labour had only one anti-socialist opponent, the Scotsman was later 
to claim that Liberal 'spoiling tactics' has lost Unionist seats in 
West Edinburgh, Berwick and Haddington, Partick, Dunbartonshire, 
(33) West Renfrew, Kilmarnock, and Lanark, seven seats in all The 
Glasgow Herald went further: 
Shame must rest with Mr Lloyd George and those other 
Liberals who were responsible for the policy of running 
candidates whose prospects from the beginning were 
hopeless ... for the most part the Liberal contribution in 
the urban areas has been limited to handing the seats 
over to socialism. (34) 
30 Scotsman, May 17,1929. Headquarters argued that 'as the 
Liberals were putting forward candidates in constituencies not 
already contested it was time that they put a Unionist 
candidate in the field'. 
31 Ibid., May 18,1929. 
32* Scotsman, May 18,1929. 
33 Ibid., June 1,1929. 
34 Uasgow Herald, Editorial, June 31,1929. 
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In 1929 the Liberals' effort was concentrated in the counties 
rather than in the burghs. The party intervened in less than half 
of Scotland's burgh seats (16 of 33) and in twenty-seven of the 
thirty-eight county seats. In Glasgow and Lanarkshire the party 
managed only eight candidates - four out of fifteen seats in 
Glasgow and four out of seven in Lanarkshire. When the Daily News 
correspondent visited Scotland, he found the west 'the bleakest 




. The party placed its 
hopes in winning in the rural areas. As the party's Western 
Divisional Secretary added: 
In the Industrial districts Liberalism had been at a low 
ebb.. hopeful reports had been received from all 
districts but the flame was burning brightest in the 
rural districts such as Argyllshire. 
The Eastern Secretary spoke of 'great enthusiasm in such districts 
(36) 
as East Fife, the Lothians, and the Border Burghs' 
With Lloyd George's financial support, the rural 6ampaigns were the 
party's most effective of the twenties. In Argyll, Labour 
complained of a Liberal 'network of paid agents with a fleet of 
motor cars and a system of telephone communication'. In the 
Western Isles the feeling was the same, with a complaint about 
(37) 
highly-paid agents and canvassers 
But taking the country as a whole, the state of Liberal 
organisation was poor. With Wales and the English counties 
boasting a bigger Liberal presence in candidates than Scotland, the 
Scotsman argued, 'the Liberals evidently have small hopes in 
35 Daily News, April 9,1929, quoted in Forward April 13,1929. 
36 Scotsman, April 30,1929. 
37 Forward, June 8. 
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Scotland. There was a time when Scotland was a Liberal stronghold. 
Now apparently it is the worst of all fields for Libe-ral 
(38) 
candidates' Many local associations had no funds and thirteen 
of the forty-three candidates were rushed in at the last 
(39) 
minute 
The state of their organisation was not the only problem for 
Liberals. Prominent members of the party, such as Vivien Philipps 
in Edinburgh expressed doubts about the validity of the Lloyd 
George programme to cure unemployment. He had the 'greatest 
possible hesitation' in supporting the practicability of the scheme 
and a number of other Liberal candidates shared his doubts. In the 
Western Isles, MacKenzie Livingston felt that the 'only right 
course' for him was to retire. Writing to the Chairman of the 
Western Isles Liberal Association, he stated that he could not 
endorse the pledge to abolish normal unemployment within 12 months 
free of cost. 'The promise given', he wrote, 'is one -with which I 
am quite unable to associate myself for I have grave doubts as to 
(40) the possibility of its fulfilment' Probably, however, 
McKenzie Livingston's unease was not simply over unemployment. A 
year before he had wanted the Lloyd George election fund wound up - 
(41) 
and the money given to hospitals . McKenzie Livingston defected 
to the Labour Party but increasingly the Liberal MPs from Scotland 
were individuals who stood under a Liberal banner rather than 
Liberal Party representatives and part of the party machine. 
38 Scotsman, May 20,1929. On May 6, according to the Scotsman, 
there were -only 30 Liberals selected. By May 10, forty-three had been chosen. 
39 Scotsman, May 10,1929. For example the Scotsman found Tin-ýIiT(; nshire 'so nearly dead' that it is difficult to get 
twenty 'members to attend the annual meeting of the local 
association'. (Scotsman, May 20,1929). 
40 qLSLýgiýw Her2l Lý, April 12,1929. 
41 Scotsman, April 25,1929. 
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The Coqservative campaign, in Scotland at any rate, emphasised 
social reform without socialism. Prior to the election, industrial 
and agricultural derating had been agreed, and it was argued that 
the reform of local government would ease problems over the poor 
law and the co-ordination of hospitals(42). On education, Gilmour 
claimed he had 'done everything in his power to encourage parents 
to leave their children at school, to the age of fifteen'. 
Although compulsory education until this age was 'not practicable 
1 (43) now , it would come 'perhaps at a not very distant date' . On 
housing, it was argued that more than 70,000 houses had been built 
over four years, and, for rural areas, Chamberlain promised that by 
(44) 1931 every cottage in rural Scotland would be in decent repair 
Other Unionists were prepared to go further. In Maryhill, Cooper 
argued for pensions at sixty for workers in 'strenuous' 
occupations. 
There were Labour accusations that the Unionists were fighting a 
less than fair campaign - for example, publishing falsý statements 
(45) 
about the Roman Catholic Church's attitudes to socialism 
However, it was on the general issues of the economy that the 
election concentrated - with the Conservative solution to 
unempl6yment summed up in three words, training, transfer, and 
trade. They argued that the out-of-work should 
42 RLZýSgn lj( d, May 15,1929. nýL_ 
43 Ibid., May 23,1929. 
44 Ibid., April 23,1929. 
45 Arthur Woodburn was later to accuse Lewis Shedden of Scottish 
Unionist Association Western Divisional Council of sgnding a 
letter, urging that a false statement made by Cardinal Bourne 
of the Roman Catholic Church be: 'displayed'and distributed 
Judiciously and anonymously where there is a substantial Roman 
Catholic population. It is suggested that this should be done 
during the weekend at chapel doors. ' 
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undergo training, if necessary move to other areas, and that in 
(46) 
the end what was required was an improvement in trade 
On the day of the 1929 poll, the Scotsman called the election 'the 
quietest election of recent times 1(47) . It was an opinion held 
throughout the campaign. Four days before nominations closed, its 
leadý-r writer spoke of: 'the quietest and dullest election for at 
least forty years. .. Neither of the parties succeeded in raising an 
issue which excites any enthusiasm among the electorate, old or 
new 1. He went on: 'ýhe fact is * that in spite of high 
unemployment - which, high as it is, is only about half what it was 
in 1921, when Mr Lloyd George was Prime Minister - the general 
(48) 
standard of living is higher today that it was before the war' 
But neither the Scotsman nor Lla2gow Herald - nor indeed, in the 
end, the Conservatives - had any doubt as to what the main issue of 
the election should be. The issue was socialism and 
anti-socialism. As a Scotsman editorial said as early as the 11th 
of May, Lloyd George was Tof secondary importance' 
(49). 1 The real 
issue', it stated on the day of election, 'now no less than 1924 is 
socialism versus anti-socialism' 
(50) 
. The Glýýgowý'Herald was of 




21ýLsg2w Herald, April 23,1929. 
47 Scotsman, 30 May 1929 
48 Scotsman, 16 May. 
49 Scotsman, 11 May, 1929 
50 Scotsman, 30 May, 1929. 
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Ramsay MacDonald had expressed the fear, at the outset of the 
campaign, that the press would manipulate the issues at the 
election, and instead of concentrating on the Labour-Unionisi 
contest, would pose the issue as between Liberalism and 
Conservatism. Writing in Forward, he suggested the 'policy of the 
press is to boycott the opposition and lead people to assume that 
(51) 
the two combatants are the Tory and the Liberal leaders' He 
also felt that in spite of this, there would be 'another coupon 
election against Labour' with the party managers making 'private 
arrangements against Labour'. 
While the initial stages of the campaign in Scotland saw 
discussions of the viability and desirability of the Lloyd George 
programme on unemployment - promised in the Yellow Book, issued on 
13 May - the contest was always tending to become one of Labour 
against "moderation". When Churchill came on a speaking tour to 
Scotland, he argued in Edinburgh against Lloyd George's programme 
and in Glasgow against the socialist creed. But generally the Tory 
tactic was to emphasise the positive measures of social reform of 
the previous government 
(52) 
and at the same time to attack 
socialist extremism. They were, of course, helped by the divisions 
within the Labour Party. 
But in 1929 the socialist and anti-socialist issues were part of 
the rhetoric rather than the substance of a campaign which dealt 
with practical rather than ideological issues. The ILp National 
Council led by Maxton issued its own programme for the election, 
proclaiming boldly that 'the issue is between 
51 Forward, 4 May, 1929. 
52 Scotsman-,, 26 April 1929. 
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capitalism and socialism' and arguing for the nationalisation of 
the banks, railways, mines, and import and export trade as well as 
(53) for the living wage . But Labour's own election programme was a 
mild one emphasising unemployment and social reform measures. 
Candidates played down nationalisation, according to the Scotsman, 
which argued the manifesto was further watered down for rural 
(54) 
areas In Aberdeen, for example, the campaign was said to 
concentrate on practical measures and 'peaceful and democratic 
(55) 
progress' Labour's support for the non-contributory pension 
was seen as a bigger issue than any proposals for nationalisation 
and the Scotsman argued that the leading ILPers were isolated in 
(56) 
the campaign . Maxton was 'not so much in demand in many of the 
constituencies' because of his support for left-wing tendencies and 
Wheatley's political stock had 'sagged to a much greater 
(57) 
extent' 
The campaign thus reflected how far Labour had become a party which 
grounded its electoral appeal on social and economic reforms, 
rather than full-blooded socialism. In fact in 1929 it has been 
estimated that only 6% of Labour election addresses mentioned 
V (58) socialism' while 43% of Conservative addresses did 
In 1929 only thirty-eight constituencies, just over half Scottish 
seats, saw three cornered fights involving Liberal, Labour and 
Conservative (including Dundee as two seats). 
53 Scotsman, May 6,1929. 
54 Ibid., May 16,1929. 
55 C Phipps, OP-C; t-, P. 157. 
56 Scotsman,, May 6,1929. - 
57 Scotsman, April 25,1929. 
58 A Rowe, The General Election of 1929, Oxford University, 
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Thus in 30, by accident or design, Liberal or Conservative stood 
down to make the fight against Labour a straight fight. Labour won 
Partick and South Lanark as a result of Liberal intervention. But 
Labour believed the Liberals held Leith and the Conservatives 
retained Renfrew East and North Ayrshire, because the other party 
(59) did not fight 
While the Liberals gained one quarter of their new seats from 
Scotland -f ive out of 19 - and indeed 13 out of their f inal tally 
of 59 seats came from Scotland, their win was less impressive than 
it appeared. Kinnear has suggested that although the Liberals won 
only a few more seats - nineteen - than in 1924, 'they could point 
out that whereas in previous elections they had often relied on 
much Labour or Conservative support, in 1929 they won most of their 
seats in three cornered contests. ' He also adds that the Liberals 
, (60) 'won several seats for the first time since 1918 In fact in 
Scotland the picture was far less imposing, despite the gain of 
five seats. The Liberals had e: kpected to win twenty seats at least 
in Scotland 
(61) 
, but they won no seat they had not held in 1923 
(and lost in 1924) with the exception only of Kincardine and West 
Aberdeen which they had held until 1922. Indeed, the Liberals 
failed to recover in 1929 eight of the seats they had held in 1923. 
In almost all of these, as in 1924, the Labour intervention was 
critical and had deprived them of the chance of a straight fight 
with the Conservatives, with Labour votes moving towards the more 
radical party. Thus, although, in almost every seat they had 
contested in 1924, their vote improved and in rural areas more so 
than Labour, it was insufficient to counteract a strong Labour 
59 Forward, June 8; 1929. 
60 M Kinnear, The British Voter, p. 48. 
61 Scotsman, May 13,1§29 ., 
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presence. In the Aberdeen and Kincardineshire East seat the 
Liberals did not fight at all; in two'Edinburgh seats, North and 
West, the Liberals were pushed 'into third place. Their showing 
relative to Labour in the seats the party lost in 1924 and failed 
to regain in 1929 is set out in below. While in most cases the 
party's vote improved more than Labourls, they could not counteract 
the strong third party efkect which the Labour vote registered. 
This left, ihe Conservatives in charge. 
TABLE 9.2 
Liberal Improvement and Labour Vote, 1924-1929 
Former Liberal Seats 
Liberal Improvement % Labour ImILiEovement 
and % Vote 
Argyll +1% +0.7% 23.8% 
Aberdeenshire & Kincardine Central +1.5% -0.7% 17.7% 
Forfarshire +4.8% +2.1% 25.0% 
Perth +5.7% +2.7% 23.5% 
Edinburgh East +0.4% +3.0% 47.3% 
Edinburgh North * (3rd) +5.4% +4.3% 32.2% 
Edinburgh West * (3rd) -0.6% +5.6% 38.6% 
Aberdeenshire & Kincardine East No Candidate +13.7% 43.1% 
Even in the thirteen seats the Liberals won, they owed much to the 
other parties. Five of the thirteen were won in straight fights, 
with no Conservative intervention in Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, 
Montrose, and Leith and with no Labour candidate in West Aberdeen. 
Leith, which *the Liberals had narrowly won in the by-election of 
1927, wa*s'held simply because the Conservatives did not intervene, 
(and almost all the Conservative vote seemed to swing to Liberal) . 
The second urban constituency the Liberals held in 1929, Greenock, 
was won simply because as in 1924 there was a Communist-Labour 
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Party split. Sir Godfrey Collins' vote (only 32.5%) was less than 
a third of the total cast. In the other seats the Liberals 
benefited from a swing from Conservative to Liberal. East Fife and 
Galloway saw the first Labour interventions ever in a general 
election and in Western Isles the first Conservative one. In all 
eight three-party contests the Liberals had not the benefit of any 
swing from Labour but a swing from the Conservatives was sufficient 
to give them Banff, Dumfries, Fife East, and Galloway. 
Labour believed that the main reason for the Liberal success ýas 
Lloyd George's political fund. In Argyll, for example, the Labour 
Party's poverty was contrasted with the Liberal network of paid 
agents with a fleet of motor cars and a system of telephone 
communications, and Forward claimed of the Western Isles that 'we 
would have won this seat if it had not been for Lloyd George's 
money 1(62) . The Conservatives argued that 'in some constituencies 
where there was no Liberal candidate it is thought that many 
Liberals did not vote at all and that a number voted Labour rather 
than Unionist 1 
(63) 
But the evidence suggests that the important 
characteristic was a swing from Conservative to Liberals and that a 
number of factors influenced this. One reason the Conservative 
Party accepted was that the local government act which had reduced 
the status of small towns in the local government system had been 
'misrepresented' and had lost the party votes in Roxburgh, East 
(64) 
Fife, West Aberdeenshire, Kilmarnock, and Dunbartonshire . The 
Conservatives also believed that the disquiet felt in Scotland's 
fishing communities about the effects of Conservative policies had 
(65) helped the Liberals But the Conservatives believed that the 
Liberal improvement was transient and that the results emphasised a 
62' Forward, June 8,1929. 
63 'Impressions on the General Election', Paper by Colonel Blair 





restoration of the two party system. Just af ter the election, the 
Conservative. agent in Scotland, Blair, who bad been asked by 
Gilmour to examine the merits of a proportional representation 
system and how that might prevent further Labour advances, found no 
one in favour of an alternative vote system 
-on 
these lines and he 
concluded that it could only be 'the means of temporarily 
prolonging the life -of a moribund party'. The three party system 
of competition which appeared to prevail in Scotland in the 
nineteen twenties was seen to have been 'transient' 
(66) 
. The 
President of the ScQttish Unionist Association, the Duke of Atholl, 
drew the same conclusion: 
What a result as a whole. I cannot help however, hoping 
that it will bring many Liberals to see that we must have 
a closing-up of the anti-socialist forces. (67) 
As the political parties moved nearer to each other in policy, the 
electoral map of Scotland became more class-oriented, with Labour 
winning almost all the industrial and mining seats of Scotland in 
1929, and Liberals and Conservatives sharing the middle class seats 
and rural areas. The four exceptions to the industrial picture 
were Leith and Greenock, which the Liberals held, and Midlothian 
and Peebles North and Renfrew East - two seats which Labour had won 
for the first time in 1923 and lost in 1924. The party was unable 
to recover Renfrew or to hold on to Midlothian and Peebles North 
which they had won earlier in 1929 in a by-election. Otherwise, 
the industrial areas went heavily to the Labour Party. Labour won 
back nine seats it had lost to the Conservatives in the 1924 
election and held two of its three by-election victories 
(Linlithgow and North Lanark). The party also managed to win 
Edinburgh Wesi*for the first time. ' 
66 * Ibid. 
67 Atholl to Gilmour, June 1,1929, Gilmour Papers GD/383/29. 
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Nevertheless Labour did not believe it had done as well as it might 
have. The. party felt that it had been hampered by lack of. finance. 
In 1929 Labour's financial problems hit its campaign severely. The 
party spent less than in the three previous elections ( 1922,1923 
and 1924) despite the much larger electorate and the five years the 
party had to prepare for the campaign. The average expenditure for 
constituencies was substantially below the previous election. And 
despite the fact Labour had candidates in sixty-seven of 
seventy-one constituencies, there were few where7it spent much more 
than the average. The exceptions were the unique two member seat 
in Dundee where their candidate incurred E644 in expenses, and 
South Ayrshire where the miners' president, James Brown, spent 
E609. From a position where the miners had spent more than twice 
as much as the average, the miners' election expenses were little 
more than the average of E312 in the Lanarkshire, the Lothian, 
Fife, and Falkirk constituencies. Apart from James Brown in South 




Average Election Expenses 
GB Average Scottish Scotland 
Labour Total spent Range in 
Average by Labour Labour Expenses 
1922 E707 E447 (43)*E19,207 E145-E921 
1923 E679 E384 (48) E18,425 E113-E821 
1924 E645 E321 (64) E20,537 E112-E595 
1929** E701 E312 (67) E20,976 E 75-E609 
No. of Labour Candidates 
In Britain in 1929 Conservative Expenses averaged E915: 
Labour Expenses E452: and Liberal Expenses E800. 
68 Labour Party, Scottish Council, Report of Executive, 1930, 
p. 2-4. See in addition, F Craig, British Parliament 
Election Statistics, p. 44. and A Rowe, op. cit.. p. 535. 
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Reports from the constituencies confirmed the picture. East 
Renfrew 'had very little money', Kelvingrove 'almost no Labour 
Party machinery', and Hillhead lacked 'an efficient organisation'. 
The party felt especially aggrieved in rural areas where it had 
found 'highly paid agents and canvassers' funded by Lloyd George's 
political fund(69) 
But Labour also felt that it had a long way to go in attracting the 
support of certain sections of the Scottish working-class. The 
rural areas remained a disappointment; but so too did the 
unskilled manual worker. The Edinburgh North candidate, Eleanor 
Stewart, confirmed an opinion that had been widely shared by others 
when she argued that propaganda was clearly needed in the poorer 
districts, since it seemed the bulk of Labour support had come to 
have come from 'artisans, civil servants, and the lower middle 
class elector' 
(70). 
While Labour had 1politicised' the skilled 
manual worker and the miner, it had not yet persuaded many of the 
less skilled sections to vote. 
But the new Parliament of 1929 reflected the changing character of 
the Labour Party. Seventeen of Labour's Scottish contingent were 
from middle class occupations and other six had been trade union or 
political organisers before the election. 
Labour looked more of a middle class party in Parliament than at 
previous elections, although a third of the Scottish group were 
still miners or engineers. But the new group also reflected the 
shift to the right in Scottish politics. In 1918 Labour's Scottish 
69 Forward, June 8,1929. 
70 Forward, June 15,1929. 
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group did not look left-wing although most parliamentary candidates 
had been. In 1922 the Parliamentary Party looked more to the left 
than perhaps it actually was. But in 1929, while the ILP and 
miners' union still provided the bulk of the sponsorships - 
twenty-seven out of thirty-six - they were hardly dominated by the 
(71) left wing . The miners' MPs had beeft antagonistic to the claims 
of the ILP throughout and any influence Maxton and Wheatley had 
over them had been diminished by the retiral of Robert Smillie. 
But of the ILP contingent, only a few could be relied on to support 
a left wing stance. Shinwell and Johnston were to join the new 
Government; McNeill Weir had been prominent in attacking Maxton in 
the twenties; and even the twelve potential supporters -a third of 
the Scottish group - were not fully united in their views. The 
Scottish group in 1929 represented the voice of Labour, not 
socialism. 
71 In the rest of Britain the ILP influence was diminished, with 
constituency Labour parties providing the bulk of sponsorships 
in the election. In Scotland only five of the thirty-six 
victorious Labour candidates were sponsored by divisional 
Labour Parties. But as the chapter suggests, the strength of 
the ILP's contingent did not reflect a united front. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 1919 the Conservative Leader, Andrew Bonar Law, is said to have 
attended a dinner party when speculation over socialism came to 
dominate the conversation. Bonar Law was asked what he thought 
Labour supporters really wanted. Looking round the dining r6om at 
týe silver and crystal which adorned it, Bonar Law replied, 
perhaps they just want a little of all this'"). However, most 
Scottish Conservatives went beyond the mere suspicion that class 
envy lay behind the aspirations of Labour. To the political 
establishment of the day Labour leaders may have seemed, as Cowling 
suggests, 'paper tigers, but among Conservatives in Scotland the 
fear was of Bolshevism, with Scotland suffering from the 'disease' 
that was sweeping westwards from Russia, and figures such as 
William Adamson and Ramsay MacDonald seen as British Kerenskis who 
would pave the way for a home-grown Lenin. In 19 18 the f ear was 
that Bolshevism would be transplanted from Russia to Britain, with 
the GlasgowHerald asking, 'are we to escape from this universal 
epidemic' 
(2). 
The 1919 strikes were inspired by 'Bolshevism', 
according to the Daily Record and Mail and 'the first step towards 
(3) 
that squalid terrorism', according to the Glasgow Herald In 
time the alarm of the right changed simply to fear of a British 
form of socialism. By the later twenties many Conservatives even 
accepted that Labour voters were not necessarily full-blooded 
socialists. Even then, however, they could not be sure. In 1929, 
the right in Scotland rallied against the evils of socialism, 
although the substance of the political arguments revolved around 
issues of social and economic reform. 
Yet by 1929 all the cardinal elements of a modern, relatively 
stable, and consensual political system for Scotland hýd been 
assembled. Under a mass franchise, a new type of two party system 
R Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of 
Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923 (London, 1955), p. 412. 
2 Glasgow Herald, November 16,1918. 
3 Glasgow Herald, January 31,1919. 
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had come into being. In 1929 the Liberals won 18% of the popular 
vote, a third of their pre-war share, and the average vote. for 
Liberal candidates in the field was 65% of that for Labour and 75% 
of that for Conservative candidates. It might still have seemed 
that the Liberal decline could not be equated with their downfall. 
Constituency by constituency, however, Scotland had in the twenties 
gone over to a two party system, or at best a trinity of most 
unequai partners. In most areas where the Liberals prospered, 
their survival depended on the weakness of one. of the two other 
parties. In the Inverness constituencies, Caithness, and Orkney, 
where the Liberals remained the dominant force, it was as one of 
only two effective parties in the field. Elsewhere Conservatives 
rather than the Liberals offered the major opposition to Labour; 
or alternatively Labour rather than the Liberal candidates were the 
major alternatives to the Conservatives. In those few industrial 
seats where the Liberal message still held some sway, its survival 
was at the behest of the Conservative Party. When Asquith was 
finally ejected from Scotland after his defeat in Paisley iý 1924, 
he had admitted as much. His result was, he concluded, 'not bad 
for a dying party set between the upper and nether millstones'. 
The country, he said, was divided 'between tranquillity and 
socialism' 
(4) 
The argument of the preceding chapters has been that what 
determined the shape of the Scottish political system from 1918 
onwards was the advance and the threat of Labour. It is important 
therefore to appreciate the extent and the limits of Labour's 
breakthrough. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 summarise the electoral 
changes from 1918 to 1929, first by constituency successes, and 
then by vote. From Table 10.1 it can be seen quite clearly that 
Labour had by 1922 a solid group of constituencies that it held in 
every election of the twenties. Table 10.2 shows quite'clearly 
J Kelley, Asquith at Paisley..., loc. cit., p. 159. 
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that the left's share of the vote was increasing throughout the 
twenties, rising even as phe party lost seats, as in the elecýion 
of 1924 
(5). 
From being a negligible force in Scottish politics 
before 1914, Labour progressed, winning just under 30% of the vote 
in 1918, more than a third in 1922, and more than 40% in both 1924 
and 19 29. But Labour's advance was not uniform. Indeed the 
Party's growing support came in staggered breakthroughs in 
different areas of Scotland and the decade from 1918 saw losses, as 
well as gains. Tables 10.3 and 10.7 show the differential Labour 
advances in industrial cities, &ounty shires, ' and burghs. Labour's 
attempt to win the rural areas was virtually still-born. Table 
10.3 and 10.4 (where adjustment is made for uncontested seats) 
shows that it was in the industrial cities - Glasgow, Dundee, and 
Aberdeen - that Labour had achieved its most solid support before 
1914. This provided a platform for the swing to the Lab6ur Party 
by the new electorate of 1918. 
For figures in this and the following tables, I am grateful 
for the computing assistance of Mr Ian Levitt. 
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TABLE 10.1 
Labour 'Safe' Seats by Year of General Election Win 
LABOUR HELD SEATS 
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% Votes Cast for Parties (and Allies) 1918-1929 
1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Labour 28.5 33.6 38.3 41.8 43.5 
Co. Labour 1.3 
Liberal 14.2 21.5 28.4 16.5 18.1 
Co. Lib. 20.3 
Conservative** 33.5 39.2 31.6 40.8 35.9 
Ind. 2.0 2.1 1 1.7 0.9 2.5 
For purposes of this table Labour's vote has been augmented 
by adding votes of allies including Communist and Scottish 
Prohibition Party. 
For purposes of this table, Conservative vote has had added 
to it Liberal Unionist, National Liberal, Coalition Conservative 
and National Democratic Party. 
The basic electoral data is drawn from FWS Craig. 
British Parliam2nýary Election Results, 1918-1945, 
as cited above. 
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TABLE 10.3 (A) 
Labour Advance 1910-1929 
, 
Percentage Vote By. Areas 
1910 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Industrial 
Cities 14.0 34.9 44.0 49.0 49.1 53.8 
Industrial 
Counties 6.3 35.0 45.6 50.4 47.1 51.9 
Burghs 4.6 26.7 36.8 39.5 46.0 48.7 
Labour Advance 
TABLE 10.4 
1910 -1929: AdjusýL 
(B) 
for contests 
, ýta&ý_ Vote _by 
Areas 
B est Vote 
1906-14 1910 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
(D) (C) 
Industrial 
Cities 32 29 36.4 50.6 49.0 49.7 53.5 
Industrial 
Counties 27 25 36.5 47.1 50.4 47.1 51.9 
Burghs 23 19 30.0 41.0 43.4 46.0 48.7 
TABLE 10.5 
% Addition to Labour Vote. -Adj. Hs n for Contests 1910-1929 
1918-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-29 
Industrial 
Cities +14.2 -1.6 +0.7 +3.8 
Industrial 
Counties +10.6 +3.4 -3.4 +4.8 




MLr2 of Labour Advance AýJusted for Controls Sýn 
1924 = 100 
Best Vote 
1906-14 1910 - 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Industrial 
Cities 64 58 73 102 99 100 110 
Industrial 
Counties 57 53 77 100 107 100 110 
Burghs 50 41 65 89 94 100 106 
TABLE 10.7 
% Labour Vote in Rural Shires and. ýýýlarjds 
1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Rural 5.4 2.5 3.5 18.4 21.5 
Highlands 15.8 0.0 14.6 27.5 26.8 
(A) The division of Scotland into the categories above is based on 
the social composition of the areas and is broadly in line 
with that suggested by M Kinnear's classifications in 
The British Voter. The following constituencies make up the 
classifications used: 
Industrial Cities Glasgow, Aberdeen Dundee 
Industrial Counties Ayrshire, Dunbarton, Renfrew, Lanark, 
Lothians, Stirling, West Fife 
Burghs Edinburgh, Leith, Kirkcaldy, Dunfermline, 
Montrose, Stirling, Coatbridge, Motherwell, 
Hamilton, Rutherglen, Dumbarton, Paisley, 
Greenock, Ayr, Kilmarnock 
Rural Shires Moray, Banff., Aberdeen Forfar, Perth, East 
Fife, Roxburgh, Dumfries, Galloway. 
. For the' purposes of this classification, the Highland 
constituencies are understood to be Orkney, Caithness, Ross 
and Cromarty, Inverness, Western Isles and Argyll. 
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(B) The adjustments made for 'non contests' are estimates. The 
methodology has been to make an assessment of the potential 
size of the Labour vote in seats which the party did -not 
contest, based on the general swing in the same group of 
constituencies and related to the party's subsequent vote in 
the constituency. 
(C) The 19 10 share is an estimate and may be regarded as the 
maximum possible Labour vote in the January 1910 election, 
assuming the Party had contested each seat. It is based on 
the % vote in constituencies fought in each group in January 
1910, divided by the number of fights and multiplied by the 
total number of constituencies. Constituencies which became 
'city' or 'county' constituencies after 1918 have been placed 
in their post-war categorisation. 
(D) The 'best vote' 1906-1914 is an estimate and may be regarded 
as the maximum possible Labour vote at any time before 1914. 
The methodology of calculating the share is the same as that 
for calculating the 1910 share except that the votes on ;; hich 
the assessment was based are the best votes Labour received 
between 1906 and 1914. 
493 
The industrial counties present a different picture. Here, as our 
discussion of Lanarkshire in Chapter One illustrated, Labour had 
made insufficient headway before 1914 to threaten the position of 
the other two parties. By 1918 however, Labour's vote in these 
areas had arisen to an average of 36-37% - almost the same 
proportion as in the industrial cities. It suggests that in 19 18 
Labour enjoyed the support of substantial sections of worýers in 
heavy industry and the coal mines. Between 1918 and 1922 most 
headway was made in the cities, particularly because Labour's 
policy seemed more relevant to highly urbanised areas. But in both 
industrial city and industrial county seats, Labour could claim 
that by 1922 the party had, or was in sight of, majority support. 
Labour's major advance in the burghs of Scotland came later. At 
its maximum, Labour's support in the burghs in 1910 was only around 
20%. In 1918 it was less than 30%. In 1922 the party failed to 
make gains that were commensurate with those in the cities and 
industrial counties. Labour's 'arrival' in the burghs appears to 
have come between 1922 and 1924 with a 5% swing to Labour there, 
contrasting with a declining or stationary Labour vote elsewhere. 
The pattern suggests that the burghs saw a more complex ideological 
battle between Labour, Liberals, and Conservatives, and that it 
took until 1924 for Labour fully to establish its position. 
The limits to Labour's advance are most clearly seen in the rural 
areas and in the Highlands. Certainly as Table 10.8 shows Labour 
contested few constituencies until the later twenties. But no 
matter how Labour's performance is viewed the party was a marginal 
force outside the 'central belt and the cities. It would appear 
that the party's performance was better in 1918 and in immediate 
post-war by-elections than at almost any time during the inter-war 
years, so suggesting that Labour's appeal was more wide-ranging 
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Labour Interventions in Rural Area 
1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Highlands (6 seats) 40135 
Rural Shires 
(12 seats) 1119 11 
6 There are few rural seats, as Table 10.8 confirms, which 
Labour contested continuously in the nineteen twenties. But 
the following constituencies suggest Labour's support in 1918 
was higher or nearly as high as later - and certainly Labour's 
rural vote was a higher proportion of its industrial vote in 
contested seats than it was to be later. 
TABLE 10.9 
Share of Vote in Selected Rural Seats 
1§18 1918-22 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Aberdeenshire 
Central 26.4%* 18.4% 17.7% 
Roxburgh 29.9% 26.1% 26.2% 27.6% 




However, it should be noted that in Westerh Isles where the 
party did badly in 1918-10.2% the party's vote rose - in 
1924 to 17.7% and 1929,32.5% in three party contests. But 
before the 1929 election the Liberal MP, McKenzie Livingstone, 
had defected to Labour. 
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In fact in all areas it became obvious during the twenties that 
further progress beyond the initial gains would be difficult. 
Although the burghs shifted to Labour latest, the plateau reached 
in the industrial cities and shires was hardly surpassed in any 
area in the twenties. Taking into account seats Labour did not 
contest, the evidence suggests Labour could not build further on 
its strength in the cities and shires. In other words there were 
trends resisting Labour throughout industrial Scotland as much as 
there were trends pushing Labour up to its plateau of 47-54%. In 
industrial as well as rural Scotland, there were distinct limits to 
Labour's advance. Far from becoming a party of all Scotland in the 
way the Liberals had once been, Labour became identified with 
clearly defined sections of society. In particular, it appears to 
have been the party which spoke most for the industrial worker of 
the cities and towns and the miners of the industrial shires. 
Much of this study has concentrated on the electoral politics of 
those parties to the right of Labour. By examining their 
manoeuvres and calculations it is possible to construct a profile 
of political activity which shows that the real issue was seen on 
the right as a conflict with socialism. Firstly, in almost every 
one of the five elections of the period, with the exception perhaps 
of 1923, it was a matter of judgement for Liberals and 
Conservatives as to how far they were prepared to allow genuine 
disagreements to affect the unity of anti-socialist forces. 
Secondly, which constituted the better anti-socialist party was 
also a clear matter for discussion in many cases. Both parties 
sought to develop modern forms of political organisation capable of 
adjusting to the new mass politics. While the Conservatives were 
able to build a successful anti-socialist machine especially in the 
urban areas, the Liberals singularly failed to do so, and, as we 
have seen, even in 1929, when the party's local organisations were 
centrally financed virtually for the first time, the concentration 
of effort was on the rural areas. In these circumstances the fate 
of Liberalism seems little tied to support for a distinctive 
Liberal ideology but rather enmeshed in the general politics of 
combating socialism. 
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Our account has suggested that voters sensed a futility I rather than 
vitality in the three-party system once Labour became. an 
alternative government. Of course, the rise of Labour was not a 
function of Liberal decline. Matthew, McKibbin, and Kay have 
suggested that 'the disintegration of the Liberal Party did not 
produce large net gains for either of its rivals and it is slightly 
more probable that the Conservative ,s were 
the main 
beneficiaries 1(7) This is in accord with the conclusions of 
Butler and Stokes who ground their judgements about politics in the 
twenties on interviews with voters in the sixties, who were asked 
to name their previous political preferences and the preferences of 
their. fathers. These authors argue that only a minority of 
historic Liberal support went to Labour, and the proportion that 
went to the Conservatives was found to be greater among those whose 
fathers were remembered as Liberals and among* those who named their 
own earlier preference as Liberal. They suggest as a result that 
Labour's new-found strength was achieved most of all by mobilising 
the support of manual workers who grdw up in relatively 
(8) 
non-political homes The Scottish evidence seems to support 
this interpretation, that previous Liberal sympathisers were more 
likely to move to the Conservatives than to Labour in the nineteen 
twenties. 
The precise extent of the move to the Conservatives is, of course, 
uncertain; since most voters in the general elections of 1918 and 
1922 had not voted before 1918, it is quite possible that most 
previous Liberal voters retained their old loyalties, as Matthew, 
McKibbin, and Kay have suggested. This may be so, but the more 
important issue is not whether individuals who voted Liberal before 
1914 continued to do so in the 1920's but whether among new voters 
a similakly convinced group of Liberals existed. Matthew, 
McKibbiq, 
7 Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, op. cit., p. 739 
8D Butler and D Stokes, Political Change in Britain, (London, 
1970). 
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and Kay in fact suggest that in the nine teen-twen ties about 
twenty-five to thirty per cent of those who voted Liberal were 
'unwilling to vote for either of the other two parties'(9). .. 
How can one test this hypothesis for Scotland? It is possible to 
do so perhaps by examining differential turnouts in contests in 
which Liberal candidates stood or were absent, since the difference 
in turnout might suggest the existence of Liberals who preferred to 
abstain rather than to vote Conservative or Laýour. The picture 
is, of course, complicated by the -Liberal splits; whether a 
Liberal voter in 1918 and 1922 would have regarded Coalition 
Liberal and National Liberal candidates as genuine Liberals is 
unclear. But the evidence suggests that there was no positive 
effect on turnout where an independent Liberal stood. In 1918, the 
turnout without independent Liberals averaged 59% and with Liberals 
54%. In 1922 the turnout without Liberals averaged 78% and with 
Liberals 72%. In other words a Liberal intervention does not seem 
to have had the effect of raising turnout, and the absence of a 
Liberal did not appear to make voters -stay at home. In 1923 and 
later there is no discernible difference at all in turnout in these 
two types of contest. In fact -the prime determinant of turnout 
between 1918 and 1923 appears to have been the Labour Party's 
decision to intervene or not, as the table below suggests. 
TABLE 10.10 
Av2KMe Turnouts with and without Labour Candidates 
1918 1922 1923 
With Labour 58% 75% 72% 
Without Labour 51% 62% 66% 
9 Matthew, McKibbin, and Kay, op. cit., p. 739. 
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Thus in the three vital elections of 1918, , 
1922 and 1923, it 
appears that there was a committed group of Labour supporters. who 
would abstain if no Labour candidate was in the field, but no 
similarly committed group of Liberals. However, Liberal 
interventions did affect Labour and Conservative voting potential 
and at least until 1924, the appearance of a Liberal candidate 
(10) 
would attract back voters who had previously defected 
Table 10.11 summarises Liberal decline. It offers a useful counter 
to those who imply that Scotland's political map was uniform. 
Throughout the twenties the Liberals remained the dominant party of 
the Highlands, although the party's share of the vote fell there, 
(11) 
and, to a lesser extent, the major party of the rural shires 
But the Table shows clearly that the Liberal vote had collapsed 
almost entirely in the industrial counties and the cities in 1918 
and 1922; that the Liberals retained a significant presence in the 
burghs, but only until 1924; 
(12) 
and that generally the Liberals 
were being re'duced to a small part of the anti-socialist movement 
led by the Conservatives. 
10 In 1923, in seats where Liberals stood and where there had 
been no Liberal candidate in 1922, the Labour vote increased 
in seven seats but fell in ten. When no Liberals stood, 
although the party had put forward candidates in 1922, the 
Labour vote increased in four cases and declined in one. This 
contrasts with the position in nineteen of the twenty-one 
other constituencies fought by Labour where Labour's vote 
increased irrespective of whether Liberals had contested both 
elections or been absent on both occasions. 
11 This conclusion is similar to that of Cook who suggests that 
'it is essential to contrast the relatively sudden collapse of 
the party in the majority of the large cities and mining areas 
with the persistent strength of the Liberal Party elsewhere. 
In 1923, in voting behaviour, Britain was essentially divided 
into two nations, the urban and the rural. The chronology, 
the , extent, and the speed of Liberal decline were quite 
different in each'. Age of Alignment, p. 340. 
12 The swings against Liberal MP's in the burghs were extremely 
high - against Asquith in Paisley, 13%, and Collins in 
Greenock, 12% - in 1924, thus suggesting that the polarisation 
between Labour and the right had taken place. 
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Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is the small number of seats 
won by the Liberals in three-party contests (with Conservatives and 
Labour) throughout the twenties. Moreover, in the rural areas, 
where the Liberals continued to prosper and won three-party 
contests, the successful candidates seem less party spokesmen than 
political figures with a powerful local following, who claimed 
considerable freedom from the party line. 
TABLE 10.11 
Liberal Share of Votq by Areas 1910-1929 
1910 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Industrial Cities 48.5 4.7 10.7 17.8 8.5 8.8 
(17.3)* 
Industrial Counties 54.3 11.7 12.1 15.4 6.4 8.3 
(12.8) 
Burghs- 57.2 22.6 23.8 38.1 24.5 20.8 
(18.4) 
Rural Shires 60.0 36.6 50.8 49.6 30.6 36.3 
(17.0) 
Highlands 14.2 45.2 54.7 47.6 53.1 
(70.0) 
Figures within brackets denote 'Coalition Liberal' share of 
the vote. 
In fact two processes were at work during the decade: from 19 18 
the success of Labour at the expense of socialism, and the triumph 
of Conservatism at the expense of laissez-faire 'individualism. To 
different degrees by 1929 both right and left offered the 
electorate social and economic reform. *The Conservitives wbre 
alive to the need to offer the electorate a measure of 
interventionism while their rallying-point was still the fight 
against socialism. By 1929, with the defeat of the industrial 
500 
and political left in the Labour Party in Scotland, even the 
position of Maxton and Wheatley who argued for 'socialism with 
speed' was viewed with suspicion by many of the leaders of both the 
(13) 
Independent Labour Party and the Labour Party in Scotland 
How had Labour managed to become a party which was increasingly 
part of an established order many felt it had threatened to 
overthrow? In previous accounts, answers to this question have 
concentrated on the national perspective of party politics. Thus, 
in the traditional accounts which emphasise the organisational 
achievement of Labour, the conventional view, best expressed by 
McKibbin, argues that as soon as the trade unions espoused the 
Labour cause, the socialism of the party inevitably evaporated; 
Labour's mass support rested merely on 'a highly developed class 
consciousness and intense class loyalties', which had no socialist 
(14) 
content An alternative view, from the lef t, has emphasised 
Labour's betrayal by its leadership, its avowed Parliament ar ian ism 
at a time when extra- p arl iament ary (and ariti-parliamentary) 
industrial and political struggle ought to have been waged, and 
Labour's failure to give content to its commitment to socialist 
(15) 
change 
13 One example of the change in Labour is to compare the 
manifestoes of 1918 and 1929. In 1918 Labour demanded 'the 
immediate nationalisation and democratic control of vital 
public services such as mines, railways, shipping, armaments 
and electrical power' as well as a capital levy. The Labour 
Party's Scottish manifesto went further. In 1929 the party's 
'shopping list' for public ownership included only coal and 
land. The emphasis in 1929 had shifted to 'a peaceful but 
determined national development and reconstruction'. 
14 R McKibbin, op. cit., p. XIV and pp. 236-247. He argues that if 
the war did not necessarily mean the defeat of socialism in 
Britian it did mean the defeat of socialists. 
15 -McNeill Weir's polemic against Ramsay MacDonald is one early 
statement of the position; Miliband, for. example, takes the 
issue further, suggesting that 'Labour's leadership was 
clearly imbued with Parliamentarianism, and always rejected the 
kind of political action, such as political action for 
industrial purposes which fell or which appeared to fall 
outside the framework and conventions of the parliamentary 
system'. For a fuller statement of his argument, see 
Parliamentary Socialism, (London, 1964). See also L McNeill 
Weir, The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald, (London, 1938). 
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But is either the correct framework within which to view Labour's 
changing character? As one writer has suggested, both explanatýons 
betray 'a whiggish concern with the rise and consolidation of the 
Labour Party and the emergence of trade unionism as an estate of 
the realm', with, on the one hand, leaders praised for encouraging 
this trend or, on the other, blamed for encouraging 'the 
16) 
progressive subordination of the working class'( In fact, both 
fail to connect the experience bf local areas with national 
politics and to appreciate the way in which popular attitudes were 
changing during the nineteen twenties. 
In explaining the changing political situation in the twenties it 
is important to understand what kind of party Labour became. 
First, Labour never achieved its aim of becoming a mass membership 
party in Scotland. At its peak the Independent Labour Party, which 
provided most of the Labour Party's individual members, had only 
9,000 Scottish members. In 1929 this figure had dwindled to less 
than 5,000. In 1928 when figures for individual Labour Party 
branch membership were first compiled, Labour's entire Scottish 
membership numbered less than 12,000, a tiny proportion of Labour's 
Scottish vote. This was not a result of competition from other 
left-wing parties. At its peak, in 1926, Communist Party 
(17) 
membership in Scotland was less than 3,000 
16 J Hinton, New Left Review, No. 182,1981 who argues that in 
response to the school of historians who concentrate on 
'Labour's magnificent journey' a Marxist school has 
reconstructed 'an alternative magnificent journey, a stream of 
pure proletarian self-expression - from syndicalism to the 
Communist Party'. (pp. 88-92). It is as he implies a 
historiography of titans and traitors, rebels who resisted the 
blandishments of the establishment and leaders who fell for 
the aristocratic embrace, and it explains little. 
17 S McIntyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working_. Siý. ss 
MiJ: it an - . 
ýy in interwar Britain (Cambridge, 1980), p. 28. 
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Together Labour and all left-wing parties in Scotland had fewer 
members throughout the twenties than the Conservative Par. ty, 
although a few politically active members could assume a dominance 
in communities, in spite of the smallness of local Labour 
(18) branches Secondly, for most of the twenties there was never 
in fact an industrial base of support for the political militancy 
to which the Labour party aspired in the immediate popt-war period. 
STUC membership, for example, never recovered from its peak of 
1919, when more than half a million workers were affiliated. For 
the rest of the twenties it oscillated between 250,000 and 
350,000; (19) and one of the strongest industrial unions, the 
miners, saw its membership halved during this period of relative. 
stability. 
In these circumstances the party increasingly saw its role as a 
force to protect and defend the industrial working-class. It 
adjusted to the depression. As the twenties progressed its 
strength became concentrated in the areas where trade union 
activity was strong. This was as true of the ILP as much as the 
Labour Party. Labour was thus increasingly restricted to the 
18 As McIntyre argues in respect of the Vale of Leven Communist 
Party, a group of less than one hundred 'drew on the spirit of 
solidarity' which characterised the area and assumed an 
importance far beyond their membership, S. McIntyre, op. cit., 
p. 28. 
19 Forward, April 28,1928. Membership figures for the STUC 
were: 
1921 536,432 1925 423,645 
1922 226,822 1926 328,922 
1923 250,949 1927 307,676 
1924 324,157 1928 278,398 
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central belt and rested on the support of particular occupational 
groups. It failed to build on the possibilities of support which 
had been revealed in the rural areas in 1918. It did not 
successfully exploit anti-landlord feeling and did not make much 
headway in the small one-industry towns of rural Scotland. It saw 
this failure as a result of -the low level of trade unionism in (19) 
these areas, although constituencies there had a high 
propo rtion of working-class electors. Ironically, the party which 
had set out to build socialism (and come to the aid of trade 
unions) was increasingly reliant on trade unionism for Labour 
votes. 
Was it inevitable that the Labour Party became the political 
expression of class consciousness, expressed in trade unionism, and 
a party which prospered or fell largely according to the strength 
of trade union activity in different areas? While no study of the 
quantitative electoral data can answer such a question, the 
evidence does suggest that Parkin's model of political change, 
explored in our introduction, accurately describes the kind of 
Labour Party that had emerged by the end of the period. However, 
we have to ask wh the class consciousness which developed among 
the industrial working-class of Scotland failed to extend to all 
manual workers, and why that class consciousness did not develop 
into*the 'socialist' consciousness, which Labour leaders in 
19 In 1924 the STUC investigation of trade union strength found 
the Highlands 'practically devoid of trade unionism. There 
were only 10,000 trade unioni9ts in the Highlands and Islands 
and 10,000 in the North East outside Aberdeen. Similarly in 
the counties of Berwick, Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Dumfries, 
and Galloway, there were in all only 16,000 trade unionists. 
What is interesting is that the situation had &hanged little 
by 1947 when a new survey was, done (membership was only 12, 
, 
000 
in Dumfries and Galloway, 43,000 in the North East and 
Highlands, and had fallen in the south east Borders). 
Information from STUC Conference Reports, 1925 and 1948). 
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Scotland in 1918 had indicated would develop there. Some 
writers 
(20) 
stress that the new electorate were 'politicdlly 
immature', that their horizons were limited, and that leaders, (no 
ma tter how much the charge of 'betrayal' is made) were more radical 
than the electorate they sought to represent (and so justifiably 
could not be expected to go much further than their supporters 
sought to do) . In reply, those who accept Parkin's approach, can 
point to the 'socialising' role of the key institutions * of 
society - from the churches to the education system - and argue 
that Labour contributed to, rather than challenged, the prevailing 
(21) 
culture which existed This line of argument suggests that 
voters 'accommodated' themselves to the existing order and that the 
quiescence of working-class voters was partly shaped by what their 
leaders suggested was possible. 
Our study of Scotland offers only some answers to these hypotheses. 
It may be that, while religious and other sectional loyalties did 
not diminish the centrality of class, they did prevent its full 
expression. More research is required on this theme. Equally, the 
experience of the rural areas suggests that there remained a 
different ideological perspective amongst manual workers there. 
But the evidence suggests the crucial importance of the interplay 
between the objective facts of economic change and the ideological 
and political perspective of the Labour Party's leadership. 
20 See R Skidelsky, Politicians and the (London, 1967); D 
Marquand, 
-Ramsay_MacDonald 
(London, 1977). W Runciman's views 
of the period are set out in his book Relative D2. privation 
and Social Justice (London, 1966). The suggestions that the 
new electorate were 'politically immature' are made in 
-Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, op. cit. 
21 F Parkin, Class, Inequalj:. ý_X and Political Order, (London, 
1971). 
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Chapter 2 and 3 have shown how the post-war threat to stability 
which saw previously unprecedented anti-government swings in 
by-elections was defused (and coalition promises of social reform 
evaporated) as Labour defined itself as a party of parliamentary 
power and gradual social and economic reform. A new stability was 
cemented by the depression, which ensured that the industrial 
conditions necessary for a socialist break-through were not 
present. Scottish Labýur politicians like Maxton and Wheatley 
sensed that one important consequence of the recession was to 
diminish the possibilities for political change, and when they 
urged a bolder course of socialist advance in the later twenties, 
they were aware that they were acting not because of a 'popular 
demand for change, but in spite of it. Nevertheless, much of the 
weight of their attack on the Labour leadership was that the 
expectations of the working-class had been restrained by what 
politicians had said was possible, and by what kind of party Labour 
had become. Whatever was the precise relationship between these 
local and national forces, the fact was that, despite a rupture in 
the political system, most Scottish people were by 1929 little 
better housed, fed or economically secure than they had been a 




HOME RULE AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
Scotland's distinctiveness in the British political system has 
always been recognised, although the degrees to which Scotland is 
regarded as different have varied. A conventional view in the 
sixties was -that of Birch who suggested that 'the distinctions 
between the English, Welsh and Scots are cultural rather than 
ethnic and do not have many political consequences'"). But other 
historians have sought to regard the differences as of more than 
passing signif icance. Thus in their study of Scottish Political 
Behaviour, principally based on interviews in Glasgow in the 
1960's, Budge and Irwin have concluded: 
There is a wide range of topics other than those related 
to social class upon which Scottish electors adopt a 
consistent attitude. Those topics relate to Scotland and 
Scottish affairs. The thread running through these 
opinions is a concern for the well-being of Scotland and 
fellow Scots. (2) 
Thus Budge and Irwin argue that I Scottishness' is as important a 
dividing line as 'class' in modern Scottish politics. The work of 
Michal Heckter takes this position further. - 
In a recent series of articles, and in a book, Internal 
Colonialism, Heckter has suggested that in British political 
behaviour in the nineteenth and twentieth century we can identify 
in Scotland 'the persistence of regionalism' which cannot be 
explained by social class. 
His most recent work suggested a new view. See A Birch, 
Political Integration and Disinte in the United 
KiLigdom (London, 1979). 
21 Budge and D Urwin, Scottish Political Behaviour, (London, 
1965). 
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His argument leads him to suggest that 'Scottishness' was an 
important factor In determining political behaviour and attitudes 
and that Labour benefited in the twenties from its identification 
(3) 
as the anti-London and anti-establishment party Indeed the 
implication is that Labour inherited the Liberal vote partly for 
that reason. 
The history of 'home rule' sentiment in Scbtland cannot therefore 
be ignýred and in this appendix we attempt to examine how the 
Labour Party in Scotland inherited and transcended the Liberal 
Party's pre-war commitment to 'home rule', and to examine what that 
commitment meant in practice. While in the early twenties the 
major organs' of home rule sentiment were dominated by the Labour* 
Movement it was disenchantment with Labour's performance which had 
brought the new national party of Scotland into being 'by the time 
of the 1929 election. The evidence suggests that it was possible 
to incorporate 'home rule' aspirations into Labour's appeal, 
although the Labour Party itself could never quite reconcile 
nationalist aspirations to its own views of socialist development 
in Britain. While activity promoting home rule was vigorous, the 
strength of. home rule sentiment was never sufficiently strong to 
dominate the politics of the twenties. All this can be seen if we 
trace Labour's attitudes to home rule in the twenties, the position 
of the pressure group, the Scottish Home Rule Association, and the 
steps which led to the formation of the National Party of Scotland 
in 1928. 
Attempts at devolution had been frustrated by a mixture of 
indecision and inertia in the years before the First World War. In 
1911 the House of Commons was tolJ that sixty Scottish MPs 
supported Home Rule. But some wanted radical nieasures of home rulý 
for nationalistic reasons, others saw Scottisý reforms as part of 
'home rule all round' and as a remoulding of the British 
3 Heckter, Internal Colonialism (London, 1976). 
508 
constitution. Cabinet committees discussed such proposals, 
including the setting up of enhanced grand committees as a f. irst 
step. But while a private member's bill gained a majority (but no 
rýore parliamentary time) in the Commons in 1912, Asquith was 
lukewarm on the issue when he met a deputation of Scots MPs in 
1913. The real problem, as Jallard suggests, was that Liberals were 
'far from united' on the detail of the measures they sought and 
that Home Rule all round was 'a sufficiently vague and all 
embracing formula to mean all things to all men' 
(4). 
While 
vigorous nationalist and devolutionist pressure groups promoted the 
home rule cause in Scotland before 1914, they were never in a 
position to bring the Liberals to the point of formulating precise 
legislative measures, despite the Scottish Secretary's announcement 
just before the outbreak of war that he proposed additional 
initiatives in the field. 
In 1918 most Liberal and Labour candidates offered a measure of 
support for home rule. Indeed amongst the Coalition Government's 
ministers, there was support for home rule from Munro, the 
Coalition Liberal Scottish Secretary, and Lloyd George, the Prime 
Minister. This brought a Speaker's Conference in 1919 which 
examined but could not fully agree on various alternatives for home 
rule. The real problem was a contradiction between the proposals 
of the Haldane Committee and of the Speaker's Conference. Haldane 
argued that government should be administered 'on the basis of 
services to be performed' rather than 'the persons or classes dealt 
with'. Yet the Speaker's Conferences was called to discuss the 
'special needs and characteristics of the component parts' of 
Britain, and whether statutory legislatures be set up. it 
recommended the creation of councils, but could not agree on who 
should be in the devolved assemblies, or councils, existing MPs, 
nominated or elected representatives. 
4P Jallard, 'United Kingdom Devolution, 1910-1914, Political 
Panacea or Tactical Diversion, ' English Historical Review. 
XCIV, 1979, p. 785. 
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But the Conference represented a recognition of the demand for 
self-government and in the post-war years the Scottish Secretary at 
different times reaffirmed his support for home rule. In June 
1919, when a motion supporting home rule came to the House, only 
one Scottish member opposed it - and, in fact, thirteen 
conservatives supported it - and in 1920 Munro again reiterated his 
support. When he met the STUC in 1919, he suggested that 'home rule 
is no longer a party question but a business proposition : the 
chief difficulty in the way has been England' 
(5) 
. But, in fact, 
throughout most of the twenties the running for home rule was made 
by Labour. Although the Liberals had promoted the Scottish Home 
Rule Council, the Scottish Home Rule Association, that was 
reconstituted in 1918, had Labour supporters as its dominant 
figures. 
Roland Muirhead, a socialist businessman, was its guiding force. 
In September 1919, at its first annual meeting, a resolution was 
passed: 
That this meeting representing all shades of political 
opinion and industrial activity being convinced that the 
present centralised system of government from London is 
inefficient and inconsistent with national sentiment 
resolves to form itself into a committee for the purpose 
of organising and focusing the Scottish demand for self 
government in respect of Scottish affairs. (6) 
The meeting also resolved that it would work as a pressure group by 
promoting public meetings, press correspondence, distributing 
literature, holding national conventions and 'securing of pledges 
from Parliamentary candidates'. But the new Association was far 
closer to the new Labour Party than to the Liberal Party. 
5 Scottisý Trades Union Congress, Report, 1919. 
6 Scottish Home Rule Association Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 
1920. 
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Its Committee as well as Muirhead, an ILP member, included William 
Gallagher of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, Roýert 
Smillie, the miners' leader, and James Maxton. A measure of its 
Labour strength is given by a study of its affiliated membership. 
Of 138 organisations affiliated in 1920,47 were co-operative 
societies, 38 trade union branches and 24 ILP branches; in 
addition to the STUC, Scottish Mineworkers' linion, Scottish Farm 
Servants' Union and Scottish 'Horse and Motormen's Association were 
(7) 
affiliated S. H. R. A. speakers were priRarily ILP 
(8) 
propagandists 
Nevertheless the Scottish Council of the Labour Party were unhappy 
that initiative for home rule was being seized by an all-party 
pressure group, rather than the Labour Party itself. In January 
1919 Maxton and Smillie, (members of the Scottish Home Rule 
Association Executive), were advised to work through the party's 
(9) 
channels not the SHRA, for home rule The Labour Party 
Executive agreed that while it was in favour of home rule, 'the 
people of Scotland can secure this measure by a fuller support of 
Labour at the polls, and therefore considers it inadvisable for 
members of the Labour Party to assoi: iate with members of other 
political parties in special organisations for the purpose of home 
(10) 
rule' 
7 Cited in J Brand, Scottish Nationalism, (London, 1978), p. 176. 
8 Scottish Home Rule Association Newsletter, Vol. 1, July 1920. 
The claim is made also by Brand, op. cit. p. 176. 
9 Labour Party Scottish Executive Committee, January 13,1919. 
As early ajs November 1918 a letter from the Scottish Home Rule 
Committee signed by Ma*xton, 'Smillie, Shýw of the Glasgow 
Trades Council as well ag ULonists and Liberals had asked for 
support, with Maxton accepting the proposal that 'a 
decision be 
delayed until the Home Rule Committee had submitted its rules 
and constitutions. 
10 Ibid . 
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Despite the warning, the records of the SHRA suggest that a 
majority of Labour MPs were close to the association in the 
twenties. It was the Labour Movement to whom most home rulers 
looked for support and sponsorship. Labour's 1918 national 
conference accepted that 'there should be constituted separate 
legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales and England with 
autonomous administration in matters of local concern'. The 
manifesto of the Labour Party in Scotland in 1918 supported the 
principlýs of self-determination for the Scottish people, through a 
Scottish Parliament and separate representation at Versailles, and 
in 1919 the Scottish Executive with unanimous approval from the 
Scottish conference laid down the foundations of new constitutional 
arrangements. Its report argued that: 
A determined effort should be made to secure Home Rule 
for Scotland in the first session of Parliament ... and the 
question should be taken out of the hand of place-hunting 
lawyers and vote-catching politicians by the political 
and industrial efforts of the Labour Party in Scotland 
which should co-ordinate all its forces to this end, using 
any legitimate means political and industrial to secure 
the establishment of a Scottish Parliament on a 
completely democratic basis. (11) 
A draft constitution was proposed under which the Secretary for 
Scotland would summon a Scottish Parliament after electiohs on 
proportional representation with the vote open to all over 21: 
'Subject to the constitutional veto, the Scottish Parliament shall 
have powers to deal with any Scottish matters including the levying 
of taxes hitherto within the jurisdiction of the Imperial 
Parliament at Westminster except such as determine the control and 
equipment of the army, navy, civil, diplomatic, dominion, colonial 
and other imperial services'. 
. 
In a rousing speech to the 
Conference Ramsay MacDonald said that: 'he looked forward to the 
time when Scoftish devolution or home rule would become enormoLly 
stronger for he was sure that if a Scottish legislative authority 
11 Labour Party, Scottish Executive, 1919 Report, p. 20. 
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sitting in the Scottish capital had powers to deal with land; to 
deal with democracy, to deal with education, their work would -be 
much more effective in rebuilding a new world on the foundations of 
righteousness. He hoped that in the reconstruction of democracy 
12) 
they would lay great emphasis upon national development'( 
During the 1919 debate the point was made most strongly from the 
Secretary of the Labour Party, on behalf of the Executive, that 
definite action should be taken to secure positive laws for home 
rule. 'The time for philosophising on the matter, ' he said, 'was 
past. ' 
1919 was no accident in Labour's history. While the Speaker's 
Conference discussed and could not agree on the question, the 
Labour Party's Scottish Conference continued to press for home 
rule. In 1920 Conference agreed that the Imperial Parliament would 
be left only with 'such questions and powers as affect the British 
Commonwealth as a whole', and the Scottish Executive announced that 
a committee would work with the Parliamentary Party and the 
National Executive in drafting a bill. In 1921 the Executive were 
asked, in drafting their proposed Home Rule Bill, to examine 
developments in Ireland, 'a settlement of which may affect 
materially the constitutional position in Scotland'. The Scottish 
Divisional Council of the ILP was prepared to go even further. In 
1919 the party had rejected a proposal for a 'Scottish socialist 
government in Scotland', although the ILP's Scottish Conference 
called for a Scottish Parliament. But by 1922 the party was 
demanding a constituent assembly so that Scots could meet in 
Scotland to determine what form a new goverment would take. 
It was the trade union movement ýhAt provided the muscle for the 
demands for Scottish self-government. In his Presidential Address 
to the STUC in 1918, Hugh Lyon of the Scottish Cariers argued that: 
'if reconstruction is to 'take place in Scotland after the war, then 
12 Ibid., p. 20,21. 
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we should not be humbugged by writing and sending deputations to 
people in London who know absolutely nothing of our wants.. A 
Parliament should be set up in Scotland thus saving time and 
expense and giving the people in Scotland a fair opportunity of 
working out their salvation' 
(13). 
The STUC's-election proposals of 
1918 included as their first demand a Scottish Parliament. From 
1914 to 1923, ý the STUC Annual Conferences consistently passed 
pro-Home Rule resolutions and when the STUC met the Secretary for 
Scotland in 1919, Home Rule was the first matter raised with Munro. 
When Munro agreed with their support for home rule and said that 
Lloyd George and Walter Long were also in favour, this was not 
enough for the STUC, and Hugh Lyon, a member of the Parliamentary 
Committee and leader of the Scottish Carters, suggested: 'while 
Home Rule was not the cause of the unrest in Glasgow it would have 
had an effect to some extent of preventing unrest'. While Home 
Rule later became less prominent in future STUC agendas, the STUCIs 
support for home rule remained strong. it voted in 1923 for 
'dominion self-government", holding to that policy fbr the next 
eight years. Indeed the conclusion that trade union leaders drew 
not only from failure of the strike activity in 1919 but also from 
the failure of the Triple Alliance to work in '1921 was that a 
Scottish Government would be a more effective vehicle for 
representing Scottish interests. - 
In an STUC debate in 1921, the 
delegate from the Scottish Union of Dock Labourers argued: 
There would have been no Triple Alliance failure north of 
the Tweed if the Scottish workers had been free to act by 
themselves. He complained that the Scottish workers 
would not move far without the consent of the great 
people in London. (14) 
13 Scott-ish Trades Union Congress, Annual Repoýt, 1918. 
14 Ibid., Annual Report, 1921, p. 64. 
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The Co-operative movement also supported devolution and home rule. 
As the Scottish Co7op Kýý; pr reported of the 1918 Scottish 
Co-operative Conference in April, 1918, 'there was a strong 
expression of opinion that Scotland must have freedom to work out 
its own social and political salvation ... it ought to be recognised 
that a confederation of self-governing units was far stronger than 
any organisation which could be -managed from any one centre' . In 
1919 William Gallagher of the SCWS took over as the first President 
of the SHRA. Co-operative support remained strong throughout the 
twenties, Gallagher writing in 1927 that the Scottish Co-operative 
movement needed home rule to placate national sentiment and to 
achieve social reform which was being hampered by Conservative 
dominance in England. 
At the 1922 General 'Election almost every unsuccessful and twenty 
six of the successful Labour candidates pledged themselves to Home 
Rule for Scotland. There had been. some dissension within the 
Party's Parliamentary group in that Tom Kennedy, the Kirkcaldy MP, 
had argued that Home Rule should be abandoned 'to avoid factious 
controversy and ensure a wide sympathy beyond ordinary members of 
the party'. But others like Graham had argued that Labour's 
programme should emphasise 'the necessity of Scottish Home Rule for 
the decentralisation of many questions including pensions, fishery, 
15) housing, agriculture etc'( In the end it was Graham's advice 
that won the day, and a statement was put out by the British Labour 
Party stressing: 
The Labour Party is pledged to statutory legislatures for 
Scotland, Wales and England as well as Ireland as part of 
the larger plan of constitutional reform which will 
transform the British Empire into a Britannic Federation 
of Commonwealths and British self-governing communities. 
The Labqur Party advocated the establishment of these 
local Parliaments to deal with Scottish legislation and 
administration in matters of exclusive local concern and 
the basis of Lomplet6 autonomy with a council for the 
whole British Commonwealth. 
15 Labour Party Scottish Executive, Minutes of Meeting of 
Executive with Scottish MP's, October 7,1922. 
515 
As the Clydesiders made their triumphal descent on Westminster in 
1922, Wheatley told newspaper reporters that 'in Scotland there is 
no subject which aroused enthusiasm so much as the subject of 
Scottish Home Rule', 
(16) 
and during 1923 pressure for Home Rule was 
maintained by Labour Members of Parliament. For example, during 
Maxton's suspension from the House, he and nine other Labour MPs 
spoke to a crowd estimated at 35,000 in Glasgow in August; he 
argued that the experience of Westminster 'bad converted him 
absolutely to the necessity of making a strenuous effort to keep 
their own parliament in Scotland'. He continued, 'we mean to tell 
them they can do what they like about English children but they are 
(17) 
not going to suffer Scottish children to die' In the 1923 
election thirty three Labour candidates signed the SHRA request to 
declare themselves in favour of Home Rule. 
In January 1924 after Labour took power, fourteen Labour MPs signed 
a motion regretting the omission of home rule proposals from the 
King's speech and saying they were committed to 'a Parliament for 
Scotland and giving to that country a measure of home rule'. 
During the 1924 Parliament, a private member's bill, which 
reflected the Labour Party's Home Rule committee's discussions from 
1920 onwards, was introduced by George Buchanan, and backed by all 
Scotland's backbench MPs as well as the Prime Minister and Scottish 
Secretary, William Adamson. Its appearance produced a nationwide 
campaign in its support organised by the Home Rule Association and 
supported prominently by Maxton, who argued in the climax of the 
campaign that he would prefer not to have to go back to 
Westminster. The bill which was modelled on devolution as it 
operated in Ulster and proposing a system of federal Home Rule, 
with Scottish MPs remaining at Westminster until Home Rule all 
round was achieved, came before the House in May 1924. Despite 
Maxton's attempt along with Buchanan, McLean and the Liberal., 
16 Glasgow Herald, n. d., contained in papers of Scottish 
Secretariat (National Library). 
17 Llasgow Evenkrýjg Citizen, August 27,1923. 
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McPherson, to force a vote on the matter, the Speaker allowed the 
bill to be talked out by Conservatives, and it was refused a seýond 
reading. 
Thp Scottish Secretary, William Adamson, told the House during the 
debate that 'the Government gives the general principle of the bill 
their approval ... what. they suggest they are prepared to do is 
appoint a committee to examine this whole question and repont to 
the house. The Cabinet, in fact, asked Clynes, Lord Privy Seal, 
to draw up terms of reference for a committee of enquiry. Clynes 
then recommended a Royal Commission which the Cabinet refused on 
the grounds the matter was one for MPs, but when a Select Committee 
was suggested this was in turn ruled out because the Government 
lacked a Commons majority. Thus Ramsay MacDonald told 'home 
rulers' that while he favoured devolution, he could not take any 
immediate action to secure its implementation. 
This was the nearest home rulers were to come to achieving a 
measure of Scottish self-government and it marked the climax of 
activity in the twenties, 
(18) 
despite the Scottish Home Rule 
Association's attempts to maintain momentum by calling a National 
Convention in November 1924. Out of it came a draft bill which was 
discussed at a second National Convention in October 1926. 
The Association had a rising membership, both in terms of 
individuals and affiliation organisations from 1918 to 1927 
(19) 
9 
and their activities centred on these National Conventions and on 
proposals for new Home Rule legislation. 
18 P. R. O. Cabinet Committees, May 14,1924 CAB. 31(24)2; May 30, 
1924 CAB. 35(24)7; June 4,1924 CAB. 36(24)2; cited in M 
Keating and D Bleiman, op. cit., p. 81-82. 
19 Scottish Home Rule Association, Newsletters. The figures 
given for membership have been compiled by Brand, op. ci: t., p. 17) 
suggesting individual members rose in number from only 327 in 
1919 and 1150 in 1920 to 3,148 in 1927 and that organisational 
affiliations rose yearly from 81 in 1919 and 138 in 1920 to 
335 by 19.27. 
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The second Parliamentary attempt to force a home rule bill into law 
came in 1926 as a result of the Association's deliberations and the 
liaison it maintained with Scottish MPs. The new bill that was 
introduced by Rev. James Barr in 1927 was a more radical measure 
arguing for dominion status and the withdrawal of Scottish MPs from 
Westminster; the latter clause caused disagreement among Scottish 
MPs which the Association's Liaison Committee failed to resolve. 
Johnston, who seconded the bill, reflected a general feeling at the 
.. 
time among S6ottish Labour MPs when he said later that the bill was 
'all pretty airy fairy'; 
(20) 
and it never received the full 
(21) 
approval of the STUC, which felt it had not been consulted it 
was talked out without a vote and marked the parting of the ways 
between the Labour Party and nationalists who regarded home rule as 
the absolute priority, At the Home Rule Association's national 
rally of 1927, Labour MPs were absent from the Association's 
platform. When Roland Muirhead announced he would stand as an 
independent nationalist in West Renfrewshire, and the National 
Party of Scotland was formed after meetings organised by the 
Glasgow University Student Nationalists, the Scottish Home Rule 
(22) 
Association could no longer contain its divergent elements 
20 T Johnston,. Memoirs, (London, 1952) p. 66. 
21 M Keating and D Bleiman, op. cit., p. 103. 
22 The story is told in Ibid. p. 107-108. By 1927 in addition to 
Labour and trade union factions there were the Scottish 
National Movement led by Spence, Scottish National League and 
Glasgow University Student Nationalists. As John MacCormick 
records of the 1927 Convention, 'the debate wandered backwards 
and forwards and finally petered out without any real decision 
of any kind being made'. The Convention which had 100 
delegates including a number of Labour MPs, and with the 
Labour element in the majority were recommended by Lewis 
Spence to form one national party but James Barr indicated 
Labour MPs could not be associated with the proposal. (p. 21). 
518 
Although the Association continued in being for two more years, and 
the STUC rejected a motion to disaffiliate immediately, its 
nationalists left it for the National Party. The Association voted 
to dissolve itself at its 1929 Annual General Meeting. 
Increasingly, after these events, Labour MPs came under nationalist 
attack for ? appalling apathy.... in face of the continued decay of 
the Scottish means and instruments of production and of the growth 
(23) 
of alien control' Muirhead had decided to stand as a National 
candidate in West Renfrew, as a result, he said, oi unsatisfacto . ry 
replies to letters from the SHRA to all candidates in Scotland 
about their views on home rule, although he had chosen a 
constituency where there was as yet no Labour candidate in the 
field. He argued that: 'it is now clear that so long as political 
parties are controlled from their headquarters in London, there is 
little hope for Scotland. The advent of a Scottish National Party 
is now imminent. If the Labour Party in Scotland had been really 
independent as far as Scotland was concerned the need for a 
(24) 
Scottish National Party would not likely have arisen' His 
position was made clear in a letter to Forward which reminded its 
readers what had happened in 1924: 
Ramsay MacDonald and those with him (i. e. the Cabinet) 
had failed to give the facilities for further discussion 
of Buchanan's bill after it had been talked out through 
the intervention of Sir Robert Horne. He-and his Cabinet 
therefore condoned the accentuation of the centralisation 
of Scottish affairs in London. (25) 
23 Forward, September 10,1927. 
24 Forward, January 21,1928. 
25 Foridard, February 11,1928. 
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Johnston, who had seconded Barr's bill in 1927, wrote that the new 
national party was a 'capitalist agency designed to withdraw voters 
from the Labour Party. Had the Labour Party been given a chance 
and had it failed in Scotland then the creation of a new party 
would be another matter altogether. ' He continued: 
With the desire to speed up self-government for Scotland 
I have every sympathy but this new policy business seems 
to me to be a policy of despair ... despite the often 
unreasoned abuse to which the Labour Party has been 
subjected on the ground that it is 'English controlled' 
the f act remains that it never has had a chance of 
translating its programme into realisation. (26) 
The National Party refused to accept this argument and reciprocated 
the hostility it expressed. Ramsay MacDonald said in January 1928: 
I wish I saw a more widespread demand for Scottish Home 
Rule. Its supporters however must have some sense of 
proportion. No Government whatever the sympathies of its 
ministers may be can carry such legislation as this 
except upon a demand which had hardly been more than 
whispered from Scotland as yet. (27) 
In his study, The National Movement in Scotland, Brand has 
described in detail the numerically insignificant organisations 
which developed in the nineteen twenties to form the National Party 
of Scotland in 1928: the Scots National League, the Scottish 
National Movement and the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist 
Association. Without the impetus of dissension in the Scottish 
Home Rule Association, and the disenchantment with the Labour 
Party, these organisations might have led to nothing. As John 
McCormick records of his days as a young member of the ILP and a 
student at Glasgow Univp-rsity, he was 'not satisfied' with Labour's 
efforts at home rule and in the summer of 1927, decided to leavý 
the Labour PaKty to 'make Scottish Home Rule a live ýssue and 
26 Forward, June 2,1928. 
27 Forward, January, 1928. To nationalists however, these views 
seemed to support the allegations that he had always been 
lukewarm on home rule. 
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an issue which would transcend the differences among Tories, 
(28) 
Liberals, and socialists' In April 1928, the newly foýmed 
Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association, itself a 
breakaway group from the University Labour Club, brought the Scots 
National League, the Scottish National Movement and members of the 
Scottish Home Rule Association together to form the National Party 
of Scotland. It required a series of compromises, as MacCormick 
records, to bring a National Party of Scotland into being, with the 
rather model3t aim 'to secure self-government for Scotland with 
independent national status within the British group of 
(29) 
nations' In response Labour banned dual membership, regarding 
the National Party as the equivalent of 'the Communist or other 
party which it is not eligible for us to affiliate or become 
(30) 
members of The new par'ty's successes were few, despite a- 
well-publicised Glasgow University Rectorial Campaign in October 
1928 in which the former Liberal, now Nationalist, Cunningham 
Graham lost by only 60 votes to the Prime Minister, Stanley 
Baldwin. The party's first by-election contest, North Midlothian 
in January 1929, ended with the nationalist poet, Lewis Spence, 
receiving only 850 votes and a lost deposit. It was, records 
MacCormick, 'a bitter disappointment' (31) , but the party did 
little better when it placed two candidates - MacCormick himself in 
Camlachie and Roland Muirhead in East Renfrewshire - in the general 
election contests of 1929. Both lost their deposits after 
campaigns which MacCormick records 'were amateurish in the 
(32) 
extreme' If Scottish sentiment was important in determining 
voting behaviour in 1929, it was Labour 7 not the nationalists - 
who could mobilise it. Labour was the home rule party of the 
twenties. 
0 
- 28 J MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, (London, 1955) p. 16. 
29 Ibid., p. 22-30. 
30 Labour. Party Scottish Executive Minutes, May 21,1928. 
31 J blacCormick, op. cit. p. 39. 
32 Ibid., p. 41 
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What then did Home Rule and devolution mean to the Labour Movement 
of the twenties? There were three Bills introduced or supported 
by Labour members at this time. The 1922 bill rejected separation 
and divided powers into three different categories - retained, 
common, and devolved services under the Crown. It accorded with 
the 1919 conference decision to retain 'a constitutional veto' . 
The 1924 Bill introduced by George Buchanan retained to the UK 
Parliament major services including the Post Office, Customs, army, 
navy, foreign affairs, and tax collection, and other matters and 
services constituted the devolved powers. There was to be the same 
representation as before from Scotland in the House of Commons (but 
Scottish members would abstain from voting on English matters), and 
the memorandum of the Bill suggested the proposals were 'an 
extension of the (present) policy of devolution within the United 
Kingdom'. A Joint Exchequer Board was to allocate finances. In 
speaking to the proposals, Tom Johnston asserted Scots' nationhood 
but said that he did not want to be accused of separation: he 
wanted a federal solution. The 1927 Bill was one of three produced 
by James Barr wh#h arose from the Scottish Home Rule Association, 
precA-ding its break-up and demise, and it was the most radical. 
There was to be continuation of representation from Scotland in the 
House of Commons and in speaking to the proposal Johnston stated 
that there was 'a desire to have a worthy Parliament and a share in 
the administration of imperial affairs'. In short, a form of 
federalism was envisaged. There were to be joint services 
including the army, navy, air force under a joint constitutional 
council. Executive power in Scotland under the king was to be 
represented by a Lord High Commissioner. It was, said Johnston, la 
similar measure' to that of 1924 and the aim was to secure a full 
enquiry into the details of a devolution agreement. 
In 1923 the Scottish Home Rule Association attempted to clarify the 
confusion on devolution in a well argued, concise pamphlet on home 
rule. The meaning of home rule, it said, was the creation of a 
National Parliament and a National Executive, but the government of 
the United Kingdom would have reserve matters in their control and 
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there would be conjoint administration in other areas. There would 
be separate Scottish representation in the League of Nations. The 
pamphlet stated: 
Some people try to make a radical distinction between 
devolution and home rule and one Scottish MP contended 
that the two things were opposed to each other. 
Devolution means the handing over of certain powers from 
a central body to a subordinate body. There may be 
different degrees of devolution and it may assume 
different forms. Home Rule for Scotland is simply a 
variety of devolution but it has two main characteristics 
that make it important. First, it is thoroughgoing and 
complete devolution: Second, it is devolution to a 
nation. Home Rule is simply natural, thorough, 
efficient, and harmonious devolution. 
The Labour Party of the twenties accepted Scots nationality and 
nationhood as a fact; it accepted the contentions made about, 
Parliamentayy overload and congestion; and it accepted that there 
must be joint or reserve matters between Scottish and British 
Parliaments. The Labour Party in Scotland and its MPs. were never 
in favour of complete separation. But the stumbling-block was how 
to reconcile the claims of self-determination (as in the Treaty of 
Versailles) and functional devolution (the delegation of 
legislative authority), and this led to a vague commitment to home 
rule within a multinational, quasi-federal, state, hence the 
slogan, a Scottish Parliament for Scottish Affairs. Thus the 
constitutional question of whether sovereignty derived from the 
people, as socialists would wish to contend, or from Parliament, a 
monarchical or Parliamentary constitution, was usually glossed 
over. In 1918 the Scottish Parliament was to be 'subject to the 
constitutional veto'. In 1924 Buchanan's Bill was 'an extension of 
devolution' within an Imperial 
, 
Parliament. In 1927 Barr's bill was 
for 'a sovereign staýe', yet that Parliament was to be subject to 
the British monarchy and to have shared powers. The question of 
federalism was lefi open. In 1929, the Labour Party's commitment 
to 'federal devolution' showed the contradiction in relief. There 
was to be af ederation where sovereignty was seen ýo be diffused 
and a devolutionary settlement where the delegation of legislative 
authority was subject to the overriding power of the Westminster 
Parliament. 
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How then do we assess the home rule objectives of Maclean, Maxton, 
and the others who supported its principles? Maclean's conversion 
to Scottish independence places the issue in its context after the 
First World liar. It was the failure of the 1919 strikes in the 
West of Scotland as well as his assessment of the Irish situation 
that made him support Scottish independence. 'In the Final Strike 
Bulletin of 12 February 1919, as -the Forty Hours' Strike drew to a 
close, Maclean wrote, twe must emancipate ourselves from the 
dictatorship of the London Junta by building an. organisation which 
will be under our control and function when we want it to 
function'. By late 1919, after his failure to stimulate a general 
strike over unemployment, and after flirting with the Socialist 
Labour Party, he was coming round to the strategic calculation that 
revolution was not possible in England, and in August 1920 he 
declared for Scottish independence. That this belief in the 
millenium on the Clyde arose more from a sense of frustration, a' 
feeling that the revolutionaries had missed the boat elsewhere, 
becomes clear from an assessment of his speeches and writings. 'I 
am certain' he wrote to James Clunie in November 1922, that 'London 
will never lead the Clyde or Scotland, so we must lead ourselves' . 
And in 1923, he wrote in his Gorbals election address: 'Russia 
could not produce the world revolution. Neither can we in the 
Gorbals, in Scotland, or Great Britain. Before England is ready I 
am sure the next war will be upon us. I therefore consider that 
Scotland's wisest policy is to declare for a republic in Scotland 
so that the youths of Scotland will not be forced to die f or 
English markets. .. the social revolution is possible in Scotland 
sooner than in England... Scottish separatism is part of the process 
of England's imperial disintegration and is a help towards the 
ultimate triumph of týe workers of the world. ' Thus Maclean was a 
Marxist first and a Home Ruler second. And it was the calcuIation 
that. England-was incapable of pnoducing a socialist government'that 
led him to favour independence in the form of a Scottish Workers' 
Republic. 
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It was this conviction of Scotland's vanguard position that 
stimulated the home rule aspirations of Maxton and many others. 
Speaking in St Andrews Hall, Glasgow, in May 1924, as Buchanants 
Bill was being debated in the Commons, Maxton stated that if it got 
through, 'he for one would never go back (to Westminster) again - 
nor to Parliament. He might to the International or to hear the 
Orpheus Choir, to something worthwhile but never for the sake of 
legislating for the British Empire ... he would ask for no greater 
job in life- than to make English-ridden, capitalist-ridden, 
landlord-ridden Scotland into the Scottish socialist commonwealth, 
and in doing so he would be rendering a very great service to the 
people of England, Wales, and Europe and to the casue of 
internationalism generally ... Give us a Parliament in Scotland. Set 
it up next year. We will start with no traditions. We will start 
with ideals'. 
But what was Maxton's real position? In the House of Commons 
later, on 9 May 1924,. he said that Buchanan's Bill was not an 
attempt to break the Union. His aim was to have Parliaments for 
Scotland, England, and Wales subordinate to a single and better 
British Parliament. And looking back on the events of the 
twenties, he said on January 30 1943, at the ILP Conference: 
The Scottish Nationalists came to us, who were the 
spokesmen of international socialism, and told us that if 
we were to secure their support we would have to place 
nationalism before international socialism in our 
propaganda and activities. I for one declined to do 
that. The ILP is the best servant of Scottish 
nationalism ... I am not prepared at any time to whip up 
the population to fight for their independence from the 
English association. 
It was therefore a, strategic calculation bf many in the nineteen - 
twenties that England was incapable of 
. 
producing a socialist 
majority, but the solutions proposed by Labour hardly reached the 
level of separation or independence. That is why when the Scottish 
Home Rule Association broke up in disillusionment after the failure 
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of successive governments to deliver the home rule goods, to form 
the National Party, in 1928, no mainstream Labour leader suppqrted 
the new formation. 
In its 1929 manifesto Labour committed itself to 'federal 
devolution'. The manifesto promised to support 'the creation of 
separate legislative assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and England 
with autonomous powers in matters of local concern'. This followed 
from the second full discussion of home rule at a UK Labour Party 
Conference in 1928. In the King's speech debate, Ramsay MacDonald 
said that he would instigate an enquiry at 
ýhe end of 1929 into the 
workings of the new Local Government (Scotland) Act and that this 
would include consideration of self-government. But he added, 'it 
will not be my fault if the terms of reference are so narrow that 
the larger questions -of Scottish self-respect and the recognition 
of Scottish historical authority are excluded. ' In 1929 and 1930, 
he informed questioners that he had nothing more to add. 
It has been suggested that the election of Labour MPs to 
Westminster killed Home Rule, that, ironically, the 1922 victories 
for Labour began the process of integrating the Scottish Labour MPs 
and Party into the British political system. But the process by 
which Labour became lukewarm to devolution in the late nineteen 
twenties is more complicated than that. Keating and Bleiman go 
further: 
To maintain the alliance between Home Rule and Labour 
would have needed both a greater degree of commitment 
from Labour and more agreement on the meaning of Home 
Rule itself ... As the meaning of Home Rule became clear, 
Labour MPs began to back away from it. The econorpic 
consequences in particular had coiýcerned Labour and trade 
union leaders but if Home Rulers were defined to exclude 
all economic matters it would be of little importance to 
the Labour movement and of little interest to dýdicated 
Home Rulers. The Labour. Party had opted decisively for a 
UK strategy and the pursuit of power at Westminster could 
not be easily combined with a vigorous advocacy of a 
diminution of Westminster's power. Nationalism could be 
harnessed to a movement striving for recognition and 
challenging the established political order but was a 
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danger to a party seeking to achieve its aims within the 
political order. It might be an appropriate ideology for 
a movement of the periphery but as soon as that movement 
became serious about capturing power at the centre its 
nationalist credentials became suspect. A parallel can 
be drawn with the earlier history of týe radical 
Liberals. (35) 
Thus Keating and Bleiman accept that Labour's increasingly lukewarm 
attitude on home rule was a consequence of political success in 
Scotland and Britain. The evidence adduced in the chapter suggests 
that conclusion may not be wholly appropriate - and that while 
Laýour lost much of its initial enthusiasm for home rule and 
concentrated attention on economic and social questions during the 
twenties, the real problem for Scottish Labour was that it wanted 
to be Scottish and British at the same time. No theorist attempted 
in sufficient depth to reconcile the conflicting aspirations for 
home rule and a British socialist advance. In particular, no one. 
was able to show how capturing power in Britain - and legislating 
for minimum levels of welfare, for example - could be combined with 
a policy of devolution for Scotland. 
Labour's problem in the twenties was two-f old: it was never in a 
sufficiently strong electoral or political position to legislate 
for home rule; and it appeared unable to reconcile its aspirations 
for changing the nature of the British state with its commitment to 
creating a new form of Scottish government. But lying behind 
Labour's inability to meet its policy on home rule was the fact 
that the sense of Scottish separateness was never sufficiently 
strong to force Labour into a more decisive stand. It would appear 
that issues of constitutional reform ran second to questions of 
socialism and anti-socialism and measures of economic and social 
reform. It. was not so much that Labour betrayed Scotland or 
35 M Keating and D Bleiman, op. cit., p. 107-8. 
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vacillated on the Scottish issue: popular demand for home rule was 
secondary to the demand for action on unemployment, the poor law 
and other social and economic questions. By the thirties questions 
of central planning came to dominate Labour thinking (and the 
Scottish element of British Labour was far weaker). It was only 
the rebirth of political nationalism in the sixties and seventies 
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